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PUBLIC OPINION
AND
LORD BEACONSFIELD
1875—1880



PUBLIC OPINION
AND
LORD BEACONSFIELD

1875—1880

BY
GEO. CARSLAKE THOMPSON, LL.M.
OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

London
MACMILLAN & CO.

1886

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RICHARD CLAY & SONS,
BREAD STREET HILL, LONDON,
Bungay, Suffolk.

TO
PROFESSOR J. R. SEELEY,
WHOSE TEACHING HAS BEEN A STIMULUS TO
THE PURSUIT OF POLITICAL TRUTH,

This Book is Dedicated

BY HIS GRATEFUL PUPIL.
FOR THE PARTICULAR OPINIONS ARRIVED AT
HE IS IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE.

PREFACE.

THIS work was commenced by Mr. E. Seymer Thompson¹ and myself in the hope and with the intention that we should complete it as joint authors.

Early in the course of the excitement to which the events of 1876 gave rise, the importance of the utterances of the platform and the press became apparent. They seemed to constitute a great debate, rivalling in importance those recorded in the pages of Hansard. The daily and weekly journals gave a wide publicity to the contentions in the form of leading articles, correspondence, and reported speeches. But these records were essentially ephemeral in their nature, and after they had served the purpose of the moment, they were often difficult or inconvenient of access. At the same time many of the points contended for appeared to be of more than passing interest and importance.

This book is an attempt:—

(1) To discuss briefly, though sufficiently to indicate the point of view adopted, the functions which the genius of the English Constitution assigns to Public Opinion (Part I.).

(2) To discuss methods of evaluation of Public Opinion in general, and to analyse English Public Opinion on the Eastern Question in particular (Part II.).

(3) Finally, to show that in the events of 1876-8 Public Opinion was deprived under Lord Beaconsfield of its due influence on the foreign policy of England (Part III.).

While not concealing our own opinion that this influence would, in this particular case, have been wholesome and beneficial,

¹ Fellow and now Tutor of Christ's College, Cambridge.

we regarded it as lying somewhat beyond our scope to arrive at any dogmatic conclusion on the general question of the advantages or the reverse of personal government in foreign affairs.

We long worked at the book together, and with regard to a great deal of it, it would be hard to say what was due to one or to the other of us. But it became evident that the hope of completing the work jointly must be given up or the publication be indefinitely delayed. At last we reluctantly came to the conclusion that the MS. must be completed by me, and that the responsibility of the whole should rest with me alone. But my collaborator, as I still must call him, retained his lively interest until the end, continuing to furnish many valuable criticisms and suggestions; and though his name does not appear upon the title-page, he has had no small share in the production of this book.

G. C. T.

CARDIFF,

March 26th, 1886.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PART I.

THE PLACE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE PLACE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| § 1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTEST WHICH MARKED LORD BEACONSFIELD'S LAST MINISTRY | 3 |
| § 2. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENT BY CONSULTATION | 4 |
| § 3. HOSTILITY TO ARBITRIUM, A MARK OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION | 6 |
| § 4. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, GENERALLY ASSUMED IN THE THEORY OF CABINET GOVERNMENT | 9 |
| § 5. UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM OF CABINET GOVERNMENT | 16 |
| § 6. GENERAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN TIMES MAKING AGAINST THE CON- SULTATIVE ELEMENT | 18 |
| § 7. SPECIAL TENDENCIES MAKING AGAINST THE CONSULTATIVE ELEMENT | 23 |
| § 8. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE DOMESTIC STRUGGLE WHICH MARKED LORD BEACONSFIELD'S MINISTRY | 24 |

PART II.

ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.

CHAPTER II.

| | |
|--|----|
| THE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC OPINION | 29 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER III.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| VARIOUS GENERAL BIASES DISTINGUISHABLE | 40 |
| § 1. IDEAL OF OUR COUNTRY'S RÔLE | 40 |
| § 2. CRITERION OF NATIONAL CONDUCT | 43 |
| § 3. THE VALIDITY OF TREATIES | 46 |
| § 4. THE DOCTRINE OF BRITISH INTERESTS | 52 |
| § 5. HIGH-HANDED FOREIGN POLICY | 57 |
| § 6. DISRAELI TORYISM | 61 |
| § 7. FOREIGN OFFICE TORYISM | 63 |

CHAPTER IV.

THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM.

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| INTRODUCTORY | 72 |
|------------------------|----|

ANTI-TURKISM.

| | |
|--|----|
| § A. THE CRUSADING SPIRIT | 73 |
| § B. THE HISTORIC INSTINCT | 75 |
| § C. HUMANITY | 79 |
| § D. ENGLAND'S SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TURKEY'S GOOD BEHAVIOUR | 87 |
| § E. NATIONALITY | 90 |
| § F. THE OPEN SORE MUST BE HEALED | 93 |
| § G. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE | 94 |
| § H. THE PROVINCIALS MAY BE MADE A BARRIER AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION | 96 |

ANTI-WAR.

| | |
|--|----|
| § A. WAR IS A SIN. § B. WAR IS A MISTAKE | 99 |
|--|----|

ORDER.

| | |
|---|-----|
| § A. THE GREATEST OF ENGLISH INTERESTS IS PEACE | 101 |
| § B. DANGER OF A EUROPEAN SCRAMBLE | 101 |
| § C. APPREHENDED DANGER TO FRANCE | 104 |
| § D. FEAR OF A JEHAD | 104 |
| § E. FEAR OF A MASSACRE | 106 |

LEGALISM.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| § A. DIVINE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGN STATES | 107 |
| § 1. NOTE ON TECHNICAL NON-INTERVENTION AND TERMINOLOGY | 108 |
| § B. LEGALISTIC NON-INTERVENTION | 115 |
| § C. TREATY LEGALISM | 117 |

ANTI-RUSSISM AND PHILO-TURKISM.

| | |
|--|-----|
| § 1. | 131 |
| § A. RUSSIA A BIG AGGRESSIVE POWER | 133 |
| § B. RUSSIA REPRESENTS THE HOLY ALLIANCE | 136 |
| § C. RUSSIA SYSTEMATICALLY FAITHLESS AND CUNNING | 138 |
| § D. RUSSIA THREATENS CONSTANTINOPLE | 140 |
| § 2. THE RULE OF THE STRAITS | 141 |
| § E. RUSSIA THREATENS THE RULE OF THE STRAITS | 150 |
| § F. TURKEY AS COMMANDING THE STRAITS IS A USEFUL ALLY | 154 |
| § G. ASIATIC ANTI-RUSSISM | 155 |
| § H. NON-DIPLOMATIC ANTI-RUSSISM AND PHILO-TURKISM | 161 |

CHAPTER V.

POLICIES.

| | |
|---|-----|
| § 1. EMANCIPATION, ISOLATION, POLICE, AND SUPPORT | 171 |
| § 2. EGYPT | 181 |

APPENDIX TO PART II.

| | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| TABLE I. NOTIONS AND VIEWS | 185 |
| TABLE II. POLICIES AND VIEWS | 187 |
| THE TABLES | 187 |

PART III.

COURSE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND EVENTS.

CHAPTER VI.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| INTRODUCTORY | 193 |
| § 1. FIRST ASPECT OF THE CONSERVATIVE MINISTRY | 193 |
| § 2. DECLINE OF RUSSOPHOBIA | 203 |
| § 3. THE WHOLE PERIOD MAPPED OUT | 210 |

CHAPTER VII.

INCUBATION PERIOD. FIRST PHASE—TO FAILURE OF THE
CONSULAR MISSION.

| | |
|--|-----|
| § 1. OUTBREAK OF REVOLT IN HERZEGOVINA | 214 |
| § 2. FIRST ENGLISH MEETING IN FAVOUR OF THE INSURGENTS | 221 |
| § 3. THE PROBLEM RECOGNISED AS SERIOUS | 223 |
| § 4. HOPED-FOR SOLUTION BY TURKISH "REFORM" | 226 |

CHAPTER VIII.

INCUBATION PERIOD. SECOND PHASE—TO END OF
PARLIAMENTARY RECESS.

| | |
|--|----|
| § 1. THE TURKISH REPUDIATION | 29 |
| § 2. THE RUSSIAN VOLTE FACE | 33 |
| § 3. THE FIRST GUILDHALL SPEECH | 35 |
| § 4. PURCHASE OF THE SUEZ CANAL SHARES | 37 |
| § 5. THE ANDRASSY NOTE | 41 |

CHAPTER IX.

INCUBATION PERIOD. THIRD PHASE—TO THE AWAKENING
OF PUBLIC OPINION.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| § 1. OPENING OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, 1876. MR. GLADSTONE'S SPEECH CUTS THE LIBERAL PARTY ADrift FROM THE POLICY OF SUPPORTING TURKEY | 265 |
| § 2. THE ROYAL TITLES BILL | 271 |
| § 3. THE ANDRASSY NOTE HAS NOT SETTLED MATTERS. INCREASING RECOGNITION OF THE NECESSITY OF SOME INTERVENTION | 277 |
| § 4. EFFECT OF THE REJECTION OF THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM ON PUBLIC OPINION | 283 |
| § 5. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION | 290 |
| § 6. THE SERVIAN DECLARATION OF WAR | 295 |

CHAPTER X.

ATROCITY PERIOD (WAR IN THE AIR).

| | |
|--|-----|
| § 1. PUBLIC OPINION AWAKES | 307 |
| § 2. NARRATIVE OF THE ATROCITIES | 310 |
| § 3. THE SERVIAN CAMPAIGN (TO THE SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES) | 339 |
| § 4. THE ATTITUDE OF PUBLIC OPINION WHEN IT AWOKE | 343 |
| § 5. FEELING OF "WAR IN THE AIR" DISPELLED BY LORD DERBY'S REPLY TO DEPUTATIONS (JULY 14TH) | 347 |

CHAPTER XI.

ATROCITY PERIOD. SUB-PERIOD—PUBLIC OPINION WAITING
FOR GUIDANCE.

| | |
|---|-----|
| § 1. THE BLUE BOOKS OF JULY 1876 | 353 |
| § 2. THE DESPATCHES OF MAY 25TH AND SEPTEMBER 5TH | 356 |
| § 3. OPINION BEGINS TO CRYSTALLIZE (WILLIS'S ROOMS MEETING) | 358 |
| § 4. PARLIAMENT FAILS TO AFFORD GUIDANCE | 363 |
| § MR. DISRAELI BECOMES UNPOPULAR | 374 |
| § THE CABINET JANUS-FACED | 377 |
| § THE CABINET TRIPARTITE | 378 |
| § MR. DISRAELI BECOMES LORD BRACONSFIELD | 379 |

CHAPTER XII.

ATROCITY PERIOD. SUB-PERIOD—THE GREAT AGITATION.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| § 1. PUBLIC OPINION FINDS VOICE | 382 |
| § 2. EMANCIPATION POLICY COMES TO THE FRONT | 401 |
| § 3. MR. GLADSTONE COMES TO THE FRONT (FIRST PAMPHLET AND BLACK- HEATH SPEECH) | 408 |
| § 4. TRAITS OF PUBLIC OPINION CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PERIOD— | |
| <i>a.</i> Self-confidence at the zenith | 413 |
| <i>b.</i> Doctrine of British Interests and Anti-Russism at the nadir | 413 |
| <i>c.</i> Great energy and apparent unanimity | 415 |
| <i>d.</i> Question of persistence | 416 |
| § 5. MINISTERIAL UTTERANCES— | |
| <i>a.</i> Sir Stafford Northcote at Edinburgh | 417 |
| <i>b.</i> Lord Carnarvon at Derby | 418 |
| <i>c.</i> Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, September 11th | 419 |
| <i>d.</i> The Guildhall Meeting | 422 |
| <i>e.</i> Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, September 27th | 424 |
| § 6. THE PRO-TURKISH PRESS | 432 |
| § 7. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH | 435 |

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

PART III. (*continued*).

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RECONCILIATION PERIOD.

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| § 1. GENERAL VIEW | 3 |
| § 2. REASONS FOR BELIEVING IN THE CONVERSION OF THE GOVERNMENT | 8 |
| § 3. A BLOW IN THE FACE OF PUBLIC OPINION (THE AYLESBURY SPEECH) | 19 |
| § 4. HOW THE QUESTION BECAME A PARTY ONE | 30 |
| § 5. MINOR INFLUENCES AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION— | |
| <i>a.</i> Russian Volunteers | 50 |
| <i>b.</i> Turkish barbarities in Servia | 53 |
| <i>c.</i> Murad deposed in favour of Abdul Hamid II. | 54 |
| § 6. COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS— | |
| <i>a.</i> Suspension of hostilities | 54 |
| <i>b.</i> The demand for punishment | 59 |
| <i>c.</i> The English Terms | 60 |
| <i>d.</i> The proposal for Coercion | 63 |
| <i>e.</i> The English Government fall back on "Isolation" | 69 |
| § 7. THE FIRST EPISODE— | |
| <i>a.</i> "Erubescence" of Public Opinion | 73 |
| <i>b.</i> The "Return to Sanity" | 74 |
| <i>c.</i> Charges against the Agitation | 77 |
| <i>d.</i> Second "War in the Air" | 79 |
| <i>e.</i> Collapse of the bellicose adherents of the Government | 80 |

| | PAGES |
|--|-------|
| § 8. THE AGITATION REHABILITATED— | |
| <i>a.</i> The lost opportunity returns | 82 |
| <i>b.</i> Ministerial “Dii Minores” unheeded | 83 |
| <i>c.</i> The Servian defeat and the Russian Ultimatum | 85 |
| <i>d.</i> Lord Derby again proponnds the “English Terms” | 87 |
| <i>e.</i> Lord Hartington endorses the Agitation | 88 |
| <i>f.</i> Lord Salisbury’s appointment confirms the belief in the “Conversion” | 92 |
| § 9. THE SECOND EPISODE— | |
| <i>a.</i> Lord Beaconsfield’s Guildhall Speech | 94 |
| <i>b.</i> The Czar’s Moscow Speech | 102 |
| <i>c.</i> Phenomena of the First Episode repeat themselves | 102 |
| <i>d.</i> Rise of a bellicose Party in England | 108 |
| <i>e.</i> Formation of the Eastern Question Association | 110 |
| § 10. CLOSE OF THE RECONCILIATION PERIOD— | |
| <i>a.</i> The Czar appeals from the English Government to English Public Opinion | 112 |
| <i>b.</i> The “Reconciliation” mature | 120 |

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CONFERENCE PERIOD.

| | |
|--|-----|
| § 1. CESSATION OF AGITATION | 128 |
| § 2. THE ST. JAMES’S HALL CONFERENCE | 129 |
| § 3. THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE | 136 |
| § 4. ATTITUDE OF THE PHILO-TURKISH PRESS | 138 |
| § 5. REAL ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT | 141 |
| § 6. BEWILDERED PAUSE OF PUBLIC OPINION | 142 |
| § 7. ENTHUSIASM FOR MR. GLADSTONE | 145 |

CHAPTER XV.

THE PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| § 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERIOD . | 148 |
| § 2. THE PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS— | |
| <i>a.</i> The Debates on the Address | 151 |
| <i>b.</i> The Guerilla Warfare | 155 |
| <i>c.</i> A Debate on Treaty Obligations raised by Mr. Gladstone (Feb. 16th) | 158 |
| <i>d.</i> The Duke of Argyll's Debate (Feb. 20th) | 160 |
| <i>e.</i> Lord Stratheden and Campbell's Debate (Feb. 26th) | 162 |
| <i>f.</i> Mr. Fawcett's Debate (March 23rd) | 162 |
| <i>g.</i> Mr. Rylands's Debate (March 27th) | 163 |
| <i>h.</i> The failure of Parliament | 165 |
| § 3. LORD DERBY'S PROTOCOL— | |
| <i>a.</i> The "Golden Bridge for Russia" theory | 173 |
| <i>b.</i> Murmuring out-of-doors | 175 |
| <i>c.</i> Apprehended danger to France | 176 |
| <i>d.</i> The Protocol signed | 177 |
| <i>e.</i> The Parade Debates | 179 |
| <i>f.</i> The extinguisher catches fire | 180 |
| § 4. THE THIRD CRISIS OF "WAR IN THE AIR" | 183 |
| § 5. THE SECOND AGITATION AND MR. GLADSTONE'S RESOLUTIONS | 191 |
| § 6. THE CHARTER OF ENGLISH NEUTRALITY— | |
| <i>a.</i> The despatch of May 6th | 200 |
| <i>b.</i> The Five Nights' debate | 201 |
| § 7. THE SUPPLEMENT TO THE "CHARTER OF NEUTRALITY"— | |
| <i>a.</i> Russia will respect the English Interests | 208 |
| <i>b.</i> Russia communicates her Terms | 209 |

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CONDITIONAL NEUTRALITY.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| § 1. REMAINDER OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION | 212 |
| § 2. MR. GLADSTONE AS THE EXPONENT OF OUT-OF-DOOR PUBLIC OPINION— | |
| <i>a.</i> Mr. Gladstone's position | 220 |
| <i>b.</i> The Bingley Hall Meeting | 221 |
| <i>c.</i> Enthusiasm for Mr. Gladstone | 226 |
| <i>d.</i> Attacks on Mr. Gladstone | 229 |
| § 3. COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN | 229 |
| § 4. THE COMPETITION OF ATROCITIES— | |
| <i>a.</i> Recriminatory and fictitious charges | 232 |
| <i>b.</i> The residuum of truth | 234 |
| <i>c.</i> The exodus of the Mahometan population | 237 |
| <i>d.</i> The Rhodope Commission | 240 |
| <i>e.</i> Taunts against the Anti-Turkish Party | 242 |
| § 5. INFLUENCES AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION— | |
| <i>a.</i> The Gladiatorial Spectacle | 243 |
| <i>b.</i> Consequences of a Russian defeat | 244 |
| <i>c.</i> Sir Stafford Northcote's "bit of blue" | 245 |
| <i>d.</i> The Turkish apologists | 246 |
| <i>e.</i> Platform and Press utterances | 247 |
| § 6. CONFLICTING ESTIMATES OF PUBLIC OPINION— | |
| <i>a.</i> Attempts at diagnosis | 255 |
| <i>b.</i> The "Daily Telegraph's" diagnosis | 256 |
| § 7. THE CONDITIONAL NEUTRALITY DRAWS TO ITS CLOSE | 260 |

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ARMED NEUTRALITY.

§ 1. THE ENGLISH QUASI-MEDIATION—

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| <i>a.</i> The effort of English diplomacy | 266 |
| <i>b.</i> Hopes of English assistance revive at Constantinople | 269 |
| <i>c.</i> New opportunities of quarrel with Russia | 272 |
| <i>d.</i> Reopening of the domestic controversy | 276 |

§ 2. THE THIRD AGITATION—

| | |
|--|-----|
| <i>a.</i> Public Opinion takes alarm | 276 |
| <i>b.</i> Parliament Out of Session | 278 |
| <i>c.</i> The Question of the Straits | 284 |
| <i>d.</i> The Liberal leaders come to the front | 285 |
| <i>e.</i> The counter-agitation | 290 |
| <i>f.</i> Significance of the Agitation | 293 |
| <i>g.</i> The misleading light (Lord Carnarvon's Speech) | 294 |

§ 3. THE WEEK OF FALSE CONFIDENCE 300

§ 4. THE MINISTRY PROPOSES TO ARM AGAINST RUSSIA—

| | |
|--|-----|
| <i>a.</i> A Vote of Credit demanded | 305 |
| <i>b.</i> Lord Carnarvon's resignation | 307 |
| <i>c.</i> The Russian conditions of Peace | 310 |
| <i>d.</i> The Vote of Credit resisted as significant of a "red" policy | 314 |

§ 5. THE RESISTANCE IN PARLIAMENT (MR. FORSTER'S AMENDMENT) 318

§ 6. THE LAST AGITATION 324

§ 7. THE ARMISTICE 329

§ 8. THE INTERVAL OF QUASI-WAR—

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>a.</i> Manœuvring for strategic positions. An English fleet passes the Dardanelles | 333 |
| <i>b.</i> The Russian advance to San Stefano | 342 |
| <i>c.</i> "Beati Possidentes" | 344 |
| <i>d.</i> Popular belief that the English fleet had saved Constantinople | 346 |
| <i>e.</i> Dangerous proximity of quasi-hostile forces | 346 |
| <i>f.</i> Continuance of confused fighting | 349 |
| <i>g.</i> Hellenism | 349 |
| <i>h.</i> Insurrections in Thessaly and Crete | 351 |
| <i>i.</i> The Rhodope Insurrection | 351 |

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE DICTATORSHIP.

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| § 1. THE GOVERNMENT ACQUIRES AN ASCENDENCY AS IN TIME OF WAR | 352 |
| § 2. BREAKDOWN OF RESISTANCE IN PARLIAMENT | 353 |
| § 3. BREAKDOWN OF AGITATION OUT-OF-DOORS | 359 |
| § 4. GROWING ACERBITY OUT-OF-DOORS | 370 |
| § 5. CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS | 376 |
| <i>a.</i> Apprehensions of a Russo-Turkish alliance | 376 |
| <i>b.</i> The Treaty of San Stefano | 378 |
| <i>c.</i> The English Government poses as the champion of Hellenism | 383 |
| <i>d.</i> The Negroponte affair | 387 |
| <i>e.</i> The Turks turn recalcitrant | 388 |
| § 6. SUBMITTING THE TREATY | 392 |
| § 7. PROGRESS OF EVENTS— | |
| <i>a.</i> Lord Derby's resignation | 403 |
| <i>b.</i> Lord Salisbury becomes Foreign Secretary | 406 |
| <i>c.</i> The calling-out of the Reserves | 409 |
| <i>d.</i> Parliament adjourns | 414 |
| <i>e.</i> The movement of Indian troops announced | 415 |
| <i>f.</i> Parliament Out of Session | 416 |
| <i>g.</i> The Ghosts of Agitation | 420 |
| <i>h.</i> Estimates of the "violet" forces | 425 |
| § 8. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONINGS— | |
| <i>a.</i> Out-of-door attention aroused | 430 |
| <i>b.</i> Demand for empirical remedies | 435 |
| <i>c.</i> Verax and the "Quarterly Review" | 436 |
| <i>d.</i> Debates on the Indian troops | 437 |
| <i>e.</i> Ministers at the Congress | 445 |
| <i>f.</i> Imperialism | 448 |
| § 9. THE NEW DEPARTURE— | |
| <i>a.</i> Count Schouvaloff's mission | 451 |
| <i>b.</i> Clearing off of "War in the Air" | 452 |
| <i>c.</i> The Secret Agreement | 455 |
| § 10. THE BERLIN CONGRESS AND TREATY | 465 |
| Tabular Comparison of Treaties of Berlin and San Stefano | 471 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOL. II.).

xxi

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| § 11. THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION | 476 |
| § 12. PEACE WITH HONOUR . . | 478 |
| § 13. LORD BEACONSFIELD'S SOLUTION— | |
| <i>a.</i> Criticisms of the Opposition | 481 |
| <i>b.</i> Complexity of the Solution . . | 483 |
| <i>c.</i> Ambiguity of the Solution . . | 492 |

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD.

| | |
|---|-----|
| § 1. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MINISTERIAL POLICY | 497 |
| § 2. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN . . . | 506 |
| § 3. THE ISSUES ON WHICH THE CONTEST TURNED | 521 |
| § 4. THE EVENT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION | 524 |
| INDEX | 529 |

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS.

LONDON DAILY NEWSPAPERS.

| | | |
|-------|-------|------------------|
| T. | | TIMES. |
| D. N. | | DAILY NEWS. |
| ST. | | STANDARD. |
| D. T. | | DAILY TELEGRAPH. |

LONDON EVENING NEWSPAPERS.

| | | |
|----------|-------|---------------------------------|
| P. M. G. | | PALL MALL GAZETTE. ¹ |
| | | GLOBE. |

LONDON WEEKLY NEWSPAPERS.

| | | |
|-----------|-------|------------------|
| SPEC. | | SPECTATOR. |
| SAT. REV. | | SATURDAY REVIEW. |
| | | ECONOMIST. |

MONTHLY MAGAZINES.

| | | |
|---------------|-------|-----------------------|
| FORT. REV. | | FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW. |
| 19TH CENT. | | NINETEENTH CENTURY. |
| CONTEMP. REV. | | CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. |
| BLACKWOOD | | BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE. |
| FRASER | | FRASER'S MAGAZINE. |
| MACMIL. | | MACMILLAN'S MAGAZINE. |

QUARTERLIES.

| | | |
|-------------|-------|-------------------|
| ED. REV. | | EDINBURGH REVIEW. |
| QUART. REV. | | QUARTERLY REVIEW. |

PARLIAMENT.

| | | |
|----------|-------|-------------------|
| H. OF L. | | HOUSE OF LORDS. |
| H. OF C. | | HOUSE OF COMMONS. |

¹ In May, 1880, the *Pall Mall Gazette* changed hands, and the *St. James's Gazette* was started under the former editor of the *P.M.G.*, Mr. Greenwood. The *St. James's Gazette* must be regarded as substantially identical with the *P.M.G.* cited in the following pages.

NOTE ON MODE OF CITATION.

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Extracts which are paraphrased or more or less epitomised are introduced by a phrase, such as "The *Times* says." In such cases, the date is appended at foot, in round brackets.

The extracts from the parliamentary debates, or single speeches in parliament or on the platform, have been taken or compiled from newspaper reports. In such cases square brackets denote a departure from a citation intended to be otherwise verbatim.

PART I.

THE PLACE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION.

PUBLIC OPINION

AND

LORD BEACONSFIELD.

[1875—1880.]

CHAPTER I.

THE PLACE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

§ 1. *Significance of the Contest which marked Lord Beaconsfield's last Ministry.*

LORD BEACONSFIELD'S last Ministry will be chiefly remembered in connection with the war between Russia and Turkey, and the bitter and protracted controversy to which that war gave rise in England.

Great events took place which have left their mark upon the nation; but perhaps after all the chief importance of the time to us Englishmen may consist in its bearing on our own Constitution.

A particular line of policy in foreign affairs was earnestly pressed upon the English Government. In this matter Public Opinion at first assumed its own right to dictate, and took for granted that this right was unquestionable. But in the struggle which ensued, the question "What ought to be done?" got mixed up with the question "Who has the right to decide?"

The right which Public Opinion had assumed of laying down the course to be followed with reference to the broad issues of foreign policy was challenged.

Hence the time is one of controversy on a fundamental constitutional point: the place of Public Opinion in the English Constitution.

§ 2. *The connection between the organisation of Public Opinion and Government by Consultation.*

Probably no government that ever existed, not even the most despotic, has ever been able to shake itself quite loose from all restraint imposed by Public Opinion. In the last resort, as it has been said, despotism has been tempered by fear of assassination. The question is not so much between States which are ruled in accordance with Public Opinion and States which are ruled without any reference to it whatever, as between States where the constitution comprises some organisation of Public Opinion and States where this is not the case. In States of the latter class, though the rulers must at times be borne away by the pressure of Public Opinion, yet its action is fitful, uncertain, and, it may be added, proportionally violent. It cannot, properly, be called sovereign. But in States where a recognised means exists, as a part of the constitution, for the organisation of Public Opinion, for gathering it up and condensing it, for bringing its inchoate suggestions to a head, and for definitely ascertaining its verdict, so that the course of the State may be governed by that verdict—in such States we may properly say that Public Opinion is sovereign.

If, then, we wish to classify governments with reference to the place of Public Opinion, they fall, in the first place, into the two great genera which have just been indicated, according as Public Opinion is, on the one hand, unorganised in the constitution, or, on the other hand, organised and sovereign.

But important distinctions will arise from the mode in which Public Opinion is organised. It may be ascertained, shaped, and expressed (“represented” we say) by some *body of men* which, by the practice of the constitution at the time, is recognised as appropriate for the matter in hand. This, of course, is the most obvious case; but the question arises whether Public Opinion may not, as another alternative, find its exponent in a *single man*.

From this point of view, constitutions may be classified as “Consultative” or “Arbitrary.” The distinction now drawn is between those forms of government where the great acts of sovereignty are due to a single mind, and those where such acts are the result of the concurrence of many minds consulting together. The essence of Consultative Government appears to lie in the elimination not merely of personal interests but also of personal bias; and th s it

aims by the joint working of many minds to approximate to the working of an ideal mind.

To consider the practical differences in the manner of government likely to result from the adoption of the Arbitrary or the Consultative method would be beyond our present purpose; but the point may be illustrated by the following passage:—

When Boswell said to him that people would wonder how he could bring himself to take so much pains with his speeches, knowing with certainty that not one vote would be gained by them, Burke answered that it is very well worth while to take pains to speak well in Parliament . . . and though an Act that has been ably opposed becomes law, yet in its progress it is softened and modified to meet objections whose force has never been acknowledged directly.—Morley's *Burke*, p. 210.¹

We may use the term Cæsarism generally for any form of representative democracy where the representative is a single man. It is the characteristic of the Cæsar always to found his claim to rule on the will of the people, in contradistinction to the Autocrat who stands upon divine right or military force. How far, we may now ask, can Cæsarism properly be classed as coming within the category of governments where Public Opinion is sovereign? Can it be held that the Cæsar and the Autocrat fall respectively into the two great genera first recognised, distinguished by the sovereignty or non-sovereignty of Public Opinion?

If indeed the constitution could provide Public Opinion with an organ whereby it could intervene at any moment when the Cæsar ceased to be representative, and replace him by another, then, to be sure, we should allow it to be a case where Public Opinion remains sovereign. We may doubt, however, whether it is possible to find means which should operate like some self-acting machinery to put the Cæsar out of power the moment he begins to diverge from the course marked out for him by Public Opinion, without recourse in some form or other to an organisation of Public Opinion on a consultative basis.

On the other hand, if the Cæsar has been elected once for all, or even if he can only be replaced at long intervals, or by a special and abnormal effort, then we must come to the conclusion that Public Opinion has abdicated its sovereignty—at all events, for the time being—and the Cæsar is only to be distinguished from the Autocrat by the greater deference which he is willing to pay to unorganised Public Opinion. It may well be questioned

¹ *English Men of Letters*, Macmillan and Co.

whether a Cæsarism must not necessarily be of this nature. It seems to follow that the arbitrary species of government by Public Opinion has at best but a precarious existence.

We have thus practically eliminated one of the cross-divisions arising out of the above two-fold division of governments, and have been led to the conclusion that all governments in which Public Opinion is really sovereign must adopt in some form the consultative method. We may now turn to the converse cross-division and ask whether it is possible to have a government on the consultative method in which Public Opinion is not sovereign. We are led by this question to recognise a certain ambiguity in the phrase "Public Opinion." There is the Public Opinion of the whole nation, and there is the Public Opinion of each section or stratum of it. Clearly a consultative body may exist that only represents the opinion of one section or one stratum; and in a country that is governed by a consultative body of this nature it cannot properly be said that Public Opinion is sovereign. But if the consultative body really represent all the important elements of Public Opinion capable of existing in the country at the time, (whether actually *elected* by the persons in whom these elements reside, or not, is for the present purpose immaterial,) then Public Opinion may be said to be sovereign. It is worth notice, moreover, that these conditions may be fulfilled even when the assembly is in form aristocratic; provided, as just now said, that all the elements of Public Opinion capable of existing in the country at the time be virtually represented. It is the mark of the oligarchic assembly on the other hand that it deliberately *suppresses* certain really existent elements of Public Opinion.

These points, however, need not detain us further, it being the present object to show not so much that all government by consultation must be government by Public Opinion, as that all government by Public Opinion must adopt the consultative method.

§ 3. *Hostility to Arbitrium a Mark of the English Constitution.*

If we now consider the nature of the English Constitution as tried by this scheme of classification, we see at once that the consultative character is conspicuous in it.

Indeed no characteristic appears to be more thoroughly ingrained in the traditions of English polity than hostility to

Arbitrium. It is wholly repugnant to the spirit of the English Constitution for any great act of state to be performed by the unaided ingenuity of King or Minister. All such acts are expected to be performed in accordance with the advice of, or at least after consultation with, councillors who are recognised as the constitutionally appropriate advisers for the matter in hand.¹

In legislation this is plain. So too in the judicial function. Parliament and the Jury spring from the same root, and the *idée mère* in both is the elimination of any personal or arbitrary element by a fair sampling of Public Opinion. In trials the adjudication on matters of fact is exercised by ordinary every-day Public Opinion, while matters of law are finally decided by a consultative body which consists of the sages of the law.

But the executive function, and especially the conduct of Foreign Affairs, may appear at first sight to constitute an exception to the otherwise consultative nature of the English Constitution. The books lay down that the King has the prerogative of making war and peace.²

Some would say this doctrine was true, to be sure, of a past phase of the Constitution, but is no longer of anything but antiquarian interest. But if we accept the historic conception of a constitution, the doctrine in question will hardly thus be satisfactorily disposed of. If we are conscious that at the present day as a matter of fact the Queen does not decide questions of war and peace, it is important for us to know how this result has been arrived at. Has it been by a series of successful encroachments on what was once the province of Arbitrium? Or had Arbitrium never really any province here at all, and has there been no other change than a change in the organs through which Public Opinion has at different times acted in executive matters?

If we look a little below the surface, the exception to the

¹ With reference to the phrase "The Spirit of the Constitution," it may be remarked, that according to one view "the Constitution" is nothing but a compendious expression for the mode in which government is in fact, for the time being, carried on. Opposed to this is the transcendental conception, which makes the constitution consist in a set of maxims of the highest dignity and authority, which bind the sovereign, and cannot be abrogated without bringing the constitution to a end. Different from either of these is the *historical* view of a constitution, which traces a real connection between forms which the constitution assumes at different epochs, and refers them all to general principles, expressive of the traditions and ingrained habits and beliefs of the nation. It is from this, the historical point of view, that we may speak of the "Spirit of the Constitution."

(Compare Mr. Sheldon Amos, *Fifty Years of the English Constitution, 1830-1880*, p. 6-13.)

² Blackstone, i. p. 257 (cf. 252-3).

otherwise consultative character of the Constitution, which the existence of the Royal Prerogative seemed to afford, turns out to be an apparent exception only. There has always been some recognised consultative body intrusted with the function of advising the King on administrative matters, and matters of war or peace; and if the King acted independently of it he acted unconstitutionally. Thus the King's Prerogative is by no means the same thing as the Monarch's Arbitrium.

The distinction between "Arbitrium" and "Prerogative" corresponds pretty much to the distinction drawn by Allen¹ between the real and the ideal king, and by Kinglake between the personal and the genuine "State" sovereign.² The action of the real king, or it may be of a minister affecting to act for him.—"encroaching to himself the royal power" in the phrase of our ancestors³—is Arbitrium. Prerogative denotes matters belonging to the constitutional executive as distinguished from those which must be regulated by act of Parliament. The real king is the man who fills the office for the time being; the ideal king is that man regarded as the personification of the wisdom and collective determination of his councillors. Sovereignty is vested in him something as the legal estate in trust property might be vested in a trustee, to be used in accordance with the discretion of appointed guardians, and not at his own discretion. The distinction is well brought out by an old writer whom Allen quotes, and who comments on the doctrine that the king cannot be a minor, thus:—

There is no infancy in the crown, though in the person; because the wisdom of the crown is not intended to rest in one person, but in the counsels of many, who are equally wise, whether the person of the king be old or young.—*Royal. Prerog.* p. 31.

It may be convenient to use the phrases "The Crown" and "The Monarch" to denote the powers of the ideal and the real king respectively. Again, the word "Throne" seems appropriate when we desire to speak of royalty as an institution, and the word "Court" for the personal influence of the monarch together with that of persons surrounding him, other than his constitutional advisers.

¹ Allen on *The Royal Prerogative*.

² *Invasion of the Crimea*, vol. vii. p. 18 (Cab. Ed.).

³ See Articles of Impeachment of the Earl of Suffolk and others in 13. *Parliamentary History*, vol. i. p. 178-9.

May it not fairly be said of the various epochs of our constitution, that the consultative body in its ideal operation has been fitted to form, express, and represent such Public Opinion as could exist, for the time being? The Privy Council, in its ideal operation at all events, was a representative body, in the sense that it comprised the notable men who would bring to the discussion of the matter in hand whatever was to be said from every point of view. In a comparatively simple state of society, a monarch would have little difficulty in knowing whom to summon to his council if he were honestly desirous to take the course to which the best deliberate opinion of his people would point.¹

The transition from the Privy Council to a system of Cabinet Government in which the Ministry holds office during the pleasure of the House of Commons, makes the House of Commons itself the consultative body for the large and broad issues of policy, while a consultative function is left to the members of the Cabinet on matters on which the House cannot be consulted beforehand, and which are not determined by the general principles on which the Cabinet have already agreed. Thus the transition from the Privy Council to the Cabinet in one of its aspects marks the accession to the consultative body of a great body of popular opinion, which had been unrecognised before; and in this aspect it resembles the reforms by which the House of Commons itself has from time to time been rendered representative of new strata of opinion as these have risen into importance.

§ 4. *The Sovereignty of Public Opinion in the English Constitution, generally assumed in the theory of Cabinet Government.*

At the time when Mr. Disraeli's ministry succeeded Mr. Gladstone's, in 1874, the sovereignty of Public Opinion had long been taken for granted. Mr. Bagehot, in a book which was recognised as the classic authority on the modern form of Cabinet

¹ The constitutional king, gathering the best public opinion after this fashion, has his analogue in the "Clerk of the Meeting" under the practice of the Society of Friends. In that body, questions about which there is a difference of opinion are not decided by counting of heads, but the clerk "gathers the sense of the meeting."

After hearing those who express an opinion of their own accord, it may be that the clerk will request the opinion of others whose words will carry weight. He then, without any division being taken, declares the sense of the meeting. This is a method which pre-supposes the most perfect good faith and singleness of purpose on the part of all concerned. If opinions are to be weighed, instead of counted, the scales must be held true.

Government as developed in the English Constitution, and which, as he tells us, applies to the Palmerstonian era,¹ affirmed it in unmistakable terms.

The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is a newly-elected House of Commons. No matter whether the question upon which it decides be administrative or legislative; no matter whether it concerns high matters of the essential constitution or small matters of daily detail; no matter whether it be a question of making a war or continuing a war; no matter whether it be the imposing of a tax, or the issuing of a paper currency; no matter whether it be a question relating to India, or Ireland, or London, a new House of Commons can despotically and finally resolve . . . when sure of the popular assent and when freshly elected, it is absolute—it can rule as it likes, and decide as it likes.—*Eng. Const.* pp. 227, 228.

Mill had said much the same thing at about the same time.²

Moreover such doctrines as these were by no means confined to the philosophers—they had become the common-places of plain men.

To return for a moment to the perfection of Cabinet Government, as described by Bagehot; he speaks expressly of what may be called the organic connection existing between the Cabinet and the House of Commons, a connection which makes both of these bodies organs of the very same Public Opinion. He pointed out that

The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers. . . . The connecting link is the Cabinet.—*Eng. Const.* p. 11.

And he showed how from this fusion resulted the sovereignty of Public Opinion, acting through its constitutional organ, the House of Commons. So also his view seems to imply the necessity of a similar organic connection between the House of Commons and the constituencies as the normal and healthy condition of the Constitution.

He speaks of a House of Commons “when sure of the popular assent and when freshly elected.” In this way he avoids the question on which some writers have exercised themselves,³

¹ Introduction to 2nd Edition, page 6.

² See Mill's *Representative Government* (People's Edition), p. 11.

³ Compare Sir G. C. Lewis's *Use and Abuse of Political Terms*, p. 101; and Austin's *Province of Jurisprudence*, vol. i, p. 253.

the question whether sovereignty resides in the electors or in the elected body. In Bagehot's view they both form parts of one organic whole. If either the Cabinet and the House, or the House and the constituencies, have lost touch, why then it is time that the means which the Constitution provides for re-establishing it, should be brought into play.

When the system of Cabinet Government is working healthily, however much of detail may be left to the individual minister, every decision is within the broad lines laid down by a Consultative body, and ultimately harmonises with the drift of Public Opinion.

The connection which binds the executive to Parliament, and through it to the constituencies, is one which is founded on an ascertained general agreement of view, rather than upon an imperative mandate. Hence the provisions for the interchange of sentiment, not only between ministers and the House, but also between the House and the constituencies, are of very great moment.

Sir Erskine May has pointed out the immense importance of the system of Parliamentary reporting :

What a revolution has it accomplished! . . . Living and acting in public, Parliament under a free representation has become as sensitive to political opinion as a barometer to atmospheric pressure.—*Const. Hist. Eng.* vol. ii. p. 53.

Parliamentary reporting informs opinion out of doors of the attitude of the House; and what is called "Agitation" is a method which out-of-door opinion takes to inform the House of its own attitude. In this light, agitation is the correlative of Parliamentary reporting; and within due limits it may be regarded as a normal incident of the healthy development of English Cabinet Government. Some of its processes are necessary to keep up the organic connection between Parliament and the constituencies, just as debate in Parliament is necessary to keep up the organic connection between the Cabinet and the House. But the constitutional organ may be sluggish in responding; perhaps it may refuse to act altogether; and then the efforts to stimulate it will increase in violence until agitation becomes nothing short of an attempt of Public Opinion to find another organisation for itself whereby it may somehow become effective.

The phenomena described by the word "Agitation" are well known. People come together in large numbers to listen to

speeches, and to pass resolutions ; they form associations of a quasi-permanent character and long lists of names are published.¹ The columns of the newspapers teem with correspondence ; the "leaders" become quite unlike the running commentaries on passing events, the tentative suggestions, or even the sharp criticisms, which form the staple of ordinary times ; they are couched in terms of vehement remonstrance, of grave warning, or of earnest entreaty, sometimes almost of command ; they have become dynamic.

As permanent organisations for gauging and expressing the Public Opinion which is finally to rule, meetings and newspapers would be subject to grave drawbacks. The true note of public opinion would run risk of being lost in the straining after a factitious effect. A very small number of opponents can, at the risk of a breach of the peace, throw a great meeting into confusion, and deprive it of all articulate utterance. Newspapers which profess to open their columns to the real opinion of the country, may easily pronounce for just that opinion which they wish to prevail. However valuable agitation may be as an auxiliary, nay, though it may prove able for once, and as an exception, to afford an efficient means of organisation for public opinion, yet jealousy of agitation as a permanent rival to Parliament is by no means ill-founded. But rightly read, a violent agitation may be the symptom of an atrophy which renders the constitutional organ no longer able to perform its function ; in other words, it may indicate that the healthful working of the body politic requires the intervention of a House of Commons "freshly elected" and "sure of the popular assent."

To the three rights, the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn,² which Bagehot allows to the English monarch, may we not add these two rights more ?

First, he may on his own responsibility, if he suspects that his Cabinet Council is advising him contrary to the deliberate opinion of his people, have his great Council, Parliament, called together and their opinion taken, and in the second and last resort he may have the matter referred to a Parliament which is newly elected, although the old one has endorsed the advice of the Ministers.³

¹ See Sir Erskine May, *Const. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 271, and the passages from De Tocqueville there quoted.

² *English Constitution*, p. 75.

³ On the constitutional point see Sir Erskine May, *Const. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 89. *Times* (Sept. 30th, 1876) doubts the constitutional accuracy of Mr. Lowe's language in a letter in which he implied the Queen's right so to act on her own initiative. See

With respect to foreign affairs there is an important distinction between the broad issues which can be indicated beforehand sufficiently to ascertain that Parliament and the country are in harmony with the Cabinet, and the details of the negotiations through which a policy is worked out.

The theory of Cabinet Government leaves a foreign minister free to express an opinion in conversation with an ambassador, but it recognises the right of Parliament, and even of the constituencies, to challenge the collective discretion of the Cabinet on a broad issue of foreign policy. The line which separates what a foreign minister may do on his own responsibility from what he may do only when he is the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, is laid down by Lord Palmerston in a letter in which he gives an account of the circumstance of his dismissal in 1851. He does not claim for himself as foreign minister the right to initiate

post, chap. xiii. § 3. The *Spectator*, on the other hand, writes as follows (Dec. 29th, 1877):—

“Some of the various discussions which have been going on in relation to the Queen's share in the political crisis of the moment, seem to us to imply very spurious constitutional assumptions in the minds of those who criticise. . . . It is assumed, in fact, that the Queen has no right at all to act on her own judgment, even in such a matter as ‘recurring to the advice of Parliament’ sooner than usual, unless that earlier recurrence be approved by the Minister. . . . But the real question is, whether the Queen has a constitutional right to insist on an earlier summons of Parliament,—supposing she really believes that a good deal depends on its advice,—even though her Ministers are disposed to think that course unnecessary and undesirable. . . . We are the less likely to be biased in the strong view which we also hold,—that if Her Majesty had, even on her own sole judgment, insisted on an earlier recurrence than usual to the advice of Parliament, she would have been exercising a strict constitutional right, in which it would be most undesirable and mischievous in any way to limit her. . . . If, then, the Queen has at any time reason to believe that the majority, if consulted, would either modify the policy of the Ministers, or greatly assist them to work out their ideas, she is, strictly speaking, subserving the purpose of constitutional government in calling a meeting between the committee of management and the constituency by which that committee of management is virtually chosen. Indeed, the Crown has a power much greater than this. It can even dissolve Parliament against the advice of Ministers whenever the Monarch has grave reason to believe that the majority supporting Ministers is an accidental one, and would disappear on an appeal to the people. . . . The Sovereign, under the English Constitution, is indeed the depository of one of the most important of the regulative appliances which secure the harmony between the nation and the policy of the Administration. What the Sovereign does on the advice of the Ministry, they, of course, are responsible for. What is done on the responsibility of the Crown, the wearer of the Crown alone must be responsible for, and therefore all that can properly be done on such a responsibility is to take guarantees that the Administration is not misinterpreting the will of Parliament, and that Parliament is not misinterpreting the will of the nation. But what is done in good faith and on fair grounds with a view to secure such ends as these, is not only strictly constitutional, but one of the best of our securities that the Constitution shall continue to satisfy the people. . . . The right of the Sovereign to insist on hearing what Parliament or the country has to say, where there seems to be any plausible doubt as to the verdict which it may pronounce, is one far too important to be called in question only because, like all other rights, it may now and then be exercised where it would have been certainly ‘wiser to let it alone.’”

a policy, but contends that his communication to the French ambassador had no such significance:—

There is a well known and perfectly understood distinction in diplomatic intercourse between conversations which are official and which bind governments, and conversations which are unofficial, and which do not bind governments. . . . I said nothing [to Walewsky] which would in any degree or way fetter the action of the Government; and if it was to be held that a Secretary of State could never express any opinion to a foreign minister on passing events, except as the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar intercourse which tends essentially to promote good understanding between ministers and governments.—Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 314.¹

We may read with this a memorandum which Lord Palmerston circulated among his colleagues in 1860, and from which it appears that he assumed as a matter of course, that the House would have an opportunity of considering a critical matter of foreign policy; and that he recognised it as a fitting matter to be submitted to the judgment of the constituencies, if the existing House should be adverse.

[He contended that we ought to come to an agreement with France and Sardinia] to prevent any forcible interference by any foreign power in the affairs of Italy. . . . But such an engagement might lead us into war. War with whom? War with Austria. Well, suppose it did, would that war be one of great effort and expense? Clearly not. . . . We ought not to be frightened by words; we ought to examine things. But is such a war likely? On the contrary. . . .

It is said, however, that although the course now recommended might in itself be right and proper, it would not be approved by the country nor by Parliament. My deliberate opinion is that it would be highly approved by the country upon the double ground of its own merits and of its tendency to avert a rupture with France, and to secure the continuance of peace with our neighbour. I am equally of opinion that it would be approved of by Parliament; but if by any combination of parties an adverse decision were come to, it would, in my opinion, be the duty of the Government to appeal from Parliament to the country. My belief is that such an appeal would be eminently successful; but if it were not, I would far rather give up office for maintaining

¹ Compare what Lord Malmesbury says:—

Old diplomatists must know the difference between an officious and an official conversation. The first is the free interchange of opinions between the two ministers, and compromises neither, the latter would do so, and bind their governments. I always, when at the Foreign Office, prefaced a conversation by saying on which footing it was to be understood.—*Memoirs of an English Minister*, vol. i. p. 303.

the principle on which the course which I recommend would be founded, than retain office by giving that principle up.—*Life of Palmerston*, vol. ii. pp. 176-180.

Of course it is not to be imagined that a great statesman will be the mere passive instrument to carry out a policy dictated to him by a Public Opinion which he has had no part in forming. It is his to expound the policy which he considers appropriate; and it may be that the country will recognise it as the practical embodiment of only half-conscious aspirations, which thenceforth become clear and definite. Again, it is his to expose fallacies, by which, as he thinks, Public Opinion is being misled, or to point out the dangers of some course of policy which he believes to be fraught with disaster, and it may be that the country will recognise the value of the warning. It has been said the man who goes forward and puts his foot down makes Public Opinion. The influence which Cabinet ministers, and in a lesser degree members of Parliament, can exercise on Public Opinion in this way is immense. Nor is the sovereignty of Public Opinion trenched upon so long as this influence is exerted in a way which is consistent with frankness. But if the sovereignty of Public Opinion is to be maintained, ministers when they go forward must let the country know the purpose of the journey. They must not commit the country to risks and responsibilities without being assured of its assent. Still less must they *sophisticate* opinion by the suppression of the truth or the suggestion of what is false; or venture to treat the country like a patient in delirium, or a timid child, to be deceived for his own good and led to safety through dangers and suffering which of his own will he would refuse to encounter.¹ Or, to give the metaphor a forensic turn, we may say that "the Court must not be *misled*;" the opportunity of pronouncing judgment on a right appreciation of the issue must not be withheld until the decisive step has been taken and it is too late to recall it.

¹ It seems sometimes to be suggested that for its own ultimate safety, it is necessary that the country should be committed to a war for objects which Public Opinion would deliberately decide were not worth the sacrifice.

Lord Salisbury on one occasion put a curious doctrine which seems to be the converse of this, and according to which it seems that the country is sometimes for its own good to be restrained from making an effort or sacrifice although Public Opinion might demand it. We may, perhaps, call this the Married Woman theory of the Constitution.

"Those who are in office have their feelings like other men; but they hold the resources and power of England not as owners, but as trustees. An owner may do what he likes, looking to his sympathies, his anxieties, and his wishes; but a trustee must act according to the strict rights and interests committed to his charge."—Lord Salisbury at Mansion House, *T. Aug. 3rd, 1876*

§ 5. *Unstable Equilibrium of Cabinet Government.*

In the popular apprehension the sovereignty of Public Opinion acting through its constitutional organ, was, at the beginning of Lord Beaconsfield's ministry, regarded as too firmly established to be in danger of ever again sustaining an overthrow. People were apt to be impatient of punctiliousness about constitutional forms. They cared little or nothing about the manner in which a thing was done, so that they approved the thing itself.¹

Scruples of this kind, to be sure, had been appropriate in a bygone age, when, as had happened now and again in the course of our history, some ambitious monarch or minister might be tempted to grasp at absolute power, but all such danger was now considered obsolete.

To wish to be a despot, "to hunger after tyranny," as the Greek phrase had it, marks in our day an uncultivated mind.—Bagehot, *Eng. Const.* p. 80.

Yet what warrant have we for reckoning so confidently on a human nature proof against ambition, or for assuming that no motives will ever again be powerful enough to urge a man to that conflict in which the prize is so great? What warrant have we for assuming that even English Cabinet government in its perfection must be proof against attack?

Mr. John Morley, after remarking on Burke's favourite topic of the delicate balance of the English constitution, says:—

If this were so, what could its best friend more strenuously desire than that it should be removed with all convenient speed from so perilous an elevation, and placed in unshaken security upon the plain?—Morley's *Burke*, p. 115.

We might indeed desire it; but is any condition of stable equilibrium attainable in politics?² The poet tells us:—

He that roars for liberty
Faster binds a tyrant's power;
And the tyrant's cruel glee
Forces on the freer hour.

While human nature remains what it is, something like a perennial conflict must go on between the principles of Consulta-

¹ A striking illustration is the impatience aroused by any criticism of the purchase of the Suez Canal Shares from the constitutional point of view.

² Cf. Mill, *Representative Government*, p. 11

tion and Arbitrium. Ambition on the one hand, that "last infirmity of noble minds," and the aspiration for political liberty on the other, can never be out of date, and the contest can never be settled once for all.

Now, if we admit the existence of this perennial conflict between Arbitrium and the Consultative principle, we must also admit the tendency of circumstances in our own times to give Arbitrium a new vantage ground for an attack upon our constitution. We assume the impossibility of public action without the consent of Parliament; but we omit to notice that the physical basis, so to speak, on which the impossibility once rested, has passed away. Once it was impossible to embark on a great enterprise without the sanction of Parliament, for the reason that the ready money required to set it in motion could only be obtained by a grant of the Commons. But the vast accumulation of loanable capital which now exists, the facility with which a minister can borrow any sum required without a whisper of the matter getting abroad, the willingness of financiers to take the risk of Parliament's refusing to ratify the transaction, these things have quite altered the conditions. To this must be added the enormous influence of the telegraph and steam in annihilating or diminishing distance and precipitating the march of events, so that wars are measured now by weeks rather than by years. Moreover, the men entrusted with the executive have a standing army ready to their hand. Again one other important fact of modern times tends the same way. De Lolme, writing about a century ago, in the chapter in which he considers "How far the Examples of Nations who have lost their liberty are applicable to England," writes as follows:—

Rome was not a state, but the head of a state. By the immensity of its conquests, it came in time to be in a manner only an accessory part of its own empire. Its power became so great that, after having conferred it, it was at length no longer able to resume it and from that moment it became itself subjected to it, for the same reason that the provinces were so. . . . But England forms a society founded upon principles entirely different. . . . From one end of the island to the other the same laws take place, and the same interests prevail.—De Lolme, book ii. chap. 18.

But our country is no longer an island; we may almost say now that England is "not a state but the head of a state;" and the homogeneity of population and interest in our empire, to which

De Lolme looked as the saving point which made the case of England differ from that of Rome, no longer exists.

So far we have mentioned certain tendencies that seem to strengthen the hand of Arbitrium as against the sovereign power of Public Opinion. But besides these, tendencies of a separate class have been at work to assail the authority of Parliament as the supreme agency through which Public Opinion shall work. As the Palmerstonian era recedes into the past, we seem to catch a tendency in the popular mind to attach less and less weight to the exercise of the sovereignty of Public Opinion through the constitutional organs. People have recently seemed half to believe that Public Opinion in the plenitude of its power had somehow struck out for itself a more subtle calculus than the coarse arithmetical expedient of the ballot box, or the division lobby. We hear of—

. . . The Press (which is now more truly than Parliament the great council of the nation).—Goldwin Smith, *Fort. Rev.* Sept. 1877.

We are startled by suggestions that Parliament might after all, at a crisis, tend to obscure rather than to bring out the true will of the nation.

We have not been, and we are not in favour of this demand [*i.e.* for an autumn session] and for this among other reasons, that we should run a great danger of seeing the Eastern Question discussed upon strict party lines; but Parliament must meet unless, first, the facts the Government have, or ought to have, at their command, are more promptly made public, and unless, secondly, there is some reasonable assurance that the Foreign Office is at least as willing to be instructed on the will of the nation as it would be constrained to be in face of Parliamentary criticism.—*T.*, Sept. 15th, 1876.

§ 6. *General Tendencies of Modern Times making against the Consultative Element.*

According to the theory of English Cabinet Government, the Cabinet is the Consultative body for executive matters.

We have been accustomed to learn that we are governed not by one man or two men, however eminent, but by her Majesty's Ministers acting after due consultation and deliberation.—*Lord Hartington, H. of C.*, June 3rd, 1878.

But it is easy to recognise certain tendencies in our own times making against the consultative character of the con-

stitution, not only in executive, but in legislative matters too; tendencies such that, if they have free play given them, the constitution will be apt of its own accord to slide involuntarily, almost imperceptibly, towards a Cæsarism.

Cavour, it is said, used to wish for a Cabinet which should consist of himself and a dozen clerks. This seems to be, broadly speaking, just the conception which the constituencies, enlarged by the Reform Bill of 1867, had formed of the position which Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Disraeli, as the case might be, ought to fill.

Democracy tends, in spite of all theories, to work through what the Americans call the "one man power."—*T.* Dec. 22, 1883.

The democracy as it grows freer is instinctively remodelling the executive, and making for itself a king.—*Spec.*¹

If it is accepted as an axiom that the will of the majority is identical with the will of the people, and that the majority is to rule accordingly, there is a strong tendency to approximate more and more nearly to the most simple and direct way of giving effect to the conception, which is to invest the elected of the majority with plenary power, and to stigmatise all efforts to modify his decrees as obstruction. Thus; as of old, the two apparent extremes, democracy and despotism, are found to lie very close together, and Arbitrium may be nearest when it seems furthest off.

We note a further manifestation of the same tendency in a growing impatience of debate in Parliament itself, and a readiness to deprecate any opposition or criticism of the proposals of the majority.

It so happened that during Lord Beaconsfield's ministry a collateral circumstance gave an enormous stimulus to this inclination, and made the cry "Obstruction" a new and very effective weapon in the hands of the supporters of the Ministry.

The House of Commons has been greatly exercised this week by indignation at the Irish obstructionists. The members for Meath, Cavan, and Dungarvan, supported more or less by three other Home Rulers, have been availing themselves of the forms

¹ About 1882. Compare the following :—
 "The Government of England is becoming a popular dictatorship. . . . A second chamber may save a democracy from lapsing into a sort of Imperialism."—"Do we want a Second Chamber?" by James Bryce, M.P.—*Contemp. Rev.*, Nov. 1884.
The Spectator, Nov. 15th, 1884, notes that Bagehot, if writing now, would have lifted his statement of the constitution.
 Earl Cowper thinks our constitution is showing signs of tending towards "a Cæsarism founded on the affections of the people." [Perhaps the first example was d Palmerston's triumph in 1857.]—"Cæsarism," *19th Cent.* Jan. 1885.

of the House, with the almost avowed intention of stopping business till the House makes some concession to the Home-rule dream.—*Spec.* July 28th, 1877.

People did not always stop to distinguish between malicious obstruction of this kind, and a use of the forms of the House as a protest, or to gain time for reflection, when a measure was strongly disapproved on its own demerits. Even genuine debate, if at all protracted, seemed involved in the same condemnation. Before long we find a notion gaining currency which would regard speechmaking as, for the most part, a frivolous amusement, and the outcome of mere personal vanity, an indulgence in which members must be firmly checked, with the stern reminder of their imperative mandate to put their party chief in power and to support his proposals.¹

Thus it appears that the combats of party are no exception to the general rule, that the exigencies of combat lead to personal government.

¹ The development of the phenomena known as "Obstruction," and the attempts to cope with them are of very great importance from the point of view of a tendency towards Arbitrium, but they cannot be considered fully here. We note, however, that Mr. Gladstone's procedure resolutions (Autumn Session, 1882) were supported on two distinct grounds from opposite points of view. On the one hand it was urged that the introduction of the Clôture tended actually, though not in form, to preserve the deliberative functions of the House. On the other hand it was approved as being necessary to enable a Ministry to carry much needed legislation. We note, too, that the *Times*, by the end of 1883, treated the transition of the House of Commons from a Consultative body where all opinions should be represented, to an Executive body representative of the dominant opinion, as a foregone conclusion:—

"If the House ought to reflect in due proportion every opinion that exists in the country, we cannot logically complain though the 600 performers should insist upon taking part in every debate. . . . The more perfect we make our electoral machinery the more thoroughly must we justify an amount of active intervention in debate compared to which the talk we now endure, is a trifle. But the fact is that the House has ceased in great measure to be a deliberative assembly, and has become executive. . . . No Government introduces [any great measure] until Public Opinion has declared itself upon all the points which deliberation at large can settle. . . . At present a measure upon which the country has practically made up its mind, and upon which debate has been exhausted on the platform and in the press, is debated anew in the House from the very beginning. . . . It is obvious that a House which accepts this character is impotent as a law-making machine. The House is now the executive in point of fact, and it ought consequently to represent, not every opinion in the country, but the balance of opinion. . . . Members of Parliament have largely ceased to be representatives, and have become delegates, while in return they have largely sunk their deliberative functions in executive ones. The deliberative functions have fallen into other hands, by which they are so exhaustively performed that by the time a bill is presented to the House of Commons very few indeed of its members are competent to say anything about it that has not been fully and ably urged already. We want a House constituted for action, not for talk."—*T.* Dec. 25th, 1883.

The logical conclusion of this view would seem to be to legislate by Order Council. Compare "Parliamentary Obstruction and its Remedies," H. Cecil Raikes, 19th Cent. Dec. 1880.

English Cabinet Government rests on the polarisation of opinion, so that the predominating opinion can be ascertained by means of the system of party. But looked at in this light the party system may strain its ties so tightly as to defeat its own end.

The permanent existence of immutable parties involves the assumption that the party creed or programme at any moment may be deduced from one or two general principles about which a man can make up his mind once for all. Such an assumption cannot be admitted, though probably a considerable number of people make it more or less consciously. It may indeed be admitted that there is a *prima facie* probability that those who have found themselves in agreement on various points in the past, will in the future be in agreement on others.¹ But if questions of a hitherto un contemplated class arise, and if men who disagree in these matters as to the principle upon which the national interest can be promoted, are constrained to act together for the sake of promoting the interests of their party, the conditions are no longer fulfilled which render the party system an apt instrument for giving effect to the sovereignty of Public Opinion. The end has been sacrificed to the means.²

The session of 1877, which witnessed the outbreak of obstruction, is also marked by a great development of the institution known as the Caucus, which consists of permanent extra-parliamentary organisations on strict party lines.

Liberal "Hundreds" had been introduced a few years before in various boroughs. The theory of these institutions was that the "Hundred," as it had been elected by the members of the party at large, was representative of them, and that all the members of the party should therefore place their votes at the disposal of the Hundred to be used for the benefit of the party as the majority of the Hundred might decide. It is a remarkable illustration of the difficulty of forecasting ultimate effects in politics that the

¹ See especially the "Defence of Party" which forms the conclusion of Burke's "Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontent." His point amounts to this; that when a political society is once grounded on general likeness of sentiment, the personal intercourse and community of experience between the members of that society is likely immensely to strengthen the original bond by propagating a community of opinion on all kinds of points.

² A phrase current in American politics, "The Right to Bolt," expresses the claim on the part of a dissentient minority to vote contrary to the nomination of the party convention without sacrificing their party affiliation. The most conspicuous example is the action of the section of the Republican party popularly known as "Mugwumps," who secured the election of the Democratic President Cleveland, in 1884 [*ex relatione amici*].

provision for the representation of minorities contained in the Reform Bill of 1867, was just the circumstance which led to the establishment of the Caucus system. By that Bill the so-called "three-cornered constituencies" were introduced, amongst which Birmingham was conspicuous. These constituencies returned three members each, but each elector might vote for two candidates only. In boroughs where the number of the Liberal electors exceeded three-fifths of the whole constituency, the Caucus promised that if the members of the party would vote for the two out of the three Liberal candidates who should be assigned to them respectively, quite irrespective of any choice of their own, then the three Liberal candidates should be returned. It was, in fact, a machine for gathering up voting power as it were into a reservoir, and distributing it in the most economical manner, on the assumption that the end of party organisation would be attained by the return of a majority of members to the House of Commons who could be relied on under all circumstances to give a strict party vote. The "Hundreds," however, were not confined to the three-cornered boroughs; in others, even though votes had not to be distributed in the way described, they could still perform the functions of selecting candidates, of carrying on electoral contests, and of "uniting the party."

The further step was taken in 1877 of federating the various liberal associations together so that delegates from them might formulate the policy which was to be adopted by the Liberal party as a whole. The prominent figure in connection with this step is that of Mr. Chamberlain.¹

The first conference of the delegates took place at Birmingham, and the occasion was celebrated by a great meeting at the Bingley Hall.²

We must recognise here the germ of a formidable rivalry to Parliament as a deliberative body. The full development of the Caucus system would relegate the House of Commons to the position of an electoral college, with the purely mechanical func-

¹ See "A New Political Organisation" by J. Chamberlain, *Fort. Rev.* July, 1877. "The Birmingham Caucus" by W. T. Marriott, *19th Cent.* June, 1882. The *Daily News* (June 1, 1877) indeed said:—"It is expressly understood that no attempt shall be made to induce the federated associations to adopt any particular policy." But this idea seems to have dropped out of mind; e.g. the meeting of delegates at Leeds in the autumn of 1883, when it was determined that the Franchise Bill should have precedence of the Reform of the Government of London in the party programme.

² On May 31st, 1877. But the chief significance of the meeting relates to another point. (*Post*, chap. xvi.)

tions of nominating the designated Prime Minister of whichever party happened to be in a majority at the polls, and of registering the party decrees as the Premier should present them. It may be said that even so the result would amount to nothing more than a mere change of forum, and that the essential consultative character of the English constitution would remain unaffected. But this is to overlook the all-important difference between the results of discussion where men of diverse views meet together, and the results where opposite views of the matter have been already discussed by separate meetings of the persons who hold them respectively. The "Caucus," to give it its popular name, is an institution which must be reckoned with in estimating the prospects of Consultative Government in England.

§ 7. *Special Tendencies making against the Consultative Element.*

Besides the general modern tendencies of which we have spoken as inimical to the consultative element in our constitution, the time of Lord Beaconsfield's administration was marked by special circumstances, likely, *a priori*, if there were any latent tendency in favour of Arbitrium, to bring it to a head.

In the first place, it was a time when foreign affairs came to the front, and in foreign affairs the consultative method has great difficulties to contend with. It is indeed, generally admitted that the public discussion of delicate negotiations while in progress would render a successful issue impossible; and so it has been urged that to permit any interference whatever with the arbitrium of the person charged with the conduct of our foreign relations is unwise.

In the next place it was a time when not only foreign affairs, but Mr. Disraeli came to the front. Mr. Disraeli was a man who in "a remarkable series of political primers" (as the *Spectator* somewhere calls his novels) had spoken of the House of Commons as by no means destined to be for ever the ultimate depository of power. Few, to be sure, imagined that much serious meaning was to be attached to his novels, or that they had any other purpose than to be amusingly extravagant; but if indeed they gave the clue to his inner conception of what the constitution of the country ought to be, now was his opportunity.

§ 8. *Significance and Importance of the Domestic Struggle which marked Lord Beaconsfield's Ministry.*

In view of the various tendencies which have been spoken of the question arises, "What was the real significance of the vehement domestic conflict which characterised Lord Beaconsfield's ministry?" Clearly the events of the time are worthy of careful study with reference to the course of Public Opinion on the one hand, and of the foreign policy of the English ministry on the other. It will be important to trace the reaction of these two things one upon the other. We may perhaps best test whether Public Opinion was in fact sovereign by considering what were its manifestations, and how far the course actually taken was in accordance with them, or contrary to them.¹

The chronological survey from these points of view which forms the bulk of the present work² has been attempted in the belief that the circumstances of the recrudescence of "the eternal Eastern Question" in 1875-8 will be of permanent interest to students of our Constitution even should the Eastern Questions itself be finally closed and forgotten.

To what conclusion the facts point, every one must judge for himself; but if it be allowable to venture an opinion, it would be somewhat as follows:—On the one hand the distinct and emphatic approval by the heavily preponderating opinion of the country failed to secure the adoption by English diplomacy of the course of policy which the country earnestly and ardently demanded; nay, it even failed to counteract a leaning which used the influence of English diplomacy in the councils of Europe in a direction to which the country was most distinctly opposed. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the vehement resistance of Public Opinion did succeed in preventing English diplomacy from calling to its aid the last argument of kings, and from engaging England in actual war in support of the policy which the country disapproved.

Now, if the conclusion which has just been stated is at all borne out by the facts, the time was one of serious constitutional aberration, to state the case at the very lowest.

¹ In considering the course taken by the English ministry we are, of course, confined to the materials furnished by published documents. The precise moment exerted on each Cabinet meeting and each act of diplomacy by the utterances of the British public, is a matter beyond our ken. But in published and ascertainable facts ample data are to be found for the consideration of the problem before us.

² Part iii.

While people were relying on the constitutional machinery to insure that the course of the state should answer the judgment of Public Opinion (not, to be sure, as a ship answers her helm, but rather as she shapes her general course for the port prescribed by the owners,) in reality the constitutional machinery had got sadly out of gear. Public Opinion, recognising the failure of its constitutional organs to give expression to its thought, resorted to extra-constitutional organisations of itself in its struggle to make its will effective; and the control of the executive, so far as it was controlled at all, passed to the nation meeting in vast primary assemblies, with the newspapers as fuglemen. Thus the influence of the prevailing Public Opinion, so far as it was effective at all, acted as Public Opinion acts in states where it is unorganised; or at best, it acted through rival and extra-constitutional organisations.

May it not be anticipated that such a crisis can hardly have been passed through without leaving grave and lasting effects upon the Constitution itself?

But according to a view which largely prevailed at the time, it would be greatly to understate the case to speak of the crisis merely as a time of serious constitutional aberration. It was regarded as nothing less than a renewal of the "perennial conflict" between Arbitrium and Public Opinion. Arbitrium, it seemed, had succeeded for the time in securing an advantage, and in ousting Public Opinion from its sovereignty. Would the usurpation be lasting? Did what was happening amount to a revolution?

The Premier was credited with the inner desire to invest England more and more with the character of a great military Empire. He was believed to be aiming, not without success, at giving effect to his conceptions by evading parliamentary control, by throwing slights and discredit upon Parliament itself, by pandering to a fictitious and illusory Public Opinion, and by venturing on acts unconstitutional to the verge of illegality.

There were doctrinaires who came to the front with the assertion that according to the true intent and meaning of the constitution, Public Opinion, organised in the constitutional way, has no business to concern itself about the conduct of foreign affairs; and that foreign affairs belong of right to monarchs and ministers conversant with the higher and permanent interests of the country, and so representative in some transcendental way of Public Opinion. These men were regarded as only enunciating

doctrines which the Premier was beginning to carry into practice. Yet bolder flights were looked for if a general election should confirm the usurpation, a result which might well have happened in 1880 had attention been called off from the vital point at issue.

The publication of the memoirs of the time at some future date may afford better means than are open to us at present of judging whether any designs like these were really entertained by Lord Beaconsfield. But it was this assumption which gave intensity to the new controversy in the sphere of party politics which is indicated by the appearance of such phrases as Imperialism, Tory Democracy, and Personal Rule.

Or perhaps we should rather say that an *old* controversy which everybody thought had been finally settled long ago, suddenly raised its head again in the last half of Lord Beaconsfield's ministry. The overshadowing of ordinary party contentions by this great controversy is the salient feature of the general election of 1880 ; and the decisive character of the election in this respect is just the circumstance which now tends to make us forget how real the danger seemed and how vital that controversy appeared to those who were engaged in it.

PART II.

ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.

CHAPTER II.

THE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC OPINION.

IN considering its place in our Constitution we have been speaking of Public Opinion as if it were one and indivisible. But in fact when one course from among several possible courses has to be chosen in reference to a matter which concerns a number of people, it often happens that a controversy ensues. People may disagree about the facts; or, agreeing about the facts, they may differ in their calculations; or, agreeing in the calculation that a certain course will attain one object at the sacrifice of another, they may differ in their estimation of the relative worth of these objects; and this last element of difference may spring from any one of an infinite series of sources, ranging from mere differences of personal sentiment or interest up to the most general and fundamental differences of thought and principle.¹ Consultation may do much to bring about an agreement as to what is practicable in many instances, but in others the conflict of opinions will remain irreconcilable, and then the course finally adopted will be adopted without the consent and against the will of some of the persons concerned. This is true of any body of people associated together, but if they

¹ "My Conservative friends who do me the honour to read thus far, will say: 'Why, you think just as we do; why, then, do you join the "atrocious cry" and hamper the action of Government on platforms all over the country?' The answer is not difficult. I reply: 'Our premises are to a certain extent the same, because they rest upon immutable physical facts. Our conclusions, as to the right course for England to pursue, are totally different; because they are based upon totally different views of the motives that ought to guide public as well as private morality and policy.'" [He goes on to say that because he sees as plainly as his opponents that the command of the Dardanelles is at present essential to England, it does not follow he must do violence to his conscience by being blind to barbarities for which we (who placed Turkey in a position so to abuse her power) are morally responsible, unless we take effective measures that she shall have no such power in the future.] "Keep the key of the Dardanelles in your hands as much as you like, but go to Constantinople, if you go at all, in a right cause, and not in a wrong one."—Sir H. Havelock, "Constantinople and our Road to India," *Fort. Rev.*, Jan. 1877.

form a *State* then the power of determining upon the course to be adopted and of constraining the acquiescence even of those who dislike or disapprove it must reside somewhere, and it is this power which writers on jurisprudence call sovereignty.

It must be remembered that "Public Opinion" "the Will of the Nation," and phrases of that kind are really nothing but metaphors for thought and will are attributes of a single mind, and "the Public" or "the Nation" are aggregates of many minds.

One of Mr. Galton's typical portraits,¹ formed by super-imposing the portraits of a number of individuals, in which the individual peculiarities are eliminated and the features which are common to the type come out, is in some respects an analogue of "Public Opinion." But this method assumes a general conformity of type among the individuals who are grouped together, and if we attempt too wide a generalisation, or if we have to deal with diverse, still more with conflicting, types, the method breaks down. To get at any satisfactory result we must group burglars with burglars and philanthropists with philanthropists. Under circumstances such as those with which we have to deal, where the discrepancies are great and numerous, we cannot reduce Public Opinion to one type, but we can reduce it to a limited number of types.

With regard to the expression "the National Will" the case is somewhat different. The National Will must always be one, however fierce may be the internal dissensions. The psychological analogy seems to hold good, for will is the expression of the final impulse after all the motives have had play. The National Will, then, is that which would be the will of the sovereign if sovereignty were vested in a single man. Apart from the occasional use of the phrase as applied to the people in distinction from, or in opposition to, their government, the phrase always has an implied reference to this hypothetical autocrat, with his mind made up and acting accordingly. And though he may vacillate, at any one moment he must will one thing. How he makes up his mind is the question to which an account of the constitution of any country is the answer, and how the imaginary being who stands for the will of England made up his mind in the particular case we are considering is the question which we must try to solve. We shall see him torn, as it were, by conflicting motives, and if we can gauge the strength of each legitimate motive, we may be able to judge by the course actually pursued whether there were any bye motives operating.

¹ See Galton's *Inquiry into Human Faculty*.

The opinion which is politically predominant, or in other words sovereign, is a matter which can be definitely ascertained by reference to the course which the State actually follows. But that is not what we mean when we speak of the "predominant" or "preponderating" opinion. By such phrases as these, we mean the same thing which men have in their minds when they talk of the true, or the real opinion of the country, and it is another question whether this is actually sovereign or not.¹ If the constitution of a state insures that power shall be exercised according to the preponderating public opinion, we say shortly that in such a state Public Opinion is sovereign. We conceive of the persons who contribute to the predominating Public Opinion as forming a quasi-corporate body, and we need not stop to consider the metaphysical problem, whether sovereignty is vested for the time being in these shifting and indeterminate individuals, or in the officials who are intrusted with the actual exercise of power.

The question now arises, "What criterion have we which will enable us, amid conflicting counsels, to say where the weight of opinion lies?" Public Opinion being manifold, we want some calculus by which to distinguish that particular opinion which preponderates.

So far as Public Opinion is organised on some such form as Parliament, the preponderating opinion can of course be easily ascertained. But all organisation or machinery is imperfect, and though Parliament professedly exists as the reflex of the country's opinion, and derives its authority from that fact, yet there are occasions when it is felt that the true opinion of the country is something distinct from that of Parliament. How then is this true opinion to be ascertained?

But it may be questioned whether the problem suggested is one which, in the nature of things, admits of a complete and satisfactory solution even in theory, irrespective of imperfections in the machinery through which, as a matter of practical politics, the attempt must be made to give effect to the best approximation attainable. May not some of the factors of the weight of Public Opinion be ultimately incommensurate? For instance, a small number of great philosophers and statesmen, might be opposed to a large number of ignorant persons. In such a case could anything

¹ Having regard to derivation perhaps strictly the word "predominant" ought to be confined to political predominance, leaving "preponderating" to indicate what is indeed often called "the weight of opinion," whether sovereign or not. But this is a distinction which hardly seems recognised in common parlance.

be said more than some such account of the matter as this?—"Here is so much opinion of such a kind on one side, and so much more opinion of such another kind on the other side." On the other hand if the numbers on each side were even approximately equal, there would be no difficulty in pronouncing that the opinion of the philosophers preponderated. Thus, although cases may occur where we must confess ourselves baffled, there are others—and these are practically the most numerous and important—where the difficulty does not appear to be insuperable.

We want to know then, what the considerations are which we should consciously or unconsciously apply, if, as unprejudiced observers, with the facts fully before us, we were pronouncing on the relative weight of competing opinions.

In the first place we should find that we need not bring into the competition every minute variety of opinion which could possibly be discovered. As has already been observed, opinion though manifold may be practically treated as grouped according to certain types. Therefore we need not go the full length of the maxim, "*Quot homines tot sententiæ*." Again, as it is not every singular or obscure crotchet, neither is it every passing flash of like or dislike, which must be taken into the account; an opinion must have a certain *persistence* as well as a certain *volume*, to entitle it to rank as "Public Opinion" at all. Volume (or the number of persons among whom the opinion is *diffused*), and persistence in duration, are quantitative elements of opinion. These go some way to measuring its importance; but not the whole way, for there are qualitative elements which must be regarded too. We recognise that a few men who hold a definite opinion *earnestly* and on *rational grounds* will outweigh a greater number who merely entertain a slight preference which they cannot explain for something vague and general.

The words "on rational grounds" suggest a difficulty. It may be said the phrase is merely a veil for the meaning "on grounds with which the person who used it agrees." Are we entitled to pronounce that to be the most reasonable opinion which seems to us to be so? A man could only answer "yes" on the assumption that he was possessed of a perfectly normal mind. After all, it seems to be the same difficulty which presents itself when an ultimate objective standard is sought in any department of inquiry into human conduct, from ethics down to taste;—the difficulty which Aristotle sought to get over by the introduction of

the "Wise Man." The desideratum seems to be to eliminate everything of the nature of "personal equation."

There are, as we said above, three main causes which may lead to a difference of opinion between men in politics; firstly, differences in the views of facts; secondly, differences in the estimation of the best means for attaining desired ends; and thirdly, differences in the appraisement of various ends. The phrase "on rational grounds" then means, with regard to differences about facts, an opinion which rests on some basis of evidence; as to the estimate of the best means for securing desired ends, it means a carefully reasoned view which has the support of appropriate analogies; and with regard to the appraisement of ends, the phrase indicates that the end on which political action is based is one which reasonable men recognise as affording an appropriate motive.

For the purpose of weighing individual opinions we should take into account the opportunities the individuals have had of informing themselves of the facts, and the manner in which they have drawn their conclusions. And so before the principle of majority or diffusion can be accepted in estimating the weight of Public Opinion, there are two scrutinies that must be applied to it. First, it must be considered whether the majority is determined by any question of class interest. Next, we must endeavour to distinguish between cases where the volume of an opinion consists in the unanimity of a number of uninstructed people, who all take their political creed on trust from a similar source; and cases where there is a real consensus of many minds of differing types who have reasoned their way to the same conclusion. Where we have a consensus which shows itself, when tried by either of these scrutinies, *independent*, it carries an authority of a far higher degree than that which is due to its mere numbers. We should expect to find the *best* Public Opinion in the verdict of such a consensus, when confirmed by the weight of numbers, and when held with such intensity and persistence as to preclude the notion that the reasons which led men to it were frivolous or transient.

Thus there are four principal characteristics which, it seems, should be taken into account in the evaluation of Public Opinion:—Diffusion, Persistence, Intensity, and Reasonableness. One very important element of reasonableness is *elaboration*, which term may be used to denote either on the one hand *definiteness with*

regard to practical action, or on the other the degree to which the opinion in question results from a thought-out political theory; let us say *theoretical completeness*.

If we classify opinions according to their definiteness with regard to practical action we can distinguish these three ascending stages:

1st. A general preference.

2nd. A wish for a particular end or course of action.

3rd. A belief as to the best practical means for achieving those particular ends which are desired.

Or, to put the same thing in another light, when we enumerate the different factors of Public Opinion which appeared during the discussion on the Eastern Question, we find that they group themselves as answers to the three following questions:

1. What is the kind of political action which I like generally to see England engaged in?

2. What are the considerations in connection with the Eastern Question which strike me as important?

3. What do I think the English Government had better do, looking at matters all round?

If we denote the answers to these questions respectively as Biases, Notions, and Policies, we get three words, answering to the three ascending stages of definiteness, by which we can class such opinions as had volume and persistence enough to rank as public. In terms of this nomenclature, then, a policy is the most definite form which anything diffused enough to count as Public Opinion assumes. It is not merely an approval of a certain sort of conduct, or a desire for a particular end. It is all this, together with a conception of certain means as the best practicable for attaining that particular end which is regarded as most important, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances. Out-of-door Public Opinion can hardly strike out a policy for itself. It must have the assurance that the means are practicable from some one whose position implies that he has the opportunity of knowing the facts. A policy implies a notion, or in most cases a group of notions, which may be regarded as its factors, and also a belief that all the material circumstances have been taken into account. Policies, at least for the most part, are mutually exclusive.

It is otherwise when we descend a stage in the order of definiteness, and come to notions; for several ends can be desired at the same time, and in fact one man will probably hold several allied notions, nay, one man may consistently hold notions which

are factors of different policies, and two men who have adopted different policies may entertain a notion in common—they may both recognise the end as desirable, but one may give it the first place, and the other think it should give way to something which he considers of greater importance. Thus, though a policy implies a notion, the converse is not the case; for a notion may have existed in a man's mind without leading him to adopt a policy at all; it may be because he has not advanced from the conception of ends to that of means, or perhaps, because he considers he has not all the factors of the problem before him, or again, because he may fail to decide which notion should weigh for most among several which commend themselves to him, but which point to different policies.

If we turn for a moment to the consideration of the specific factors of English Public Opinion about the Eastern Question of 1876, and make a list¹ of the "Notions" which can be distinguished, arranged in such a way as to exhibit what may be called the continuity of Public Opinion, we shall be struck with the fact that the transition from any one notion to the next on the list is not violent. If a man holds one he will be very likely to hold the next too; and yet when we pass over several steps, a divergence becomes apparent, and presently perhaps we come to a notion which is the direct negation of that with which we began. Thus some of these notions are mutually exclusive, while others of them can exist simultaneously in the same mind, and many of them are so nearly allied that they most probably will be held together. Arranged in this way the notions fall naturally into groups which we may call "Views," for they seem to answer to the views one or other of which actual men would entertain; actual men, that is to say, as distinguished from the ideal politician whom it is convenient to imagine for purposes of analysis, whose mind takes in one notion, and one notion only. The views seem to occupy an intermediate position between the policies and the notions.

We notice that subjectively the notions are of two kinds. In the first place there are those which positively lead men to approve policies and to adopt views, and in the second place there are apologetic notions which are called in argumentatively to reinforce and defend a foregone conclusion.

The conviction of the importance of a particular end, or the desire for a particular course of action, while they are confined to

¹ See table to Chap. IV. *post.*

small knots or individual thinkers, lack that volume which entitles them to rank as Public Opinion at all. But such ideas industriously preached with favouring circumstances often gather volume (if losing something of their elaboration), till they fairly rank as notions or as policies in the sense we have given to these terms. They are the germs which falling on fruitful soil will grow to something which may move the world, or falling on stony ground may perish. Mr. Freeman long looked upon himself, as he said,¹ as one preaching in the wilderness, but his Anti-Turkish doctrine became a view of mighty power. Mr. Grant Duff's nostrum for solving the Eastern Question by enthroning the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh at Constantinople² never became a policy.

We have no precise numerical test of the volume necessary to constitute an opinion public, nor need we look for numerical accuracy on such a point. But there are two indications that will serve with tolerable precision.

In the first place, is the matter mentioned by candidates in their election addresses and in "Parliament out of Session"?—not, of course, here or there only, but would an omission be remarked upon as unsatisfactory? The other test is, has the matter passed from the magazines to the newspapers? Is it a common subject for leading articles, and do a good many people write to editors about it?³ If these conditions are answered, it may be said broadly that there is enough of volume to constitute the opinion in question public.

Turning now to those elements of Public Opinion which we distinguish as biases, it seems that a bias may be either a popular instinctive judgment embodying a generalisation more or less consciously made from the moral sentiments or from the proclivities to which politics afford a field, or again, that it may be one of those moral sentiments or proclivities themselves in a simple instinctive form.

If the analysis is pushed far enough, it may be said that in the last resort all political opinion (except what is the outcome of

¹ "When I wrote in December last, or when I wrote on these matters twenty years back, I wrote as one of a small band maintaining an unpopular view. . . . For months the few who had their eyes open were still preaching in the wilderness. At last the Turk did our work for us. . . . What we had whispered in the ear in closets was now preached on the housetops by a mighty company of preachers"—*"Present Aspect of the Eastern Question,"* E. A. Freeman. *Fort. Rev.* Oct., 1876.

² See his letter in *Times*, Sept. 11th, 1876.

³ Compare Disraeli's speech, third reading Royal Titles Bill, March 23rd, 1876. *Post.* Chap. IX.

mere self-interest) must ultimately rest upon *instincts*; that is upon moral sentiments of approval or reprobation, and upon emotional proclivities of like or dislike. Upon this instinctive basis political judgments are founded of greater or less generality. The political philosopher seeks maxims applicable to the whole course of history; the statesman, contemplating one particular group of states, arrives at his maxims of international law; the ordinary citizen has a general conception, perhaps a little vague, as to the sort of way in which he desires his own country to act.

Thus we recognise the second of the two directions in which, as we observed, political opinion is capable of elaboration. In distinguishing policies, notions, and biases, we considered one of these, that is definiteness, or elaboration in the direction of practical action, having regard to the actual circumstances of the time and place. We now note that in the other, that is in the direction of elaboration with reference to theoretical completeness, we can go upwards from the popular instinctive like or dislike to the highest generalisation of political philosophy.

It may be broadly laid down that the diffusion of opinion varies inversely with its elaboration, either in the direction of practical definiteness, or of theoretical completeness. Widely diffused complete political theories are hardly to be looked for. But the popular instincts and instinctive judgments seem to be diffused enough to count as effective Public Opinion, and it is these which constitute that kind of Public Opinion which we propose to distinguish as Biases.

In their higher generalisations political maxims regarded as abstract propositions lose that diffusion which entitles them to rank as Public Opinion, and become the exclusive property of diplomacy or of the schools. It is only when the special circumstances of the time call for a practical application that such maxims enter the sphere of Public Opinion, and when they do so they appear clothed with the special circumstances of the times, and not in their naked abstraction. In other words they appear as notions or policies. We shall see, for instance, the international jurists' maxim of non-intervention giving rise to the special notion of the impropriety of action on the part of any Power on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and this notion again we shall see is connected with the policy of resisting such unbecoming action, and hence of supporting Turkey against her enemies.

It must be observed, however, that when circumstances once draw

a maxim out from its seclusion and put it in the mouths of the people, it may become henceforth part of the popular heritage of ideas, apart from any special application of it, as was notably exemplified in the French Revolution.

We note also that when a popular bias is excited it has a tendency to run as it were to maxims, and thus to assume an appearance of higher rank in the scale of Public Opinion than that to which it is justly entitled. Thus, we shall meet with certain forms of opinion, very widely diffused, connecting themselves with a maxim about British Interests, which from one point of view marks the popular adoption of certain theories concerning the criterion of duty in international affairs, and England's true rôle among the nations; but which was probably with a large majority merely the form in which a lust after territorial aggrandisement or military glory found its most convenient and effective expression.

Public Opinion which does not get beyond a bias may be content with supporting a Ministry upon a general understanding without any clear conception of the ends the Ministry is aiming at or the means by which it proposes to achieve them. The mass of mankind, no doubt, do not strike out notions, far less policies, for themselves, but when such are presented to them they will accept or repudiate them as they fall in with or cross their bias. Hence, to excite or to allay a bias is one of the most powerful means of influencing effective Public Opinion.

With regard to the intensity and persistence of Public Opinion, it is frequently asserted that these two characteristics likewise vary inversely. According to some it is absurd to expect anything like persistency in intense Public Opinion, and the fiercer the excitement for the time, the sooner, according to this view of the matter, will it subside. The variability, uncertainty, and gustiness of Public Opinion is one of the oldest of commonplaces. A capital instance of intensity is furnished by the feeling of September, 1876, in reference to the Bulgarian massacres, and this has been cited in support of the supposed want of permanence in such strong feeling.¹

With regard to the atrocity agitation, they all looked at it with supreme contempt. He confessed he never viewed it, in its palmy days, with any other feelings, and there was hardly an

¹ Compare Lord Derby's indictment of Public Opinion. H. of L., April 8, 1878. *Post.*

Englishman who regarded it in any other sense. Now if that sort of machinery were again attempted to be set in motion, he would suggest they should say, "Call again in a month."—*Mr. Lowther*.¹

But is not this an entirely erroneous estimate of the permanence of the views of which the agitation was the expression, that is to say of the strenuous objection that provinces of European nationality should be held in subjection by the Turks? If an opinion may be ventured, it would be, on the contrary, that those views had become permanently incorporated in the main body of English political opinion.²

It is no doubt difficult for Public Opinion to maintain itself at a high tension for a long space of time together, but too much importance must not be attached to this, or to the cessation of the visible tokens of agitation. The truth seems to be that a Public Opinion which is intense, and at the same time *definite*, is most persistent.

Before proceeding to examine the various elements that contributed to form Public Opinion on the Eastern Question during the time with which we are dealing, we may notice that its verdict was very far from being simple. Nor was this surprising; for there were special circumstances in the case to produce an extreme amount of complexity. The intermixture of races and beliefs in south-eastern Europe; the ambiguity of the relation of the Turks to the European system; the geographical peculiarities of the waters of the region—especially the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal; the possession of large interests in the East by England, a Western Power; the position of Russia; all these circumstances combined to multiply the various streams of opinion which must be distinguished, if we would ascertain the set of the main current.

We have a dilemma of almost endless complexity. It is precisely such a case as that which exercised the ingenuity of the great statesmen of Elizabeth when they drew out a double table of reasons, *pro* and *con* for the adoption of some policy or project. Every argument has its answer; every answer its rejoinder.—*F. Harrison*.³

At York, *T.*, Sept. 18th, 1878.

² This point will be further discussed. See Index under head, "Anti-Turkism (alleged want of permanence)".

³ *Fort. Rev.*, Dec. 1878, p. 713.

CHAPTER III.

VARIOUS GENERAL BIASES DISTINGUISHABLE.

IF we commence the attempt to analyse the English Public Opinion of 1876-80 about the Eastern Question by applying the most general considerations we are met at once by two matters of capital importance. These are indeed implicated the one with the other, but to a certain extent they may be disentangled. The consideration of these questions is important, as many differences of opinion may be traced to the answers given to them. The two points are:—

1. The position among States which we wish our country to fill, and—
2. The standard of conduct to which it behoves our country to conform in dealing with other nations.

§ 1. *Ideal of our Country's rôle.*

One fundamentally determining cause of a man's politics will be his cherished ideal of his country's *rôle*. With reference to our relations to other countries it seems at first sight that England may be thought of (1) as an Island, (2) as one of the Great Powers of Europe, or (3) as a World Power.

But when we examine the conception of England as a World Power, we shall find that it comprises two conceptions which are really very wide asunder in the consequences involved in their development. These two conceptions are (1) England as a cosmopolitan military Empire, and (2) England as a group of English-speaking countries. The one carries with it the pursuit of conquest and a great development of the military side of the State; the other colonisation, a development of the industrial side of the State, and

probably also the growth of more complex representative institutions, such as would be appropriate to some kind of Federation. The first of these conceptions is at the root of what came to be known as Imperialism, though no doubt this word was used with a larger signification as comprising all the results, in all departments of the State, which would flow from the adoption of the Imperialistic theory of England's *rôle*. On the other hand the Colonial conception is in fact much more nearly allied to the Insular, than it is to the Imperialistic conception. The phrase "Greater England" seems exactly to express it. It appears less important to take as a basis of classification the territorial area of the State, than the nature of the government and institutions which will naturally be developed according as the State comprises one race and civilisation or a great variety of races at different levels of civilisation. We may, therefore, take as our revised heads of classification, our country as English, as European, or as Imperialistic, and comprise the "Little" and "Greater England" conceptions under the first of these heads.

It is not the case of course that these conceptions are always entirely antagonistic. Probably, consciously or unconsciously, most men have deep down in their minds their ideal of something which is the true *rôle* of their country and to which they would have every other give way in the last resort. But it often happens that several of the characters can be maintained at the same time in relation to separate matters and to a limited extent. Thus the distinction between England an island and England a military Empire is not perfectly hard and sharp. There are many men whose conception is in its essence insular, and who would scout the suggestion that it is England's allotted task to cover the earth with her law, but who nevertheless may well regard it as essential for the safety of this small island, dependent as she is for the very bread her people eat upon the freedom of her maritime trade, that she should hold strong places and possessions beyond seas. All that can be said is that it is a question of degree; or perhaps rather, that the line is crossed when men cease to regard the strong places as held in order that the islanders may live in their island the life which suits them, secure from interruption or attack. Perhaps it is hardly too much to say that the great controversy of 1876-80 ultimately turned on the question, "Is England in the last resort an Asiatic Power, and must she at any cost act up to the exigencies of that position?"

Thus for our purpose it is the classification of England as Imperialistic (with special reference to Asiatic conquest), as European, or as simply English, which is important.

We should hardly have to trouble ourselves about "Greater England" were it not for an impression that the Liberal Party looked forward with complacency to a time when our connection with the Colonies would be severed, and that their policy had been directed rather to accelerate than to retard such an event.

In 1842, Mr. Cobden wrote :—

The Colonial system with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people can never be got rid of, except by the indirect process of Free Trade which will gradually and imperceptibly loose the bonds which unite our Colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest.¹

And Mr. Cobden's desire to get rid of the Colonies was often attributed to the Liberal Party as a whole.

Possibly at one time there was a tendency in official quarters to regard this as a part of the orthodox Liberal creed : but if so, a change seems to have taken place during the interval 1868-74.² Mr. Forster's great speech at Edinburgh in 1875, significantly marks the reversal of the current of Liberal opinion on this subject.³

Still a certain amount of unpopularity continued to attach to the Liberal Party on account of their supposed connection with the policy of separation, a reputation from which they found it somewhat difficult to dissociate themselves. But what we notice now is a certain tendency to mix up the two conceptions of Imperialistic and Greater England, and to burden the opposition to the former with all the weight of unpopularity attaching to any suggestion of being rid of the Colonies.

¹ Letter to Henry Ashworth, Morley's *Life of Cobden*, vol. i. p. 230.

² See article "Greater or Lesser Britain," Sir Julius Vogel, *19th Cent.*, July, 1877. He says that with regard to the Colonies, Gladstone's Government (formed in 1868) was divided, and after setting on foot a policy of separation, abandoned it. He quotes the following : "Ministers have changed their policy, have changed it very abruptly, and have changed it for the best of all reasons—because they had begun to discover that their line was not the line of the people of England, and would, if pushed to its logical results, end in events which would bring down the bitter displeasure of the people of England."—*Spectator* of May 21st, 1870.

³ At the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. *T.*, Nov. 6th, 1875.

§ 2. *Criterion of National Conduct.*

The great dividing line with regard to the standard of conduct to which it behoves our country to conform in dealing with foreign nations, is between those who acknowledge the obligation of some duty in the relations of State with State, and those who do not. But we must distinguish among the former class between those who seek to deduce the rule of right for States straight from the first principles of natural justice, and those who think it safer to apply those principles at second hand, and so look to some conventional interpretation of them as their guide. Of course this last is the subject which engages the attention of writers on "International Law." Their books generally commence with an attempt to lay down, and to establish the cogency of some principles, the observation of which, they say, is obligatory upon independent nations in their intercourse one with another; and they go on by considering the practical maxims deducible from those principles and appropriate to special cases.

Now the idea of "self-interest" as the sole criterion of international conduct evidently excludes the idea of International Law. We mean, of course, immediate interest, in each isolated case; for it must not be supposed that the dictates of self-interest and of International Law, any more than self-interest and morality, are necessarily and always opposed. International Law is only an attempt to formulate general rules by which all interests, including our own, will be best served ultimately.¹ But when we come to

¹ We must notice an argument, somewhat akin to the economic argument for free competition, that would reconcile the dictates of self-interest and morality in international dealings on the ground that, owing to the complexity of the calculations, we shall be most likely to do good in the world by attending to our own interests. A correspondent of the *P. M. G.* says:—

"Whatever doubts we may have of the propriety of any step regarding our own safety and interest, we are sure to have incomparably more knowledge of the subject than we have as to the interest of any distant peoples or States. . . . It is undeniable that for any doubt that may arise as to the effect of any purely domestic legislation or change of arrangement, a tenfold or hundredfold doubt must exist as to the effect which any political action of our own will have on a foreign, especially an Oriental, people. It results that our only wisdom is to study what conduces to our own safety, our own honour, and our own prestige. As to this, if we have not all the materials for forming an absolute judgment, we have at least very much more information than we have as to the effect of our action on other States. . . . That the welfare of the world is more likely to follow from our caring for our own welfare and wisely protecting it than from any anxious effort to do good to our neighbours is undeniable."—Letter in *P. M. G.*, July 22nd, 1876. But the writer seems to be advancing not so much a general theory of international obligation as reasons for abstaining from particular action in a very complex case. He continues: "Our Government took this simple ground with regard to the Berlin Note. That document

the converse case and consider whether all who adopt some other criterion than self-interest acknowledge the obligation of International Law, we notice that the recognition of considerations of duty, or morality, as binding upon States, does not involve the acceptance of that particular code of international morals recognised by European statesmen, and constituting "Practical International Law." There are those who are disposed altogether to reject this code in favour of "Natural Right." But it must be remembered that "Natural Right" is too often the high-sounding phrase under colour of which a judge in his own cause can justify to himself a selfish course; and experience seems to show that much will be gained if nations can be induced to govern their conduct on particular occasions in accordance with general rules. Still, there is no necessity to think of the maxims of natural justice and International Law as having no connection with one another, much less as antagonistic. There is just now, to be sure, a tendency among the English School of International Jurists to rely on mere usage, as creating a binding obligation, irrespective of any consideration of intrinsic rightfulness; but it seems more reasonable, and more in accordance with the best authority, to regard International Law as the precepts of natural justice applicable to the case in hand, checked, and experimentally verified, so to speak, by the common sense and experience of the whole community of nations. And this view seems to accord with a definition offered by the late Professor Cairnes. International Law, he said, was—

The formal expression of the Public Opinion of the civilised world respecting the rules of conduct which ought to govern the relations of independent nations, and which is consequently derived from the source from which all Public Opinion flows—the moral and intellectual convictions of mankind.—*P. M. G.*, Jan. 27th, 1876.

Among those who reject the authority of the conventional International Law there is a strong English party, the so-called Peace Party, which, while insisting on our duty to abstain from offence, limits our obligations to other States to the passive duties.

was neither more nor less than a specious argument that it was better for the welfare of Turkey for the Powers to set her troubles to rights. The English Government simply said, 'We cannot sign that.' She inquired what was demanded by her own interest, she did that, and she did no more. By this armed and dignified watchfulness we shall have more chance of preserving the peace of the world, of narrowing the scene of strife, and of checking the brutalities of a religious war, than by any other possible course."

They do not admit that any circumstances can arise which would render it justifiable, far less obligatory upon us, to interfere forcibly in any external quarrel. It might seem that this view is nothing less than the denial of anything like a community among States, and implies International Anarchy; but it must be remembered that one section, and that the largest and most important of this party, is often extremely active in urging the adoption of means of international action other than actual or potential war. But even these, though in theory they must be distinguished from those who would have us keep strictly to our own affairs, yet practically coalesce with them, when all the pressure that can be brought to bear on another nation, short of a veiled appeal to force, proves ineffectual. Thus in the eyes of this party wars of self-defence alone are lawful; and while some of them, on religious grounds, refuse to admit even this necessity as a justification, the general tendency of the party as a whole is to ignore the possibility of direct attack, or to minimise the importance of any interest which is said to be threatened, as if they would say that it can never be worth while to fight for it.

Thus the conception of some obligation between States may be limited to the recognition of the passive duties, as not to attack, or molest, and so on; or it may extend to the acknowledgment of an obligation to perform active duties towards one's neighbours when occasion may require. And this active duty may in the view of some extend to the length of going to war for maintenance of the rights of other States, if international law is violated, and no other means avail for their protection.¹

It is rather remarkable to notice an assumption which appears to underlie the thought of many of those who make national interest the sole criterion of national conduct; the assumption, namely, that war, except perhaps in the last extremity of self-defence, must necessarily be immoral. These persons appeared to imagine that they had propounded a conclusive objection to an opponent who advocated a certain course on the ground of national duty, when they pointed out that such a course might lead to war.

¹ See Kinglake's *Crimea*, Chap. II., "The Usage."

² Compare an article by Mr. E. Dicey in the *19th Cent.*, Sept., 1877:—"Now logically I admit the difficulty of reconciling the existence of our empire, or of any empire supported by force, with the doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount."—See on the other hand article by the Duke of Argyll "Morality in Politics."—*Contemp. Rev.*, July, 1877.

Thus we arrive at the distinction of three standards of conduct—on the one hand interest, answering to the one great class of those who deny the obligation of duty between States altogether, and on the other hand morality and International Law, answering respectively to the two subdivisions into which the other great class falls. From one point of view the man who ignores the obligation of the conventional International Law and falls back in every case upon his conception of Natural Right, may be classed with the man who ignores everything but “interest” as an International Anarchist, for neither of them has any cut-and-dried code of rules ready for practical application; but in each emergency must fall back on first principles. The difference between these two kinds of “International Anarchists” would lie in the kind of first principles they would appeal to, and may be practically exemplified by the respective dealings of Penn and Cortez with the Indians. The man whose criterion of international conduct is Natural Right, may or may not admit the obligation of going to war to support a good cause, according as he admits or denies the morality of an appeal to arms, under any, and if so what, circumstances. But the system of conventional International Law appears to imply that there are certain rules of international conduct which in certain circumstances it may not only be not wrong but meritorious for a State to enforce, even by means of war if no other means will avail. It is implied, to be sure, that this is a duty of imperfect obligation, to which no State is bound; and that it is therefore not to be expected that any State will go to war to uphold the public law unless from the point of view of self-interest it seems to be worth while to do so in that particular case.

§ 3. *The Validity of Treaties.*

The question of the validity of Treaties was one which was much discussed in reference to the negotiations which followed the war between Russia and Turkey. At a crisis when war between England and Russia seemed to be imminent, a particular doctrine relating to this question had as we shall see¹ a very considerable effect on English Public Opinion. We must therefore give a little consideration to the theory of the matter. We shall perhaps be

¹ See *Post*. “Submitting the Treaty.”

able to appreciate more clearly than otherwise in what the validity of Treaties consists by the help of the conception of such a community of States as is postulated by the man who acknowledges International Law as the criterion of national conduct. Such a man conceives of States, as having certain rights, and owing certain duties towards one another according to the law of the community; and of war as the appropriate procedure for enforcing those rights when all other means fail. If entered upon for any cause but to enforce such a right, war is an outrage against the whole community.

Thus, there are certain recognised and valid *casus belli*, that is to say, circumstances which, according to the conventional code of International Law, entitle a State to proceed to the extremity of war to enforce her pretensions, without thereby offending against all the other States and entitling them to treat her as an outlaw.

In this view, the validity of a Treaty consists in this, that an act which but for the Treaty would give no other Power any right to complain, will if done in breach of a Treaty afford aggrieved Powers a *casus belli*. Thus the practical value of a Treaty as a restraining force may be measured by the distinction which International Public Opinion draws between a wanton disturbance of the public peace, and a declaration of war upon a legitimate *casus belli*; and the greater likelihood that the former course will draw down general reprobation, and possible retribution, upon the offender.

Thus, for instance, prior to 1856 it would have been a disturbance of the public peace, calculated to incur the reprobation of the Great Powers, for any State to object to Russia's building war-ships, and fortifying arsenals on the Black Sea.¹

But by the Treaty of Paris (Art. XI.) the position was reversed.

The Black Sea is neutralised; its waters and its ports thrown open to the Mercantile Marine of every Nation are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions² mentioned in Articles 14 and 19 of the present treaty.

The Treaty of Paris was valid to neutralise the Black Sea in the sense that between 1856 and the Treaty of London in 1871, the parties to it would have been within their right according to

¹ That is to say short of the point where the right of self-defence against a manifest danger would come in.

² The exceptions refer to light vessels for coast service, and to be stationed at the mouths of the Danube.

International Law in proceeding to the extremity of war to restrain Russia from having ships of war upon those waters. Nor is this validity reduced to nothing by the events of 1870 and 1871.

It will be remembered that in 1870 Russia suddenly announced that she would no longer be bound by the 11th Article of the Treaty of Paris, and that in January, 1871, a Conference assembled in London by which the neutralisation of the Black Sea was given up, and Russia and Turkey were restored to their natural liberty to display their war flags upon those waters. The English Government, however, had refused to entertain the question, except on the basis which Lord Granville expressed at the first sitting of the Conference—the understanding, namely, that the Conference was accepted for the purpose of examining without any foregone conclusion, and of discussing with perfect freedom the proposal which Russia desired to make. Accordingly, a Protocol headed “Inviolability of Treaties” was signed by the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Conference which ran as follows:—

[The Plenipotentiaries] recognise it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.¹

The various Foreign Offices may have been able to make a shrewd guess at the result in that particular case, but the abrogation of the 11th Article did not follow as a thing of course upon its denunciation by Russia. The English diplomatists were careful to maintain the right of any Power whose interests might demand it, to treat it as a *casus belli* should Russia persist in her declared intention to disregard the Treaty without the consent of the other signatories.

While the International Jurist would regard the wanton offering of a *casus belli* to other Powers as an offence against the public peace comparable to a wanton declaration of war,² he would probably admit that just as a *casus belli* may arise without any Treaty having been violated, so the existence of a state of things set up by Treaty may in changed circumstances become so intolerable that

¹ Dated, London, the 27th, January, 1871.

² “Wanton” in either case signifying the absence of circumstances sufficient to justify war in the last resort. It seems there may be occasions in the complexity of human affairs, and the absence of an International Tribunal, in which *both* parties must be regarded as having a legitimate *casus belli*.

the Power on which it presses may have a legitimate *casus belli* if other Powers insist on maintaining the Treaty by arms.

In the House of Commons (March 29th, 1878) Mr. Courtney called attention to the Treaty of Paris, and the Protocol of the Treaty of London, and moved :—

“That while, according to the Law of Nations, and the right interpretation of the said Protocol, no Power can arbitrarily renounce obligations once accepted by Treaty, it is equally true, according to the Law of Nations and the said Protocol, that no Power can arbitrarily insist upon maintaining obligations once created by Treaty.”

He said

His contention was that while no Power could arbitrarily renounce obligations contracted under Treaty, it was equally true that no Power could arbitrarily insist upon keeping up obligations once made. The word “arbitrarily” was the key-word of his proposition. If half a dozen Powers assent together to a Treaty, that Treaty was liable to be affected by circumstances which might exist from time to time. If no change whatever had happened in the circumstances in reference to which the Treaty was contracted, it would be a purely arbitrary act on the part of any Power to declare that its obligations should cease because it wished its position under the Treaty to be altered. Again, circumstances might have altogether changed so that the Treaty would be dissolved as a matter of fact, and five out of the six Powers might agree that the circumstances had changed so that their obligations were dissolved. It then would not be proper for the sixth Power to say, “Your obligations are not dissolved because I refused my assent to a declaration that they are dissolved.” That would be as arbitrary as the conduct of the former Power in declaring its obligations had ceased though the circumstances had not altered.

In reference to this speech, the *Pall Mall Gazette* (April 1, 1878) published an article entitled “Mr. Courtney’s Conundrum,” and he rejoins,

My position is shortly this :—1. A Treaty is liable to be affected by circumstances, so that through a change of circumstances its obligations are as a matter of fact dissolved. 2. In the absence of such a change, it is arbitrary and indefensible for any Power to renounce the obligations of a Treaty. 3. Such a change having happened, it is arbitrary and indefensible for any Power to insist on the maintenance of obligations. It follows from these premises that whether a Treaty can be maintained as of binding power or must be laid aside as obsolete depends upon the circumstances with which it is or may be related. There is no international tribunal empowered to decide that the necessary

change has or has not happened; though, when we look back upon past events, as, for example, the establishment of the Kingdom of Belgium, we may be entitled to say from the concurrence of all men that it had happened in a particular case. It is obvious that I do not rely upon any decision of five to one of signatory Powers; indeed, my object is to reject the notion that these questions can be decided by divisions at a Conference.—*P. M. G.*, April 2, 1878.

He returns to the subject in a letter headed "Why shall we fight?"

Briefly stated the principle for which I am contending is that the obligations of a Treaty may cease to be binding by force of facts that have happened, and this is independent of the circumstance whether all the parties to a Treaty have agreed in recognising the effects of these facts . . . I know the Protocol of 1871 may be cited against me, but the history of that Protocol shows that it was directed to a condemnation of the doctrine that a Power could *arbitrarily* repudiate obligations it had once contracted, and if the Protocol were to be otherwise construed, it would be in contradiction to the history and principles of International Law, and a most dangerous snare for our own discomfiture hereafter.—*T.* May 6, 1878.

Russia in 1876 contended that the position of the inhabitants of the Christian provinces of Turkey was so intolerable as to entitle her to insist on an alteration, even to the extremity of war. When Russia actually made war in the spring of 1877, if the interpretation of those be right who held that the *status quo* and non-intervention was what the Treaty of Paris contemplated, then that Treaty was valid to entitle the other Powers to treat the action of Russia as a technical *casus belli*, entitling them to interpose, if their interests required it. Or rather it might have been so, if by the course they took in the Conference at Constantinople the Powers had not already precluded themselves from contending that the *status quo* could any longer be maintained.

In point of fact no Power chose to interfere for the protection of Turkey. But though this was the case, a great deal was heard about the validity of the Treaty of Paris, and the invalidity of the Treaty of San Stefano when the latter Treaty was concluded between the belligerents.

It can hardly have been meant that the consent of the other Powers was necessary to restore a state of peace between Russia and Turkey,¹ although the language used appeared sometimes to go

¹ If the treaty of San Stefano was null and void, Russia and Turkey were still entitled to exercise against neutrals the belligerent rights of blockade and of search.

to that length. But a notion seems to have prevailed that any new arrangements, though to be sure they might exist as a matter of fact, somehow or other could have no proper or legitimate existence until they should have been formally assented to by the other Powers in a particular manner, on the ground that the Treaty of Paris was "valid" to prevent their legally taking effect.

But if the view of the validity of Treaties which has been suggested is the true one, it would seem that the Treaty of Paris could have no such metaphysical action. It might be doubted, indeed, if its validity was not exhausted (so far, of course, as the declared objects of the war were concerned) when the Powers determined to leave Turkey to her fate, or at all events when they received without objection the Russian communication as to the changes Russia would insist on at the close of a successful war. When any new arrangement in contravention of existing Treaty stipulations is in question, the Treaty may entitle those who wish to interfere in order to uphold the old arrangement to do so if they choose; but if they neglect their opportunity the validity of the Treaty is exhausted. To assert the contrary is to set up the distinction between what exists *de facto* and *de jure* in international matters, a region where the law, divorced from the fact, becomes shadowy and eludes our grasp. It is an abuse of language to say that a promise which has in fact been disregarded, which there is no means of enforcing, and which no one thinks of trying to enforce, is *valid*.

The absurdity is even greater if executed territorial arrangements, which are *de facto* acquiesced in, are stigmatised as "invalid" *de jure*. They may it is true be invalid in the moment of their inception—but acquiescence cures the defect, and the acquiescence may be implied as well as expressed. There is no one form prescribed by International Law as the only one by which the abrogation or modification of existing Treaties may be assented to.¹

¹ The annexation of Savoy to France affords a case in point. By the act of the Congress of Vienna, a part of Savoy, comprising Chablais and other districts, was neutralised, and its neutrality guaranteed. It was recited in the Treaty of Turin (March 24th, 1860), by which Savoy, including the territory so neutralised, was ceded by Sardinia to France, that it appertained to the Emperor of the French to "come to an understanding" with the guaranteeing Powers. Thus it was assumed that their consent must somehow be obtained. Accordingly France proposed that negotiations should take place, either by way of a conference, or by an exchange of notes, or by a direct negotiation between France and Switzerland, the country most directly affected. The English reply [June 25th, 1860, see "Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty"] expressed a preference for a conference; but no hint appears that it was only by means of a conference that the necessary consent could be manifested and the guaranteeing Powers absolved from their engagement. In point of fact no conference was held.

Will it be objected that this view practically renders Treaties so much waste paper, by reducing their validity to a mere question whether the stipulations are in fact observed or not?

It will not be so, provided the international opinion which frowns on a State which unjustly provokes to war, or which goes to war for less than a just cause, can be maintained.

A Treaty is at least a formal acknowledgment that the state of things it provides for and contemplates may justly be maintained, and if need be enforced, on the one side, as long as on the other side no change of circumstances have caused it to afford a reasonable ground for complaint.

§ 4. *The Doctrine of British Interests.*

Let us now consider for a moment the relation which the different conceptions of England's true rôle, and of the criterion of international conduct, have to one another.

In the first place, to regard it as England's true rôle to act as one of the Great Powers of Europe implies the conception of a community, or system of States, and is tantamount to acknowledging the law of the system, that is to say the Conventional European International Law, as the proper criterion of conduct. This of course does not preclude attempts to *amend* the existing conventional law, if it is deemed defective, any more than an English citizen is precluded from agitating for acts of Parliament to amend the law of England. But just as to boast one's citizenship in a State implies that one is proud to have lot and part in its institutions, so to boast oneself a Great Power of Europe implies a similar acceptance of the European public law.

In proportion as England is thought of as English rather than European does the conception of the cogency of European public law fade away, and there is nothing in the nature of the case to determine whether it will be replaced by the notion of acting according to the rules of abstract morality between States, or by that of pursuing purely English Interests.

It is to be noticed that those who admit the cogency of the passive duties only, incline, as a rule, to the Little England conception. But there is no abstract reason why the English conception should carry with it an admission of the cogency of even passive duties. We might easily have the cry for a thoroughly immoral war (as, for instance, a war for tariffs) going

with that conception. But in such a case the Interests which would be fought for would be the supposed Interests of the English people. Again, in the desire for territorial aggrandisement, as affording scope for English commerce and industry, or the profitable investment of English capital, we see how the English conception may merge into the Imperialistic one.

Let us now turn to the Imperialistic conception of England, and ask, "What room is there for Morality, and what are the Interests here?" In a growing military State Interests and territorial aggressions are apt to be regarded as synonymous. For such a State International Morality, whose very basis is respect for the right of other States as States, has no place. For such a State the pursuit of Interest will not be limited by even the *passive* duties. Now we shall find that this conception, as to the criterion of international conduct, was implicated in the discussion on the Eastern Question. When policies were advocated on the ground of national *duty*, this assertion of the binding nature, as between nations, of considerations analogous to those which among individuals go by the name "Morality," was met by expressions of the most scornful contempt for persons who, aspiring to be politicians, were yet sentimental enough to admit the cogency of any motive but Interest in international dealings.

The maxim answering to this latter position found apt expression in the watch-word "British Interests," which played a great part in the coming controversy. But it is to be noted that the Interests referred to under this phrase were always those of Britain conceived of as a great military, and chiefly as a great Asiatic, Power—and not as an Island or a group of English-speaking Colonies.¹

It was contended that the maxim was not new. Lord Palmerston, at the commencement of the session of 1848, in defending his foreign policy, used the following expressions:—

If I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the Interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.—Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 63.

And accordingly, Canning and Palmerston were often vouched as sponsors of the maxim. But in the mouth of Palmerston, or of

¹ "British Interests" of course would be very different from "English Interests" in this sense. Compare Goldwin Smith's "Policy of Aggrandisement," *Fortnightly Review*, Sept., 1877.

Canning, the doctrine was different indeed from that which we are considering. With Canning it was little more than a corollary from his principle of non-intervention. He meant by it that England should not allow herself to be made the cat's paw of the Holy Alliance; not that the aggrandisement of Great Britain should be sought at the expense of other Powers.¹ On the contrary, he held that her dignity and character required her to protect weaker nations against oppression, not only if such assistance was consistent with her interests, but so far as it was not absolutely incompatible with her own security.² It is singular that the dictum of Lord Palmerston, which has been quoted, was uttered in reply to an attack upon him for not being hostile enough to Russia. His thesis was that English policy ought not to be ruled by any such antipathy, but by the exigencies of our Interests understood in the broad way in which Canning understood them.

I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I hold that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right, pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done. As long as she sympathises with right and justice, she will never find herself altogether alone. She is sure to find some other State of sufficient power, influence, and weight to support and aid her in the course she may think fit to pursue. Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally, or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.—Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 62.

To make Interest the sole criterion of the conduct of States is to push to an unwarrantable extreme that protest against internationalism, which within due limits is not only reasonable and wholesome, but absolutely essential to the existence of States at all. It is to make submission to the claims of the political tie paramount to every other consideration. This spirit often usurps the name patriotism, yet, inasmuch as this word has acquired a connotation which admits the idea of wishing one's country to sacrifice her Interests in a good cause, and as the doctrine we are

¹ Stapleton's *Canning*, vol. i. p. 134.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 6.

considering is strictly the antithesis of the various forms of internationalism, it might perhaps more appropriately be called extreme Nationalism.

The matter will perhaps be clearer if we consider for a moment what internationalism in its various forms essentially is. We have the black internationalism of a priesthood, which claims every man's devotion, body and soul. We have, again, the white internationalism of a royal caste, who would fain use the national force intrusted to them for national purposes to hinder any derogation from the privileges of any one of their number. Lastly, there is the red internationalism of those who seek to weld together in one compact organisation all who live by the labour of their hands that they may, as they think, better their material condition.

Thus from time to time it happens that some principle of union arises, which cuts across the lines of division marked out by the boundaries of States, and engages men of different political allegiances to combine for common action. If the members of the new organisation can pursue their course without failing in their duty to their political sovereign it is well; but if the duty a man owes to his cause clashes with the duty he owes to his State, which is he to follow? It will of course depend upon his estimate of the importance of his cause in comparison with the claims of his State upon him. But we notice that to feel an affinity powerful enough to decompose States, and to group their elements in new combinations is internationalism,¹ while to affirm that in no case ought a man to prefer any claim to that of his State upon him is nationalism, which in another light is closely connected, if not identical, with the doctrine that Interest is the sole criterion of national conduct.

To be sure, in one aspect it is the standard of individual, and in the other of national conduct, which is in question, but there is a close connection between holding that every other consideration must give way to the claims of the State as far as a man's own conduct is concerned, and holding that one's State is entitled to consider the claims of its own interest as paramount to those of every other person or organisation in the universe. If one exalts one's State so high as completely to sacrifice oneself, why not every one else?

On the other hand, men who are possessed by some form of

¹ "The idea that the world would profit by the removal of the barrier between nations is internationalism."—Fyffe, *Hist. Modern Europe*, vol. i. p. 372.

internationalism, if they chance to get political power at home, will be apt to use it to promote their object without regard to the interest of their own State, as a State, in the matter. The phrase, "English Interests," in the mouth of Palmerston or of Canning was nothing but a protest against this kind of internationalism.

But the doctrine of British Interests as proclaimed in 1876 was something very different from the moderate and reasonable nationalism of Canning or of Palmerston. It amounted to nothing less than the assertion of England's freedom to act untrammelled by any moral considerations whatever. Some persons appear to have arrived at this conclusion from the belief that the attempt to formulate general rules for national conduct was too intricate.¹

Others took the ground that it does not concern us to observe such rules, although they seemed to admit that rules are possible. Others were led to the same result because they thought that international anarchy had set in, and that for any one country to abstain from any course which offered advantage from any moral considerations would be destruction.² And, finally, there was a curious apologetic and self-righteous argument, which reconciled interest and morality on the ground that English aggrandisement was tantamount to the spreading of virtue and civilisation, and that thus the Interests of England and of Morality were identified.

Thus we note as one of the factors of Public Opinion the existence of a general theory, to the effect that our action as a nation should be guided by regard to our own Interests solely. This theory was to a certain extent reasoned out, but the ready acceptance of the maxim, and the way in which the cry of "British Interests" was caught up, indicates the existence in considerable volume of a separate bias of Public Opinion tending to reinforce the demand for the policy to which that maxim and cry would point.

¹ See above § 2, p. 43.

² This appears to be the view of the *Pall Mall Gazette*: "We cannot do as we would be done by, because if we did we should nowadays in most cases expose ourselves to irreparable injury or ruin. And the reason is that the moral rules which writers on public law eloquently exhort States to respect are now either openly defied or, if they are used, they are merely employed as bandages to blindfold a too confiding victim. There is not now anywhere in the world an assemblage of equal States conducting themselves on the principles which govern the intercourse of man and man. There is overwhelming evidence that the moral code, which Radical orators declare to have been shamefully violated, has collapsed in all the greatest States of the civilised world."—"International Morality, Old and New." *P.M.G.*, Dec. 20th, 1879.

§ 5. *High-handed Foreign Policy.*

The bias which rendered Public Opinion so ready to respond to the cry of "British Interests," was one towards an aggressive, or at least a spirited and enterprising, Foreign Policy. It may perhaps best be described as a bias towards a strong, passing into one towards a high-handed, Foreign Policy. Such a bias was, in fact, widely diffused, and became a very important element of Public Opinion. In the abstract this bias would favour any line of conduct that did not leave the nation a passive spectator of important events, nor does it necessarily exclude the idea of disinterested or benevolent activity, but as a matter of fact, owing to special causes, it happened that in 1876-8, the bias in question tended to reinforce the views and policies which were friendly to Turkey and hostile to the cause of the Provincials with their ally Russia.

But before speaking of these special causes, we may pause for a moment to consider in what way this bias is connected with the idea of membership of a system of States. There is a tendency among the professed peace party to disparage diplomacy as a mischievous pursuit, and to doubt the necessity of having a "Foreign Policy" at all. But as the idea of the importance of our position and functions as a member of the system gains ground, so will rise the desire for a strong Foreign Policy, in other words the wish to take a leading part in the affairs of the system.

It is easy to see how this may slide into a high-handed policy, even without being consciously or intentionally unjust or aggressive, if through self-conceit we get an unduly high opinion of our own strength virtue and wisdom, and undervalue these qualities in other States.

It is but a step further to deny that other States have any rights or claims which we are concerned to respect at all, and to make our own wishes or interests the sole criterion of our international conduct. Thus from one point of view the bias in question is a protest against the anarchy of absolute isolation, but a protest that is pushed to an extreme, and over-shoots its mark. From another point of view, it is connected with the anarchy of the doctrine of British Interests. Perhaps at bottom, and apart from cases where the notion of some profit from a policy of aggression comes in, the proclivity in question in its extreme form rests upon a love of excitement, and the gratification of feeling oneself to be taking part in great events. It is worth considering

how much more *interesting* the newspapers are in war time.¹ Manifestly, as compared with any previous epoch, a vastly increased audience can now enjoy the great spectacle of war, and if the pleasurable excitement thus afforded weighs at all as a motive, we have a new force in politics inimical to peace.

There is another motive, not often avowed, but yet a not ignoble one, which seems to operate on a few minds, and to make them almost ready to welcome war for its own sake. It is the idea of war as something which can raise men out of the petty meannesses and drudgery of their every-day life; the idea that the sense of a great common cause will break down the barriers between different classes raised by jealousy or the clashing of sordid interests. In this aspect the efforts and sacrifices demanded by war appear as a purifying and ennobling discipline, both for the nation and the individual citizen. It is this conception which finds lyrical expression with relation to the Crimean War in Tennyson's *Maud*.

Various causes may be suggested which will in part account for the rise of the bias for a strong Foreign Policy into importance after Mr. Gladstone's fall in 1874. There had been a time of great material prosperity, and it is not the first time that a nation has waxed fat and kicked. Then, again, people had been witnesses of great military events upon the Continent. Their emulation may have been aroused, and such a feeling may easily pass into mere pugnacity.

But the thing to note as of greatest importance is the attitude of Mr. Disraeli towards this bias. He allied himself with it, and while thus giving it an enormous stimulus he was able to lean upon it, and to derive from it considerable support for the policy he favoured.² Mr. Disraeli advertised this alliance by his exclamation that the English people were "sea-sick of the silver streak."³ His utterance had been heralded a few days before by Lord Salisbury at a dinner of the Associated Chambers of Commerce:

There is a kind of sensation, a thrill, a longing for action, a desire for a definite aim to be stated, and a definite policy announced. Foreign countries have thought that a new spirit, one altogether strange, was coming over the country.—(Feb. 16th, 1876.)

¹ Compare article entitled "The Intellectual Charm of War," *Spectator*, April 25th, 1885.

² The *Spectator* (April 30th, 1881), connects Lord Beaconsfield's popularity with his pugnacity: "The people love to see a good fighter fighting fair. In 1876 with a flash of genius he threw himself into opposition to Russia."

³ Speech on purchase of Suez Canal Shares, Feb. 21st, 1876. *Post*, part iii. chap. viii. § 4.

Ere long the effects of this alliance were visible in the increasing volume and intensity of the bias and in the appearance of a new name, which bids fair to become permanently incorporated in English party nomenclature. The word "Jingo" quickly passed into currency. At first it denoted those who were passionately and pugnaciously devoted to Turkey abroad and to Lord Beaconsfield at home. Soon acquiring a wider and more general significance it came to indicate an admirer of high-handed methods and aggressive tendencies in Foreign Policy generally; thus becoming nearly an equivalent for the French *Chauviniste* and the German *Junker Partei*.

From the nature of the case it is not apparent why the wish for merely a *strong* Foreign Policy should always have tended to reinforce the anti-Russian views instead of those in favour of the Provincials. But any tactical advantage which might have been secured from an appeal to this bias by those who were pressing for an active policy in favour of the Provincials was missed. The way in which the possible necessity for an actual resort to force was persistently ignored by many of the friends of the Provincials—especially by some of the Liberal leaders—lent some colour to Lord Salisbury's taunt that they had not "picked the idea of coercion to pieces."² As a mere matter of tactics, it might have been wiser to have faced the possibility that the policy they advocated might involve war, as Lord Palmerston faced it in 1860, when he advocated an understanding with France and Sardinia to prevent any forcible interference by any foreign Power in the affairs of Italy.³ Again, it happened that it was mainly the Liberal Party which became associated with the anti-Turkish, and the Conservative party with the anti-Russian policy. Now there was a widespread and deeply-rooted belief that the Liberal Government which preceded Lord Beaconsfield's had been weak in Foreign Policy, weak in the sense of not showing sufficient insistence in

¹ The derivation of the name is a little curious. In 1877-8 the favourite songs of the frequenters of the London music-halls were of a violently anti-Russian, or so-called "patriotic" character.

The most popular of the choruses ran:—

"We don't want to fight,
But by Jingo if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men,
We've got the money too."

Mr. Holyoake, in a letter to one of the newspapers, alluded to these noisy patriots as "The Jingoos." The conceit caught the public fancy, and the name "Jingo" stuck.

² House of Lords, Feb. 8th, 1877. *Post*, chap. xv. § 2.

³ See *ante*, p. 14.

their dealings with foreign Powers, and also weak in the sense that they had no adequate sense of the importance of international affairs, and neglected them accordingly, in favour of home legislation. There was a vague impression that the Liberals would put up with anything rather than go to war, and that foreign affairs were not their *forte*.

The *Spectator* confessed that they

were never much in sympathy with Mr. Gladstone in relation to his Foreign Policy.—(Feb. 5th, 1876.)

The *Times* thought it unfortunate

that the Liberal Party in the House of Commons has so few masters of foreign affairs.—(Feb. 7th, 1876.)

It was strenuously argued that the impression was altogether a mistaken one, and that Liberalism was not actually guilty of shortcomings in regard to England's position in the world.¹ But, however this may be, every one knew that the Foreign Policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government had not been *showy*.

The late Government [1868-74] . . . made one very great mistake. It did not remember that in dealing with a democracy, you must not only *be* right but *seem* right.—*Grant Duff*.²

On the other hand, the Conservatives were fond of talking about their Foreign Policy, and asserting that they were going to maintain the Empire and the influence of England. It was Mr. Disraeli who gave the lead which the Conservative Party blindly followed. Not a few, probably, were decoyed by their belief that where the cautious Lord Derby led, they might safely follow. But a time came when Lord Derby himself became the most inapt of instruments for the further development of Mr. Disraeli's policy, and then the long connection between them was broken. The Conservative Party still followed Mr. Disraeli, as they had originally followed him in adopting pro-Turkish views. The manner in which Mr. Disraeli allied himself with the proclivity for a high-handed Foreign Policy brought about a great development of the bias, and it is in the accident of his personality that we find the special cause of the connection which existed between that bias and the anti-Russian policies.

¹ See article by Mr. Gladstone "England's Mission," *Nineteenth Century* Sept. 1878.

² Essay on "Foreign Policy," dated Christmas, 1879, published in *Practical Politics*, Macmillan, 1881.

§ 6. *Disraeli-Toryism.*

Another important element of Public Opinion connected with the ascendancy of Lord Beaconsfield was a bias which may perhaps best be described as Disraeli-Toryism. This new or revived Toryism had nothing to do with the Conservatism which is founded on a bias in favour of extreme caution in altering existing institutions, except the accidental alliance which resulted from the circumstance that Lord Beaconsfield was the recognised leader of the Conservative Party. The fortuitous character of the connection between the old Conservatism and the new development was noted by many of the periodical writers from time to time as the constitutional bearings of the question came under discussion, but generally the distinction was not recognised. There is a proneness in the popular mind to look for a simple and sharply-defined duality in party politics, and to assume that a man must be a good Conservative if he follows a leader who is vehemently opposed by the Liberals. Thus Lord Beaconsfield was not only enabled to make use of the Conservative party vote, but he succeeded also, to a great extent, in engrafting this Disraeli-Toryism upon the party creed.

The essence of Toryism in one of its aspects appears to be a tendency to depress representative institutions in favour of the autocrat or the Cæsar. We have already spoken of a certain liability in our Constitution to slide into a Cæsarism, and of the special causes operating in that direction at the time in question. The impetus to the remarkable development in this direction which marks Lord Beaconsfield's administration, came largely from Lord Beaconsfield himself and his followers.

In cases of representation through one man, the character of the representative man becomes of capital importance. A dictatorship of Mr. Gladstone would be as great a departure from our consultative constitution as a dictatorship of Lord Beaconsfield, though the one dictatorship would differ widely from the other. The main characteristic of Disraeli-Toryism was impatience of the consultative method with its scrupulosities; but the feeling was further stamped with the impress of Disraeli's peculiar genius. Just as the Toryism of George III.'s time was impressed by the character of that monarch, just as it came to reflect his narrow Protestantism, his dislike of change, his strict disciplinarianism,

and his leaning to repressive measures, so the new development of Toryism which took place during Lord Beaconsfield's administration was impressed by the personality of Disraeli. It bore traces of his scorn of representative institutions; his idea of politics as a game where the boldest adventurer will win; his admiration for the East, and the immense importance he attached to the diplomatic and military side of politics. Here we find a link between the Disraeli-Toryism and the bias for a high-handed Foreign Policy, and again we can in part see how it happened that both of these were elements of Public Opinion hostile to Russia and favourable to Turkey.

As the bias for high-handed Foreign Policy is connected with a love of excitement, so the Disraeli-Toryism was based in part on admiration of the Disraeli type of character. It became fashionable. It came to be regarded as the distinguishing politics of people in "society."

There was a sentence in the speech of my friend, Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, at Deal the other day, which struck me very forcibly, because the same thing has been so often said to me—"Well, I may tell you frankly that I have been advised by more than one member of what is called the 'Upper Class of Society,' who are kind enough to take an interest in my political career, to leave Mr. Gladstone alone, and not to damage my own position by saying a word in his defence." Well, now, gentlemen, it is a curious thing that "society" is always on the wrong side.—*Mr. Baxter*.¹

Probably "society"—the society that is which Mr. Baxter had in his mind—is influenced by nothing so much as by reaction against enthusiasm.—*D. N.*, Nov. 18th, 1876.

The London music-halls followed suit. Disraeli-Toryism in its social aspect may be regarded as the alliance between "society," the music-halls, and Lord Beaconsfield. It often fell under the lash of the social satirist, *Punch*.²

London, as was natural from the circumstance, was the headquarters of this bias; and we find that a difference in political tone between London and the provinces was often remarked on.

Some difference of this kind we find noted at a very early moment of our period.

¹ At Montrose, *D. N.*, Nov. 17th, 1876. *Post*, chap. xiii. § 9.

² See "Extremes meet," (Interlocutors, "Our old Friend 'Arry" and "a Swell," Nov. 3rd, 1877. "Fashion's New Fetish," Dec. 8th, 1877.

In an article on "Mr. Disraeli and the Public," the *Spectator* alludes to

The country papers . . . always first to indicate a change.¹
—(July 22nd, 1876.)

At a later time the difference between the London and the provincial press became much more strongly accentuated.

§ 7. *Foreign Office Toryism.*

We may, perhaps, connect the rise of a doctrine which may be called Foreign Office Toryism with the biases that have just been discussed. It was in the department of foreign affairs that the right of Public Opinion to be sovereign was most explicitly challenged; and, as we shall see, the matter became the subject of a great constitutional controversy. We note the rise of:—

A political doctrine which has during the past few years been put forward with a great deal of emphasis and some small ingenuity in journals which affect to be the interpreters of Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy, from the solemn and deliberate *Quarterly Review* to the least responsible and most frivolous of daily chatteringers. It is this, that the foreign policy of England is the business of three persons only—the Sovereign, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary, and principally of the Sovereign, inasmuch as while Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers come and go, he or she remains, comparatively speaking, for ever. The Crown therefore represents, it is said, continuous and uninterrupted knowledge, extending it may be over a generation, while successive Ministers have only the fragmentary knowledge of a few years.—*D. N.*, Jan. 7th, 1880.

It is not altogether easy always to understand exactly what was meant by the exponents of the doctrine. In the mouths of some of them indeed its scope seemed narrowed to an insistence on large discretions for the responsible Ministry for the time being, as to the means by which effect should be given to some general course of policy. But others based the doctrine on a plea that the monarch has a peculiar interest, personal and private to himself, in the international dealings of the State.

The English Sovereign has a double interest in the conduct of foreign affairs; first, the security of his country; next, the main-

¹ "A London Scribe" (*Spec.*, July, 29th) says this dictum is the echo of a sound which Mr. Gladstone emitted. "He used to say, and he and his confidants still say, that the London newspapers represent only Pall Mall and the Clubs, and that the provincial newspapers, which support him through thick and thin, represent the country." The writer says 1874 showed Mr. Gladstone was wrong. "A Provincial Editor" replies. (*Spec.*, Aug. 5th, 1876).

tenance of his personal honour. Therefore, though, on the principle of self-government, the opinion of the Queen may not in the decision of home affairs be of more value than that of her poorest subject who possesses a vote, yet in foreign questions, it is obvious that her interest is beyond all comparison greater than that of any other single Englishman ; and may even be compared to that of the nation itself. Hence it follows that not only by virtue of her prerogative, but by the nature of things, she must be allowed a large personal share in the control of our foreign policy. . . .

There is only one quarter in which the knowledge exists, in which the unity and continuity of England's policy is kept ever clearly in view apart from the illusions of party warfare. That quarter is the Crown, represented by the Ministry. There is only one member of the nation on whom the foreign relations of the country in respect of its honour and majesty bear with an immediate and personal effect. That member is the Queen.—*Quart. Rev.*, April, 1878.¹

This claim seems founded on the conception of the monarch as a feudal lord, who, while he owes his vassal subjects protection against external aggression, claims from them in return their assistance to maintain his own pretensions, pretensions as to which they are not concerned to judge. In another page, however, the same writer bases his argument on quite a different conception, and puts forward the idea of the English monarch as the exponent of an unorganised Public Opinion.

Our Empire rests upon Opinion, and the Crown is the centre to which all sound opinion, independently of party, should gravitate. . . . In the opportunities of collecting, centralising, and directing opinion, it is plain that no influence can compare with that of the monarch.—*Quart. Rev.*, April, 1878.²

But altogether apart from any question of the personal king, Foreign Office Toryism drew support from the notion that it is of the first importance for a State in contact with other States to be completely united within itself, and that, therefore, whatever Ministry is in power, it must be supported, even if it is not going right.

Liberals must learn that it is an abuse of the privileges of the opposition to thwart the policy of the Foreign Minister ; to attempt, without official relation to the facts, to dictate the course to be taken. . . . Even if we are opposed to the policy of the Minister, still he is for the time intrusted with the authority of the State, and only ill can come of impairing that authority in the moment of action.—*Blackwood's Mag.*, November, 1876.³

¹ "The Crown and the Constitution," pp. 297-8 and 326. ² *Ibid.* p. 323.

³ "The Recent Home Agitation and the East,"

From this point of view the doctrine of Foreign Office Toryism was identified with patriotism.

One of the favourite appeals made by the supporters of the Government addresses itself to the forbearance and prudence of the nation. At such a time, it is urged, no patriotic person ought to interfere with the action of Ministers lest by even a suggestion we should hamper it, lest by even the appearance of a difference of opinion we should weaken their influence.—*D. N.*, Oct. 23rd, 1876.

When the energies of the foreign office were directed to aggrandisement, patriotism, in the language of Disraeli Toryism, became "Imperial."

Perhaps there are men of "Imperial patriotism," to use the phrase employed by Lord Beaconsfield on Thursday,¹ to whom any consideration of cost in such a matter seems inglorious. We certainly would not be for counting cost too carefully when some great object approved by the nation was to be obtained But it is hard indeed for the great mass of the English people to have an immense burden of expense imposed upon them by a course of policy which was taken without their consent, and of which they would never have approved if they had been consulted in time. That "Imperial patriotism" of which Lord Beaconsfield talked has much to answer for. We may remark that the absurd misuse of the word "Imperial" is becoming of late an intolerable nuisance. That which ought just now to be the "Imperial instinct" and "Imperial patriotism" of every genuine Englishman—if such pompous words could ever be properly employed to describe anything true and patriotic—is the wish to recover for England that right of Parliamentary self-government which we all believed until the other day that Constitutional principles, if not technical rules, secured to her. After what has lately happened, no one can say that he feels any such security. Lord Beaconsfield, if uncorrected, has established a new precedent. Unless the country refuses to admit it, a Prime Minister may hereafter, by virtue of this principle, call up new armies, annex new territory, incur limitless obligation and enormous expense of his own good will and pleasure.—*D. N.*, July 23rd, 1878.

Closely connected with the notion of the importance of presenting a united front to Foreign Powers, is the notion that matters of foreign policy must be left to experts, and that it is worse than useless for laymen to seek to influence the course of matters which they are wholly incapable of properly understanding. Much was said of the proneness of Public Opinion to go wrong.

¹ The reference is to a debate in the House of Lords, July 18th, 1878.

The fallibility of that Public Opinion, which "Verax" desires to be our pilot in foreign affairs, might be illustrated by a hundred examples since 1832. . . . If we turn to the House of Commons of the Crimean War period as the truest image of a self-governed nation, we shall be unable to conclude that the opinion of the majority is a safe basis of national security and independence. . . . As a deliberative assembly, claiming control over the actions of the executive, it can scarcely be said to have added to its reputation.—*Quart. Rev.*, April, 1878.¹

The inability of the public at large, or of a body like Parliament, to attempt with advantage to control the executive in the sense of interfering with the details of negotiations, was generally admitted. It was also generally accepted as a principle that there is a presumption that the executive is acting for the best interests of the country in its negotiations with Foreign Powers, and is accordingly entitled to the support of men of all parties.

It has been at all times a recognised principle of English politics that party organisation should be used with much more reserve in foreign, than in domestic questions.—*T.*, Sept. 26th, 1876.²

But how far this indulgence should be carried was a question of degree. The claim of Foreign Office Toryism was that Parliament and the public should be satisfied with the vaguest and most general expositions of ultimate ends, such as "Peace" or the "Interests of the Country." All men are agreed as to the desirability of such ends as these if they can be attained; but the question which has to be decided is, "What policy will attain them?" Clearly there may be great differences of opinion as to the line of policy most conducive to peace and to the real interests of the country.

Is the decision on such a line of policy to be left entirely to the executive, or is Public Opinion to have a voice in it? The point is well illustrated by a favourite simile. On the one hand it was urged that it was improper, nay, extremely dangerous, to speak to the man at the wheel. On the other hand it was said this maxim only applies to the helmsman's manœuvres for the avoidance of shoals and collisions; and must not be extended to allow the helmsman to take the ship upon any voyage he pleases.

We are fully impressed with the necessity of avoiding in all ordinary times any appearance of pressure upon a Government which is endeavouring to deal with a delicate and difficult question

¹ "The Crown and the Constitution," pp. 304-6.

² The whole article is noteworthy on this point. See *post*, chap. xiii. § 4.

of foreign policy. But if a Government is actually going a wrong way, it is at least allowable to call out and warn it to come back. If diplomats make it evident that they do not know the way, that they are feebly looking out for it, the bystanders may be allowed to put them on the right track.—*D. N.*, Oct. 23rd, 1876.

Quite right, William! It was a case for speaking to the man at the wheel!—*Punch*, May 19th, 1877.¹

In this view, the discretion left to the executive depends on the assurance which Public Opinion has that the general course of the policy of the Government on its broad lines is appreciated and approved by the country.²

¹ "Too hard a-port (e)."

² This seems to be the principle laid down by Mr. Gladstone, when Sir Wilfrid Lawson pressed for an assurance that no warlike steps would be taken by the English fleet at Alexandria. Mr. Gladstone said :—"It was impossible for the Government to undertake to give pledges of this kind—that they would not do this or that in the employment of the forces with which her Majesty is provided for purposes connected with the interests of the country. While asserting that general proposition to which I adhere, I repeat that it is the desire, and the absolute duty, of the Government in all such matters to act in accordance with what they believe to be the deliberate views of Parliament and the country. There may be cases where their views are beyond or at variance with what they believe are the opinions prevailing in the country. If there be such cases, then I think it is their duty to make known to Parliament what their intentions are—unless under circumstances the most extraordinary—before they proceed on any general views and principles except such as they feel convinced are known to and approved by the general sense of Parliament and the country. That sense may be either expressed or understood. In this case we believe we know perfectly well what the general sense of Parliament and the country is, and I believe whatever we may do or not do will be found in accordance with that general sense. . . . [He referred to the happy solution of the territorial questions relating to Montenegro and Thessaly in connection with Greece.] That was not done with an absolute abstention from the exhibition of force, and most certainly it was not done under the restriction which would have been imposed upon us if we had been asked at the time to give an absolute engagement under no circumstances to employ force. It is not politic to ask for such an engagement. It is not possible, consistent with duty, to give it. The real question is whether my hon. friend has good reason to suspect us of pursuing aggressive schemes, of immoderate doctrines, and of actions of self-assertion, or of any other defect on that side of human weakness which would tend to excess in these matters. If not, I hope he will refrain from pressing us to give the engagement which he has asked for."—*H. of C.*, May 26th, 1882, *D. N.* report.

In a remarkable speech at a later date, Lord Salisbury accepted the disadvantages entailed by public criticism of negotiations in progress, as a necessary incident of our form of Government. Earl Granville had spoken of it as a great danger, having regard to the critical state of matters between England and Russia with regard to Afghanistan,—"when the leader of the Conservative Party rushes off to make an electioneering speech in Hackney, to make a declaration without a real knowledge of the facts which tends to show that England is entirely in the wrong, and that Russia has been triumphant all along, and gives that cue to all the Conservative writers and speakers in the country." Lord Salisbury said :—"The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of an Opposition not to canvass or condemn the conduct of the Government if by so doing it should have the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to. The noble Earl must remember that if we are of opinion that the course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute

But the suggestion that Public Opinion might attempt with too much meddlesomeness to concern itself with details which could only be satisfactorily adjusted by the Foreign Office, or that it might indiscreetly insist on too much publicity at a dangerous crisis, was not the most formidable of the accusations brought against Public Opinion. It was said that Public Opinion was so variable and inconstant in its nature that it was utterly incapable of giving any consistent impulse at all to any course of foreign policy.

Lord Derby lodged a remarkable indictment in the debate of Monday¹ against British public opinion. He charged the public with not having from the beginning of the last two years to their end known its own mind for six months together. Two years ago it would, he declares, have been as dangerous to express a doubt of Russian disinterestedness as now to express any faith in it. In the judgment of Lord Derby, "the foolishness and the virulence of each view do not leave much to choose between them." He proceeded,—“If I could from this place address the English people, I would venture to ask them how they can expect to have a foreign policy, I do not say far-sighted, but even consistent and intelligent, if within eighteen months the great majority of them are found asking for things directly contradictory.”—*T.*, April 11th, 1878.

Lord Derby, who is too observant not to acknowledge the revolution of feeling denied by Mr. Gladstone, seemed to look upon it merely as an illustration of the inherent capriciousness, if not of all public opinion, of English public opinion.—*P. M. G.*, April 13th, 1878.

The correctness of the conclusion that the current of Public Opinion had suffered an entire reversal may well be questioned.²

Sovereign to whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil ; our absolute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have a form of Government which in many points is purely democratic, and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The Cabinet is the authority which decides in the first instance, and it decides in secret, and it rightly maintains its secrecy to the utmost, but the authority to which you must appeal from the Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in the open field. If they are to be rightly informed you must deal fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communications between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it and you may be adversely affected by it. You might as well say that you will allow a trial to go wrong because counsel hesitated to tell the jury the whole truth as it appeared to him, lest some one outside should be offended or discouraged by the language used. I therefore demur entirely to the general doctrine laid down, as I understand.”—*H. of L.*, May 12th, 1885.

¹ Speech in the House of Lords, April 8th, 1878. *Post.*

² *Ante*, p. 39.

As we shall see, at the time Lord Derby spoke, there had been extraordinary manifestations of anti-Russian feeling, and the advocates of the policy of furthering, instead of resisting the emancipation of the Christian provinces from the rule of Turkey were well-nigh silenced. The partisans of the policy of supporting Turkey against Russia, loudly insisted that the country had come round to their views. But there were many who held that the change was in seeming only, and that the real opinion of the country was only silenced, not convinced.

The *Times* comments as follows:—

The accusation is not unnatural in the mouth of an ex-Foreign Secretary, but we should despair of discovering a way out of this terrible Eastern labyrinth if it could be held entirely just. When England blazed into indignation at the Turkish mode of suppressing the Bulgarian insurrection, her demand simply was that the Porte should be deprived of power it had always abused; the English public did not ask Russia to execute the commission of Europe. Exactly in the same strain, when Russia crushes the Ottoman forces and manifests an intention to replace the Turkish Empire by her own, Englishmen desire to prevent such a result; but no one has ventured to assert that the authority of the Porte should be restored where it has been destroyed. This country is resolved that, so far as in it lies, it will, to adopt Lord Salisbury's definition, which Mr. Gladstone warmly applauded, of British policy, strive to secure good government, assured peace and freedom, for the Christian provinces of Turkey. It has protested against the Treaty of San Stefano because terms which on their face aim simply at substituting Russian influence for Turkish cannot be supposed favourable to the main object the English people desires. But the country necessarily leaves it to its Ministers to find a common term for the two ends it insists upon. —*T.*, April 11th, 1878.

The occasion is made by the *Pall Mall Gazette* the text for a discourse on the incompetency of Public Opinion to guide in such matters, and the evils of accepting it as a guide.

We are bound to say that the Statesman who habitually looks upon the public as his "employers," and who thinks too much of what is "almost dangerous" at periods of public commotion, will always find himself in Lord Derby's perplexity about public opinion. . . . There is a most undoubted and very direct connection between the Bulgarian atrocity agitation and the strong current of stern sentiment which is now running and perhaps mounting. Nobody can create habits of excitement in a nation with impunity. Public conscience and public sentiment have, in fact, never been at rest since they were stung into violent nervous activity by such stimulating diet as "Lessons in Massacre." . . . It is not two years since public opinion consisted

in shouting thousands crammed together at public meetings and in country booksellers buying Bulgarian pamphlets by the sheaf. Now it is to be found in the post-cards delivered at Mr. Gladstone's door, and in the applause of those mysterious assemblies called Conferences, of which it can only be said that they are not public meetings. Let nobody seek it in majorities of the House of Commons. It lies anywhere except in the regions where men congregate—not in London, not in Middlesex, not in Leeds, not even in Worcester; but far away in Scotland, or perhaps in Northumberland. Now this, we say, is little less than pitiable. . . . The fact is, that the task of pumping the cool water of truth over the victims of incendiary speeches was too much left to the forlorn hope of sceptical journalists. The great majority of leading English politicians have been shown by many subsequent events to have rightly judged the Russian policy and objects: Lord Derby was certainly under no false impression about them. But the plain truth is that most of them were cowed—Lord Derby, perhaps, by his theory that he is the journeyman of the public; others by that terror of the multitude which is visibly overcoming all English public life. One Statesman alone never concealed for a moment what his opinion was; and it is remarkable that he is the one eminent politician whom his detractors have charged with having no opinions whatever. The result is that Lord Beaconsfield is at the very pinnacle of popularity and power, while Lord Derby quits office preaching the very philosophy of political despair.—*P. M. G.*, April 13th, 1878.

There is reason to believe that not a little injustice is done to Public Opinion by the argument which would deny its capacity to rule on the ground that there is no stability in it. It is to be noticed that it is always *unorganised* Public Opinion whose infirmities are held up to scorn and whose influence over Foreign Secretaries is bewailed.

While even in foreign affairs English Ministers now stoop for a policy to "popular opinion," popular opinion is studiously led away from the contemplation of every circumstance, every contingency of a disquieting character. We shall allow ourselves to remark, parenthetically, that that is a system which cannot work to advantage. If popular opinion is to control foreign policy, or to shelter Foreign Ministers, it is necessary to adopt the Bismarckian manner—that is to say to make the country a confidant in policies, which it may otherwise baffle through ignorance.—*P. M. G.*, Nov. 3rd, 1875.¹

Throughout this period we find writers engaging themselves with the effort to find a means for reconciling the exigencies of foreign policy with the democratic idea. The problem is dealt with, in a spirit less hostile to the agency of Public Opinion than

¹ "Egypt for the English."

that shown by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in the paper on "Foreign Policy," already referred to¹ by Mr. Grant Duff—a name specially noteworthy in connection with the vindication of the Liberal Party from the charge of ignorance or carelessness about foreign affairs.

The sovereignty of Public Opinion according to writers of the school represented by the above extracts from the *Pall Mall Gazette* would consist in the facility with which a Foreign Secretary can be made to change his course according to each apparent change of mood out of doors; and the inference is suggested that owing to the absurdity of this he must be left to hold to his own course regardless of opinion out of doors altogether. But these are not exhaustive alternatives. A Statesman who too anxiously watched for every indication whereby haply he might guess at the popular desires, and attempted to govern himself accordingly, would often be entirely mistaken in his diagnosis, and he could hardly hope to conduct a consistent or intelligible policy. As a correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* observes, Public Opinion is a thing not easily measured. He adds:—

It is obvious that the balance of it, one way or the other, cannot be ascertained unless both parties in the State assist in the operation. No one can tell whether there is a slumbering echo at any given point unless he takes the trouble to shout.²

We have here an indication of two important conditions:—First, the formulation of an intelligible policy by an authoritative voice, and secondly, the existence of some machinery beyond mere guess-work for ascertaining how far Public Opinion responds.

Because in the absence of such conditions statesmen seeking Public Opinion are liable to be misled by light and inconstant voices, or it may be by factitious shouts, it by no means follows that it is impossible for Public Opinion to be organised on a basis that shall give due weight to its developed and reasoned elements, so that its deliberate verdict can be ascertained. Nor has it been made out that it is fraught with disaster to let such Public Opinion take effect in foreign affairs.

¹ Essays printed in *Practical Politics*, ante p. 60.

² *P. M. G.*, about April 15th, 1873. The writer continues:—"Had Lord Derby, instead of listening to the echo of other people's voices, opportunely and vigorously raised his own, it is conceivable that he would have saved Russia and Turkey a horrible and bootless war, and certain that he would at any rate, like the more courageous Prime Minister, have saved his own reputation and retained his own usefulness for a happier moment." But it is to be observed the Government had for a long time been shouting in an Anti-Russian strain. At first, so far from evoking an echo, the response was clearly hostile; and when at last the echo came it seems to have been a false one.

CHAPTER IV.

THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM.

Introductory.

LET us now proceed to the consideration of the various Notions with respect to the Eastern Question, which actually made themselves felt as factors of Public Opinion. For this purpose we call in the aid of the table¹ where they are enumerated and arranged in order.

It will be seen that there are a very great number of "Notions"; and that the broader "Views" into which they group themselves are six, which may be distinguished as Anti-Turkism, Order, Anti-War, Legalism, Anti-Russism, and Philo-Turkism. The number will be reduced to five if we regard Philo-Turkism as an aggravated form of the Anti-Russian view. The list of notions so arranged constitutes a kind of natural scale, and the analogy of the solar spectrum presents itself. And indeed this will be a convenient metaphor to make use of, for it will enable us shortly and concisely to speak in general terms of the "red notions" or "the violet notions" by reference to either end of the list.

Let us be allowed, purely arbitrarily, to speak of Anti-Turkism as occupying the violet, and Philo-Turkism the red end of the spectrum. We must remember that no mind was capable of perceiving at once the whole scale of notions; all suffered from a greater or less degree of colour-blindness. The inability, however, was not merely subjective, as some of the notions are logically inconsistent with each other.

In going through the list *seriatim* and quoting from contemporary writings, both to elucidate and to show that the notions which appear in the list actually existed as elements of the Public

Opinion of the time, we shall sometimes be able to separate a notion from its allies, but more often we shall find several allied notions closely involved together.¹ For some a few words or a reference to the list will suffice. Rather more must be said about others.

ANTI-TURKISM.

§ A.—*The Crusading Spirit.*

History affords many examples of the belief that community of religious faith creates a tie which ought to determine political alliances. The Crusades themselves are the great example of the capacity of this tie to maintain an offensive alliance. Long afterwards, though the Reformation had broken the visible unity of Christendom, the act of Francis I. in allying himself with the Turks against the House of Austria was looked upon as something little short of sacrilege. The relations between England and the Protestants of the Continent in the time of Elizabeth, James I., and Cromwell sufficiently show that community of faith was still regarded as a proper ground for affording political aid and comfort. Men have conceived Christendom as a unity transcending and underlying the separate portions into which it may be split up, and capable, upon occasion, of being welded into one mass for common defence against the infidel. Closely allied, or perhaps the same thing in a modernised form, is the conception of Europe as a congeries of peoples, marked by a common Aryan descent, a common acceptance of juridical notions derived from the Roman law, and a common acceptance, not so much of Christian faith, as of Christian morality. From these points of likeness there has arisen a substantial agreement about conduct, a European civilisation and morality based upon the institution of the family, which forbids polygamy and slavery and which is averse to cruelty and bloodshed. Hence to Europeans there is something shocking in the spectacle of any European people being subjected to people of a lower type of civilisation, if such political subjection means persecution for the European religion, a check to the development of the European civilisation, or outrages on the European morality. All Europeans will feel concerned to bring such subjection to an

¹ Of course quotations which are made for the express purpose of *isolating* one idea must not be taken as fair representatives of the whole position of their authors.—Mr. Freeman (*Contemporary Review*, Feb., 1877) distinguishes and describes many of the factors of opinion.

end. It will be observed that the word "European" is no mere geographical term. Just as it includes the great off-shoots beyond seas so on the other hand it includes much that first became European by adoption. It is a striking fact that Europe's characteristic religion sprang from a Semitic source.

Jurists find the germ of International Law in the fundamental agreement about conduct of the European nations as contrasted with others.

The European law of nations is mainly founded upon that community of origin, manners, institutions, and religion which distinguished the Christian nations from the Mahometan world.—Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations*, p. 555.

Again, we find that the term Christendom is used by modern Statesmen to mark the same conception. Lord Clarendon warned the Sultan that he might render it impossible for England to "overlook the exigencies of Christendom."¹ The "Capitulations" by virtue of which each European Power exercises through its Consuls its own jurisdiction over its subjects sojourning in Turkey are another recognition of the same thing. They show that the European Powers are not content to leave such of their subjects as business or pleasure may take within Turkish territory to be dealt with according to the maxims of a non-European jurisprudence. It is worth observing, too, how often in common usage Turkey is spoken of not as one of, but in contradistinction to, the European Powers.

The notions which we call the "Crusading Spirit" and the "Historic Instinct" are nothing but the application of these general considerations to the facts of the particular case.

In some instances special prominence was given to the expression of the Crusading Spirit. In others we find it alluded to somewhat apologetically.

No one ought to think it strange that the cries of suffering Christians should touch the hearts of their fellow-Christians. . . . We may frankly confess, therefore, that, as Christians, we feel impatient when we see a Christian population trampled upon by Mussulman rulers.—*Rev. J. Llewelyn Davies*.²

There is no shame in saying that it is only natural that that duty should be more keenly felt when the victims are Christians, just as any duty is more keenly felt towards a friend, kinsman, or

¹ Despatch of Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of 25th Feb., 1853. Kinglake, i. 126. (cab. ed.)

² *Religious Aspects of the Eastern Question*. Eastern Question Association Papers, No. 2.

countryman, than a duty which is abstractedly the same can be felt towards a perfect stranger. I can see no shame in allowing a community of religion between ourselves and the sufferers to strengthen a feeling which would be righteous were the sufferers of any other religion. . . . My own feeling would simply come to this: while I should feel a call to help Jews, Parsees, or Hindoos, in the same case I feel a still stronger call to help Christians.—E. A. Freeman, *Contemp. Rev.* Feb. 1877.

The persistent assertion that the body of English Liberals who are on the Russian side, or rather against the Turk, are sympathising with a crusade, is unjust, not to say petulant. They are on the Russian side simply because, all things considered, and without the slightest general bias in favour of Russia, much less of despotism or of bigotry, they happen to be convinced that the cause of humanity, which has sometimes to put up with very questionable quarters, is on the present occasion in the camp of the Czar. . . . We may surely, without fanaticism or any regard for dogma, prefer a monogamic and industrial to a polygamic and predatory race.—Goldwin Smith, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1877.

§ B.—*The Historic Instinct.*

Closely allied to the Crusading Spirit is what may be called the Historic Instinct. In this notion we get the first glimpse of the special importance of Constantinople, which was with many the last word in the Eastern Question. There is a suggestion of some special unfitness in the fact that the "New Rome" is subjected to barbarian dominion, and this aspect of the notion may be compared with the way in which men of poetic and artistic temperament chafed half a century before at the thought of Greek subjection to Turkey. But this concern about territory, from an historical sentiment, was of very little importance compared with concern about the people of kindred race and civilisation.¹

When the men who endure these wrongs are brethren in the Christian faith, trodden down by misbelievers; when they are sharers in the blood, the speech, the historic memories of Europe, trodden down by barbarian invaders; when the lands to be set free are the old historic seats of Greek intellect and Roman rule; when our mission is to free the throne of Constantine from a barbarian intruder, and to cleanse the church of Justinian from the defilement of a false worship—I feel no shame to say that all this makes me feel more keenly a duty which, were all these motives absent, I should still feel to be a duty. This may be sentiment, passion, enthusiasm, or any other name that any adversary chooses. Sentiment, passion, enthusiasm, are parts of the nature of man.—E. A. Freeman, *Contemp. Rev.* Feb. 1877.

¹ The Bulgarians had become European by adoption.

We are not entitled to use in illustration of the Public Opinion of 1876—1878 what was written of nearly half a century before. But the circumstances are so parallel, and the analogy is so close, that it is impossible to refrain from quoting Alison's comments on the battle of Navarino. Indeed it is hardly wrong to say that the sentiment he describes and sympathised with is in a sense the very same as that of 1876—1878. For anti-Turkism is a perennial view as long as Turkish dominion lasts over any European people.

Never, save by the taking of Jerusalem in 1199 by the crusading warriors under Godfrey of Bouillon, had so unanimous a feeling of exultation pervaded the Christian world. . . . Opinions in England were somewhat divided, from the obvious increase which it gave to the preponderance of Russia in the East; but on the Continent the rejoicing was universal. . . . The fleets of Asia had been sunk in the deep, and its armies had wasted away in the struggle; a single day had secured the independence of Greece, and restored her to her place in the European family. Such a result was felt by every generous bosom to be the fit subject of exultation. In vain did political considerations intervene; in vain did the caution of statesmen stigmatise this glorious achievement as "an untoward event." The chilling phrase, the unworthy sentiment, was drowned in the universal shout of Christendom. A voice superior to worldly wisdom made itself heard; a feeling deeper than the desire for national advantage was generally experienced. The cause of religion and humanity was felt to have been at stake, and men were thankful that, after so many alliances had been formed for the purposes of ambition and national rivalry, one at last had been found where nations were banded together in defence of the oppressed, and the sword of Christendom had been drawn to rescue one of its families from destruction.—Alison, *Hist. of Eur.*

We may, indeed, for purposes of analysis, distinguish between the Crusading and the Historical notions, but in the mouth of the Jurist or the Statesman the words "Europe" and "Christendom," if not absolutely synonymous, express but slightly differing aspects of the same fact. Whichever aspect was uppermost in a particular mind, the conception of the Turks as different in religion, and of the Turks as alien in civilisation from the Europe to which the men of the subject provinces belonged, practically always went hand in hand to reinforce one another. The faint boundary line that distinguishes the "Crusading" and "Historical Spirit" from "Humanity" is passed when the desire to liberate fellow Christians and fellow Europeans from Mahometan and Asiatic rule is felt,

not solely, or chiefly because the rule is infidel or alien, but because it is also incurably vicious and leaves men who happen to be Christians and Europeans no room to live their lives in security and happiness. The three notions, which may be regarded as the primary factors of anti-Turkism, generally went pretty much together, and together constituted the main strength of that View. The other anti-Turkish notions came in to reinforce the conclusions or to justify the policy to which these three pointed; but of themselves they would never have aroused the passion and enthusiasm which the first three evoked.

The Crusading and Historic notions collectively often found expression in the phrase "the Turk is non-European." Sometimes the phrase "the Turk cannot reform" was used as an equivalent. The meaning was that the root of the evil was not so much Turkish misgovernment as Turkish government over a people of European stock and religion. The acceptance or rejection of the doctrine implied by these phrases will be found to be one of the main dividing lines of the controversy.

Reform in this sense was equivalent to becoming European by adoption. The word pointed to methods of government which it was urged a Mahometan power could not adopt from the nature of its creed. Such a power, it was said, governing a mixed population, could only be true to the first principles of political justice as understood by Europeans by being false to the first principles of its religious creed.¹ But the persuasion that the Turks could not reform bore another aspect, namely, that of special ineradicable vices inherent in the Turkish government, and this last aspect was not very clearly distinguished from that first alluded to.

Thus there arose a controversy as to "the capacity of the Turks to reform." What really was urged was, on one side, that there were democratic and tolerant elements in the Turkish polity, and, on the other, that, even if this were so, the Ottomans in Turkey were a governing race, holding a race of another faith in subjection; and that under such circumstances, the more democratic the government of a governing race, the worse it is for the governed; but that, in fact, the government of the Turkish Pashas was incurably vicious and corrupt. Thus nothing short of emancipation from the yoke of the Pashas was adequate to cure the evils which the Provincials groaned under.

¹ Compare preface to second edition of Freeman's *History of the Saracens*, published in 1876 (Macmillan), and see review in *Times*, Oct. 19th, 1876.

The great exponent of this argument was Mr. E. A. Freeman, and it appears constantly in the numerous writings which he contributed to the controversy. The first article from which we quote is noteworthy, on account of the time at which it appeared, and the influence it undoubtedly had in forming Public Opinion.

I have in the course of this article more than once, of set purpose, made use of phrases which I know will provoke controversy. I have called the Turks barbarians. I have called them an invading horde. . . . The one point to be clearly understood is, that the state of things in South-Eastern Europe is not an ordinary case of government, good or bad. It is a case of subjection to a Power which has no right to be called a government at all The evil is far too deeply rooted for any mere attempts at reform to mend it. The truth is that no real reform can be made as long as Mahometans, whether Turks by blood or not, bear rule over men of any other religion. . . . The Turk, then, must go, or he must cease to be a Turk. As he is not likely to cease to be a Turk, it is enough to say he must go. It does not follow that he need go all at once. From Servia he has gone already. Bosnia and Herzegovina have given him notice to quit, and from them he must go at once. It will be time for him to go from Bulgaria and Albania when Bulgaria and Albania give him notice to quit also. But Bosnia and Herzegovina have made up their minds that they will get rid of him or perish. Which of these two alternatives is to take place is the true Eastern Question.—*E. A. Freeman*.¹

The Turks came in 500 years back as an invading horde, and an invading horde they have ever since remained. They have neither assimilated themselves to the people of the land, nor have they assimilated the people of the land to themselves. The distinction between the conqueror and the conquered, the oppressor and the oppressed, is as broad now as it was when the first Ottoman crossed the Hellespont. And so it ever must be as long as a Mahometan minority bears rule over a majority of Christians or of men of any other religion. Herein is the great lesson of experience, the lesson which philanthropists and pedants understand, but which those who sneer at them appear unable to understand. The Turk cannot reform. If he would reform, he must first cease to be a Turk. People talk of liberal Turkish statesmen, of the spread of Western Ideas, of reforms, concessions, this and that pretty sounding phrase. But the light of experience proves all such talk to be moonshine.—*E. A. Freeman*.²

If we are to form any just estimate of the Turk's capacity for reform it will be necessary to observe the attitude of the Koran towards this question. At first sight all looks hopeful. There is an air of sententious philanthropy about it it breathes the

¹ "The True Eastern Question," *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1875.

² Letter to *P. M. G.* June 8th, 1876.

very essence of the purest democracy, and establishes a community in which all outward distinctions vanish in the presence of religion. But the most casual observation reveals the fact that these benefits are reserved for co-religionists alone. Here is the flaw. . . . Each promise of reform extorted by Western Diplomacy is glibly made by Parisian-taught Pashas, who know its value. But it is resented as an impious insult to their creed by the fanatics who form the bulk of the nation.—*Fraser's Mag.* July, 1876.¹

§ C.—*Humanity.*

The word "Humanity" is often used in the sense of simple hatred of cruelty, bloodshed, and oppression. It is quite certain that this feeling has been a very powerful factor in English politics. Hallam² in reference to the Marian persecution speaks of the English as "constitutionally humane," and endorses Burnet's suggestion that their dislike to Romanism is due to their horror of that persecution. Macaulay says we have become "not only a wiser, but also a kinder people," and goes on to speak of our "sensitive and restless compassion."³

The weak point in the temperament of England is now fully disclosed. It is an incontinence of sympathy showing itself by hysterical sobs and cries.—*P. M. G.*, Oct. 17, 1876.⁴

Humanity as an element of English political opinion probably comes out in its strongest form when a government is cruel, and its subjects are the victims. The settled resolve against extending the extradition laws to political offences may witness to the strength of this feeling. So a government which makes use of cruel or excessive punishments will draw down a great amount of English ill-feeling upon itself and its agents. The unpopularity of Austria in England twenty or thirty years ago was probably more owing to the idea people had of Italians languishing in "Austrian dungeons," than to any purely political wish for Italian unity. If there is any question of cruelty to *women* the symptoms are marvellously heightened, as was shown when General Haynau was attacked by the men employed at Barclay and Perkins's brewery. The case of Turkey was presented as one in which the Christian subjects were exposed not only to grinding extortion enforced by the most cruel means at the hands of the

¹ "The Koran v. Turkish Reform."

² *Hist. Eng.* (ed. 1872) vol. i. p. 106.

³ *Hist. Eng.* chap. iii. *ad fin.*

⁴ "The Competition of Barbarism."

Turkish officials, but also to outrages and crimes of the direst nature at the hands of the dominant race, outrages against which they were prevented from protecting themselves by carrying arms, and for which they were unable to obtain protection or redress from the law; and this, partly as the normal condition of things, partly as a measure of terrorism on the part of the Government. Hence it is not surprising that a very great body of English opinion should be excited when attention was drawn to the outrages to which the Provincials were subject.

Wherever one goes in the Turkish Empire one hears the same story of the inhabitants oppressed by exactions, of wanton cruelties perpetrated by the officials and the tax-farmers. . . . [The Porte guards against the dangers of local governors getting too strong by changing them very frequently.] A good governor—for there are good governors even in Turkey—is taken away just when he has begun to know something of his district, and all the sooner if it is suspected that he is popular there. A bad one . . . makes the most of his short tenure by squeezing every piastre he can out of his wretched subjects, whether by way of taxes or of plain downright extortion. And in both sets of cases all continuity and regularity of administration, all possibility of carrying out reforms, is destroyed by these frequent changes. From the unspeakable misery which this misrule causes, the Mahometan population suffers, not indeed so much as the Christian, because the former have more chance of protection from the courts of law, may carry arms, and are less liable to be robbed or bastinadoed by a brother Muslim, but still quite enough to entitle them to our earnest sympathy. It is surely a mistake in dealing with this question to endeavour to set creed against creed, and enlist European feeling on behalf of the Christians only. It is also a mistake to make the indictment against the Porte appear to rest on isolated acts of cruelty and revenge, however hideous. It rests upon a long course of misgovernment, persevered in after repeated warnings, which has reduced some of the richest countries in the world to beggary, which makes the lives of their inhabitants wretched, which produces the state of society wherein massacres, like that of May last, become possible.—James Bryce, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

What kind of treatment it is that Turkish rule carries with it Englishmen may learn from the letters from Ragusa in the *Times*. . . . One necessary accompaniment of Turkish rule is what the Greek poet sang of in Byron's day:—

παίδων παρθένων γυναικῶν ἀνήμετος φθορεία.

"Every pretty girl," so I heard at Ragusa, "is carried off, as a matter of course." It was a specially foul outrage of this kind which immediately led to the revolt.—E. A. Freeman, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1875.

It must be allowed that the champions of the Turk have one great advantage in all these disputes. There are some crimes which are protected by their own foulness. . . . The hearts of the men who are now fighting for all that is just and holy against the powers of darkness have been turned to steel, their blood turned to flame, by wrongs compared to which the wrongs of Icilius and Virginia might hardly seem to have deserved the yells and the pelting which fell upon the head of Appius Claudius.—E. A. Freeman, *D. N.* July 13th, 1876.

Europe is astounded to find that it has within its confines a race—races, perhaps, it should be said, for more than one goes to make up the Turk—capable of worse things than even the African or the Red Indian. Against neither of these is it alleged that they do more than fighting men have ever done against fighting men. The worst incidents of warfare among those who are called “savages” in any part of the world hardly exceed the Homeric standard. Military details from Central Africa or Central America are full of horrors, but not unreadable, for they are the favourite reading of many pure-minded persons. On the contrary, the Bulgarian details are a new chapter in human nature—new, that is to say, to those who happen not to be versed in Tartar or Turkish history. Turkey, unable to trust arms to the greater part of her population, just as she is unable to trust them with office or power, holds her ground by what may be called brute means—worse than brute, it should be said. She can let loose on the people a deluge of rapine the instant they rise against her hateful yoke; and she trusts that the horrible nature of the weapons she employs may make a widespread impression. A good many millions are cowed and kept in what Englishmen would feel to be a bondage by the thought of what might happen, not to soldiers, or even to citizens, but to women and children. The Turkish rule is to regard the wife and the daughter as hostages for the obedience of the husband and the father.—*T.* Sept. 8, 1876.

The anti-Turkish view in its aspect of revolt against inhuman cruelties committed by a people alien to European civilisation and Christian morality appeared in many newspaper columns, and in many magazines. But it finds perhaps its most eloquent expression in passages from Mr. Gladstone's two pamphlets:—¹

Let me endeavour very briefly to sketch, in the rudest outline, what the Turkish race was, and what it is. It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race. They are not the mild Mahometans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain. They were upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as their

¹ Published by Murray, London.

dominion reached, civilisation disappeared from view. They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by law. For the guide of this life they had a relentless fatalism, for its reward hereafter a sensual paradise. They were, indeed, a tremendous incarnation of military power. This advancing curse menaced the whole of Europe.—Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*.¹

The lesson which the Turkish Government has conveyed to its Mahometan subjects by its conduct since last May in the matter of the Bulgarian rising, cannot be more pithily or more accurately expressed than in the three short English words, "Do it again." My charge is, that this lesson was conveyed; and not only conveyed, but intended to be conveyed. . . . Again then, I repeat the accusation. The Turkish Government, which debases its subjects when they submit, and by its agents plunders, violates and murders them 'at its own sweet will' from time to time, has a more developed and consistent method for seasons of crisis. On the occasions when they rise, as in Bulgaria, it exhausts upon them, it must be deliberately said, all the resources of a wickedness more fiendish than human, either by instigation beforehand, which is not yet proved, or by reward, protection, sanction afterwards, which is proved. After the most solemn and reiterated pledges to endow them with equality of rights . . . it is inexhaustible, like Proteus, in ever new forms of evasion and escape, available to cozen none, except those who are, lazily or perversely, willing to be deceived.—Gladstone, *Lessons in Massacre*.²

It must not be supposed that such sweeping indictments against the Turks were allowed to pass unchallenged.

The pretence that the whole story of Ottoman rule is one unbroken tale of blackness is a simple outburst of fanatical rhetoric. We may go through the whole black catalogue of crime and cruelty which has stained even Christian nations in our quite modern times, and summon one after another to the bar of outraged humanity. . . . We learn that the crimes in Bulgaria differ in degree and not in kind from the crimes of Christian nations; and that none of the nations of Europe have the moral right to enter on a crusade.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.³

The *Quarterly Review* asks:—

Shall a whole family of mankind be cut off from our sympathy in order to sympathise the more with their victims? Shall we apply the rule only on the slopes of the Balkan, and not to the wilds of Circassia and Glencoe?—(Oct. 1876).

Mr. Malcolm Maccoll rejoins:—

What the Turkish atrocities have revealed and brought home to multitudes who never realised the fact before, is not that human

¹ Sept. 1876, *post*, chap. xii. § 3.

² March 1877, *post*, chap. xv. § 3.

³ "Cross and Crescent."

nature, be it Turkish, Russian or English, is capable in certain emergencies of doing frightful things, but that there is in the midst of us an organized political power of such a character that crimes against human nature are a necessary and a normal outcome of its existence. [Poland, Turkistan, Badajoz, Glencoe, these crimes are violations of the moral code professed and ordinarily acted on by Russia and Great Britain. They are things which have to be explained or apologised for, excused on plea of accident, misunderstanding, or dire necessity.] The very doers of them would admit that they were ugly blots on a system to which they were essentially foreign. But the atrocities of Batak are not foreign to the Turkish code of morals. They are part of it. They grow out of it as naturally as thorns out of a bramble bush. The Turk does not think them morally wrong, and when he condemns them it is not because they are wicked, but because they have been found out. The atrocities in Bulgaria are not one of those abnormal outbreaks of human nature which all nations have to lament; they are, on the contrary, nothing more than a grand representation or tableau of what goes on all the year round in detail over the whole area of the non-Mussulman population of Turkey.—*Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1876.

We recognised as springing out of the first two factors of anti-Turkism a certain hostility to Turkey as filling a place which might be occupied by a Christian and European State. But the conception of Turkey as non-European does not necessarily imply hostility to the Sultan or condemnation of his government; still less hostility to the Turkish people, excepting so far as the government or the people dominated or oppressed European lands or Christian populations. The persuasion that the government of the Turkish Pashas is incurably vicious and corrupt is the conception characteristic of the notion "Humanity." This conception seems necessarily to imply hostility to the government of the Pashas, and the notion that it would be good for the world to supersede it everywhere. Thus in one sense "Humanity" implied a more universal hostility to the Turkish Government than did the first two notions, but, on the other hand, it drew a broader distinction between the Turkish Pashas and the Turkish nation.

It is unnecessary to discuss whether this incapacity for reform is due to religion, or to race, or to both; but a protest may be made in passing against the notion that the Turks deserve to be driven out of Europe because they are Asiatics, as if the Magyars, for instance, were not Asiatics in almost the same sense as the Turks.—James Bryce, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

I believe the Turks, Pashas apart, to be an extremely fine race.—Sir G. Campbell, *Fort. Rev.* April, 1878.

When the Turk is gone, "bag and baggage"—that is, of course, the gang of official oppressors, not the Mahometan population, whom no one wishes to injure, and who may in truth be counted among the victims of the official Turk—when the Turk in this sense is gone, there will still be other difficulties to grapple with, difficulties which were in full force before he came.—E. A. Freeman, *Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1877.

It might seem the logical outcome of this notion to demand the supersession of the government of the Pashas everywhere, in Mahometan and Christian provinces alike. But however ill-governed the Turkish population might be, the wrongs of the Christians were tenfold greater, and the problem they presented was much more definite and easy of solution. Moreover there were manifold reasons for attacking it, and for disregarding in the case of the Christian provinces the general presumption against intervention. The same reasons did not apply to the Ottoman empire generally.

Thus practically the notion "Humanity" led men to the same result as that which was arrived at from the point of view of the "Crusading Spirit" or the "Historic Instinct"; to the result, namely, of thinking the emancipation of the Christian provinces important, rather than the remodelling of the Turkish Government generally. We shall see indeed that the attempt to reform the administration of the Ottoman empire generally was connected with Philo-Turkism and the policy of strengthening the hold of the Sultan upon all the provinces of his empire. Still it is significant to notice that the desire to supersede the Turkish Government, founded on the notion "Humanity," was not confined to the limits laid down by the Crusading and Historical notions, but seemed to extend to the case of Egypt, which, like the European provinces, presented a problem which might be solved apart from the fate of the Ottoman empire generally. There was a strong objection entertained from the anti-Turkish point of view to reinstating the authority of Constantinople in Egypt, while from the same point of view it was urged that the Fellahs should be withdrawn altogether from the yoke of the Pashas, and their government undertaken by England.

The notion "Humanity," regarded as standing alone, is the notion of the desirability that humane conduct should be enforced on the Turkish Government independently of the special grounds which were the foundation of the first two notions. In an article written, as representative of the views

of English working men we get the matter put pretty much on this ground.¹

With working men the question is not as to whether Turkey is necessary in order to maintain our highway to India, but rather "Has Turkey done right to the Christians in the Slav provinces?" If not, then the mass of the working people would declare in a voice of thunder "*Make her do it*, and we will settle the question as to the right of way to India afterwards."—George Howell in *Contemp. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

The antithesis to this position may be given in the words of Mr. Gathorne Hardy:—

Above all we feel that we who had been engaged ourselves by treaty, who have had no personal wrongs done to us, have no right and no commission, either as a country, or, I may say, from on High, to take upon ourselves the vindication by violence of the rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.—*H. of C.* April 13, 1877.

In the same sense Mr. Harrison wrote:—

The practical question, however, is not what is the exact moral culpability of the Ottoman system, but how does it make it our duty to interfere? Nor is this quite so easy a matter to answer as some people think. . . . It needs little to show what are the evils we incur when foreign nations sweep away any dominant race, destroy any oppressive government, or put down a system of religious injustice. . . . An era of general aggression and lawlessness would follow from the doctrine that, given a dominant class, oppression and misgovernment, it is the right of or duty of foreign nations to step in and crush it by arms. It is a doctrine which will scarcely be established in the public law of Europe by the rulers of Ireland and of Poland.—"Cross and Crescent," *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

Although it contains no express reference to it, the passage quoted from Mr. Harrison amounts in fact to a statement of the argument for non-intervention. The doctrine of the *jus naturale* seems to have fallen into some discredit; and it would be easy to show amongst what pitfalls we should be led by the maxim that it is morally incumbent on us to avenge its violation by arms. Still it is impossible to deny that such a maxim derives some countenance from the institution of our West African Slave Squadron, and it may be, that in an extreme case a healthy moral instinct will be a safer guide than rules which have been arrived at without

¹ In some of the exponents of this view we notice a trace of what we may call the Continental sense of the word Humanity, when it becomes the watchword of a movement.

taking into account just the event which has happened. After all, do the elaborate limitations which the text-writers put on the rule of "non-intervention," amount to more than saying it cannot apply in an extreme case?¹

However this may be, to return to the specific factors with which we have to deal, this notion, "Humanity," in the sense described, is the antithesis of the notion "Legalistic non-intervention," occurring somewhere near what we may call the "yellow" portion of the spectrum, to the consideration of which we shall come presently.

Humanity appears in the list as an anti-Turkish factor, but a similar sentiment, though in a vastly less degree, operated in a contrary direction. One effect in English politics of the general humane sentiment is to make English people ready to sympathise with the weaker side in a conflict between two nations. Thus in the list of red notions we shall come upon what was alluded to on one occasion as "the school-boy notion" of sympathy for the weaker, as a pro-Turkish element.²

Again the notion that Russia was a cruel power, especially with reference to the Poles, appears as one of the factors of the anti-Russian view.

The article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* (already quoted),³ entitled "The Competition of Barbarism" (October 17, 1876), is an example of the recrimination of charges of cruelty upon Russia. The writer, citing from Mr. Schuyler's account,⁴ contends that the Russian troops had been guilty in Turkestan in 1873 of worse than "Bulgarian horrors," and that should Russia occupy European Turkey there would still be "atrocities," though the victims would be different. Later, when the war broke out, charges of cruelties against the Russians appeared again and again.

If hypocrisy be indeed "a homage which vice pays to virtue," we may consider the immense pains which both parties in the present war are taking to bring home charges of wanton cruelty each to the doors of the other a tribute to the humanity of the rest of Europe generally, and England in particular. It is easy to see that these endeavours are made by Russians and by Turks not so much to vindicate their own characters, or in the cause of innocence, but because each perceives it is of political importance

¹ See J. S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," *Fraser*, 1859; reprinted in *Dissertations*, vol. iii.

² Compare the article in *Fraser's Mag.* Oct. 1875, quoted in § E, *post*, p. 92.

³ *Ante*, p. 79.

⁴ Cf. Mr. Gladstone's "Turkestan," which is a reply to the *P. M. G.* article, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1871.

to itself to awaken the sympathy of civilised communities in its cause, and to raise a correspondingly strong feeling amongst the same powerful witnesses against its opponents.—*Bath Chronicle* (about) Aug. 9, 1877.¹

But the result seemed to be that the public mind was surfeited so full of horrors that it failed to respond to the stimulus.

The public mind is far less eager for security against the continuance of all these horrors than it was. It is getting accustomed to the notion that an amount of lust, cruelty and plunder, which would make England a boiling sea of righteous passion, has a certain sort of geographical appropriateness in distant places between the Balkan and the Danube, and does not call for any very strenuous policy of repudiation. And therefore, though Mr. Gladstone's second pamphlet is infinitely more cogent and conclusive than the first, we much doubt whether it will have a proportionate effect.—“Comparative Atrocities,” *Spec.* March 17, 1877.

§ D.—*England's Special Responsibilities for Turkey's Good Behaviour.*

Let us pass on to the notion that England was under obligation to protect the Christian populations from ill usage, not as being generally commissioned from on High to redress human wrongs, but by reason of the special circumstances of this particular case. This was presented in several aspects. The Guildhall meeting² resolved:—

That the favour shown and the protection accorded for so many years by Great Britain to Turkey entail upon us grave responsibility for the acts of the Turkish authorities, and in view of this responsibility we urge upon the Queen's Government the necessity of taking immediate steps to obtain reparation for the wrongs already done, to prevent the recurrence of such atrocities as have recently been committed, and especially that the Government do all in its power to provide for the independence of Slavonic provinces now subject to the rule of Turkey.—(Sept. 18, 1876.)

The money spent and blood spilt for him [*i.e.* “the Turk”] twenty years ago have only served to prop up a little longer an execrable barbarism. England especially is responsible for this.

¹ Compare the following articles in *Punch*, which seems to represent the feeling of the time:—

July, 21, 1877, “Atrocities and Atrocities,” written against the *P. M. G.*, goes to show that the balance is heavily against the Turks.

July 28, “Poor Humanity”: a different tone; one of perplexity and regret that truth should be overlaid for party purposes.

Aug. 11, “Holding the Balance”: a dialogue between Mr. Punch and a philosopher; same tone as the article of July 21.

² *Post*, chap. xii. § 6.

It is now the duty of the working classes of this country to proclaim in an unmistakable voice that the direct rule of the Ottoman Government over the non-Mussulman Provinces must cease.—*Working Men's Address*. T. Dec. 15, 1876.

But I wish to point out that Lord Derby is not correct in saying we are no more answerable for the conduct of the Turks than other people. I say we are answerable in a manner that no other State in Europe is. I will endeavour to prove it to you by a very familiar illustration. Suppose I am afraid of my house being robbed, or some other calamity happening to it, and I keep a very fierce dog which flies at everybody and tears them to pieces. The law of this country, founded upon common sense, says—if I am not aware that dog is fierce I shall not be answerable for his acts, but if I am, and have the power of restraining him, I should be responsible.—*Mr. Lowe*.¹

Now supposing the Porte to be victorious, we cannot in fairness lose sight of those circumstances whence it has derived the means of victory, and whence, if not controlled, it may hope to enjoy a harvest reaped by its unsparing sword. Millions on millions extracted from the moneyed classes of Christendom since the Crimean War have enabled it to form those numerous battalions which are now in the fields of slaughter, and promises of reform proclaimed by authority and recorded in treaty have obtained for it the countenance and friendly protection of its Christian allies, on credit of performances hitherto but faintly and partially realised. Do not these undeniable facts confer a right—nay, even impose a duty of mediating with a firm resolution to carry into full effect the dictates of humanity and the principles of equitable government?—*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*.²

Mr. Goldwin Smith (*Contemporary Review*), Nov. 1877, speaks of the Sultan's fleet as "built with a part of the money stolen from his creditors."

With reference to the argument from the loans to Turkey, there seems no warrant for suggesting that a State is in general bound to assume any responsibility arising from private loans, but it had been understood by those who had lent money to Turkey that they did so with the approval of their Government; and perhaps this suggestion was intended as an argument addressed to the consciences of the bondholders to induce them to throw their individual influence in favour of the "Violet" policy. It is difficult to say whether, in fact, the bondholders collectively exercised any definite influence, or into which scale their weight was thrown. We cannot find that they contributed any one definite notion to Public Opinion. They

¹ At Croydon, D. N. Sept. 14, 1876.

² Letter to T. Sept. 9, 1876.

were often reckoned as a pro-Turkish element,¹ and it was said that they hoped, by speaking smoothly to the Turks, to obtain payment of at least some of their debt. On the other hand, the *Edinburgh Review*² appears to think the agitation against Turkey was the work of persons irritated by the loss of half the high rate of interest they had been receiving, and begs them to consider what would remain of their investment if the Turkish Empire were annihilated. The reviewer agrees that the Turkish power was to a great extent the creation of private English capitalists, but so far from drawing the conclusion that England lay under a special responsibility to curb the Turkish power, he argues that the bondholders should in mere consistency support it.

Lastly, this notion of special responsibility was deduced from one view of our obligations under the Treaties.

The claims of Neutral Powers to intervene in the government of Turkey have been long since established as a matter of fact. The Crimean War and the Treaty of 1856 settled that, not for the first time. Russia had obtained by previous Treaties the title and authority of protector of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and though we withstood, and successfully withstood, the abuse of the privileges of this position, we did not on that account hand over Slavs, Bulgarians, and Greeks to the unrestrained caprices of the Porte and its Pashas. The Guaranteeing Powers accepted, instead of Russia, the rights and responsibilities of the Protectorate of the Christians, and the Sultan, as a party to the Treaty of Peace, recognised and allowed this Protectorate. We have, therefore, not morally only, but as a matter of international law also, the power and the obligation to intervene to see that justice is done to the Christian subjects of the Porte. A single illustration will show the pertinence of this reflection. It is sometimes said that the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians rebelled and have been defeated, and they must endure the consequences of defeat. The Bulgarians were ready to rise against their rulers, and their nascent rebellion was stamped out—perhaps with some excess of severity; but are we the armed missionaries of civilisation to rectify every deed of cruelty done in the world? One answer of course is that if we withdrew our aid and countenance, the Turks could not do what they have been doing, whence arises a moral obligation on us to check their barbarities; but there is a legal right antecedent to this moral obligation. We are the trustees of the settlement under which these Bosnians and Bulgarians live. We have undertaken to look after their interests, and—as has been happily said—the Sultan is no more than a ward in Chancery, subject, as the lawyers would say, to a very strict impeach-

¹ *c.g.* by Arthur Arnold, *Contemp. Rev.* July, 1876.

² October, 1876.

ment of waste if he does not administer the property with full regard to the well-being of all his subjects.—*T.* Sept. 5, 1876.

It may be observed that just as we found the notion of "Non-Intervention" antithetical to "Humanity" so we shall find later on a notion, "Treaty Legalism," antithetical to this notion of "Treaty Responsibility." The question of the true construction of the Treaties was debated at length, and the two opposed interpretations were enunciated over and over again, in Parliament and out of it, on various occasions.

§ E.—*Nationality.*

In attempting to reduce the factors of the Eastern Question to fundamental questions, we find that these questions are largely concerned with facts of race. Again, questions of race are closely connected with questions of Nationality. It seems appropriate to take as the next of the constituent notions of anti-Turkism the application to the case in hand of the doctrine of Nationality that is to say, the doctrine that unity of race is the best foundation for political unity.

There has been in recent years a rise of the feeling that the aspiration for a national unity, which shall correspond to a race unity, is an aspiration to be sympathised with; and there has been a corresponding discrediting of the doctrine of the previous two centuries—the Balance of Power. The aim of this last principle was not, as sometimes appears absurdly to be supposed, to make all States equal, but to secure their independence by so regulating their size that no one of them should be able to dominate a coalition of the rest. This, as the Duke of Argyll points out, is not an immoral aim;¹ but the attempt to preserve a balance had sunk into disrepute, and it was the fashion to denounce it as an old-world device of an effete diplomacy. Mr. John Bright spoke of it "as a ghastly phantom."² The doctrine was regarded too as immoral because it subjected populations to one government rather than another without any regard to their wishes. In this aspect there is a connection between the doctrine of Nationality and the humane sentiment.

With respect to the danger of a universal monarchy from the tendency to aggregation which the doctrine of Nationality allows,

¹ "Morality in Politics," *Contemp. Rev.* July, 1877, p. 323.

² Speech at Birmingham, Jan. 13, 1878.

it has been pointed out¹ that this doctrine carries bane and antidote together. If, on the one hand, it favours the formation of immense States which from their vastness might well aspire to universal empire, on the other it sets bounds to their growth which they may not overstep.

The Liberal party of late years has rather inclined to the doctrine of Nationality, and against that of the balance of power.

There is some ground for attributing the reverse position to the opposite party.

[The late] Lord Derby took occasion to comment with severity upon the conduct of the Government [in approving the events then passing, by which the unity of Italy was being achieved]. Speaking of the unity of nationalities he said, "No doubt all the people in Italy might be called Italians,

As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
Shoughs, water-rugs and demi-wolves, are cleped
All by the name of dogs."—(Feb. 5, 1861).²

The fatal error of Tory policy has always been that it has based national settlements on dynastic arrangements regardless of the sympathies of the people who were the subjects of the transaction. Austria expiated in Italy, by long years of disaster, this capital mistake. She may yet suffer the same bitter experience from dreams of Slavonic aggrandisement. The policy of the Liberal party has been exactly the reverse. They have sought, in the contentment of autonomous and homogeneous races, the solid foundation of tranquillity and peace.—*Sir Wm. Harcourt*.³

Italy seems to regard it as her special rôle in Europe to champion the doctrine of Nationality in much the same way that France was supposed to be the appropriate champion of a democratic form of government, and England of personal liberty. We had occasion to notice the antithesis between the notion of Humanity and Non-Intervention. Now the notion of Humanity, particularly if the word assume its Continental tinge of meaning, is closely related to the notion of Nationality. That non-intervention should appear as the antithesis of Nationality need therefore not surprise us. To illustrate this point we naturally turn to Mazzini.

Having denied the idea of nationality—soul of the new epoch—and substituted his personal potency for that of a principle, the genius, energy and prestige of the first Napoleon vanished on the first interruption of his victorious career. . . . A similar fate

¹ By Professor Seeley.

² *Annals of our Times*, p. 593.

³ At Liverpool, Oct. 6, 1879.

awaits England should she persist in cancelling from her external policy that principle of liberty which was the source of her power, and still inspires her internal life. [He traces the attempts to find a guiding principle of international action after Catholicism had lost its influence. Of these attempts the most important is that which looks to the balance of power.] All of these systems—the issue of the materialistic idea—were foredoomed to perish in impotence, anarchy and crime. . . . At the present day, the nations, as if in despair of finding any remedy for the ever-recurring conflict, are inclining, under the guidance of England, to the theory of *non-intervention*, a theory which is founded upon no principle, but is the negation of every principle hitherto accepted (intellectually at least) by humanity—the unity of God and of the moral law, the unity of the human family and of the aim set before us all, the fraternity and association of the peoples, and the duty of combating evil and promoting the triumph of good.¹

It is clear that immediately before the recrudescence of the Eastern Question the inclination in England was to regard the tendency to the aggregation of great States on the lines of Nationality, if not with actual complacency, yet as one against which it was in vain to struggle, and which could be no more than regulated.

To understand the aspirations and ideas of Russians we must endeavour to put ourselves for the moment in their places. . . . What Russia urgently needs is first of all a settlement of the all-important Slavonic Question, of which the Eastern Question is but a part. It is most desirable that this subject should be thoroughly comprehended by Englishmen, and that we should rid ourselves of the ordinary schoolboy view of the question—that of great, strong, cruel Russia bullying poor weak inoffensive Turkey. —*Fraser's Mag.* Oct. 1875.

Viewed in the light of such a doctrine, the claims of the Provincials to be emancipated from Turkish rule, and to be constituted in some form or other into States of Slav Nationality, was a legitimate one, the satisfaction of which would tend to the tranquillity of Europe. In this last aspect we get an affinity with the notions yet to be spoken of which point to the preservation of the *peace* of Europe as the great end to be accomplished. We note, too, that this notion treats Russian impatience of Turkish oppression as a natural, nay, commendable, feeling. It sympathises with it so far as to admit its claim to be satisfied.

The Continental doctrine of Nationality, as a general principle

¹ "Letters on International Policy," translated in the *Fort. Rev.* April, 1877. (Compare a letter from Mazzini, *T. Feb.* 8, 1876.)

applicable to all cases, probably has not very much vitality in England. It was said in Italy that England was incapable of dealing with the East because she did not understand Nationality. But in this special case, no doubt there were those who recognised its appropriateness. On the other hand, a somewhat revolutionary flavour was associated with it, and in so far as anything like Pan-Slavism was supposed to be involved it is probable that the idea of any connection between the Eastern Question and the doctrine of Nationality operated rather to increase suspicion of Russia. There was a tendency to despise the Slavonic enthusiasm of race, even among some who thoroughly believed in its genuineness.

It is a strange instance of the force of national jealousy, that Englishmen, who understood and applauded the career of Garibaldi, should sneer at the Russian enthusiasm for the Christians of Turkey. But inasmuch as the Russian people are far more religious, or rather more theological, than the Italian—are in a far lower state of civilisation, and thus more liable to the stupid fanaticism of race . . . we have every ground for believing that their sympathy with their brethren across the Danube is of a more passionate kind than any we have seen in Italy.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876, p. 721.¹

On the other hand Mr. Freeman, in an article in which he examines into the foundation of the notion of race, regards this sentiment as far less primitive.

The plain fact is that the new lines of scientific and historical inquiry which have been opened in modern times have had a distinct and deep effect upon the politics of the age. . . Ethnological and philological researches have opened the way for new national sympathies, new national antipathies, such as would have been unintelligible a hundred years ago.—*Contemp. Rev.* March, 1877.²

§ F.—*The Open Sore must be Healed.*

In passing from the wish to help an oppressed people, whether because they are conceived of as bound to us by ties of blood or of religion, or from a simple humane feeling, to the notion that to set up Slav Nationalities would ultimately tend to the benefit of Europe, we seem to be leaving the region of what has been called sentiment for the region of diplomatic calculation. In the remaining notions of anti-Turkism we shall find that this characteristic

¹ "Cross and Crescent." Compare with this the introduction to the first volume of the sixth (Cabinet) edition of Kinglake's *Crimean War*, dated Dec. 20, 1876.

² "Race and Language," reprinted in *Hist. Essays*, Third Series.

is more marked, and that the emancipation of the provincials from Turkish rule is pointed to, not so much for the sake of the provincials, as for the sake of other people. This notion, so far as the ultimate end is concerned, has much in common with the view presently alluded to as "Order," but it differed in its conception of the appropriate treatment. "Order" was content that the malady should be suppressed by driving the symptoms inwards, while the notion we are considering, regarded as an element of anti-Turkism, was a conviction that nothing short of an heroic remedy would go to the root of the evil.

Obviously things cannot go on as they have done. Europe cannot tolerate such open sores as these chronic insurrections in what might be some of her fairest lands. The grim resolution of the Herzegovinians to perish or flee the land to a man rather than yield again to the Turk is itself enough.—A. J. Wilson, *Macmillan's Mag.* Dec. 1875.

The dangers of the *status quo* are now at least distinctly greater than the dangers of action. . . . The arguments that the Ottoman rule is abominably evil; that whilst it remains unchanged and controlled, Eastern Europe must continue in a hopeless ferment; that Russia must certainly open war unless it is controlled; that the existence of this rule is practically the work of ancient and continuing interferences—these arguments would seem now to overpower the risks of entering on a course of which no man can foretell the end, of proclaiming the doctrine that evil governments are to be controlled by foreign neighbours. . . . It is idle any longer to dream of the *status quo* in Turkey as a guarantee for the peace of Europe, for it is become its principal disturbing cause.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.¹

This notion seems to involve the assumption that Turkish government in the provinces could be abolished without a serious disturbance, which is directly contrary to the notion we shall have to speak of presently—that Turkey, if pushed too hard, would raise a Jihad.

§ G.—*The Concert of Europe.*

Closely connected with the last is the notion which saw the path of safety in collective action by the European Powers as the alternative to the otherwise inevitable single-handed action on the part of Russia. By preserving the "Concert of Europe" it was thought the danger of serious conflict would be averted, either with the Ottoman Power, or among the supporters of rival schemes

¹ "Cross and Crescent."

for dealing with it. Turkey, it was said, would not resist the collective pressure of Europe. Hence the importance of maintaining the European Concert, and the unwillingness in many quarters to embark England in any course of pressure except jointly with all the other Powers of Europe. This notion assumed importance in the position taken by some of the leading members of the Opposition.

There are various forms of external foreign intervention, some more effective in the opinion of many and some more stringent than others; but what I think we ought to keep in view, and the great distinction which we ought to bear in mind is, that intervention of the mildest kind by any single Power is fraught with the greatest possible danger to the peace of Europe, but that intervention even of a much more stringent character, if made by the unanimous consent of the whole of Europe, although it too may have its dangers and difficulties, is still a far less dangerous course to be adopted.—*Lord Hartington*.¹

There is another aspect of this notion, that namely, which welcomes any collective or judicial European action as an approach to "The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World."

The more *judicial* the proceedings of the Six Great Powers, the more beneficial will be their operations. Nay, it may be hoped that at this crisis the basis may be laid for an International Tribunal, which shall mediate authoritatively in the future quarrels of European States. If this end can be won, the present affliction may become an auspicious beginning of a wiser and happier conjunction.—F. O. Newman, *Fraser*, Oct. 1876.²

While, as it thus appears, there were those to whom the "Concert of Europe" was welcome, not merely on account of the object it was to attain in this particular instance, but because it seemed to be a step towards the international organisation destined to exist "When the war drums throb no longer, and the battle flags are furled," there were others to whom this "Concert of Europe" seems to have been obnoxious as being hostile to national independence.

Hatred of the "Holy Alliance" was, as we shall see, an important element of the anti-Russian view. There appear to have been some who saw in the attempt to bring about the "Concert of Europe" a taint of the Holy Alliance, and an approach to the state of things of which Canning's biographer speaks in the following passage.

In short, a new era had commenced in the history of the world—a system of governing Europe by congresses, instead of by

¹ Speech at Keighley, Nov. 3, 1876.

² "Cause and object of the Crimean War."

separate and independent governments was established. A scheme was formed, and actually begun to be put in operation, to destroy throughout the globe the just freedom of the people.—Stapleton's *Canning*, vol. i. p. 62.

Russia was regarded as the moving spirit of this revived coalition, and it was assumed that the almost preternatural cunning attributed to her diplomacy would ensure for her the practical dominion of Europe.

Shall we support the scheme for establishing an extra-national Government of Europe, or shall we fight to preserve our liberties?—*Lord Robert Montagu*.¹

Thus in "anti-Russism" we find factors antithetical to the "Concert of Europe." We meet, too, with another instance of the far-reaching consequences of the acceptance or rejection of the doctrine "The Turk is non-European"; for this dread of a revived Holy Alliance taking upon itself to keep in check and manage the affairs of all the European peoples, had no application to the Eastern Question except in the eyes of those who refused to recognise the essential difference between Turkey and the other countries of Europe.

§ H.—*The Provincials may be made a Barrier against Russian Aggression.*

In this, the last of the notions of anti-Turkism, we get the first distinct appearance of anti-Russian feeling. We make acquaintance with the idea of Russia as the bugbear of Europe. In this instance the idea takes the specific shape of the belief that Russia is a Power naturally inclined to aggression, who must be deprived of all opportunity or shadow of an excuse.

Nothing can be clearer than this, that the more reason we have, or believe we have, for suspecting the ultimate designs of Russia, the more prompt we ought to be in admitting all reasonable demands that may be put forth by it. The way to check Russia's unreasonable demands is to anticipate and admit all that she can fairly claim. It is undeniable that the Government of the Czar is more than justified in insisting upon the necessity of Turkey giving security for the accomplishment of the reforms promised by the Porte.—*T.* Oct. 23, 1876.

The opportunity, too, which the state of the Christian, and especially of the Slav, populations affords Russia for ostentatiously displaying *sympathy*, and so increasing her *influence* in those

¹ *England and the Eastern Question*, p. 316 (compare p. 326).

quarters, is regarded as affording her dangerous scope for applying the doctrine of Nationality in her own favour.¹

But this notion comprises more than the mere removal of opportunities for Russia. It contemplates the setting up of a check or counterpoise, and in this aspect it is the conception that the best check to Russia in those regions will be to substitute free Christian States for the moribund Turkish Power. Whether the whole of Turkey in Europe should eventually pass from under Mahometan rule, or whether the Sultan should remain seated at Constantinople, surrounded by a "Ring" or "Barrier" of free Christian States, was another question.

It might not be a bad eventual arrangement if we could have a real and independent Turkey consisting of Asiatic Turkey, *plus* the Constantinople peninsula."—Sir G. Campbell, *Handy Book of the Eastern Question*, chap. vii.

The *Daily News* was perhaps the chief exponent of this "Barrier" theory.

To repel permanently Russian aggression we must do our best to further the growth of a ring of free States. Dislike to Russian aggression and distrust of Turkish capacity to prevent it may yet be generally recognised as perfectly compatible—nay, necessarily and properly united sentiments.—*D. N.* Oct. 20, 1876.

Thus, according to this notion, there was no reason to dread a "Big Bulgaria." The more able to stand in their own strength the new Balkan States should be, the less would they lean upon Russia.

The following account of a conversation held some years before between the writer of the letter and one of the principal advisers of Prince Milan is interesting:—

"Since" (says the latter to his English interlocutor) "I have been concerned in Servian politics, your Consul-General at Belgrade has always sided with the Turks in all questions that have arisen between us and them. Your avowed policy has always been to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Alone, we could not shake off the Turkish rule; we are, therefore, obliged to ally ourselves with the only Power that will aid us, although probably not from any real friendship towards us, but in her own interests. The Eastern Question must culminate in a war; to you the danger of the war is that Russia may make conquests for herself in Asia, and may create small independent States between the Danube and the Balkans, which, from the fact of their being small, and from the fact of being obliged to look to Russia for support, will have to become the allies of the Czar . . . What then, looking at the

¹ See "Russia and Turkey," Bryce, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

Eastern Question from an English point of view, would be most advantageous? That the Turks should be maintained in Armenia and in Constantinople, and that all pretexts for Russian interference south of the Danube should be removed by the creation, in the European provinces of Turkey, of strong autonomous States absolutely independent both of Turkey and of Russia, neutralised like Belgium, on friendly terms with the Porte, and animated with no feeling of hostility towards us. I regard Russia with utter distrust. Her game is obvious. We render this game easy by playing into her hands. Once admit that Turkey cannot defend her European provinces, and that Europe will not defend them, and all half-measures are Russian measures. . . . "But," I said, "would you be satisfied without Constantinople? Would you not, if Turkish rule in Europe were limited to that capital, at once commence to intrigue with Russia to drive the Turks out of it?" "No," he replied, "for the plain reasons that such a policy would neither be feasible nor in our interests. Constantinople is a Turkish town. Even if we could enter it as conquerors we are well aware that the Russians themselves would not allow us to retain it. Besides, my scheme of the settlement of the Eastern Question involves an accession of territory to Roumania, to Montenegro, to Greece, and to ourselves, under some sort of federative league. Each of these States would object to any other retaining Constantinople. We should none of us gain by its becoming 'a free city.' We should have precisely the same interest in its remaining in the hands of the Sultan as you have. I cannot repeat to you too often that we thoroughly distrust Russia. We may use her in our endeavours to put an end to a situation which is intolerable, but we are perfectly well aware that she will seek to use us for her own ambitious schemes. If once the Turks were driven back on Constantinople we should be their warmest allies in putting an end to the influence of Russia south of the Danube."—*Diplomatist* in *D. N.* Nov. 27th, 1877.

In opposition to the theory that a barrier might thus be formed against the further advance of Russia, it was urged that Roumania and Servia were, in effect, advanced Russian posts.¹ It will be observed that this reply assumes that the influence of Russia over the semi-independent States is permanent, and not merely based on the circumstance of there being a common enemy. The *Edinburgh Review* urged further that in Mr. Canning's Greek policy we had tried the plan of going a mile with Russia, and that it had egregiously failed.

It is worth noticing that a rejoinder has been furnished in advance by Alison² which may be summarised thus: "It failed because we only went *half* a mile."

¹ Compare *Edin. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

² *Hist. of Eur.* chap. xv.

ANTI-WAR.

§ A. *War is a Sin.* § B. *War is a Mistake.*

We have already had occasion to speak of the professed "Peace Party" and the conception which their doctrine implies of England's rôle. Applied to the circumstances of 1876-8 their general doctrine becomes a specific "View" in relation to the controversy of the time—a view which may be spoken of as "Anti-War." The essence of this view was that under no circumstances should England take any hand in any settlement of the Eastern Question which might involve an appeal to force. Thus in considering this view we get out of the region of International Law once more, and find ourselves thrown back on more simple and elementary considerations, like those which characterise the extreme ends of the scale of notions. It is as if the view were an offshoot, breaking the line of sequence to which the next view brings us back. Little remains to be said of the two notions which constitute this view, viz.: that for us to take part in any Eastern war would be a mistake, or again, that it would be a sin.

The notion that such a war would be a *mistake* finds expression in arguments to minimise our concern in the matter at stake, and to show that it cannot be worth our while to fight about it.

If you measure the distance from the Land's End to Constantinople by the route that would be taken by a ship, you find that we are close upon 3,000 miles away. And does any man in his senses believe that the honour or interest of England could be affected or involved in any question of territory or of conquest that may arise in that part of the world?—*John Bright*.¹

Then we have the notion of the value of human life, which is closely connected with the humane sentiment and with the religious aspect of the question.

I recollect being disgusted at the time of the Russian War by the observation of a gentleman at the table of a person of high rank in this country, and of the Party by whom that war was originated. He said, "As for men that are killed, I think nothing of them. A man can only die once. It does not matter very much when he dies or how he dies." ("Shame.") I think it matters a good deal. (Cheers.) To the widows,

¹ At Llandudno, *T.* Nov. 23, 1876.

orphans, parents, brothers, sisters and friends of the hundreds of thousands of men who are thrust through with bayonets and rent asunder by shot and shell it matters a great deal. (Cheers).
—*Part of same speech.*

The strictly religious aspect of the question was not brought prominently forward; but in truth it went to the root of the matter, for the strength of the professed Peace Party lies among those who hold the Quaker doctrine on this point. The following anecdote brings out the religious aspect strongly:—

In answer to a remark to this effect: "I wonder, if the country were invaded, what the Peace Society would do?" John Bright replied that "Lord Palmerston used to say they (the Peace Society) would go with their hands full of money and say to the invaders, 'How much will you take to go away?' But," Mr. Bright concluded, "I never doubted that when there was a nation that accepted the laws of Christ, and sought to act them out, and sought to live consistently amongst these other nations, and carried out the influence of the Christian spirit in its relation with others—I never doubted in my life that the Eternal would take care of that nation."

Mr. Kinglake has pointed out¹ how the arguments of a professed peace party against any particular war may lose their force; but it seems that the counting of the cost and the dread of war were much more effectual in 1876-7 than in 1854, and the weight of the peace party was proportionally greater.

We shall see how the weight of the "Anti-War" view was thrown alternately against the "red" and the "violet" policies, as there seemed a possibility now that one now that the other might be adopted; still the considerations tending to a "violet" policy were strongly felt by many whose position on the whole was "Anti-War." The following utterance of John Bright is remarkable:—

I sometimes have thought during the past year that Her Majesty's Government were rather too much in favour of peace; they are in favour of peace, if not at any price, at least at a price which some of us would scarcely wish to pay for it.—*Speech at Birmingham, Dec. 3, 1876.*

¹ *Crimca*, vol. ii. p. 71 (Cab. ed.)

ORDER.

§ A.—*The greatest of English Interests is Peace.*

We now come to a view which is like the last in deprecating any appeal to force to settle the Eastern Question as the greatest evil which could happen, but which deprecates it on somewhat different grounds. We get back into the region of diplomatic considerations and of International Law. While admitting theoretically the lawfulness on sufficient grounds of an appeal to the last argument of kings, the view would regard the maintenance of peace as the greatest of European interests in any particular case. It is as if a man, while admitting the necessity of judges and policemen, should advise his neighbour who complained of some contumelious wrong or extortionate demand to put up with it rather than be at the expense and trouble to his neighbours and himself of carrying the matter into Court. We have, then, as the leading notion of this view, an overwhelming sense of the paramount importance of European peace. The continuance of the *status quo*, however bad, is regarded as preferable to any attempt forcibly to disturb it. It is summed up in Lord Derby's dictum,¹ "The greatest of all British Interests is the interest of Peace."

§ B.—*Danger of a European Scramble.*

But the leading notion was reinforced by others. Canning is reported to have replied to an argument on the importance of avoiding war by the question, "Why this particular war?" The auxiliary notions we are now to notice furnished so many answers to a similar question, and attempted to show why "this particular war" was especially to be deprecated.

In the first place there was an apprehended danger of a European scramble. According to this notion Europe was in a state of unstable equilibrium, depending on a highly artificial and carefully balanced arrangement. The "Integrity of Turkey" becomes a self-denying ordinance for the sake of the general peace.

They said with great generality that "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is a delusion." But the integrity of the Ottoman Empire meant, "Here is an extensive territory which we agree to respect, because, if not respected, it would lie open to a general scramble and be the theatre of war."—*Lord Derby*.²

¹ At Merchant Taylors'. *Post*, chap. xvi. § 1.

² Reply to Mr. Farley's deputation, *post*, part iii. chap. x. § 5.

As Russia was the great Power which was seeking to alter the *status quo*, the notion which saw in the *status quo* the only safeguard against European anarchy naturally tended towards the anti-Russian view.

Of course, this conclusion was based on the assumption that no change was possible in the direction of withdrawing the Christian populations from the hand of the Porte without at the same time altering the map and infringing on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Hence the importance attached, on the other hand, to schemes whereby the provincials, while secured practical independence or some form of autonomy, should still remain united to the Porte by some nominal tie, so that technically these territories might remain within the ambit of the Ottoman Empire. The *Times* (September 5th, 1876) denounced as an insidious fallacy the failure to distinguish between the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Porte. In the phrase "The Integrity of Turkey," as thus understood, the word "Turkey" becomes a geographical expression, comprising what Mr. Freeman preferred to call "South-Eastern Christendom." The force of the word "integrity" is rather negative than positive. It implied that no part of the territory called Turkey should be detached and handed over to any European Power, and that no portion should be converted into a sovereign State capable of entering into international relations.

Of these two phrases, "integrity" and "independence," the bearing is perfectly distinct. The first is negative, the second positive. The integrity of Turkey will be maintained by a titular sovereignty, verified, as it were, through a moderate payment of tribute, in order that the Ottoman sovereignty may serve the purpose of shutting out from the present limits of the Turkish Empire any other sovereignty, or any exercise, in whole or in part, of sovereign rights by any other Power, whether it be Russia on the Euxine, or Austria on the Danube, or France or England on the Nile and the Red Sea. The independence of the Ottoman Empire is a very different thing. It meant at the time of the Crimean War, and it means now, that, apart from Roumania and Servia, where Europe is already formally concerned, and apart from any arrangement self-made with a vassal State like Egypt, which can hold its own against Constantinople, the Porte is to be left in the actual, daily and free administration of all the provinces of its vast dominions. Now, as regards the territorial integrity of Turkey, I for one am still desirous to see it upheld, though I do not say that that desire should be treated as a thing paramount to still higher objects of policy. For of all the objects of policy, in my conviction, humanity, rationally understood, and

in due relation to justice, is the first and highest. My belief is, that this great aim need not be compromised, and that other important objects would be gained by maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey. There is no reason to suppose that, at the present moment, any of the Continental Powers are governed by selfish or aggressive views in their Eastern policy. [A reference follows to the debate of July 31st, 1876, when the Prime Minister spoke of Mr. Gladstone as having recommended the re-establishment of the *status quo*.]¹ Across the table I at once threw the interjection "not *status quo* but territorial integrity." The Prime Minister promptly replied that territorial integrity would be found virtually to mean the *status quo*. Now the territorial integrity means the retention of a titular supremacy, which serves the purpose of warding off foreign aggression. The *status quo* means the maintenance of Turkish administrative authority in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Territorial integrity shuts out the foreign State; the *status quo* shuts out the inhabitants of the country, and keeps (I fear) everything to the Turk, with his airy promises, his disembodied reforms, his ferocious passions, and his daily, gross and incurable misgovernment.—Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*.¹

In your paper of yesterday you speak of "the territorial integrity of Turkey" as "a principle the value of which not only Mr. Gladstone but Mr. Freeman has defended." Now, I have never defended the territorial integrity of Turkey as a principle. I have never in any way recognised "Turkey" at all. I never even use the word "Turkey" if I can help it. In what is called "Turkey" I see only South-Eastern Christendom, Greek, Slavonic and Rouman, held down for five hundred years by a gang of Turkish robbers. That I care nothing for territorial integrity, I have shown by constantly arguing that the right thing for Bosnia, in the interest of its large Mussulman minority, is annexation to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. If the Apostolic King will not have it, it is no fault of mine. But setting aside this special case, I do hold that it is most important that all the States in that part of the world should be bound together by some common tie to their natural centre at the New Rome. As long as the Turk abides in the New Rome, the only possible tie is that of the tributary relation to him. When he has got rid of, the tributary relation may be exchanged for a Federal one."—*E. A. Freeman*, in *D. N.* Sept. 15, 1876.

In the belief in the tremendous dimensions of a war in the East, if it once broke out, we meet again with the enormous importance attached to Constantinople. The sense of the magnitude of the prize raises in men's minds the idea of a conflict which daunts them.

¹ See *post*, part iii. c.g. chap. xi. § 4, as to the dissatisfaction expressed at Mr. Gladstone's having declared for the "Integrity of Turkey" until he made the distinction plain.

§ C.—*Apprehended Danger to France.*

The conception of the unstable equilibrium of Europe appears in another aspect. A theory was broached, for which no foundation in fact is apparent, but which seems to have been caught at as a possible explanation why excessive care to avoid this particular war was being exhibited by the English Ministry. It is just worth mentioning, though it was very ephemeral and very limited in its spread. It was, that Germany was only waiting the opportunity which would be afforded by the other Powers being involved in war to attack France.¹

§ D.—*Fear of a Jihad.*

Besides the fear of inviting a European scramble, the danger of exciting Mahometan fanaticism was urged as a reason against violently disturbing the *status quo*.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* was one of the great exponents of this notion, which first appeared prominently in an article entitled "What the Turk can do."²

A time came when for a moment people began to consider what a fearful element in Europe a *victorious* Turkey would be;³ but meanwhile the notion was for the most part combated on the ground that the fear was chimerical.

If we are in earnest, it was urged, Turkey will yield, or at all events if Turkey resists, and fleets and armies have to be moved to coerce her, it will be not so much a case of war as a measure of *police*. Thus the fear now under consideration appears as the antithesis of the belief that the preservation of the European concert may provide an effectual remedy.⁴ It was asserted that the display of such an overmastering force as a thoroughly united Europe might bring to bear would secure, and was the only way

¹ *Post*, chap. xv. § 3. See *D. N.*, Feb. 26, and March 12 and 13, 1876; *Fort. Rev.*, Nov. 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs," pp. 684-5; a letter from Professor Beesley (*Weekly Dispatch*, March 17, 1877), where he says that, in view of the danger to France from Germany in case Russia should be involved, we now see the Government have been quite right in making the preservation of peace their first object. The West, he says, is of much more importance than the East.

² Nov. 22, 1875. See *post*, part iii. chap. viii.

³ See *Spec.*, Aug. 18 and Sept. 22, and *T.*, Sept. 22, 1877.

⁴ "Anti-Turkism," § G. The antithesis between the present notion and the notion that "the open sore" must be healed ('Anti-Turkism,' § F) has been noticed already, and others might be pointed out.

of securing, the quiet submission of the Turks. This position was strongly enforced by the Opposition leaders in Parliament at the commencement of the session of 1877:—

Will any one tell me that if once the Turks got into their heads the belief that, not only England, but the whole of Europe, was absolutely in earnest on this matter, they would resist the united voice of Europe?—*Earl Granville, H. of L. Feb. 8, 1877.*

What is there in the history of Turkey to lead us to suppose that a State which has never resisted any single Power whatever, unless supported directly or indirectly by some other Power, would dream of resisting the whole of Europe combined, when really in earnest, and coming forward with moderate proposals? When the noble Marquis (Salisbury) talks of the only means of coercing the Turks being the bombardment of Constantinople, I think that is a perfect chimera.—*Earl Granville, H. of L. Feb. 20, 1877.*

[Lord Hartington spoke to the same effect. See *Spec.*, Feb. 10, 1877: “The Policy of the Opposition.”]

To this was added the belief that, even if Turkey did resist, yet, owing to the crushing character of the force brought against her, the operations that would result would lack many of the most dreaded elements of war; something as in a case of cauterisation the hotter the iron the less the pain. From this follows a distinction between such applications of force and war—a distinction which might fail to satisfy the conscience of the holder of the ‘Anti-War’ doctrine, but which might calm many of the scruples of the votary of “Order.” On this distinction Mr. Gladstone insisted on a later occasion.

My honourable friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) says we are at war with Egypt. I do not admit that. I do not admit that we are at war with any one. (Laughter.) Hon. gentlemen seem to think that statement ridiculous. That is the position I hold and the position I am prepared to defend. Analogous cases have occurred within my own life, and within my political memory. [He refers to the battle of Navarino.]—*H. of C. July 12, 1882.*

It is a curious thing to notice that there appears to have been no suggestion of any dishonour, nor any sense of shame, in shrinking from a contest with Turkey on prudential grounds. A man would not feel ashamed at getting out of the way of a mad dog in the same way as he might, perhaps, feel ashamed at getting out of the way of an equal who challenged him to fight. The fact seems to be that European Powers do not regard non-European Powers as their equals in the sense that their military honour is involved by

shrinking from a conflict with them, if a conflict would be *inconvenient* or *unpleasant*. It is instructive to contrast the open, unblushing way in which the danger of a jihad was urged as a reason for letting Turkey alone, with the light hints one occasionally found of possible danger to England from a war with a European Power. It is pretty clear that the tendency of any suggestion that England had better not meddle with Russia for fear of consequences would have been to excite a very hot war spirit.

§ E.—*Fear of a Massacre.*

Near akin to the fear of a jihad is the notion that to excite Turkish fanaticism would bring greater evils on the Christian subjects themselves, and that therefore Turkey had best be let alone. This comes rather near the notion of *propitiating* the devil—or, at least, that it is best not to stir him up.

And here comes in what has been called the “massacre argument,” of which a great deal has been made, and which is said not to have been without its effect on Sir Henry Elliot.¹ It is asserted that if the Turks find they are being driven to the wall—or, to put it less figuratively, driven out of Europe—they will turn again and will kill all the Christians before they go. . . . “The Turks may go, but going they will leave a desert, and that will be your work.” I believe that this argument is of European concoction, and that, as far as the Turks use it, they have got it from the European papers. . . . I think we ought not to be, and I trust we shall not be, frightened by a scarecrow.—Campbell's *Handy-book on the Eastern Question*.

It is all very well to tell the Sultan and his Muftis . . . to pack up their traps and be off out of Europe as an abomination and defilement unbearable any longer by civilised men, but would the Turk pack up and go? . . . Regarding the matter from even a philanthropic point of view, should we not gravely compromise the Christian population in Asiatic Turkey if we gave such an order?—G. Potter, *Contemp. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

The fear of Turkish barbarities thus to a certain extent operated politically as a pro-Turkish element, or rather, as a counter-weight to the anti-Turkish view. And it is worth noticing that the same cause operated to give Turkey a certain military advantage in her contest with Russia. This occurred in two ways. The Russian soldiers appear to have been to a certain extent daunted by the fear of being left wounded on the field and falling into the hands

See despatch from Sir Henry Elliot, Aug. 29, 1876, “Turkey, I.” 1877, No. 172.

of the Turks, and the Russian strategy was hampered by the necessity of protecting the refugees.

We shall see how Germany by her protests interfered to prevent the European laws of war from being violated by Turkey.²

LEGALISM.

The view "Legalism" is characterised by the conception of some injustice or violation of law involved in any interference with the sovereignty of the Porte. Thus by stages we have arrived for the first time at a view which is quite incompatible with anti-Turkism; yet Legalism is closely allied with the idea of public order, and this again has something in common with those factors of anti-Turkism which seek to heal the open sores for the sake of peace.

The exponents of the three notions which constitute "Legalism" held respectively the following positions: (1) that Turkey has a right to do as she likes with her own subjects, (2) that any interference between Turkey and her subjects is opposed to the principle of Non-Intervention, and (3) that the Treaty of Paris expressly forbids any such interference. These three positions correspond to the threefold division of International Law into Law Natural or Necessary, Law Customary, and Law Conventional adopted by the text-writers.³

§ A. *Divine Right of Sovereign States.*

The first factor of the group "Legalism" takes without qualification the expositions of the rights of Sovereign States which occur in the text-books, such as the following:—

The empire of a nation within its own territory is of natural right exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself. The right of civil and criminal legislation in respect of all property and persons within the territory of a nation is an incident of the right of empire.—Twiss, *Law of Nations, Time of Peace*, chap. ix.

But it should be observed that the right of empire here postulated is, like many of the formulæ of Political Economy, to be regarded rather as a definition, or abstract statement of fact, than as an authoritative ethical maxim. If within its territory a given

¹ *D. N.* about Sept. 21, and *Spec.* Sept. 1 and 8, 1877.

² *Post*, chap. xvi. § 3.

³ See Wheaton, *Elements*, § 9, and Twiss, *Law of Nations, Time of Peace*, chap. v.

nation has not the right of civil and criminal legislation with respect to a certain class of persons, then so far its right of empire has been trenched upon. If it is good that its right of empire should remain inviolate, then it ought to have the right of civil and criminal legislation with regard to those persons—if not, not. With respect to Turkey, the subjects of European Powers sojourning in the territory are in fact withdrawn from her legislation by the capitulations. But we meet with expressions of the notion that the Porte by reason of its sovereignty had an indefeasible moral claim to the obedience of the provincials. Their attempt to shake off its yoke is spoken of as rebellion, and regarded as a crime meriting a terrible retribution; any sympathy with them on the part of other powers would be a partaking in their guilt.

These rebellious States seem to have framed their calculations on the basis of only one event being possible from this war. . . . But if Russia should not triumph, who will befriend them then? The Powers of Europe perhaps? Not so; the Powers of Europe will not act together, and will not concern themselves about these rebels. These last will have to encounter the vengeance of victorious Turkey, and the sooner they realise the fact, the better for them. They have been recklessly heaping up wrath for themselves against the day of wrath, and nobody can pity them when that day comes.—*Blackwood*, October 1877, "The Storm in the East," V.

§ *Note on Technical Non-Intervention and Terminology.*

The second legalistic notion depends on the doctrine of the International Lawyers which they call "Non-Intervention." But a little preliminary consideration must be given to the various meanings attached to this word. It is to be regretted that a loose and popular usage has seized hold of the term non-intervention (too widely, it seems, to admit of rescue), making it denote the refusal of a nation to take any part, or at all events any forcible part, in international affairs. This is something quite different from the meaning which the word has in its strict and technical sense. We have here an ambiguity which often produces misunderstanding, as we shall have to notice when we come to speak of Lord Derby's reply to a deputation which waited on him at the Foreign Office on July 14th, 1876.

The following will serve as definitions of the terms Intervention and Non-Intervention in the strict or technical sense:—

I wish to examine . . . the principle, as it is often called by publicists, of non-intervention. . . . By intervention I mean the interference, forcible, or supported by force, of one independent State in the internal affairs of another; and by the principle of non-intervention the rule which forbids such interference. These definitions shut out . . . several questions which are often suffered to mix themselves with the one before us—the question for example, in what cases a State may properly take part in foreign wars. . . . They exclude also every interference which limits itself to *mere* intercession or advice.—Mountague Bernard, *On the Principle of Non intervention*.

While non-intervention in the popular sense means the holding one's self aloof from *any* foreign contest, in the technical sense it excludes participation in a particular sort of foreign contest, in those, namely, which are intestine. Professor Bernard confines it to cases where force is used or contemplated; but the principle seems to extend to any intermeddling in such a contest. The negative word Non-Intervention in the text-books is usually used in the technical sense, but the same thing is hardly true with respect to the positive word Intervention. In fact the precise meaning of the three words Intervention, Interference, Interposition, seems to be by no means settled. Different writers have defined or used them in different ways: first with regard to the *nature* of the action undertaken, according as the ultimate use of force in case of need be contemplated, or not; and secondly with regard to the *occasion* of the action.

The following is an account of the technical use of these three words by some writers of authority. Kent¹ makes them all three connote force; he identifies Intervention and Interference and makes them apply to participation in internal affairs only, while Interposition, he says, is "the taking part by one State in a quarrel between two portions of another State, or between two other States."

Wheaton² appears to treat the words Intervention and Interference and Interposition as synonymous, and to confine them to action forcible or supported by force. He speaks of the "interference" of the five powers in the Belgic Revolution of 1830, and says that the negotiations

assumed alternately the character of a pacific mediation and of an armed intervention according to the varying circumstances of the contest.—§ 71.

¹ Kent's *International Law*, Abdy's edition, 1878, p. 42.

² *Elements*, Dana's edition, §§ 63 and 68.

His editor, Dana, notes :—

Publicists have assigned the words “intervention” and “interposition” to express the interference of one State in the affairs of another by force, or with force as the known ultimate sanction. . . . But the term “mediation” is limited to an offer of advice or of assistance in the way of arbitration, leaving the acceptance of the offer to the free will of the other party.—§ 72.

It will be observed that Dana’s note runs “in the affairs” and not “in the internal affairs” of another State. Wheaton, when speaking of Intervention or Interference seems generally to be treating of participation in internal affairs: but the word Interference is used in a wider sense, and as equivalent to Interposition in reference to the events of 1822.

France had given to Great Britain cause of war by that aggression upon the independence of Spain. The British Government might lawfully have interfered, on grounds of political expediency. . . . Great Britain had limited herself to protesting against the interference of the French Government in the internal affairs of Spain, and had refrained from interposing by force.—§ 68.

Halleck¹ appears to use the word Intervention as connoting an appeal to force, but he makes the term include participation in a quarrel between independent States, as well as in the internal affairs of a single State.

Wars of intervention are those where one State interferes in favour of a particular State as against others, or in favour of a particular party, sovereign or family in a State. This intervention is divided into two classes, according as it is made with respect to the *internal* or *external* affairs of a nation.—(Chap. xvi.)

He adopts the term Non-Interference instead of the more usual Non-Intervention to denote the doctrine that forbids participation in the internal affairs of another State, apparently giving the doctrine a wider range than it bears according to Prof. Bernard’s enunciation, which expressly confines it to *forcible* participation. Halleck again expressly makes the term Interference apply to forcible as well as non-forcible participations. Speaking of the recognition of belligerency in civil wars, he says :—

Each case must be determined by its own peculiar circumstances, all foreign powers which wish to preserve their neutrality strictly observing the principles of non-interference.—(Chap. xvi.) ;

¹ *International Law*, Baker’s edition, 1878.

And in enunciating this principle he says :—

No writer of authority on international law advocates any general right of one sovereign and independent State to interfere with the domestic concerns and internal government of another sovereign and independent State. Some, however, make numerous exceptions. . . . We will here examine each of these grounds with respect to pacific interference, reserving to another place a discussion of how far they will justify a resort to force or a war of intervention.—(Chap. iv.)

Lord Derby extended on one occasion at once the scope of the doctrine and the meaning of the term Intervention to apply to non-forcible as well as forcible participation.

Her Majesty's Government . . . doubt the expediency of the intervention of foreign consuls. Such an intervention is scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte.¹

Mr. Gathorne Hardy appears to have used the word "intervene" for a non-forcible participation in a quarrel between two nations.

I trust there may be some opportunity for the Government to intervene and endeavour to bring this horrible war to a termination. . . . I can vouch we will watch with the deepest anxiety for this opportunity.²

The *Daily News* (Dec. 13th), criticised this expression sharply, and citing Dana's note asked did Mr. Hardy know the meaning which publicists and diplomatists attach to the word intervention? But in truth the usage of publicists and diplomatists seems hardly sufficiently settled to justify the strictures of the *Daily News*, or to preclude the use of the word in a sense which the context rendered pretty plain. Lord Derby appears sometimes to use the word Non-Intervention in the popular sense, but with the addition of some other words to mark the distinction. He uses the phrases, "The principle of non-intervention in its extreme and absolute form." "The doctrine of absolute indifference."³

There are similar difficulties with regard to the terminology employed with respect to non-forcible participation. The word Mediation is sometimes employed to comprise all such action.

We have pointed out in another chapter the distinction between pacific mediation and armed intervention. The former consists in advice, monition, persuasion. . . . *Armed intervention* on the contrary consists in threatened or actual force, employed or to be employed. . . .—*Halleck*, chap. xvi. p. 460.

¹ Despatch to Sir Henry Elliot, Aug. 24th, 1865, Turkey II., 1876, No. 16.

² Edinburgh Speech, Dec. 11th, 1877.

³ At the Foreign Office, July 14th, 1876. See *post*, part iii. chap. x. § 5.

On the other hand, it appears sometimes to be imagined that mediation implies an ultimate resort to force by the mediator, if his solution is not acquiesced in; and a distinction is drawn between mediation and "good offices."¹

Unsought mediation is not always acceptable to belligerents. The substance of the objection seems to be an assumption that the propositions made by a third power are backed by force as an ultimate sanction.

During the civil war in the United States, Russia made to the Government an offer of its friendly offices to put an end to the war. . . . The French Government afterwards asked the attention of England and Russia to a joint offer of mediation. . . . The Russian Government apprehended that the proposed joint action would have the appearance in the United States of pressure, and would excite fears of intervention.—(Wheaton, § 73, Dana's note.)

In regard to the numerous efforts which have appeared in the foreign press on the subject of English mediation, the *Agence Russe* again points out that, by international law, mediation is only possible when solicited by both belligerents. "Now, Russia," it is added, "though always ready to listen to any overtures for peace which might be addressed by the Porte direct to the Russian headquarters, has never done anything to give rise to the supposition that she has ever had any intention of accepting mediation."—*Reuter's St. Petersburg telegram, Morning Papers, Dec. 31st, 1877.*

[At the sitting of the Berlin Conference of July 12th, Carathéodory Pasha, referring to the 24th Article of the Treaty (which relates to the rectification of the frontiers of Greece, and the eventual mediation of the Powers), desired that the word "mediation" might be replaced by "good offices." The Count de Larnay (Italy) declared that the substitution would diminish the meaning and bearing of the proposition of the Plenipotentiaries of France and Italy, and the decision taken by the High Assembly]—(Turkey, XXXIX., 1878; Inclosure 2 in No. xl., p. 276.)

Many writers appear to identify "mediation" with "good offices," and use the word "arbitration" to mark the case of an authoritative third party.

Mediation, whereby a third Power interposes its good offices to bring about the peaceable settlement of a matter which is in dispute between two Powers differs from arbitration in this respect, that the decision of an arbiter is obligatory, whilst a mediator merely gives counsel and advice. It is perfectly lawful

¹ Wheaton, p. 495, Lawrence's note.

for an independent Power to offer to mediate between other independent Powers which are either preparing for or actually engaged in war, and to suggest to them a compromise . . . or to advise that a reasonable satisfaction . . . should be offered and accepted.—Twiss, *Law of Nations, Time of War*.

Possibly it may be convenient in diplomacy to have words which may serve as the velvet glove to the iron hand, but the great preponderance of authority seems to be against any such restriction of the use of the word "mediation" as that contended for by those who would make it something more stringent than "good offices."¹ And hence the view preponderates that it is not only the right but the duty of neutral Powers (so far as concerns quarrels between States as distinguished from an intestine disturbance) to mediate when there is any prospect of a good result.

Mediation is where a common friend interposes his good offices to bring the contending parties to a mutual understanding . . . The task is a very delicate one. . . . Hübner deems it incumbent upon neutrals generally to act the part of mediators, in order to prevent, if possible, the breaking out of war. But Galiani is of opinion that, although the post of mediator may be accepted, the office is rather to be avoided than sought, on account of the danger to the mediator of compromising his neutrality. Phillimore² prefers the Christian principle of Hübner to the more safe expediency of Galiani.—*Halleck*, Baker's edition, p. 415.

If we desire to preserve the various distinctions which have been adverted to, perhaps the words "isolation" and "participation" may serve to denote respectively a complete holding aloof from the affairs of other nations, and the contrary.

Adopting these we may take "intermeddling" to indicate participation in the internal affairs of another State, "interference" to indicate forcible participation (that is, "by force, or with force as the known ultimate sanction,"³) and "intercession" for pacific participation. Then the phrases "forcible intermeddling"⁴ and "interposition" will serve for the two species into which "interference" may be divided, according as the occasion of the interference is the domestic matters of a foreign State, or a matter

¹ The *Times* Paris correspondent, discussing the relations of France and China distinguishes two kinds of mediation—platonic and imperative—the former being the mediation of powers which have no coercive influence to bear on either party (probably meaning cases in which it is understood from the beginning that all such influence is disclaimed).—*T.*, Nov. 1, 1884.

² The reference is to Phillimore's *International Law*, vol. iii. § 4.

³ See Dana's note. *Ante*, p. 110.

⁴ The word "intermeddling" is taken as the best that suggests itself. It is not thoroughly satisfactory, as it has a slightly bad connotation, which is here not intended.

between independent foreign States. Classifying "intercession" in a similar way according to the occasion, we have "pacific (or non-forcible) intermeddling" for cases where the domestic affairs of a foreign State are in question, but there seems no word specially appropriate to intercession between independent foreign States, as such terms as "mediation," "arbitration," "good offices," appear to refer rather to the manner and form of the intercession than to the occasion of it. The word "intervention" is not made use of in this suggested nomenclature, and it may be conveniently used in the popular sense for participation generally, or for the particular species of it denoted by the context. But when the diplomatic doctrine of non-intervention is spoken of, this should be restricted to the maxim which forbids forcible, and according to some authorities non-forcible, intermeddling. The distinctions here drawn are exhibited in the following table.

ISOLATION. { Equivalent to
 { "Non-Intervention"
 { in the loose and
 { popular sense.

*Acts of Participation
classified according
to the sanction.*

*Acts of Participation
further classified
according to the
occasion.*

| | | |
|---------------|---|--|
| PARTICIPATION | INTERCESSION. (No coercive measures contemplated.) <i>The form may be either Arbitration, Mediation, or Good Offices.</i> | Between Independent States. (No special name.) |
| | | Between a State and its subjects. NON-FORCIBLE INTERMEDDLING. |
| | INTERFERENCE. (Force being the known and ultimate sanction.) | Between a State and its subjects. FORCIBLE INTERMEDDLING. |
| | | Between Independent States. INTERPOSITION. |

§ B. *Legalistic Non-Intervention.*

The second legalistic notion was the contention that no European Power had any right to intervene on behalf of the Provincials, and this on the ground that the Provincials were the subjects of an independent State; not on the ground of any impropriety in taking part, even forcibly if need be, in the affairs of Europe.

It may be asked, "Why should International Law especially frown on this particular sort of interference, namely, between a Government and its subjects?" The books say that the doctrine which forbids intermeddling is a corollary from a fundamental principle—the sovereignty of States. But as a practical working rule, the doctrine of non-intervention seems to be based on the assumptions that on the whole, and as a general rule, each nation understands its own wants best, and will, if left alone, work out for itself the form of government best suited to its circumstances; moreover that in struggles between rulers and people no third party is disinterested enough, or wise enough, to be trusted to decide *ex cathedra*, which is the cause of good government, and which of liberty, and to be allowed, on the strength of its own judgment, to set up, or to pull down. However that may be, as a matter of fact, the maxim is at the present day a part of the practical recognised code of European public law, and that it is so, is owing in great measure to the stand England made in the early part of the present century against the pretensions of the Holy Alliance to regulate, in the interests of pure morality as they said, the relations of subjects and their rulers all over the world. Hence the association of the doctrine of non-intervention with the name of Canning. Non-intervention as a legalistic notion, then, means the application to the case in hand of the doctrine of International Law which goes by that name, as a reason why there should be no intermeddling, or at all events no forcible intermeddling, by any Power in the affairs of the Porte and the Christian subjects.

. . . To deprecate interference in the condition of Turkey, to allow Turkey and its subjects in the course of time to find out that condition which suited both of them best, seemed to us a policy which was desirable. Therefore we hesitated very much about joining the English consul to the others in the delegation to the insurgents which failed.—*Disraeli, II. of C.* July 31st, 1876.

The collective duty of Europe is non-interference; England has insisted upon the collective observance of treaties. Turkey and its subjects must in course of time find out for themselves that condition of things which suited both of them best.—*Blackwood's Mag.* Sept. 1876.

To treat the doctrine of non-intervention as having any applicability to the case in hand, involved the assumption that, if left alone, the Porte and the Christian subjects would work out the form of government best suited to them. It is the negation of the notions expressed in the phrase "The Turk cannot reform." Hence the relevancy of Mr. Freeman's position, that the state of things in Turkey was not a case of government in the ordinary sense at all, but a case of an invading horde encamped in Europe. As long as the rulers refuse to govern with due regard to the subjects' theory of life and of morality, so long as there is a hard and fast line between the rulers and the ruled, and the rulers govern simply for the sake of getting what advantage they can, so long it is a case of two diametrically opposed interests, in which the weaker will be remorselessly sacrificed. No homogeneous state will be formed; the subjects and the rulers will remain face to face as two foreign bodies, and if then interference does take place, it will really be more akin to interposition than to intermeddling. We have seen that the maxim of non-intervention has been attacked as an immoral doctrine; and we have also seen that it directly contradicts the humane impulse, which would see in the bare fact that people are oppressed by their rulers enough to warrant interference on their behalf.¹

The books which lay down the rule of non-intervention, also lay down that it is subject to exceptions. The attempt to formulate the occasions which justify a departure from the rule are perhaps not entirely satisfactory. Perhaps it would be better to treat it as a provisional working rule for ordinary circumstances, and to say frankly that it does not apply in extreme cases. This indeed seems to be the line taken in state papers as distinguished from text books. The maxim may be regarded as a rule of the European and civilised world, to the benefit of which no State is entitled which does not conform to the civilised code. The great example of an exception to the rule is the interference in favour of Greece in 1827, and it is worth noticing that this exception as well as the rule itself is connected with the name of Canning.

¹ See "Anti-Turkism," §§ c and e.

Beyond all question non-intervention is the rule, and interference the exception, but there are cases . . . where a different principle must be established. . . . And if ever there was a nation which had brought itself within the exception it was that which had perpetrated the massacre of Chios, and was yet reeking with the slaughter of Missolonghi * * * * After the massacre of Chios the Turks had thrown themselves out of the pale of civilisation; they had proved themselves to be pirates, enemies of the human race, and no longer entitled to toleration from the European family. Expulsion from Europe was the natural and legitimate consequence of their flagrant violation of its usages of war.—*Alison*.¹

§ c. Treaty Legalism.

The last of the legalistic notions is the notion that, apart from any general maxims of International Law, any intermeddling in the special case of Turkey was illegal in the sense of being contrary to express treaty engagements. The principal stipulations bearing upon this question are the following:—

(I.) TREATY OF KAINARDJI (*between Russia and Turkey, July 10¹/₂ 1774*).

Art. 7.—La Sublime Porte promet de protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et ses églises; et aussi elle permet aux Ministres de la cour Impériale de Russie de faire dans toutes les occasions des représentations tant en faveur de la nouvelle église à Constantinople dont il sera mention à Article XIV. que pour ceux qui la desservent, promettant de les prendre en considération, comme faites par une personne de confiance d'une Puissance voisine et sincèrement amie.—Martens,² *Recueil de Traités de l'Europe*, vol. ii. p. 286.

(II.) TREATY OF PARIS (*between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, March 30th, 1856*.)

Art. 7.—[The Six Powers] declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (concert) of Europe. Their majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement, and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation, as a question of general interest.

¹ *Hist. of Eur. from Fall of Nap.* chap. xiv. Compare Wheaton's *History of the Law of Nations*, p. 561. J. S. Mill, in his article "A few words on Non-Intervention" *ante*, p. 86, observes that the rule of non-intervention cannot apply as between a civilised and an uncivilised people, because all moral rules imply reciprocity, and there can be no reciprocity with barbarians.

² See also Prof. Holland's lecture, delivered at Oxford, April 28, 1877, on the treaty relations of Russia and Turkey (Macmillan, 1877). Text of the Treaty of Kainardji (*inter alia*) is given in the appendix.

Art. 8.—If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation.

Art. 9.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman,¹ which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of religion or of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will.

The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot in any case give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire.

[Art. 27, 28 and 29, dealt with the principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) and with Servia. As to the former, if internal tranquillity should be menaced, the Porte was to come to an understanding with the Powers as to the steps to be taken; and as to both, while the Porte's right to garrison certain fortresses in Servia was maintained, it was stipulated that no armed intervention could take place without previous agreement between the Contracting Powers.²]

(III.) THE TRIPARTITE TREATY (*between Great Britain, Austria and France, signed at Paris, April 15th, 1856.*)

Art. 1.—The High Contracting Parties guarantee jointly and severally the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the treaty concluded at Paris on March 30th, 1856.

Art. 2.—Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present treaty as a *casus belli*. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their military and naval forces.

(IV.) TREATY OF LONDON (*between Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, March 13th, 1871.*)

Art. 8.—The High Contracting Parties renew and confirm all the stipulations of the treaty of March 30th, 1856, as well as of its annexes which are not modified by the present treaty.

¹ Firman and Hatti Sheriff of the Sultan relative to the Privileges and Reforms in Turkey (February 18, 1856). Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. ii. p. 1243.

² In 1866 the United Principalities assumed the title of Roumania, and in October the Sultan granted a firman for the investiture of Prince Charles (Hertslet, ii. p. 1783). In 1867 the Turks evacuated Belgrade and the other Servian fortresses (Hertslet, ii. p. 1800).

The contention that Articles 7 and 9 of the Treaty of Paris expressly forbade either or any of the European Powers to intermeddle between the Porte and its Christian subjects is the notion which we call "Treaty Legalism." It is expressed boldly and confidently, as if there were no room for doubt or argument, in utterances like the following:—

By the Treaty of Paris the Powers who were signatories to it were bound to respect the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire.—*Sir John Holker*.¹

We shall not interfere in the unfortunate struggle between the Servians and their suzerain unless other Powers violate the clear prohibition of the existing treaty law as regards foreign intervention.—*D. T.* July 8th, 1876.

Those who adopted this notion arrogated to themselves the position of upholders of the obligations of public faith, and were unwearied in their talk of "Treaty Law." This was a position constantly taken by the *Daily Telegraph*. But this legalistic interpretation of the treaties, as we may call it, was far from being admitted on all hands to be the true interpretation, and so a great controversy arose, which we shall find continually breaking out and never coming to an issue. Incidentally, as it were, this controversy revived an older controversy of a similar nature about the Treaty of Kainardji, which similarly has never been authoritatively closed.

On enumerating the factors of Anti-Turkism we met with the notion that the Treaty of Paris laid England, as one of the Powers, under a special obligation to intermeddle if intermeddling should be necessary for the protection of the Christian populations. If we look at the other end of the list, in the pro-Turkish region, we shall see that treaty obligations come in as a reason for interposing to defend Turkey. Thus we have three distinct courses, viz. (1) Intermeddling on behalf of the Christians; (2) Observance on our own part of the diplomatic rule of non-intervention, and (3) Interposition on behalf of Turkey to repel intermeddling by Russia. The obligation of treaties is urged on behalf of each. This, of course, is only another instance of the relation of the notions in the list one to another. If we take these three contentions about the treaties, the first two are mutually replies or antitheses to one another, and the second and third show how "Legalism" is connected through "Anti-Russism" (since Russia was the intermeddling power) with "Philo-Turkism." The principal

¹ At Preston, *T.* October 25th, 1876.

Contentions which were advanced in the controversy about the construction of the treaties, may be summarised as follows:—

- CONTENTION (a) The words of Articles 7 and 9 of the Treaty of Paris expressly forbid intermeddling.
 (b) We guaranteed the Independence of Turkey, therefore we must interpose to repel intermeddling.
 (c) We guaranteed the Integrity of Turkey, therefore we must interpose to repel annexation.
 (d) By the Tripartite Treaty we engaged to make any infraction of the Treaty of Paris a *casus belli*. Russia's demand, and declaration of war to enforce it, amounts to such an infraction.

REPLY.
 (to these
 Contentions
 generally).

- (a) The treaty embodies a stipulation by Turkey, and implies our right to compel her to fulfil it.
 (b) Turkey, by her failure to fulfil her engagement, has forfeited her right to claim the benefit of Articles 7 and 9.
 (c) All the treaty does is to say the communication of the Firman shall not give us the right to compel Turkey to fulfil it. The treaty does not preclude us from intermeddling if other circumstances call for such a course.
 (d) The Crimean War destroyed a Russian protectorate over the Christian population. The moral obligation to see they did not suffer devolved upon Europe.
 (e) The treaties were made in pursuance of the experiment of admitting Turkey to the concert of Europe, which has utterly failed. The treaties have altogether lapsed. Turkey is practically under European tutelage.
 (to Contention b)
 (f) The guarantee was a guarantee in common. No obligation lies upon us to make war or to enforce it.
 (to Contentions b and c)
 (g) Whatever may be the case with regard to annexations, the Powers have for a long time treated the Independence of Turkey as non-existing.
 (to Contention d)
 (h) We are only bound to do so if called upon by France and Austria. They are not likely to call upon us to interpose on behalf of the Independence of Turkey. Nor could they do so, consistently with the line they have taken in the negotiations.

REJOINDER.

(to Reply *b*)

(a) The stipulations were entered into for the benefit of Europe, not for that of Turkey.

(to Reply *d*)

(b) The Treaty of Kainardji gave Russia no general protectorate, but only a right of intermeddling with respect to a particular church at Constantinople.

(to Reply *e*)

(c) When did the experiment of admitting Turkey to the concert of Europe so completely fail that Turkey forfeited all rights? The treaties were solemnly reaffirmed as lately as 1871.

FURTHER REPLY.

(to Rejoinder *a*)

(a) Europe then can consent to a new and better arrangement.

(to Rejoinder *c*)

(b) The whole treaty was not re-considered in 1871. This was the case only so far as related to the Black Sea clauses.

The following seem the most important occasions when the interpretation of the treaties was discussed in Parliament.

1876. *June 15th*.—Lord Derby replies to an inquiry by Earl Delawarr as to our position under the Tripartite Treaty.

July 31st.—Lord Stratheden and Campbell brought forward a resolution declaring our readiness to uphold the Treaties of 1856 (understanding this in the interest of Turkey.) Earls Granville and Derby join in the debate.

Aug. 11th.—In the debate brought on by Mr. Evelyn Ashley, Mr. Disraeli asserts that the Treaties of 1856 forbid all intermeddling, and that this principle was re-affirmed by the Treaty of London in 1871.

1877. *Feb. 8th*.—Opening debate of Session: subject touched on in House of Lords by Lords Granville and Derby.

Feb. 16th.—Mr. Gladstone's Treaty debate: (This debate was adjourned till the 23rd, but on the 22nd there was a discussion, the result of which was that the debate was dropped, Sir Stafford Northcote refusing to give up a night "to resume a conversation" or that members might make inquiries "not pointed to anything definite.")

1877. *Feb. 26th.*—Debate raised by Lord Stratheden and Campbell.

Mar. 23rd.—Mr. Fawcett's debate: Mr. Gladstone takes occasion to return to the subject of the Treaties.

Mar. 27th.—Mr. Rylands' debate: Mr. Gladstone returns to subject of Treaty of Kainardji.

April 13th.—"Parade debate" in Commons: Lord Hartington, Mr. Gathorne Hardy, Sir William Harcourt and Sir Stafford Northcote touch on the treaties.

April 19th.—Lord Stratheden and Campbell returns to the question. Lord Rosebery raises question of the Tripartite Treaty.

May 7th, &c.—Five-night debate in Commons.

May 14th.—Lord Rosebery returns to Tripartite Treaty.

July 19th.—Lord Stratheden and Campbell again raises question.

1878. *March 7th.*—Duke of Argyll's debate in Lords.

An early instance of the legalistic interpretation of the treaties is afforded by the *Times* of December 24th, 1875. The *Times*, however, did not proceed to draw the inference that there ought to be no intermeddling, but seemed inclined rather to say in effect, "so much the worse for the treaty." But the chief importance of the article consists in its having been the occasion of the first of several weighty letters, which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe addressed to the *Times* during the crisis. In his first letter he argued against a policy of total inaction on our part, he suggested a solution, and he dealt with the objection that to impose it upon Turkey would be a breach of the treaty. He advocated

a superintendence of mixed organisations internally, and a joint conventional pressure from without. . . . These measures reduced to a system, would doubtless amount to tutelage, but the Turkish empire has long been virtually in that state. . . . Stress has been laid in some newspaper articles on that clause in the Treaty of Paris which has an air of binding the Powers to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey. But the engagement is in truth limited, and conditional. The Christian plenipotentiaries promised only that the communication of the Sultan's reforms should not be held to warrant such interference. But other rights to interfere belong to the Powers, especially to those who either sided with the Porte in a moral sense, or spent their money and shed their blood in the Sultan's cause in the Crimean war. The engagement taken in its fullest interpretation moreover was an act of reliance on the Sultan's honour, and consequently, resumable on the failure of that counterpledge.

By the Treaty of Paris the Porte was admitted into the community of European States, and the table of reforms—which by the way was framed by the ambassador in conference with the Turkish minister at Constantinople—obtained a place in the treaty as proof of the practical effect of that admission.—*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, *T. Jan. 3rd, 1876*.

In opposition to the contention that the treaty precluded all interference with Turkey, we find the right of interfering on behalf of the Provincials urged upon grounds which differed somewhat according as they were based upon the embodiment of the Firman in the treaty, or upon the general policy of the Crimean war, outside the treaty. According to this latter view the treaty was regarded as a document which did not provide for the events which had recently happened. The case was stated in these two modes by Lord Granville on the one hand, and by Mr. Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll on the other. The Duke of Argyll was the great exponent of the contention that by virtue of the Crimean War it became our duty to protect the Christian populations. Mr. Gladstone perhaps equally insisted on it, but in his speeches and writings he was accustomed to deal with almost every aspect of the question.

[*Lord Granville* was not one of those who thought the Treaty of Paris was gone, or ought to go. He doubted whether it would not have been better (following a suggestion in a memorandum in the *Life of the Prince Consort*) to have insisted on receiving security from the Turkish Government instead of being satisfied with a declaration; but that declaration was embodied in the treaty]. And I hold that the fact of the declaration having been so embodied, the treaty gives to the Powers a right, and throws upon them the obligation, to step in, and see that the declaration is not thrown aside.—*H. of L. Feb. 8th, 1877*.

The guarantee given to Turkey does not contemplate an infraction of the treaty by Turkey itself—that was a contingency which never was thought of and could not have been provided against. Turkey made promises to Europe, and was bound by them, but at the same time she was intrusted with the execution of her own promises. If these promises should be violated by Turkey a case arises for which the treaty does not provide, and for which, in the nature of things, no treaty can provide. . . . We resisted Russian aggression, we were parties to putting Turkey in the position described in the treaty, and we exacted formal promises from her that she would treat her Christian subjects with justice, that she would give them certain privileges. I ask then, all your Lordships, as men of honour, does not this impose obligations on us? . . . In the common language of society in 1853 and 1854, and not only in that language but in the corre-

spondence of public men, and in a remarkable manner in the correspondence of the Prince Consort, our position towards the Christian subjects of Turkey is described as that of a Protectorate in substitution of the exclusive Protectorate which had been claimed by Russia.—*Argyll, H. of L.* March 7th, 1878.

[What] the Powers are debarred from is claiming a title to interference on a special ground [the communication of the Firman] . . . But the treaty never denied the general and indisputable position that with regard to any State whatever, especially with a State constituted like Turkey, the effect of its conduct upon the general principles of humanity or upon the peace of Europe might be such as not only to warrant but to compel interference.—*Gladstone, H. of C.* February 16th, 1877.

It is not a little curious to notice how nearly this corresponds with the views put forward at the time when the troubles in the Herzegovina first began to attract attention, by one who became prominent among the opponents of Mr. Gladstone's Eastern policy. This view is expressed in a letter which is remarkable as an early advocacy of a "violet" policy from a Conservative politician. Sir H. D. Wolff writes to the *Times* to deprecate a movement which had been commenced for affording pecuniary aid to the Herzegovinians,¹ on the ground that it is

premature for the British public . . . to subscribe to foment an insurrection the object of which may be achieved by legitimate and formal methods laid down in one of the most solemn international acts of the century. . . . The Treaty of 1856 lays down that certain privileges are to be granted by the Porte to her Christian subjects. Although no right of interference is given by the treaty to the Powers, that right clearly exists from the nature of the act itself. . . . Here then is at once a remedy, and one which apparently has been adopted. The Powers have a right to speak. If their speaking be neglected they have the means of enforcing their advice. . . . Meanwhile . . . would it not be well for the Government to take steps to let us know what they are really doing?—*Sir H. D. Wolff, T.* Sept. 1st, 1875.

Mr. Gladstone, in the debates of March 23rd and 27th, 1877, insisted that as an historical fact Russia had obtained a protectorate by the Treaty of Kainardji. On the 27th Mr. Bourke expressed his dissent. Mr. Gladstone hoped the next time Mr. Bourke spoke he would express his opinion and its grounds. On May 7th Mr. Gladstone again put this view, which was then controverted by Mr. Cross and Sir H. D. Wolff. The Duke of Argyll maintained

¹ *Post*, chap. vii.

the same view of the Treaty of Kainardji,¹ in the preface to his book, dated January, 1879 :

It was one essential feature of the policy of 1856 that the guaranteeing Powers should assume the position towards the subject populations of Turkey which Russia had succeeded in asserting for herself by a clause in the Treaty of Kainardji. . . . It was in fulfilment of this policy, and in the discharge of this duty, that the guaranteeing Powers required the Government of Turkey to give to them the promise recorded in the ninth clause of the Treaty of Paris. . . . It will be seen then, that the substitution of an European for a Russian protectorate over the subjects of the Porte . . . was a fundamental part of the whole policy of the allies. . . . Accordingly we find that this principle runs throughout the treaty.—Argyll's *Eastern Question*, preface, pp. 19—21.

The key to the whole question, according to many authorities, is to be found in the famous seventh clause of the Treaty of Kainardji. The whole controversy arising out of this clause—a controversy carried on last session with as much eagerness and as little hope of reconciliation as it was some twenty-five years ago—is simply as to whether it did or did not confer upon Russia a right of protectorate over the Greek Church and its worshippers in Turkey. We were of those who held that whether any such dangerous protectorate did or did not exist before the Crimean War, it was the obvious policy of the Great Powers of Europe, and was especially the duty and the interest of England, to see that the protection of the Christian populations of Turkey was made a matter of European concern and concert, so that they should be secured against the oppression of Turkey on the one side and the ambition of Russia on the other.—*D. N.* December 31st, 1877.

The Duke of Argyll further contended that if the right of the Porte to govern the Christian subjects as she liked was to be argued from treaty stipulations which secured her independence and her admission into the European system, yet as these stipulations had never been acted on the argument fell to the ground :

Although we professed to admit Turkey into the family of European nations, there are two important respects in which practically she was never admitted to an equality with the other Powers. . . . With regard to the non-interference in the internal affairs of Turkey the condition from the nature of the case became little more than mere words. There has been perpetual interference on our part with their internal affairs, through our agents, through our Ambassadors, through our Consuls. . . . Again [Turkey] has never been intrusted with legal jurisdiction

¹ Compare Holland (*ante*, p. 117 note). He contrasts the programme of Kutschouk-Kainardji with the programme of Paris. The latter, he says, comprised the substitution of the collective guarantee of all the Powers for the special protectorate by Russia of the Christian vassal States contemplated by the former (p. 30).

over the subjects of other nations resident in her territory.—*Argyll, H. of L.* March 7th, 1878.

From a slightly different point of view, it was contended that the Powers, by agreeing to press upon Turkey at the Constantinople Conference demands which were inconsistent with the legalistic interpretation of the treaties, had precluded themselves from falling back upon that interpretation.

Thus vanishes all the rubbish which has been written and talked for twelve months about the dangers of diplomatic intervention in Turkish affairs, and the necessity of adhering strictly to the Treaty of 1856. Why, the Conference itself is not so much a diplomatic intervention as a practical supersession of the Government of Turkey, and the conditions imposed are a deliberate repeal of the treaty.—*Sir W. V. Harcourt*.¹

Sir William Harcourt has described with great force what he conceives must be taken, as a matter of international law, to be the effect of the refusal of Turkey to accept the proposals of the Powers. He refers the origin of the Conference to that clause in the Treaty of Paris which requires that any difficulty arising between any of the parties to it should be submitted to the judgment of the other parties before any decisive step is taken. The Conference sat, therefore, in judgment upon Turkey, and the conclusions of the Conference constituted a judgment which has been pronounced and registered, but not executed; but as the Turks have failed to defer to the Powers acting under the treaty, they have forfeited the benefits of that treaty, and have put themselves in a position of outlawry. This must strike most of us as being legal overmuch.²—*T.* Jan. 29th, 1877.

Lord Hartington and Sir William Harcourt³ appear to have regarded the contention that the treaty forbids intermeddling as only to be met on the ground that under the circumstances which had arisen it was impossible any longer to maintain the course of action prescribed.

In the debate of April 13, 1877, Lord Hartington said the Protocol of March 31, 1877, was ineffectual, though containing principles of the highest importance—

principles which establish the right of interference by the Powers in the affairs of Turkey . . . and principles which I

¹ At Oxford, *D. N.* Jan. 10, 1877.

² The article refers to a long letter from Sir William Harcourt in their own columns of the same day.

Compare further criticism in *P. M. G.* January 31, and a further letter from Sir William Harcourt with an article "Sir William Harcourt's Points" in *P. M. G.* February 3.

³ Compare Sir William Harcourt at Southport (*D. N.* Oct. 3, 1879). He spoke of the policy of the Treaty of Paris as opposed to a policy of emancipation.

must say do not appear to me to be easily reconciled with the letter of the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris. . . . [The Government] have laboured to maintain the Treaty of 1856, but the Treaty of 1856 can hardly be said any longer to exist.

Sir William Harcourt was willing to leave the matter

exactly where it was left at the Conference by Lord Salisbury's declaration that the treaty could not be one-sided, that it placed Turkey under obligations she had not performed, and therefore the obligation on the other side was at an end. The arrangement, Lord Salisbury said, was founded upon the assumption that Turkey would reform herself, and that assumption had been falsified. With this statement we might be satisfied, and it followed that the Protocol was signed on the assumption that the ninth article of the treaty, forbidding interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, was not in force.

Sir Stafford Northcote, replying to Lord Hartington and Sir William Harcourt on behalf of the Government, repudiated the charge of having set aside the Treaty of Paris.

The communication of the Firman by Article 9 does not thereby give the Powers any right of interference; but there is nothing in the article which takes from the Powers any right to concert among themselves with regard to those matters which in Turkey or elsewhere may seem to them dangerous to the peace of Europe.¹

On another occasion, Mr. Courtney urged as a general proposition of International Law that Treaties "die of inanition."²

This seemed to be a sound proposition, that any convention must be considered to remain in existence only so long as the condition under which it was contracted remained reasonably the same. *Rebus sic stantibus*, the obligations remained; but if the circumstances altered, the obligations disappeared.—*Courtney, H. of C. Feb. 16th, 1877.*

The inapplicability of the treaty to existing circumstances was the result of Turkey's failure to perform her part of the bargain. Hence we have the argument from mere change of circumstances and the argument from Turkey's default very closely connected. Most stress was usually laid upon the argument that the treaty obligation could not be unilateral, and that the failure of Turkey to perform her covenant released the other parties from their

¹ It is remarkable how nearly this accords with the argument put by Mr. Gladstone (*ante*, p. 124).

² The phrase does not appear in the *Times* report of Mr. Courtney's own speech, but it was attributed to him by Mr. Evelyn Ashley, who spoke in the same debate.

obligations towards *her* whatever might be the case as between each other.

The Prime Minister has repeatedly dwelt upon the immense importance of maintaining the faith of treaties. Now mark my words. The vital question for us is this—Are the treaties of 1856, entered into at the time of the Crimean War, in force, or are they not? (Cries of “No, no!”) Are they in force—I mean not as to the honourable obligations they may entail among the Powers that have observed them—but in force between us and Turkey? My opinion is given in a sentence: Turkey has entirely broken those treaties and trampled them under foot. I recognise in them no force whatever, so far as regards investing her with any titles towards us with regard to her independence and integrity and her admission into the family of European nations. In my opinion, all these matters are to be regulated on general grounds of justice and of prudence, but the stipulations in favour of Turkey no longer exist. (Cheers.) Now this is a most serious question. There may be, and I rather expect there will be, those who will tell you that these treaties still exist; and what I wish to point out to you is what these treaties contain, and how they bind and fetter your action if they are in truth still valid instruments.—*Gladstone*.¹

What I contend is that it is impossible to separate from any of these guarantees, not only the general alteration of circumstances that may occur, but also the conduct of the party on behalf of whom the guarantee is given. . . . [Did ministers consider] that we are absolved from the obligations asserted in the Treaty of 1856, and that we are free to act as policy, justice, and humanity may seem to direct and require.—*Gladstone, H. of C. Feb. 16th, 1877.*

Mr. Gladstone interrupted Mr. Hardy, who replied to him,² to explain that he meant absolved with respect to Turkey. Turkey, he contended, had lost her rights under the treaties, though she might still be bound. Mr. Hardy retorted by asking when was it that Turkey had lost her rights, since it seemed they subsisted in 1871. Thus in rejoinder to the argument from Turkey's default we meet with the argument which Mr. Gladstone in the treaty debate of February 16th, 1877, spoke of as “Born on the Lord Mayor's day at the Guildhall.”³

We have believed that that Peace would be best maintained by an observance of the treaties in which all the great Powers of Europe have joined. Those treaties are not antique and dusty obsolete documents. They are not instruments devised under a

¹ At Taunton, Jan. 27th, 1877, *post*, chap. xiv. § 7.

² *Post*, chap. xv. § 2.

³ In this Mr. Gladstone was not quite accurate. Mr. Disraeli used the same argument in the House of Commons at the close of the session of 1876.

state of circumstances different from those that exist, and ill-adapted to the spirit of the age in which we live. They are the most recent of the important treaties to which England is a party. I am amused sometimes when I hear the great Treaty of Paris spoken of as a treaty negotiated some twenty years ago, and, so far, entitled to respect, but not as an instrument to regulate the conduct of Governments. But let me remind you, my lord, that it is hardly five years since—in 1871—in this very capital, the Treaty of Paris was revised by the most eminent statesmen of Europe, among whom I will generously account those who preceded us in office. It was revised and re-enacted under circumstances which made that re-enactment most solemn, and that treaty lays it down as the best security for the peace of Europe that we should maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish empire.—*Beaconsfield*.¹

On another occasion Lord Derby said :—

It could not be contended that so great a change had come over Turkey in those six years. This was one ground why the argument from Turkey's default was unsound. Another ground was that these stipulations were entered into, not for the benefit of Turkey, but for the benefit of Europe.—*H. of L.* Feb. 8th, 1877.

As to the reply to this argument, Mr. Courtney said Mr. Gladstone had made it clear that the Treaty of London referred simply to the Black Sea clauses.

The obligation then, being between the guaranteeing Powers, could not be appealed to by any one outside of them, and if the guaranteeing Powers chose to retire from that obligation, the obligation, whatever it was, ceased altogether.—*H. of C.* Feb. 16th, 1877.

It is noticeable that Mr. Courtney did not base his argument on the contention that we once were under an obligation to Turkey from which she by her conduct had discharged us, but on the contention that the general treaty having been made for the sake of Europe, the Powers came under no obligation to Turkey, and Turkey under no obligation to the Powers under it.

Just as one contention in the Treaty controversy takes us back to "anti-Turkism," so another contention carries us on to "anti-Russism." There were a few who contended that the treaties bound us to support Turkey against Russia, and to call upon Austria and France to assist us in doing so.

Lord Stratheden and Campbell urged this course. He complained that the Treaties of 1856 were utterly unexecuted,

¹ At the Guildhall, Nov. 9th, 1876. See *post*, chap. xiii. § 9.

while all the pretexts for neglecting them had long ago been answered. The proclamation of neutrality "only serves to flatter, where it is a duty to withstand." *H. of L.* Feb. 26th & July 19th, 1877.

Lord Robert Montagu contended that by the treaties England, France, and Austria had bound themselves to make war upon Russia if she should violate the independence or the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and the refusal of any one of the Powers to fulfil the obligation was not to act as a release to the others.—*H. of C.* Feb. 16th, 1877.

Lord Derby was very far indeed from endorsing this contention:—

We guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement, that is, we each undertake to observe it, and to do what we can to make others observe it, but there is no shadow of a promise in that treaty [of Paris] to make non-observance by other Powers a *casus belli*—the words stop short of that, they carefully avoid any such pledge, in fact they point directly to a different course of action, namely, to collective discussion and negotiation. As far as that treaty is concerned, therefore, we are in no sense bound by a promise to fight for Turkey. . . . [The Tripartite Treaty] is undoubtedly of a more binding character, since it pledges each of the Powers to regard any infraction of the former treaty as a *casus belli*, and on the invitation of the others to concert measures with the Porte. But that is not an engagement entered into with the Porte. It is not an engagement to which the Porte is a party. It does not therefore bind us in any way except to France and Austria; and unless France and Austria call upon us to interfere—a step which in existing circumstances they are not in the least likely to take—it binds us to nothing at all.—*Derby, H. of L.* Feb. 8th, 1877.

But in spite of Lord Derby's minimising, Mr. Gathorne Hardy's reply to Mr. Gladstone's interrogation on February 16th, 1877,¹ left the question in "a somewhat unsatisfactory position," as Lord Hartington took occasion to remark on February 22nd. A distinction was drawn between the Treaty of Paris and the Tripartite Treaty.

Lord Rosebery pressed upon the Government that we should take steps to release ourselves from the obligations of the Tripartite Treaty by amicable arrangement with the other Signatories, in accordance with the protocol of 1871 and before the *casus fœderis* should arise. "The question is urgent. If we choose to disregard the validity of the treaty, a vital blow is struck at the validity of all treaties." *Lord Derby* utterly refused to contemplate the possibility that France or Austria might call upon us

¹ *Post*, chap. xv. § 2.

under the Tripartite Treaty, and would not admit that the question was in any way practical.—*H. of L.* April 19th & May 14th, 1877.

Mr. Courtney, while contending that the treaties had lapsed from changed circumstances, at the same time urged that we should not wait to proclaim our freedom till Austria came to us and claimed our action.—*H. of C.* Feb. 16th, 1877.

With respect to the question of the treaty rights and obligations, the distinction between the Independence and the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire is of importance. Many of those who contended that the treaties had become of none effect to restrain any intermeddling, or to bind us to resist it, were prepared to admit that quite other considerations would apply if it became a question of the partition of Turkey. England, France, and Austria all took part in the Conference of Constantinople, and after that, at all events, it would hardly lie in the mouth of either one of them to call on either of the others to make the intermeddling of any outside Power a *casus belli*. But the three might still be bound to one another to assist in maintaining by force of arms if necessary the principle that the territories comprised in the Ottoman Empire should not be annexed by any other Power.

ANTI-RUSSISM AND PHILO-TURKISM.

We now come to the notions of which the distinguishing feature is hostility to Russia. These constitute the specific view in relation to the controversies of the time which (since the word Russophobia is invested with wider and older associations) we will call anti-Russism. These notions fall into three great groups:—

(1) Those which regard Russia as threatening the European system.

(2) Those which regard Russia as threatening England in relation to India and her Asiatic interests.

(3) A number of notions founded on more general considerations.

The last group, it will be observed, is of a character which may be called "sentimental" in contradistinction to the "diplomatic"¹ character of the first two. It is a little difficult, however, to treat them entirely apart. It is only in combination that the constituent

¹ See *post*, Appendix to Part II. as to the sense in which the terms "sentimental" and "diplomatic" are intended to be used.

elements of anti-Russism seem capable of producing their full effect.

The distinction between the European and Asiatic factors is tolerably obvious, and was adopted by many writers.¹

Side by side as it were with anti-Russism runs what Mr. Gladstone somewhere called "The kindred but more advanced disease of Turkomania." But to avoid giving to any phase of opinion a name implying in it a diseased character, we may adopt in preference the neutral term philo-Turkism. This nomenclature has also the advantage of being symmetrical, the two ends of the scale thus being filled by anti-Turkism and philo-Turkism. The symmetry would be perfect if we had a view "philo-Russism" serving as the counterpart of anti-Turkism at the "violet" end of the scale. There was indeed a good deal of English sympathy with the Russian position in respect to the particular controversy in hand; but this was not the same thing as the general admiration for Russia which was expressed on one occasion by Carlyle.² At most, such an element appeared only as an unimportant "apologetic" factor.

For the most part philo-Turkism was subordinate to anti-Russism. Turkey was regarded as a counterpoise to, or perhaps as a weapon which might be used against, Russia. Philo-Turkism must not, however, be absolutely identified with anti-Russism, as we find traces of a desire to uphold Turkey independently of any use which might be made of Turkey as against Russia.³

Moreover, as we have seen, a certain jealousy of Russia, and a desire to erect the most efficient barrier against her advance towards the south, entered into the view diametrically opposed to

¹ Compare Sir R. Alcock. He distinguishes :—

Three groups of questions which together form the Eastern Question.

(a) The future destiny of Turkey and Constantinople, which chiefly affects Europe and more immediately Russia and Austria.
 (b) Persia and Egypt enter into a second group, comprising Central Asia, in which Great Britain and Russia alone of the European Powers are concerned as principals.
 (c) The Far East, in which Russia and China alone have political and territorial interests engaged. The other European Powers have only commercial interests.

These three groups, he says, dovetail into and overlap each other, so that they can never be entirely separated. Russia is a principal factor in all three, and thus a great European Power connects them inseparably. [*Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1876.] We may put aside the considerations involved in Sir R. Alcock's third group, but it will be observed that the other two answer to our European and Asiatic anti-Russism.

² *Post*, § H.

³ Such a desire was, as we shall see, attributed to Lord Beaconsfield himself.

philo-Turkism. In this sense Russophobia was a factor of anti-Turkism itself.

Lastly, many opponents of Russia refused to be considered as apologists for Turkey. They were content to say that one was as black as the other, and that British Interests must be upheld irrespective of these matters. Still, it was the characteristic of anti-Russism to count as a loss to England any success which Russia might achieve by her diplomacy or by her arms in reference to the particular matters then occupying the attention of the world. As these were matters in which Russia was making demands which the Porte was resisting, for practical purposes hostility to Russia and support of Turkey tended to become undistinguishable. In the diplomatic notions Turkey, representing the *status quo*, appears as the counterpoise to Russia, and in the sentimental notions we get a contrast between the Russian and the Turkish government or character, drawn unfavourably to the former. Anti-Russism and philo-Turkism were often the same thing looked at from a different side. Thus, although the theoretical distinction does not entirely disappear, we may, as a matter of convenience, consider the various notions of anti-Russism together with the corresponding notions of philo-Turkism.

§ A. *Russia a big Aggressive Power.*

We find the leading notion of European anti-Russism in the conception of Russia as a Power which, by a course of systematic and persistent aggression on her weaker neighbours, advances of set purpose to an irresistible ascendancy in Europe, if not to universal empire. Hence it becomes the interest of every European State to assist in maintaining whatever barrier may confine her to her frozen steppes, and keep her from bursting out upon the world beyond.

“Russia has always from the time of Peter the Great systematically laboured without any deviation to realise the scheme of the conquest of Turkey. When checked in her advance, she draws back, but only to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity.”—[*Quoted from Lord Palmerston's speech in Parliament, March 25th, 1854: the reviewer continues*] We hold this to be an invariable truth in politics. M. Boukharow, himself a Russian, boasts that the extension of Russia in the last century is a fact unexampled in history. Since 1772 she has doubled her territories; within eighty years she has advanced 350 leagues on the road to Vienna and to Paris; she has swallowed up half Sweden,

and of Poland as much as would make another Austrian empire. She has conquered from Persia about as much as the area of Great Britain. From Turkey she has wrested by successive wars and treaties States as large as Prussia was before the war of 1866, and we have recently seen her advancing over Central Asia with accelerated rapidity. To this movement as against Europe and Turkey the Crimean War put a stop. . . . To denounce as worthless results obtained by so great an effort seems to us to be sheer folly.—*Ed. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

The mere fact of the bigness of Russia was accountable, no doubt, for some of the hostile feeling which was evinced towards her. Perhaps some half-unconsciously received tradition of the balance of power influenced the minds of some people who appear to have been disturbed and excited by the contemplation of Russia upon the map.

It is better at once to recognise that this grand theory about the necessity of repressing the Slavic nationality is as unsound in policy as it is cynically selfish. The notion of consigning certain populations to eternal servitude because the section of the Aryan race to which they belong happens to be numerous, has been reserved for the philosophers of an enlightened age. [The writer quotes John Bright's remark to the working men in reference to the franchise, "You cannot help being numerous."—*T.* Aug. 16th, 1876.

At all events in the contest between Russia and Turkey, the relative size of the combatants operated to conciliate some amount of sympathy to the smaller. If, from one point of view, this appears to be a matter of mere sentiment, yet in another aspect it is closely related to an objection to seeing small States absorbed by large ones, entertained as a general political principle.

Sympathy with the weak is pleaded in the case of the Turk as it was pleaded in the case of the slaveowner, by way of giving a chivalrous aspect to what might perhaps be felt in itself to be rather a questionable predilection. Sympathy with the weak is infinitely to be commended; but we should have thought that the weak in the former case were the slaves, and in the present the Christian subjects of the Turk.—Goldwin Smith, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1877.¹

As to the character of the aggressive Power that was so much dreaded, few had formed anything like a definite and accurate notion. Two conceptions, to some extent opposed to each other, are met with, which may be distinguished as the "Panslavist" and "Holy Alliance" conceptions. The former of these saw the chief

¹ Compare extract from *Fraser*, quoted in *Anti-Turkism*, § E, *ante*, p. 92.

danger from Russia in a destructive propaganda working through secret societies. The notion of the Russian Secret Societies as constituting the chief danger to Europe, was characteristic of Mr. Disraeli.¹

What happened? That happened which was not expected. Servia declared war upon Turkey. That is to say, the Secret Societies of Europe declared war upon Turkey. I can assure you, gentlemen, that in the attempt to conduct the government of this world there are now elements to be considered, which our predecessors had not to deal with. We have now to deal not merely with Emperors, with Princes, and with Ministers; there are the Secret Societies, an element which we must take into account and which at the last moment may baffle all our arrangements—societies which have regular agents everywhere, which countenance assassination, and which if necessary could produce a massacre.—*Beaconsfield*.²

Mr. Kinglake speaks of

the submission of Alexander II. to the Panslavistic fraternity, and the consequent accession of Russia to the cause of a half-hearted democracy. [Prince W. Mestchersky's recent account of the political Russia of the present day is referred to. The Prince] plainly agrees that it is a democracy not applying its energies to home politics, but attending, on grounds of fraternity, to foreign affairs.—*Crimea*, Preface to (Cab.) Ed. 1876.

Mr. Wallace, writing on the Russian Secret Societies distinguishes between the Panslavist and the Nihilist Societies.³ Internationally the former only are important; and it is these that are mainly alluded to in the expressions of the factor of opinion now under consideration. It is difficult to estimate the effect of the existence of the Nihilist element in Russia on English Public Opinion. The aim of the Nihilist Societies is a subversion of home institutions, and a certain internationalist character might be expected to attach to them. This character, however, does not appear to be strongly developed. Mr. Wallace tells us that in times of national crises, as in the Polish insurrection of 1863, patriotism triumphs over liberalism with the Nihilists.

So far as Russian Nihilism was taken into account at all, this element of opinion belongs rather to the sentimental group.

¹ We may recall the character of mystery and terror with which he invested his picture of English Trades Unions (*Sybil*, book iv. chap. iv.).

² At Aylesbury, Sept. 20, 1876. *Post*, chap. xiii. § 3.

³ *Fort. Rev.* Aug. 1877.

It must be noticed, however, that, by a curious apparent inconsistency, points of weakness in Russia were often laid most stress upon by the very persons who were urging most strongly the danger to be apprehended from her. They seemed so anxious to make her out contemptible that they almost forgot to make her formidable. But underneath this inconsistency lay the substantial notion that the very weakness of the Russian Government was a source of European danger.

There is something quite pathetic in the picture we form of the kindly indolent, nervous man [Alexander II.] worried by gigantic responsibilities and never-ending business, dreading the enterprises which he dares not refuse, and over-mastered by men whom he is afraid to trust.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

Such considerations (to which we may perhaps add the financial embarrassments of Russia) made her action seem less likely to be guided by the sane calculations of prudence. She was, so to speak, a volcanic element in the European system, an occult and irregular force, of which quiescence at one point was only the sure indication of activity at another.

As a pendant to this we have Turkey regarded as keeping the peace among her subject populations. We recognise the conception of the *status quo* as the alternative, not only to a scramble by the Great Powers, but also to internecine conflicts between the varied and intermingled populations of the Balkan peninsula.

§ B. *Russia represents the Holy Alliance.*

The other conception of Russia as an aggressive power had its root in the historical connection of Russia with the Holy Alliance. According to this view, in spite of the great changes which had come over Europe since the beginning of the century, Russian diplomacy was still animated by the propaganda of a cruel and repressive system of government. The spirit of the old Holy Alliance was only dormant, not dead, and Russia was identified with it. Russian diplomacy was regarded as a malign influence, hostile to liberal institutions everywhere; and resistance to Russia was identified with the maintenance of the liberties of Europe. The dread of Russian ascendancy had double poignancy given to it by such considerations as these.

The popular view may be nearly expressed thus: Ever since the battle of Waterloo Russia has been the fountain of misery to

Europe. By treachery towards the Congress of Vienna, and by false promises of a constitution to the remnant of Poland, she kept possession of the Duchy of Warsaw, violated and suppressed the Constitution, and ere long crushed the people. By her action in the Holy Alliance, and through the Congress of Verona, she overthrew constitutional government in Spain, and has doomed that country to lasting misery. She has trampled down the laws and liberties of Hungary (which are as old as those of England), in order to make Austria her humble servant. She terrifies every German prince, and, through Austria, sustains cruel despotism in Italy, Naples, and Sicily. The Emperor Nicolas is a scornful and avowed hater of all constitutional restraints on sovereigns. What will he do if, besides his vast land forces, he wins maritime preponderance in the Levant, by holding the keys of the Straits, and getting plenty of Greek sailors?—Prof. Newman, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1877.

It was contended by some that the notion of Russia as the ally and supporter of despots was something of an anachronism in reference to the events of 1876. Still the odium excited by the tradition of the Holy Alliance remained; and even the new Russia could not be regarded as wholly free from the taint.

I am in no sense an advocate, or even an apologist, of Russia. Like most English Liberals I had been accustomed to regard her, ever since the fatal day of Vilagos, when she crushed the independence of Hungary, as the arch foe of political progress, the incarnation of political evil. [Even now, the advance of Russia over Turkey would be an evil; but the Russia of 1876 is not the Russia of 1849.]—Bryce, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

The dislike excited by the notion of Holy-Alliance-Russia had its counterpart in the conception of Turkey as a liberal and reforming Power. It was remembered, too, that after the troubles of 1849, Kossuth and other refugees had found an asylum on Turkish soil, and that the Sultan, supported by England and by France, had withstood all the demands of Russia and of Austria for the surrender of the fugitives.¹

The notion, if it had been that of the importance of protecting Powers which refuse an unlawful demand for extradition, would have been diplomatic; but as an apologetic factor of philo-Turkism, the notion in question appears to be rather sentimental in its character, and we shall speak of it with that group. We notice, indeed, that many of the notions of anti-Russism, though founded upon diplomatic considerations, verge upon the non-diplomatic character.

¹ See Ashley's *Palmerston*, chap. iv.

§ C. *Russia Systematically Faithless and Cunning.*

In the conception of Russia as a systematically aggressive Power there was often involved the notion of something in her to be encountered beyond mere brute force. Russia was regarded as systematically faithless and cunning. Such ideas as these were of long standing, and indeed the older Russophobia had evolved a sort of mythus, which served as a basis for much of the special anti-Russism of 1876-80.

The notion of secret organisation has a strange fascination for some minds. Just as some find a ready explanation of all political phenomena in the machinations of Jesuits, so there are others who would trace all the troubles of Europe for the past century to the will of Peter the Great. The Russian diplomatist is thought of as a being endowed with a preternatural craft, and, at the same time, as absolutely faithless. He pushes on with unwearied persistence to the accomplishment of his unholy design. From this point of view the dread and hatred of Russia seems almost to go beyond a purely political desire that her power may be kept within bounds. There mingles with it something of the awe with which one would await the onset of a supernatural foe, and men look forward to an impending conflict as to a holy war.

Mr. David Urquhart, who was formerly secretary of the Embassy at Constantinople, and who sat for Stafford as a Conservative from 1847 to 1852, was at one time a sort of apostle of the older Russophobia. He also took a very strong view of the mischievous effect of the Declaration of Paris on England's maritime power, and, moreover, he advocated a return to something like the Privy Council system of government. He succeeded in interesting a number of people, for the most part working men, in his views, and by his influence societies calling themselves "Foreign Affairs Committees" were established in various towns, chiefly in the north of England.¹ We catch some curious glimpses of the old Foreign Affairs Committees during the crisis of 1876-8. They appear as organising opposition in the anti-Turkish meetings at the height of the Bulgarian agitation, and after the Treaty of Berlin they

¹ It appears that in 1857 there were sixty-nine of these Committees. For an interesting account of them see an article entitled "Political Reminiscences" [A. G. Stapleton, *Macmillan's*, March, 1875]. Mr. Urquhart's views were also advocated in a quarterly publication called the *Diplomatic Review*, which reached its twenty-third year in 1875. Mr. Urquhart died in May, 1877. [See Obituary notice in *Annual Register*.]

petition for the impeachment of Lord Beaconsfield.¹ Mr. Urquhart, it was said, maintained till his death that Lord Palmerston was bribed by Russia, and made the Crimean War in her interest.² Whether or not the story correctly represents Mr. Urquhart, it illustrates, not inaptly, the lengths to which people might be carried by the notion of Russian craft.

We find the same tendency to extravagant suspicion with regard to the troubles which beset Turkey in 1875 and 1876. There were some who refused to admit that the troubles which were threatening the peace of Europe were to be attributed to any fault of Turkey, and who traced them all to the machinations of Russia. It was General Ignatieff, said they, who persuaded Abdul Aziz first to extravagance, then to repudiation, and thus brought about the financial ruin of Turkey, which was intended to open the way for Russian conquest.³

It is stated on no mean authority, that it was owing to [General Ignatieff's] own advice the Turkish Government adopted the measures [of repression in Bulgaria] which led to the horrible massacres that completely turned the tide of European opinion against Turkey, and which may prove the immediate cause of the fall of the Ottoman dominion in Europe.—*Quart. Rev.* Jan. 1877, p. 296.

But, after all, these extravagant manifestations of Russophobia were only the indications of a wide-spread and deep-seated distrust of the aims and methods of Russian diplomacy.

The traditional impression concerning the untrustworthiness of Russian diplomacy had been revived and freshened by the action of Russia in taking the opportunity of the Franco-German war to repudiate the clause in the Treaty of Paris which neutralised the Black Sea. Still more was this effect produced by the virtual annexation of Khiva in 1873, after assurances offered to the English Government, which had been understood as disclaiming any such intention.

English diplomatists usually dislike, and sometimes detest, the Russian Foreign Office, which they accuse at once of overweening ambition and of habitual faithlessness—faithlessness of the kind which most irritates diplomacy, faithlessness not so much to treaties so much as to honourable engagements made in private. The Khiva affair may be misunderstood, but it will cost Russia as much as a lost battle.—*Spec.* Nov. 4, 1876.

¹ See meeting at Newcastle, Sept. 1876, *post*, chap. vii. § 1. Again see H. of C. July 25, 1878, *post*, chap. xviii. § "The Secret Agreement."

² Sir Tollemache Sinclair's *Defence of Russia*, p. 2.

³ See Alfred Austin, *Russia before Europe*.

§ D. *Russia threatens Constantinople.*

The apprehension of Russian aggression took its most definite form in relation to Constantinople. The idea that Russia aims at making herself mistress of Constantinople is of long standing in England, and has always excited a most determined opposition.¹

The English public has a broad conception of the general relations of the European Powers, and it was the accepted tradition that Russia, on the one hand, desires the conquest of Turkey and the acquisition of Constantinople, and that England, on the other hand, desires to prevent Constantinople from falling into Russian hands.

The enormous importance of Constantinople is here held to consist in the power which its possession might confer. Hence the preference for keeping a comparatively weak power like Turkey seated there.

I shall reduce the plea for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire to that one plea of expediency upon which the greatest master of Turkish policy, Fuad Pasha, was content to rest its claim. "We are the best police of the Bosphorus."—A. Arnold, *Contemp. Rev.* July, 1876.

If we assume the dream of Russian enthusiasts fulfilled, that Russia had simply succeeded to the possession of Turkey, we should find her endowed with a power which would seriously threaten the rest of Europe. She could easily make the Hellespont as impassable to attack from the south as if it were crossed by a breakwater of granite. Behind this impervious gate the Propontis and the Euxine would form a station, compared to which all the stations in the world are of trifling value, being port, arsenal, roadstead, practising-ground, and naval station all in one. . . . If to this array of nautical advantage we add the opportunities of the countless islands and roadsteads in the Levant, we get a combination of physical resources for naval supremacy to which everything else in world becomes quite insignificant.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

While the idea of the transcendent importance of Constantinople thus enters largely into the composition of anti-Russism, there were some who argued that safety might be found in this very circumstance, and others again who regarded the idea itself as exaggerated.

¹ M. Thiers (*Hist. Consulate and Empire*, book xxi.) mentions that in 1805 Pitt told the Russian envoy there was a strong prejudice in England against such an event, which he was obliged to regard.

The sovereignty of European Turkey could scarcely be added to the possessions of the Czar without tendency to dislocate the system of his empire.—*Kinglake*, vol. i. p. 62.

One axiom may be laid down: the New Rome must ever be the New Rome; she must be the head of something, be it empire or federation. . . . The Russian of our day may win her as the Russian of a thousand years back strove to win her; but, if he wins her, he will cease to be a Russian. Constantinople can never be a dependency of St. Petersburg any more than it can be a dependency of Berlin or of London.¹—*Freeman*, *Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1877.

The question as to Constantinople is more serious, though its gravity has been a good deal exaggerated by the fancy which inflates the actual importance of the place up to the measure of its historic renown. A similar illusion prevailed about Rome, the occupation of which by the Italian Government was looked forward to as an event pregnant with momentous consequences.—*Goldwin Smith*, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1877.

Again it was pointed out that Austria and Germany were much more closely concerned than England to prevent the apprehended result, if, indeed, Russia was aiming at the possession of Constantinople and preponderance in South-Eastern Europe, and that the duty of taking the initiative might be safely left to them so far as the general question of the European balance of power was concerned.

Note on the Rule of the Straits.

Very closely connected with the question of the possession of Constantinople was the question of the navigation of the Straits which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and the Oceans of the World; for the possession of Constantinople carries with it the command of the Bosphorus.

And since this people [the Russians] have a seaboard and ports on the Euxine, they are forced by an everlasting policy to desire the command of the Straits which lead through the heart of an empire.—*Kinglake*, vol. i. p. 57.

But over and above the physical control which the position of the Turks upon the banks of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles enables them to exercise over the passage of ships through those waters the way is barred to ships of war by a rule of European law.

The exact nature of the Rule of the Straits, and the relation of the closing of the Straits to the neutralisation of the Black Sea does not appear always to have been clearly apprehended. From

¹ See also *P. M. G.* Dec. 14, 1875.

the time of their settlement in Europe up to 1774, the whole of the coasts surrounding not only the Straits, but also the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, were possessed by the Turks. The Black Sea was regarded as a *Mare clausum*, in other words, as a Turkish lake or territorial water; and the Straits themselves, both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, were in a special sense regarded as Turkish territory.

The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are both so narrow that, even in the early times of artillery, they could be commanded by guns on either side.—*Kinglake*, vol. i. p. 363.

Hence, besides the general ground that they were the outlets to a purely Turkish lake, of itself, perhaps, according to old notions, enough to sustain the proposition, these Straits came also under the maxim which extended the territory of a country to the limit of the power of its arms. But in 1774, by the treaty of Kainardji, Russia acquired ports on the Sea of Azoff, and thus the exclusively Turkish character of the inland sea was lost. But the resulting changes in the right to navigate the Straits by which this sea communicates with the Mediterranean were not left to be deduced from the changed circumstances; they were expressly provided for.

Pour la commodité et l'avantage des deux Empires il y aura une navigation libre et sans obstacles pour les vaisseaux marchands appartenans aux deux Puissances contractantes, dans toutes les mers qui baignent leurs terres; la sublime Porte accorde aux vaisseaux marchands Russes nommément tels que ceux qu'emploient partout pour le commerce et dans les ports les autres puissances, un libre passage de la Mer Noire dans la Mer Blanche reciproquement.—*Treaty of Kanardji*, Art. 11.¹

It will be observed that there was accorded to Russia by this treaty a right over the territorial waters of the two Straits of the nature of a right of way; and that this easement, so to speak, was strictly limited to merchant vessels. By various stages a similar right of way was accorded to the merchant vessels of other Powers; each such act being regarded as a concession made by the Porte in favour of the commerce of friendly Powers. Ships of war were upon an entirely different footing.

So long as the Porte was at peace it seems to have been the practice to prohibit the passage of foreign men-of-war through the Straits, as being Turkish territorial waters. If the Porte were at

¹ F. G. Ghillany, *Recueil des Traités*. La "Mer Blanche" is the Ægean Sea. The article goes on to provide for permission to the subjects of the contracting Powers to trade within each other's dominions. Translation of the text is given at length. Holland (*ante*, p. 117) and in Abdy's *Kent's Int. Law*. Ed. 1878, p. 506.

war of course the prohibition would count for nothing in the case of an enemy's war-ship powerful enough to venture through in the face of hostile batteries, and the war-ships of allies would of course be welcomed by the Porte. The practice of the Porte to keep the Straits closed to war-ships, whenever it was itself at peace, appears to have been so invariable that any alteration in its practice, whereby Russian war-ships from the Black Sea should enter the Mediterranean, or the ships of other Powers should enter the Black Sea, would have been the introduction of a distinctly new factor in the European balance of power. Hence it soon came to be regarded as the duty of Turkey to insist upon this rule impartially towards all nations alike. This view is embodied in Art. 11. of the treaty of peace signed between Great Britain and the Porte on January 5th, 1809, after a hostile English fleet, under Admiral Duckworth, had forced the passage of the Dardanelles and appeared off Constantinople, in order to detach Turkey from her alliance with Napoleon.

Comme il a été de tout tems défendu aux vaisseaux de guerre d'entrer dans le canal de Constantinople savoir dans le détroit de Dardanelles et dans celui de la Mer Noire;—et comme cette ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman doit être de même observée dorénavant en tems de paix vis-à-vis de toute puissance quelle que ce soit, la cour Britannique promet aussi de se conformer à ce principe.—*Treaty of 1809, Art. 11.*¹

In 1833 the Porte, sorely pressed by Mehemet Ali and abandoned by the Western Powers, threw itself into the arms of Russia, and on July 8th, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was concluded between them, by which they engaged to furnish aid to each other for a period of eight years. The English and French Governments protested against this step as producing a change in the relations between Turkey and Russia to which other European Powers were entitled to object,² and great disquiet appears to have been caused by the knowledge that there was a secret article relating to the navigation of the Straits. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi provides that

the Porte in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need . . . shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.—*Secret Article.*³

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des Traités*, i. p. 160.

² *Hertslet*, ii. 928; Wheaton's, *Hist. Law of Nations*, 569.

³ *Hertslet*, ii. p. 927.

It appears to be sometimes imagined that the effect of this secret article was to provide for the first time for the closing of the Straits to the war-vessels of all nations except Russia, thus involving the assumption that they had been free to use them before.

A French corvette of war presented itself at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and was refused a passage. Explanations were at once demanded on the part of the English and French ambassadors. . . . These explanations were accompanied by a communication of the *public* treaty. But as the Dardanelles remained closed to the vessels of war of all nations, except Turkey and Russia, the existence of a further secret treaty became self-evident.—Alison, *Hist. Eur.* chap. xxxvi.

Unless we suppose that, notwithstanding the declaration embodied in the Treaty of 1809, the "ancient rule" had been laxly enforced by Turkey, or perhaps suffered altogether to fall into abeyance, it is not very easy to understand this. Prior to 1833 did the war vessels of other Powers go in and out of the Black Sea, without objection on the part of Turkey, notwithstanding the "ancient rule," and the treaty? Did Russian men-of-war issue from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, while the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi lasted?

However this may have been, the arrangement was only a temporary one, and in 1841, by the Treaty of July 13, between the Five Great Powers and Turkey, the rule as laid down in 1809 was reaffirmed, and its observance promised on all hands.

His Highness the Sultan on the one part declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that so long as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will admit no foreign ship of war into the said Straits. And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.—*Convention of July 13, 1841, signed at London, Art. 1.*

Possibly, prior to 1841 the validity of the English contention that the rule was a generally binding one was not admitted by the other Powers. At all events in that year it was definitely

incorporated with the general public law, and this with the good will of Russia.¹

The matter next appears in the negotiation for putting an end to the Crimean War.²

Of four points for which the allies were contending, the third was the revision of the Treaty of the Straits "in the interests of the European balance of power, and with a view to a limitation of the Russian power on the Black Sea." It was on this point that the negotiations at the Viennese Conference in the spring of 1855 turned.

England insisted that the Black Sea should be neutralised altogether, that is to say, that it should be illegal for either Power to have any war vessels at all on it. Austria recommended a system of naval equipoise; that is, a limitation of the number of ships to be maintained both by Russia and Turkey. Russia thereupon proposed that the Straits should be opened equally to the war flag of all nations. From this the allies absolutely dissented. The resolve of the English ministry cost another year of war, but at length Russia yielded, and the "third point" of the Vienna Conference was embodied in the Treaty of Paris.

The Black Sea is neutralised; its waters and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles 14 and 19 of the present treaty.—*Art. 11.*

[*Article 14* allowed Russia and Turkey to have a few light vessels for coast service, and *Article 19* allowed each of the contracting parties to station two light vessels at the mouths of the Danube.]—*Treaty of Paris.*

It is worth noticing that in reality there was no difference in principle between the Austrian proposal of mutual limitation of armaments, and the English proposal of complete neutralisation. At all events the latter is only the extreme case of the former. In one aspect, at least, either was an example of an arrangement such as has often been proposed for curtailing military expenditure by mutual agreement. It might have been thought under these circumstances that the neutralisation of the Black Sea would have received the warmest approbation and the heartiest support of the professed Peace Party. This, however, was far from being the case; on the contrary, that party always spoke in tones of

¹ Wheaton's *Hist.* p. 577; Kinglake, chap. xvi. p. 364.

² For a good account see *Edin. Rev.* Jan. 1871.

deprecation both of the neutralisation of the Black Sea and of the Rule of the Straits, as if some great hardship and injustice were imposed upon Russia which no one could wonder at her seeking to throw off at the first opportunity.

The provision for the neutralisation of the Black Sea was wholly independent of and did not affect the Rule of the Straits, although it might seem to render the latter superfluous. A convention between the Six Powers (Sardinia, which had not been a party to the convention of 1841, being now included) on the one part, and the Sultan on the other, recited that their Majesties, wishing to conform to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, had resolved to renew the convention of 13th July, 1841, subject to some modifications of detail, further extending the exceptions as to light vessels. And this convention was incorporated in the Treaty of Paris by Art. 9.

In 1870, Russia suddenly announced that she could not be satisfied with an assumed protection which rested on a theory, and that she resumed her freedom to build men-of-war upon the Black Sea for the protection of her own coasts.¹

In the upshot, the Treaty of London was signed, March 13, 1871.

The neutralisation of the Black Sea, which had been added to the rule as the result of the Crimean War, was now abrogated, and the rule restored as it was formulated in 1841, but with this modification: the Sultan, while yet at peace, was given liberty to open the Straits to the war vessels of the other Powers, if the security of his empire should demand their presence in the Black Sea. Thus things were substantially restored to the old footing with regard to the Rule of the Straits, the exception being for the case of imminent danger to Turkey.

Thus stood the "Rule of the Straits" in 1876, when the recrudescence of the Eastern Question drew public attention to it, and the notion that the rule was necessary as a protection against Russia, and that Russia would seek to enforce its abrogation, became elements of anti-Russism. But it will be convenient here to allude to subsequent events which may have a bearing upon the rule.

In February 1878, after the armistice and preliminaries of peace were signed between Turkey and Russia, but before the definite treaty, the English fleet was sent through the Dardanelles, and up to Constantinople, notwithstanding the refusal of the Porte to

¹ *Hertslet*, iii. p. 1892.

grant permission for the passage. This was spoken of by some critics as a breach of treaty stipulation.¹ The language used in Parliament by Lords Granville and Hartington was very cautious and guarded.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that the rule only operated when the Porte was at peace.² But the English fleet remained in the Sea of Marmora after the signature of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3rd, a circumstance which did not escape criticism, both abroad and at home.

The *National Zeitung* says, that whatever might have been the case during the war, the presence of the British fleet inside the Dardanelles in time of peace is a clear breach of the Treaty of Paris.—*Berlin telegram*, *D. N.* March 15, 1878.³

To be sure, the English Government did not recognise the Treaty of San Stefano as "valid"; and though technically the state of war between Turkey and another Power which causes the rule to cease to operate was not existing, actually the condition of things was more like an armistice than actual peace. But the English fleet did not repass the Dardanelles for some time after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin.

No one seems to have considered it worth while to raise the technical question of the exit of the English fleet through the Dardanelles, after the conclusion of peace. At the close of the Crimean War it was thought necessary to provide by a transitory article to the general treaty of peace, that the provisions as to closing the Straits should not apply to vessels of war employed by the belligerent Powers for the evacuation by sea of the territories occupied by their armies. But the Treaty of Berlin contains no provision providing for the exit of the English ships. At the Congress of Berlin (sitting of July 9th) when discussing the Article (53) of the Treaty of Berlin, which provides that the Treaties of Paris and of London are maintained in all such of their provisions as are not abrogated or modified by the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, Lord Salisbury

raises objections to the general arrangement, which maintains the former treaties without specifying more exactly the points modified by the present arrangements. His Excellency does not consider the decision sufficient, in particular as regards the Straits. (Turkey, xxxix. 1878, 16th Protocol, p. 242.)

¹ e.g. "Scrutator," *T.* Feb. 7, 1878.

² e.g. Sir Edward Harris, *T.* Feb. 12, 1878.

³ Compare Mr. Gladstone's speech, *H. of C.* July 20, 1878, *post*, p. 149.

The result of the discussion was that the majority of the Congress was favourable to the wording which recognised that the principle established by Article II. of the Treaty of London (that is the article which reaffirmed the "ancient rule") is maintained in all its integrity.

At a subsequent sitting Lord Salisbury asked that the following declaration, which, he said, is binding only on his Government, might be inserted in the protocol.

Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify an important part of the arrangement sanctioned by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and that the interpretation of Article II. of the Treaty of London, which is dependent on the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of dispute:

I declare on behalf of England that the obligations of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties.

Count Schouvaloff reserved the right of inserting in the protocol a counter-declaration if necessary.—(18th Protocol, p. 270.)

At the next sitting

Count Schouvaloff, referring to the declaration made in the preceding sitting by Lord Salisbury on the subject of the Straits, demands the insertion in the protocol of a declaration on the same subject, presented by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia:—

The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the Second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain respecting the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to demanding, on their part, the insertion in the protocol of the observation: that in their opinion, the principle of the closing of the Straits is an European principle, and that the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856 and 1871, confirmed at present by the Treaty of Berlin, are binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing treaties, not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions.—(19th Protocol, p. 277.)

In the debate on the Treaty of Berlin this incident did not pass uncriticised.

But what have you been doing to public law yourselves? You sent your fleet within the Dardanelles and kept it there in time of peace. Was not that a violation of the public law of Europe? . . . What declaration do we find in the protocols about the Dardanelles? We find Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, Lord

Salisbury, has taken upon himself to determine on behalf of England, without the consent of the other Powers of Europe, in what way he shall hereafter understand and construe that article of the Treaty of London which refers to the closing of the Dardanelles. What right has he to do that? It appears to me that it is a flat violation, as it stands, of the Treaty of London. The Russians met it by saying that the principle of the closing of the Straits was a European principle, and that the stipulations of the subject were binding on all the Powers in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing treaties.—*Mr. Gladstone, H. of C. July 30, 1878.*

In April and May 1885, when relations between England and Russia were very strained in consequence of the dispute on the Afghan frontier, it was seen that one of England's most effective weapons would be to send her fleet into the Black Sea.

Lord Stratheden and Campbell rose to move an humble Address to the Crown for the protocols or treaties by which the authority of the Sublime Porte to admit foreign ships of war into the Dardanelles was regulated. [He spoke of the restrictions imposed by various treaties, and said in 1871 they underwent a great modification, intended as a counterpoise to the permission to Russia to have cruisers on the Black Sea.] In the event of difficulties occurring between Russia and Great Britain, either now or at any future period, it would be important to have this matter cleared up. . . . If, therefore, it turned out that there was a power of closing the Black Sea, Russia would, according to past experience, be well entitled to deem herself invincible. It was important, therefore, to see whether the Sultan could in any case be compelled to grant Russia an immunity against the only danger which experience had taught her to be a grave one. There was, it seemed to him, only one view which was adverse to his motion—namely, that the danger was entirely past. [But, the storm might descend at any moment.] *The Marquis of Salisbury*:—The object of the declaration which I had to make on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I understood to be to establish the principle that our engagements in respect of the Dardanelles were not engagements of a general European or international character, but were engagements towards the Sultan only, the practical bearing of that reservation being that if, in any circumstances, the Sultan should not be acting independently, but under the pressure of some other Power, there would be no international obligation on our part to abstain from passing through the Dardanelles. I merely wish to point out that it was not merely with respect to Batoum, but with respect to any other matters which may arise calling for our presence in the Black Sea that the reservation then made was made.—*H. of L. May 7, 1885.*

The following criticism may perhaps enable us more "exactly

to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the Second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain."

Lord Salisbury explained the object was to assert our engagement with the Sultan only, not with the other great Powers. It is well to notice this assertion was expressly controverted by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the Congress.—*Professor T. E. Holland, T. May 11, 1885.*

Meanwhile in many quarters the Rule of the Straits appeared to be entirely forgotten, or quietly ignored, and many of the English newspapers seemed inclined to write as if an attempt on the part of Turkey to prevent the passage of our fleets through the Straits, or the action of other Powers in urging her to do so (of which there were rumours), would be an unfriendly, if not a hostile act to this country. It seemed taken for granted that in case of war the English fleet would find its way into the Black Sea. If this be so, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the supposed barrier which the Rule of the Straits presents to the appearance of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is equally futile, and that the labour and the care spent over the famous Rule have been absolutely wasted. But in 1876-8, at all events, the maintenance of the Rule was conceived of as one of those British Interests which were threatened in the controversy.

§ E. *Russia threatens the Rule of the Straits.*

We distinguish, then, the notion of Russia as threatening the Rule of the Straits from the notion of Russia as threatening Constantinople.

The abrogation of the rule would, of course, be involved if Constantinople were to pass into Russian hands; but the rule might conceivably be abolished, and Russian ships of war might pass in and out of the Black Sea, so far as any prohibition of European law is concerned, although Constantinople might remain in the hands of the Turks. Russia after a successful war with Turkey might demand the abrogation of the Rule of the Straits, perhaps even exclusive provisions in her own favour as the price of victory, short of claiming possession of Constantinople itself.

Whatever might be the case with regard to the fate of Constantinople, the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war would be calculated to touch England as the leading maritime Power, and

also as having a vital interest in the route to India, more closely than it would touch the other European Powers.

From this point of view there were two things deprecated by England as the result of the abrogation of the rule, namely, (1) the entrance into the arena of a new navy, perhaps rivalling that of England; (2) the taking up by Russia of a position of strategic advantage on the flank of our route to India. Thus we arrive at the two factors of anti-Russism which spring out of the idea that Russia threatens the Rule of the Straits.

If we accept the doctrine that English naval supremacy is an element in the European balance of power, the notion that the Russian Black Sea fleet should be kept out of the Mediterranean may be regarded as having relation to the politics of the system of Europe as well as to purely English interests; and in the notion of the Russian Black Sea fleet threatening England's communications with India we get a connecting link between European and Asiatic Russophobia.

With a great arsenal on the Bosphorus—the gates of the Black Sea in Russian keeping—to close or to open at pleasure—the position of all the maritime Powers would be affected, and those of Europe critically, by altered conditions of security, and the proximity of a first-class Power.—Sir R. Alcock, *Fort. Rev.* Aug. 1875.

The strategic questions involved in the possession of Constantinople by the Russians or the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war, were a good deal discussed in magazine articles and elsewhere, and notably in connection with our relations to Egypt and the Suez Canal.¹ It would be always necessary, it was said, for England to keep a powerful squadron like a chained watch-dog at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Among the possibilities discussed were the advance of Russia to the banks of the Suez Canal itself, and the acquisition by her of a naval station on the Persian Gulf.

It was sometimes suggested that the Rule of the Straits operated as a protection to Constantinople.

If Russian fleets issuing from the ports of the Euxine are to pass at will down the Bosphorus, Constantinople becomes a subject city.—F. Harrison, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1876.

¹ *c.g.* Sir H. Havelock, "Constantinople and our Road to India," *Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1877; Sir G. Campbell's *Handy Book of the Eastern Question*; Dicey, "Our Road to India," *19th Cent.* June, 1877; and "The Future of Egypt," *19th Cent.* Aug. 1877; Mr. Gladstone, "Aggression on Egypt," *19th Cent.* Aug. 1877; "The Khedive's Egypt and our Route to India," *Blackwood*, Oct. 1877.

But as the rule does not affect a Power at war with Turkey, the force of this contention is not quite apparent.

Russia was perfectly free throughout the whole of the war, to send her war-ships from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and up to Constantinople, as far as the *rule* was concerned. That she did not do so was owing to her circumstances. Nor does it appear how the rule can afford any security against a surprise. Supposing Russia to meditate such a treacherous attack in the midst of profound peace, she would only have to go through the formality of declaring war the instant her fleets were ready, and from that hour the rule would cease to operate. Something, however, no doubt, must be allowed for the possibility of a state of things which, though technically one of peace, would not preclude a coercive effect exercised by the presence of a quasi-hostile fleet.

It was generally taken for granted that the maintenance of the rule was distasteful to Russia, and that she would take the first opportunity to obtain its abrogation. The propriety of the rule became a matter of keen controversy in England. There was a disposition among some to admit that a demand for its abrogation might be reasonable, and should be complied with as tending to promote peace and contentment. Some speakers represented the rule as an arbitrary disability imposed on Russia, which England alone was desirous to keep up against all moral right.

Russia, as you see, is shut up by frost in the Baltic nearly half the year, and when her ships come out they have to come out through this narrow passage. I should like to know whether, in that state of things, it is likely that Russia would perpetually consent, as she is blockaded by the frost in the north, to be blockaded by England through the hands of Turkey in the south, and that from no portion of her vast empire should one of her ships be able to pass during half the year on account of the frost, nor any portion of the year from the other at the command of the Government of this country. (Hear, hear.) The thing seems to me intolerable and impossible, and it cannot long be sustained. (Cheers.) Why, if we were in that position what should we do? (A Voice—"Fight them," and laughter and cheers.) I have no doubt whatever that there would be the unanimous discovery on the part of all the people of England that we had a just claim to go through the natural passage, and though I for one should be very much in favour of negotiation, I am afraid that not a small minority, and perhaps a large majority, of my countrymen would be determined to enforce that claim by such means as came first to their hands. (Cheers.)—*John Bright*.¹

¹ At Birmingham, *D. N.* Dec. 5, 1876.

In my opinion, the prohibition which Europe has imposed upon Russia with regard to the passage of the Bosphorus, and which has driven her at a critical time to freeze up in the Baltic the only powerful seagoing ship which she possesses, is an element of the Eastern Question which it is idle to disregard. Prince Gortchakoff may write what he pleases, and may declare again, as he has recently declared, that the presence of Turkey on the Bosphorus is a thing quite pleasant in itself to Russia, but no man of common sense will believe that Russia can ever be contented in the East until she is as free as other Powers to have access to her own ports.—*Sir E. J. Reed, T. Dec. 5, 1876.*

A great Power which aspires to foremost rank as a maritime nation, is so situated by nature that its land opens both into the northern seas as well as into the southern seas of Europe; yet its fleet in the northern is locked in for more than half the year by winter ice, and its fleet in the southern seas is permanently locked in by public law. . . . As the Russians pointedly say, it is not so much Constantinople that they want as the free use of the Dardanelles.—*F. Harrison, Fort. Rev. Dec. 1876.*

Let us examine for a moment the question of Russia's moral right to send ships of war through the Dardanelles. What does this supposed moral right rest upon? More than one staunch Liberal has permitted himself to say that he considers Russia has, and will have, a just grievance till she has the privilege enjoyed by all other Powers, of sending her war-ships into all her own ports. [In the Black Sea Russia has a large commerce, and also the right to build as many war-ships as she likes, to protect it against the Turk.] Then as regards the Mediterranean. Here she has also a commerce not very considerable, certainly not one-tenth of what we have, but here also she has the power of protecting that commerce by building as many ships of war as she chooses in the Baltic, and sending them round. [As a matter of fact she had a squadron in the Mediterranean till a few days ago, when they were sent into the Atlantic, out of harm's way. No one hinders her protection of her commerce. So far as regards the legitimate use of navies for this purpose she is as free and unrestricted as any other Power. What is it she lacks? Just this:] She has not, through, first, her geographical position, and, secondly, through the neutralisation of the Dardanelles by the concert of all Europe, the one thing that could enable her to hurt, first, Turkey, and then ourselves—viz., the power of uniting her Baltic and Black Sea fleets, either in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in the Bosphorus under the Seraglio windows, and thus obtaining an undeniable naval superiority at a stroke. But what can this be wanted for, except for purposes of aggression? Is it not most salutary and wholesome that she should still remain without that power? And in what sense can this be said to be a grievance imposed by us? We might just as well complain of the existence of the British Channel, because it prevents our invading France, or Belgium or Germany, dry foot.—*Havelock, Fort. Rev. Jan. 1877.*

It is by no means clear, however, that a good deal of this sympathy was not wasted. Russia does not appear to have been by any means as anxious that the Straits should be freely open to the war-ships of all the world as was sometimes apt to be supposed.¹

§ F. *Turkey as commanding the Straits is a useful Ally.*

Looking at the question of the passage of the Straits, from the point of view of the relation of England and Turkey, Turkey possesses a power of opening them to the fleets of her allies, both in the sense of offering no opposition to the passage physically, and also in the sense in which by Public Law the Straits would be open to the ally of Turkey if she herself were a belligerent; and this power must be regarded as an element of philo-Turkism.

It was suggested that the alliance between England and Turkey must be maintained, and that England must be prepared to take her part in a defensive alliance if Turkey should be attacked by Russia, because England could not afford to lose the advantage which a Turkish offensive alliance would give her if at any time any attack of Russia upon England, or interests which England was bound to defend, should require to be met by a counter-attack by the English fleet upon the Russian ports in the Black Sea. Of course the contingency of this kind most generally in view was a threatened land attack by Russia upon the frontiers of India. It was observed that England in alliance with Turkey (or with Turkey's connivance) has a great power of coercing Russia by the access to the Black Sea.

The prominent feature of this notion is, that England could not afford to act otherwise than to conciliate or bribe Turkey, even at

¹ Mr. Kinglake (vol. i. p. 364) says it would seem that Russia has been more willing to submit to the restriction than to see the war-flag of other States in the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, and that she was a willing party to the Treaty of 1841.

It is worth while to observe the advantages which Russia would have obtained in the war of 1877 had the neutralisation clauses of the Treaty of Paris then been operative and enforced upon Turkey by the Great Powers, while her own Black Sea ports would have been free from attack and blockade. She would probably have been able to advance an army along the coast of Bulgaria, which it seems she was in fact prevented from doing by fear of an attack upon its left flank from the sea.

The Turks would not have been able to use their men-of-war to transport their troops from point to point of their coasts as they did to eke out their failing numbers.

It might indeed have been considered doubtful how far Turkey would have been at liberty to make use of Black Sea routes for her troops at all, but for an expression used by Lord Granville in a speech in the House of Lords (July 31, 1876), to the effect that under the Treaty of 1856 Russia might have built transports.

the cost of interfering to maintain an odious authority and supporting the Sultan in his resistance to demands which were just and righteous in themselves, in order that Turkey at some future time might do England a service in return. This seems an especially cynical application of the Bismarckian maxim *Do ut des*.

§ G. *Asiatic Anti-Russism.*

We now come to those factors of anti-Russism which consist in dread of danger to English dominion in India from the advance of the Russian power. Just as there was a traditional Russophobia with regard to European politics which regarded Russia as the incarnation of the spirit of the Holy Alliance, and at the same time as steadily aiming at Constantinople, so there was a traditional Asiatic Russophobia which influenced a considerable school of English politicians.

To almost all Anglo-Indians—and Anglo-Indians, though powerless on general politics, are influential on their own subject—Russia is a spectre exciting the kind of animosity which the Revolution excites in Legitimists, or the Society of Jesus in ardent Protestants.—*Spec.* Nov. 4, 1876.

England has not unnaturally been always sensitive to the existence of the influence of great European Powers in the neighbourhood of the Indian frontier. It would seem that during the early part of this century fear of Russia was subordinate to fear of France. About 1838 the tide definitely turned and “Russophobia” was in the ascendant. Moreover the *name* seems then to have been introduced and the special meaning, fear of Russian progress in *Central Asia*, was the earliest that the word had. Russophobia, like the cholera, was imported from Asia into Europe.

The feeling of England and of British India known as Russophobia may be said to have first made itself apparent in 1800. . . . Captain Trench, the clever son of the Archbishop of Dublin, devotes the first chapter of the treatise he published in 1869, styled *The Russo-Indian Question* to the origin, growth and progress of “Russophobia” to the present day.—*Ed. Rev.* July, 1875.

The agitation which affected men’s minds in India at that time [1838—the Cabul Expedition] became, and has ever since remained, known as Russophobia.¹—*Fraser*, Feb. 1871.

¹ “The Eastern Question” (attributed to Mr. Froude).

According to this conception Russia threatens not only our road to India, but our possession of India itself.

We have seen how strategic considerations of England's communications with India were implicated with the question of the Straits; and it seems that Russian conquests in Asia Minor were also deprecated for a similar reason. To be sure, men could hardly argue that because Asia Minor lies between England and India on the map, this circumstance by itself gives to the possessor of Asia Minor the command of the English communications;—but in fact, those who dreaded Russian conquests in Asia Minor from this point of view appear to have had in their minds contingencies more or less remote and hypothetical, such as the suggestion that Russia would so obtain the entire control to the exclusion of England of a railway to be made by the Euphrates Valley; or that she would be carried a step nearer the establishment of a naval station on the Persian Gulf; or perhaps, that creeping down the Syrian coast she might at length reach a position whence she might dominate the Suez Canal.

There seems to have been a vague notion, too, that Russian conquests in Asiatic Turkey would be a *direct* menace to India. Little importance, however, is to be attached to this notion, which Lord Salisbury dismissed somewhat contemptuously with the advice to use large-scale maps.¹

Putting these notions aside, we come to the great feature of Asiatic anti-Russism, which was the dread of danger to the English Empire in India, either by way of a direct Russian attack, or through a solvent Power, to be exercised by her attraction, or rather created by the impression that Russia is the ascending, and England the declining Power.

Somewhat analogous to the dread of a threat to England's political supremacy from a rival Power, was the dread of danger to England's commercial interests from the extension of the dominion of a *protectionist* Power. This regards England in the light of a cosmopolitan rather than of an Asiatic Power. England's political supremacy is desired, and that of Russia deprecated, as a means to secure free trade, and this with a view to preserving England's commercial supremacy. In the mere dislike of Russia on this ground, and the favour extended to Turkey from the contrast drawn between Russia's restrictive commercial policy and Turkey's

¹ See *post*, chap. xvi. § 1.

liberality and free trade, we get once more upon the border ground between the diplomatic and the non-diplomatic factors.

Thus we get the three notions of Russia sapping up to the walls of our fortress, of Russia sowing disaffection in the minds of the inhabitants, and of Russia closing all the markets against us, as the notions which were chiefly accountable for the disfavour with which men regarded the Russian advance in Central Asia.

Corresponding with the idea of Russia's disintegrating influence, we get the suggestion as a factor of philo-Turkism that Turkey should be supported for the sake of conciliating the Mahometan population of India.

[It is suggested that the Government might incline to condone Turkish oppression] because we may fear, if we in any way give offence to the Mahometans in Turkey on account of their misgovernment of their Christian subjects, we may produce a feeling amongst our own Mahometans in India which must be very injurious to us. I must say I never heard a more extraordinary doctrine than that, nor one I will more completely repudiate We rest the claims of Great Britain to the government of India upon the divine right of good government To think that England or Great Britain could contentedly look upon misgovernment in any part of the world upon such a plea as that, is entirely to misjudge, entirely to misrepresent, our sentiments.—*Sir Stafford Northcote*.¹

. . . . Grave and sensible men say to one another, "Ah, yes, it is all very well to let the Turks go, but what a dreadful excitement it will cause among the 40,000,000 of our Mahometan subjects! To hold India it is a necessity that we should not offend their religious prejudices." From us the idea has been caught up by some of the English-speaking and -reading Mahometans in India, and by the Turks themselves. The Turkish newspapers have lately been full of it. . . . There is no *solidarité* among the Mahometans in India itself. It is really then I must say almost absurd to suppose that there could be any very strong feeling among them, by the misfortunes of a distant and alien potentate in Turkey, except so far as such a feeling may be got up among a limited class. I have already said that among the very small class of Mahometans who read European news and are influenced by European ideas a certain sympathy with the Turks would be natural enough. . . . We can afford to be easy, even independently of that which the Chancellor of the Exchequer so rightly said, that we should not consent to hold India on the terms of being debarred from doing what we think right elsewhere by the fear of our Indian subjects.—Sir G. Campbell, *Handy Book on the Eastern Question*, p. 40-1.

¹ At Edinburgh, Sept. 16, 1876, chap. xii. §. 6.

There is another bugbear much talked of and which may possibly have some influence with our Government, the idea of a union of all the Mahometans to assist the Turks, and of our Indian Mahometans taking part in such a Crescentade. . . . [He refers to a few recent agitators who pretend to represent the forty million Mahometans, and say that these forty millions look to the Sultan as their Caliph.] Those Mahometan petitions from India are most ridiculous affairs. You have seen the principal one in the *Times*. I will venture to say that not a word of it is written by any Mahometan. It is palpably and notoriously written by an English partisan of our present Ministry. . . . As to any general sympathy and union of Mahometans, that is a matter of opinion, and every one has a right to his own. My own opinion is very decided that there is nothing in it. I believe that the mass of the Turks themselves are not really fanatical, though it is the fashion to say so.—*Sir G. Campbell*.¹

There was a class of specialists who were always watching, and occasionally writing about the proceedings of Russia in Asia;² and from time to time the subject came up and caused a flutter of excitement among the more general public.

Even if it be the case that the brute facts are all against the notion of Russia meddling with India, it is beginning to be perceived that morally a great change may be made by the proximity of that Power. There may be no real cause to dread the event, but if all India thinks so, if nations remember that former invasions had their origin in those very regions that Russia has been annexing, if they begin to whisper that a greater Power than the English is bidding for their favour—is not this a state of mind that may well create a danger where none would otherwise exist?—Robert Giffen, *Fort. Rev.* July, 1868.

One is struck at the outset with surprise that the two great propagators of European civilisation in Asia should be looked upon as natural enemies rather than the sources of immense moral support to each other.³—*Fraser*, Feb. 1871.

At present the ambition of Russia is chiefly directed to get the Central Asian trade entirely into her hands. She believes, in her economical ignorance, that she is thereby doing a great stroke of business for herself, and injuring her commercial rivals. . . . If she were thinking of India, and were at ease about Europe she would diminish her army, save her money, perfect her communications, make the three Khanates as Russian as Bengal is English, and prepare for a great struggle in 1900. . . . For myself, although mischievous people (amongst whom I am very far indeed from

¹ At Kirkealdy, Jan. 26, 1877.

² See *post*, in Part iii., as to the controversy between two schools of Indian specialists which ensued on the publication of Sir Henry Rawlinson's *England and Russia in the East*, in 1875. Compare Argyll, ii. 384.

³ "The Eastern Question" (attributed to Froude).

counting Sir Henry Rawlinson) will do their utmost to embroil the two countries, I do not believe they will ever cross swords in Asia.—Grant Duff, *Fort. Rev.* Nov. 1875.

I do not think that mere English interests would be so much affected even by Constantinople passing into Russian hands as many do. I am not—I need hardly say—one of those who attach great importance to the Russian conquests in Central Asia. If the Russians keep away from Afghanistan it seems to me to concern us very little what they do or don't do in that part of the world; but the people who disquiet themselves about Russian advances in Central Asia ought rather to wish to see the Russians come down into the Eastern Peninsula. It is quite certain that neither the population nor the resources of Russia are anything like sufficient to enable her to extend herself in both directions at once. If she turns her attention definitely to what a Russian statesman well described to me as *l'Orient sérieux*, she must perforce for some generations give up making fidgety little conquests in what he equally happily described as *l'Orient de fantaisie*.—Grant Duff, *Contemp. Rev.* July, 1876.¹

The point on which the [Anglo-Indian] mind is fixed with special anxiety is Merv, and the affection which the very mention of that word produces is so peculiar that it almost deserves a special name, and may be called "Mervousness."—*Argyll*, ii. p. 370.

It is true that the Russian policy in Asia is guided by the same spirit of monopoly as we see generally throughout the world. . . . But to find a ground of quarrel in the fact that a great and friendly Government, while pursuing an immense work of civilisation, prefers a line of policy not yet believed to be unwise or obsolete by the vast majority of mankind, and acts according to her opportunities, is surely a proposition almost revolting to common sense. Yet such is the proposition presented to us by the antagonists of Russian influence and Russian trade in Central Asia.—*Ed. Rev.* July, 1875.

There are two things which Russia desires, and we of necessity must oppose, as contrary to our security and interests in Asia. The first is to advance her frontier to the slopes of the Himalayas on the north, and to Merv and Herat on the west, in close proximity to our own. The second is, to monopolise all the trade of Central Asia, to the exclusion of our manufactures, and of all competition. To draw the cordon of prohibitive States further south and closer to our frontier would answer both ends—that of a menace to our Indian Empire, if, unfortunately, a war in Europe

¹ "Pulse of Europe." Compare his two articles on Russia, *19th Cent.* March and April, 1877.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe writes on the other hand:—[If Russia is self-interested probably] the intended passage of the Danube is a demonstration and the incursion from Circassia the reality. [The map, however, will show we have nothing to fear from this].—*19th Cent.* July, 1877.

should array the two countries in opposite camps, and of more effectually shutting out our merchants, and preventing the circulation of merchants' goods or other profitable traffic with Central Asia. To prevent both these injurious results *must* be our policy ; but is it so certainly imperative on Russia to follow out the two designs attributed to its Ruler ?—*Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1876.

Russia aspires to become, not only the greatest of military Powers, but also a great industrial and commercial nation, and she firmly believes that by means of her great natural resources and the enterprising character of her people she will succeed in realising this aspiration. Herein lies a permanent source of enmity towards England. . . . By means of her ruthless *politique d'exploitation*, it is said, she has become the great bloodsucker of all less-advanced nations. . . . The Russians habitually assail with impassioned rhetoric our commercial and industrial supremacy, and at the same time habitually seek to emulate it. The means they employ, however, are different from ours. Knowing that free competition and "the ridiculous principles of free trade" would inevitably lead to defeat in the struggle, they raise, wherever their dominion extends, a strong barrier of protective tariffs. In this way they protect their newly-adopted subjects from the heartless "exploitation" of England, and consign them to the tender mercies of the manufacturers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. . . . Wherever the Russian frontier advances the possible area of British commerce will be diminished, and the advance of the frontier in the direction of India depends, as I have already explained, on ourselves. Sooner or later the Russian custom-houses, with their protective tariffs, will be within gunshot of our sentries.—Wallace, *Fort. Rev.* Aug. 1876.¹

If we need not admit the immediate probability, we must at any rate allow the eventual possibility of the Russian advance southwards into those regions which touch our own borders. [The thing we ought to do is to secure the command of the glacis of our fortress.]—*Blackwood*, Aug. 1877.

Apart from the two ideas that Russian attacks on Turkey would threaten the English road, and that English support of Turkey would conciliate the Mahometans of India, the connection between philo-Turkism and Asiatic Russophobia was *indirect*. But though indirect, the effect of Asiatic Russophobia in promoting an anti-Russian and pro-Turkish policy on the part of England in respect to the Turkish Eastern Question was very great. To those who looked forward to a struggle between England and Russia for the hegemony of Asia as the next great war in which this country would be called upon to engage, the temptation to be the friend of their foe's foe was very strong.

¹ "Territorial Expansion of Russia."

Asiatic Russophobia, as the controlling motive of a policy, is perhaps a corollary from that conception of England's rôle which found expression in Mr. Disraeli's aphorism—"England is a great Asiatic power." With respect to those who looked at the question between Turkey and the subject Christians solely from the European point of view, the doctrine that the Turk is non-European, as we have remarked, went to the root of the controversy; but when the character of England as a world-power is brought into the question, we come upon a much more startling and important difference. For Asiatic Russophobia, if made the guiding principle of English policy would involve nothing less than the subordination of England's European character to the exigencies of her Asiatic character. Carried out, this would mean that instead of India's being a dependency of England, England, with its parliamentary government, its free institutions, and its European religion and civilisation, would become a dependency of a great non-European military empire. We get a glimpse here of the connection between anti-Russism, philo-Turkism, and the tendency which people came to recognise in the policy of the Government, and to which they gave the name "Imperialism."

§ H. *Non-diplomatic Anti-Russism and Philo-Turkism.*

The vehemence of the feelings of hostility to Russia and of partisanship for the Turks exhibited by large numbers of people can hardly be altogether accounted for by the notions which have already been enumerated.

The least intelligible and perhaps the most dangerous feature about the existing irritation against Russia is its astonishing vagueness. . . . She is described as "our natural enemy," and persons otherwise sensible are proud of a feeling exactly akin to the ancient one which produced such endless wars with France, and at which these very people now smile almost with contempt. —*Spec.* March 23rd, 1878.

The tendency against which Pitt protested¹—to think that some country or other must be filling the rôle of England's "natural enemy"—seems to be inveterate. Though in all probability such widespread feelings have never grown up without some basis, yet in their development and growth they pass so far beyond the limits within which mere reason would confine them

¹ J. R. Green, *History of the English People*, vol. iv. p. 291.

as to furnish good examples of what may be called the "contagious" element of Public Opinion.

In the present instance there was a special cause operating in the memory of the last great war in which England had been engaged:—

All the middle-aged and elderly men who are now influential acquired their strongest ideas on foreign politics during the Crimean War, when men were in earnest; and many of them are unable to shake off the impression of the convictions they then acquired.—*Spec. Nov. 4th, 1876.*

We have before remarked how the older Russophobia handed down a traditional conception of the Russian Power as politically dangerous to Europe. But the anti-Russism or philo-Turkism of a great many people was based, not so much on the idea of any political danger to be apprehended from Russia, or any political benefit to be expected from supporting Turkey against her, as upon simple feelings of liking or aversion which the conceptions they had formed of Russia and Turkey excited in them. Thus anti-Russism and philo-Turkism derived much of their strength from notions resembling those factors of anti-Turkism which were often sneered at as "sentimental." But in truth the notion that it is fitting to circumscribe the authority either of a tyrannic or of a barbarous government should be recognised as a serious political notion, even though it springs straight from a sentiment of moral approval or dislike, and is not based, like the notions which may be called "diplomatic," on any calculation of interest, or in conformity with any general maxim of international conduct.

Among the non-diplomatic factors of anti-Russism we recognise some founded on moral sentiments; but others, of a more or less æsthetic nature, were so trivial that we ought, perhaps, to regard them as advanced apologetically to support or reinforce a foregone conclusion rather than as having actually operated on people's minds to lead them to adopt the anti-Russian view. Taken collectively, however, the notions of non-diplomatic anti-Russism and philo-Turkism supplied just that element of passion and of prejudice which leads people to contemplate—almost to welcome—war "with a light heart."

In the first place, the Russian power was disliked as oppressive in civil life and intolerant in religion. In some minds the repulsion excited by these conceptions of it amounted to an almost passionate hatred, which finds classic expression in Mr. Swinburne's "Note of

an English Republican on the Muscovite Crusade," and Mr. Alfred Austin's "Russia before Europe."¹ Mr. Swinburne and Mr. Alfred Austin were not alone.

Turkey is one of the very few Powers in Europe whose maintenance (as a Power) I desire. Her rulers are corrupt and tyrannical—so are the rulers of other countries. They can, however, be changed—as late events showed—with less social disturbance than is usual in Western nations. The Turkish people do not profess the same creed as we do, but their religion is a real, living, personal thing, animating their everyday work, and, not like ours, a mere conventionalism, for profession on one day in seven. And finally, they are intrusted with—and heroically discharge—the great and sacred duty of offering resistance in the interests of European liberty, to the sanguinary aggressions of the most despotic and cruel Power that ever blasted with its presence the fair face of God's beautiful universe.—*Maltman Barry in Spec.* July 13th, 1878.²

The average Englishman has his fixed ideas about every race, and just as he regards a Frenchman as essentially volatile, and a Spaniard as the embodiment of intolerance, and a German as an unrefined Englishman, and an American as an Englishman always taking advantages, so he regards a Russian as tyranny incarnate.—*Spec.* Nov. 4th, 1876.

The notion that the faults of the Russian system of government precluded fellowship with Russia even in a good work, perhaps finds its strongest expression in Mr. Swinburne's pamphlet alluded to above, a pamphlet which bears the motto "*Non tali auxilio.*"³

In considering the factors of anti-Turkism we saw that sweeping denunciation was answered by apology. In the same way we find apologists for Russia,⁴ and protests against the notion just alluded to. But the friends of Turkey did not by any means stop short at apology; we are now coming to factors which manifest an absolute liking for the Turkish Power. On the other hand, apart from sympathy with the avowed position and the conduct of Russia in this particular case, of which there was a good deal, we do not, as has been observed, recognise philo-Russism as an element of Public Opinion answering to philo-Turkism at the other extreme end of the scale. As a rule, those who were most anxious that England and Russia should co-operate

¹ Both published by Chatto and Windus, 1876.

² Letter editorially headed "The Internationalists and the Government."

³ Compare Mr. Torrens at Finsbury, Sept. 27th, 1876, *post*, chap. xii., § 1.

⁴ As an example of the tendency to write apologetically of Russia, see "The Slaveowner and the Turk," Goldwin Smith, *Contemp. Rev.* Nov. 1877.

in a friendly alliance, inclined to apologise for or to minimise those characteristics which were so prominent a feature in the popular idea of the Russian Power.

A solitary voice, indeed, was raised in admiration of the harsh and disciplinarian Russia as a Power; but there was no responsive echo. Such an utterance seems like a paradox, serving only to throw anti-Russism into higher relief, and so perhaps it may appropriately be quoted in this place.

For fifty years back my clear belief about the Russians has been that they are a good and even noble element in Europe. Conspicuously they possess the talent of obedience, of silently following orders given; which in the universal celebration of ballot-box, divine freedom, &c., will be found an invaluable and peculiar gift. Ever since Peter the Great's appearance among them they have been in steady progress of development. In our own time they have done signal service to God and man, in drilling into order and peace anarchic populations all over their side of the world. The present Czar of Russia I judge to be a strictly honest and just man:—and, in short, my belief is that the Russians are called to do great things in the world, and to be a conspicuous benefit, directly and indirectly, to their fellow men.—*Carlyle's letter*—*D. N.* Nov. 28th, 1876.¹

The tradition of the diplomatic service, perhaps we may say the authority of the services and officialism generally, was the source to which a considerable amount of anti-Russism may be traced. Mr. Kinglake² has pointed out how the traditions of the Foreign Office were reinforced by the zeal of English travellers, coming home "with their chibouques and their scymitars;" and though his picture refers to a former generation, no doubt influences of the same kind continued at work. From sources of this kind a great deal of anti-Russian, and pro-Turkish feeling, was diffused along social channels.

"It is a part of my official religion," said a candid English consular official of an Oriental town, "to love the Turks and to hate the Greeks, but after years spent in Turkey I find myself obliged to act in a precisely contrary manner."—Greville T. Chester, *Fort. Rev.* April, 1876.

Mr. Grant Duff's hidden preference for Turkey is however still a common feeling in England.—*Spec.* Sept. 9th, 1876.³

¹ The letter was forwarded to the *D. N.* by Mr. George Howard, to whom it was addressed. It was in this same letter that Carlyle used the expression "unspeakable Turk," which became proverbial. See *post*, chap. xii. § 1.

² *Crimea*, chap. ii.

³ Art. entitled "English Mahometans." The *Spec.* refers to Mr. Grant Duff's articles in the *Contemp. Rev.* July and Sept. 1876. *Post*, chap. xii. § 1.

In the voice of the military service we catch an anti-Russian note in a tradition of Russian cruelties to English wounded in the Crimea.¹ Indeed the notion which attributed cruelty, brutality and inhumanity generally to the Russian methods of government and warfare was one which entered largely into anti-Russism.²

As a pendant to the idea of Russia as the incarnation of tyranny, we have the idea of Turkey as a progressive and reforming Power,³ an idea which dates from the Crimean War, and for which Lord Palmerston seems in great measure to be responsible.

His idea, his fixed idea, was that the Turks were a highly improving and civilised race, and it was impossible to beat into him their essentially barbaric and unindustrial character.—Bagehot's *Biographical Studies*, p. 342.

One truth which has come to light is that the Turk, with all his faults, prejudices and unspeakableness, makes about as fine a soldier as is to be found in Europe or anywhere else. Another is that the Turkish Empire, contemptible as has been its Government . . . has, with all the world to nothing against it, made such a defence, and shown such determination, as prove it to be far from rotten to the core, or the mere despair of statesmanship. The third lesson . . . is that it requires only a new system of government in Turkey to make it flourishing, strong enough for self-protection, and the ally of the great nations. Unquestionably the best change that could happen to Turkey (looking at Europe's interests) is that she should reform herself, rather than that she should be extinguished by the "bag and baggage" or by any slower and more merciful process.—*Blackwood*, Sept. 1877.

Nothing can be more surprising than the exhibition of military capacity which the Turks have suddenly made; may they not, under the pressure of necessity give evidence of an unsuspected ability in civil matters?—*Blackwood*, Oct. 1877.

The commercial liberality of Turkey⁴ was contrasted with

¹ See passage in Burnaby's *On Horseback through Asia Minor*, referred to in *Spectator*, Dec. 15, 1877. Compare Kinglake, vol. vi. (Cab. Ed.) ch. viii. § 2.

² *Russia before Europe*, A. Austin, refers to Russian cruelties in the Crimea after its conquest from the Turks, pp. 14-18; and in Poland, pp. 31-45.

³ See article by Bosworth Smith, *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1876, illustrative of the opinion that the Turks were capable of reform and liberal government.

Compare a book noticed by *Fort. Rev.* April 1877, "*Midhat Pacha*," par L. Leouzou le Duc. The reviewer says it is less a biography of the ex-vizier than a plea for the aptitude of the Turks for political improvement; the essence of which is conveyed in a quotation from Midhat himself, "Les Ottomans sont démocrates de mœurs et de religion; les institutions libérales sont donc les mieux appropriées à leur éducation sociale."

⁴ See Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 19th Cent. June 1877, on the commercial liberality of the Turks.

Russia's protectionist and engrossing spirit as another reason for conciliating English good will.

[It is said the Russians are terrible protectionists, and the Turks are comparatively free traders; if once the Russians get possession of Turkey, Manchester goods will be shut out. It is very likely this might to some degree be so. After all, our commerce is wide, and shall we undertake a great war to preserve Turkey as a field for Manchester goods?]*—Campbell's Handy Book, Eastern Question.*

The Roman Catholics and the Jews had special grievances against Russia, as the persecutor of their brethren in the faith, which were not without effect on the opinion of these classes of the community. But it should be noticed that among the Jews this influence was by no means universal, and many prominent English Jews took an active part in deprecating hostility to Russia, and in advocating the policy of co-operation with her. Moreover it was answered that the apparent liberality of Turkey, both commercial and religious, was after all mere carelessness. The vices of the Turkish Government were not those of over-interference.

All convinced Catholics regard the Romanoff government of Poland with hearty loathing, and many are wholly unable to reconcile themselves to any improvement in the secular position of the detested Eastern schismatics. All Jews dislike the Russians for their narrow prejudice against the race, and detest the Romanoffs for their persistent refusal to redress the legal oppression to which the most numerous of all Hebrew communities is subjected.
—Spec. Nov. 4th, 1876.

It has been urged with much bitterness and with some point against the Catholics of the United Kingdom, and against the Catholic Church at large, that in the recent whirlwind of popular emotion . . . they did not take a very prominent part in support of Mr. Gladstone's agitation. It is still urged that the Holy See prefers the maintenance of the dominion of the Turk at Constantinople, and over the provinces which now compose Turkey in Europe, to that of the empire which claims to be substituted for it, and which alone can produce the necessary power to displace the Turk. . . It is simply obvious that the dominion of the Turk, bad as it is, is more advantageous to Catholic interests both in Europe and Asia, than is the dominion of the Czar. And Catholic interests are only the interests of the Church of God, which it is the first duty of the vicar of Christ, and of all true Catholics, to vindicate and to extend. Under the rule of the Sultan the Catholic Church enjoys a certain and an increasing degree of liberty; rather more than it enjoyed in Ireland a century ago, subject to the accident of an occasional outburst of murderous fanaticism. Wherever,

on the other hand, the Russian rule extends, the Catholic Church is persecuted with an implacable and elaborate cruelty. It is from the Penal Code of Poland that Prince Bismarck learned the art of legislation against God. It is in accordance with Russian policy that hostility to the Latin Christians is carefully fomented throughout the Greek communities of the East, from the gates of the Holy Sepulchre to the valley of the Danube. Under this circumstance we cannot for a second hesitate to say that we much prefer to have to deal with the Turks.—*Dublin Rev.* Oct. 1876.¹

[A reason why Jews in general have held aloof from the agitation on the Bulgarian Atrocities is that their co-religionists are held under every form of degradation by the Christian population, while it is a proverb that "The rulers of Ishmael are merciful."—*A. L. Green, T.* Oct. 14th, 1876.

[Some correspondence ensued on this letter.]—*T.* Oct. 16th, 17th, 18th.

[Several Jewish-Greek subjects write to say that they are not denied civil rights.]—*D. N.* Nov. 25th, 1876.

[A deputation to Lord Derby, headed by Baron De Worms, presents a memorial emanating from a conference of Jews in Paris, asking that securities may be taken for the rights of the Jews as well as the Christians in the Turkish provinces, and drawing attention to their persecution in Servia and Roumania.]—*D. N.* Dec. 28th, 1876.

Connected with the religious aspects of the question is the idea of Russia as a theocracy.² Political dread of the Russian theocracy, from fear that such an ascendancy over the minds of vast multitudes might become as dangerous as the Papacy, appears to have had little, if any, effect as a factor of Public Opinion. But a considerable amount of distaste and repulsion was excited by the notion that the Russian Government was trafficking in solemn and sacred feelings. The *Daily Telegraph* was unwearied in dwelling on the *hypocrisy* of Russia.

Again, the principle of religious liberality was invoked to conciliate something more than mere toleration for Turkey.

At once Asiatic and European, as a consequence of its position and history, the Turkish nation often affords us a test of the spirit in which the stronger West is disposed to deal with the more disorganised families of man. . . . Wise statesmanship, guided by an instinct of what was good for humanity, for the whole race, would avail itself of this existing intermedism Far from seeking to eject the Turks from Europe,

¹ "The Impending War."

² It is worth noticing that one great difficulty in the way of the Turkish Government arose from its being, like the Russian, theocratic in character.

it would see in them a means for smoothing the differences between the continents, the races, and the creeds—for breaking down the barriers which now separate the various portions of mankind, and for showing that one common humanity could override all minor differences. . . . Any such considerations are alien, and probably distasteful to the Christian mind. . . . The extermination of the Moslems is not more impossible than is their conversion to the Christian faith, in which they see—it sounds strangely to Christians—a retrogradation. . . . Widen the area of your sympathies. Let Christendom and Islam . . . shake hands, and agree to put aside their differences. . . . If the conclusion is one from which the popular instinct as yet revolts, this only shows how weak we are in toleration.—*Rd. Congreve, Fort. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

There is no disguising the fact that there is in England a class who distinctly dislike Christianity in itself, and who are, wittingly or unwittingly, set against the victims of the Turks by the very fact that they are sufferers for the Christian religion. And there are others who neither dislike nor disbelieve in Christianity themselves, but who are so morbidly sensitive on the point of religious toleration or equality, that they fall into the very danger that they wish to avoid. They are so careful to avoid anything that can be unfair to the Mahometan, that they become bitterly unfair to the Christian.—*E. A. Freeman, Contemp. Rev.* Feb. 1877.

In certain minds, culture, when divorced from action and soothed by club furniture, begets a passionate contempt for all forms of enthusiasm, and especially for that which seems to be philanthropic. . . . A kindred cause of English Mahometanism comes from deep-seated, subtle, vehement, half-confessed, and often only half-conscious hatred of Christianity.—*Spec.* Sept. 9th, 1876.

It almost seems that one source of active goodwill towards Turkey was a latent dissatisfaction with many aspects of European civilisation. We can imagine a man in such a frame of mind listening to the letter of the Turkish Pasha to Mr. Layard, in reply to a request for information about the population and trade of his province, as to words of true wisdom :—

My illustrious friend, and joy of my liver ! The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted the houses nor have I inquired into the number of the inhabitants ; and as to what one person loads on his mules, and another stows away in the bottom of his ships, that is no business of mine. But above all as to the previous history of the city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the Infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. O my soul ! O my lamb ! seek not after the things which

concern thee not. Thou camest to us and we welcomed thee; go in peace. Of a truth thou hast spoken many words, and there is no harm done, for the speaker is one and the listener is another. After the fashion of thy people thou hast wandered from one place to another, until thou art happy and content in none. We (praise be to God!) were born here and never desire to quit it. Is it possible then that the idea of a general intercourse between mankind should make any impression on our understanding? God forbid. Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God. He created the world; and shall we liken ourselves to Him in seeking to penetrate the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail cometh and goeth in so many years? Let it go! He from whose hand it came will direct and guide it. But thou wilt say unto me, Stand aside, O man, for I am more learned than thou art, and have seen more things. If thou thinkest that thou art in this respect better than I am, thou art welcome. I praise God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in the things I care not for; and as for that which thou hast seen, I defile it. Will much knowledge create thee a double stomach, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes? O my friend, if thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but God. Do no evil, and thus wilt thou fear neither man nor death; for surely thine hour will come! The meek in spirit, Imaum Ali Tade.¹

There may have been some wish to keep from utter ruin an Empire which brought the suggestion of quite different possibilities into the dull monotony of modern European civilisation, and this wish may have led men to cast about for any argument, however far-fetched, to bespeak men's sympathies for it.

Turkey is not a nation, but an Empire . . . Surely there is something very grand in such an Empire, shorn though it be of much of its former prestige and renown. [As an Empire ourselves we ought to sympathise with her.]—*H. A. M. Butler Johnstone, P. M. G.* Aug. 23rd, 1875.

I am not surprised at anybody's sympathy with the Turks, for they and the Spaniards are still in manner the first gentlemen of Europe. But I do not think any one can entertain kindly feelings towards their government.—*T.* Dec. 28th, 1875. *Special Correspondent at Pera.*

The most savage "Miso-Turk" acknowledges that this barbarian has remarkably refined and dignified manners . . . Compare this with the Frank custom of indiscriminate shaking hands—that odious form of moral corruption.—*Butler Johnstone, P. M. G.* Jan. 8th, 1876.

¹ W. R. Greg, "Life at High Pressure," *Contemp. Rev.* March, 1875.

[In another letter, Mr. Butler Johnstone notes that the Turks never interrupt in conversation—(*P. M. G.* Jan. 12th.) The objection to shaking hands appears to be a tradition from Mr. Urquhart. In the *Diplomatic Review*, April, 1875, p. 160, there is a casual reference to “the vile practice.”]

Don't you know the Turk's a gentleman,
The Slav a scurvy knave?
That Islam takes French polish,
And can learn how to behave?
—*Punch*, Dec. 16th, 1876.

Nor were there wanting points in which a superiority was claimed for the Turk over the Russian on grounds of moral weight. The Turk, (at least with the exception of the corrupt official class), they said, was sober; the Russian was proverbially intemperate. The Turk was credited with the Oriental virtue of frequent ablution, to which the Russian was a stranger. The Turk always told the truth; the Russian always lied.

Thus the companion pictures are presented of the Turk as a being endowed with many engaging qualities, and of the Russian as a creature of coarse and repulsive habits. The contrast between the ideal portraits of the Turk and of the Russian is dwelt upon and serves to enlist political sympathy for the former.

CHAPTER V.

POLICIES.

§ 1. *Emancipation, Isolation, Police and Support.*

WE now come to the consideration of the answers returned to the question: What should the English Foreign Office do? These answers constitute the various "Policies" to be distinguished as elements of Public Opinion. Four such policies seem naturally to spring from the notions which have been enumerated, according to the differing estimates which might be formed of their validity and importance; for when persons, who had definitely adopted one of the Views which have been spoken of, passed on to the consideration of the means for giving effect to it, they would almost of necessity¹ desire that the English Foreign Office should proceed in one of the four following ways:—

1. Take part in bringing about the emancipation of the Provincials from Turkish rule.
2. Take no part in the matter whatever.
3. Deprecate or suppress disturbance as a breach of the public peace.
4. Support Turkey in resisting any curtailment of her authority.

Let us, for convenience sake, speak of these four courses as the policies of "Emancipation," "Isolation," "Police" and "Support" respectively.²

The phrase "Bag and Baggage," used by Mr. Gladstone in his exposition of the Emancipation Policy, was rather an unfortunate one. It suggested to some minds that the policy involved a

¹ See table Appendix to Part II.

² Mr. Boyd Kinnear (*P. M. G.* June 29 and 30, 1876) clearly distinguished these as the four possible policies, and argued strongly in favour of that one which we call "Emancipation."

wholesale deportation of such Turkish population as was to be found in the provinces for which emancipation from Turkish rule was sought.¹ But the advocates of the policy were eager to disclaim any such intention, or any hostility to the Turkish inhabitants, so long as these were not the instruments of tyrannising over their Christian neighbours. Their position was, that it was better that a Mahometan minority should pass under European rule, than that the Christian majority should remain under the rule of the Sultan. Christians under the rule of the Sultan could have no personal security, much less could they enjoy the rights of citizens of the State. There was no reason why under European rule Mahometans should not enjoy religious toleration and political equality. How best to secure this end was a matter to be seen to in working out the details of the solution for each province to be emancipated. But the great thing was to get rid of Turkish supremacy in provinces where the bulk of the population was alien to it.

Of course the presence of a Mahometan element in the population, we may say the mixture of the population generally, and the resulting conflict of interests, was a difficulty which had to be grappled with in any satisfactory solution of the problem of Emancipation.² We have noticed a notion that the difficulty was insuperable as a factor of anti-Turkism.³ We find a suggestion that something like a deportation of the population would greatly simplify the problem, while being in reality in the best interests of the Turkish Power.

There is yet one more question on which I am inclined to take a view which may seem not moderate. I mean in regard to the position of the Turks in these Christian provinces. And that I may not be subject to misconstruction on this subject, I may be permitted first to say that I am most assuredly not influenced by any prejudices against the Turks as Turks, or against Mahometans as Mahometans. . . . Nothing would gratify me so much as to see a Mahometan population accepting a fair and equal citizenship in communities in which Greek and Roman, Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Mahometan might manage their civil affairs together, and keep their religious affairs to themselves. It is therefore from no undue prejudice that I incline to a sort of bag and baggage policy, but for two reasons, which I will state. First, I wish to see the Turks as strong and independent as possible, and I think that they would be in

¹ See *post*, chap. xii. § 3, for Mr. Gladstone's use of the phrase, and his repudiation of any such construction.

² *Ante*, p. 84.

³ *Ante*, p. 136.

stronger and more independent if their population was concentrated in the very fine and wide countries which still remain to them, than if they continue separated and scattered; and, second, I believe that the presence of a large Turkish population in the enfranchised provinces is the very thing which must prolong, and perhaps perpetuate, Russian control and domination. . . . Much as I should like to see tried the experiment of self-government in which religious differences are put out of sight, I fear that the most unlikely field for such an experiment that it is possible to devise, would be this Bulgaria, where Christian and Mahometan, already separated by religion, laws, and social arrangements, are embittered by terrible massacres and an internecine strife. The Mahometan population of Bulgaria is very considerable—certainly a fourth, possibly almost a third of the whole, even after the Mahometan Dobrudcha is excluded. . . . While, then, it would be impossible to expel the Turks, I would certainly give them every encouragement towards, and facilities for, emigrating. . . . See the case of Roumania and Servia; practically, Mahometans are obliged to abandon those countries. In Bulgaria, as in some parts of Greece, I hope that the Mahometans of Bulgarian race and language may remain and become good citizens; but I really do believe that the sooner all the true Turkish-speaking Turks, who are not willing to become mere sojourners in an alien land, move to proper Turkish soil the better. Those who are satisfied to cling to the soil without political power may be protected as Jews are to be protected, but that is all.—Sir George Campbell, *Fort. Rev.* April, 1878.¹

The gist of the Emancipation policy was to cut down Turkish sovereignty over Christian populations to a mere shadow, if, indeed, it was to be allowed to retain even a nominal existence.

To use the influence of England, on the one hand to prop up the Turkish Power, or on the other hand to emancipate the Provincials were two courses, each of which was clearly strongly enough supported to entitle it to be considered as a type of Public Opinion, and so to rank as a Policy. The same may be said of the course of taking up a position of isolation by withdrawing ourselves from the affair altogether. These three policies were mutually exclusive, and remained so, through all the stages of the controversy.

The Police policy stands on rather different ground. It was a tentative policy only, which broke down as events developed. Moreover, even as a tentative policy, it presented different aspects according to the different conceptions formed of the probable course of events.

¹ "The Resettlement of the Turkish Dominions."

Thus in speaking of this policy we seem forced to anticipate somewhat the consideration of the sequence of events. In the first stage the object was to limit the area of the disturbance by preventing the insurrection from spreading beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by preventing Serbia and Montenegro from allying themselves with it. The next stage was to attempt to confine the disturbance within the nominal limits of the Turkish Empire, and to insist that, technically, the public peace was not disturbed by what was after all an internal quarrel. So long as it appeared possible that if all external support were withdrawn from the Turks, the Provincials, including Serbia and Montenegro, by their unaided efforts might win the freedom of themselves and their brethren, this development of the Policeman policy, which would secure them a fair field, if no favour, had some attractions for many who were afterwards strong advocates of an active Emancipation policy on the part of the English Government.

But as events developed themselves, it became apparent that the Provincials were being worsted, but that Russia would come to their assistance. For the second time the attempt to localise the disturbance was about to fail. Would the theory that Russia was committing a breach of public law in acting thus be followed up by a forcible attempt to arrest her, or on the other hand, would remonstrance be dropped when it became evident that mere remonstrance would not avail? In the one case the Police policy became the mere prelude to a policy indistinguishable in its practical manifestation from supporting Turkey; in the other to a policy of Isolation.

So far as the Police policy contemplated an eventual resort to force, it must be regarded as going to reinforce the policy of Support. In this aspect it derives its importance from the circumstance that it was exactly from the Police point of view that at certain times it appeared to be the policy of the English Government to oppose the Russian pretensions.

But there was another aspect in which the policy must be regarded as a type of Public Opinion, and that is in its aspect of a tentative policy, hardly looking beyond the preservation of peace, or failing this, of minimising the disturbance. In this aspect it was really the policy of administering sedatives, although in the disguise of a Police policy. Lord Derby was the great representative of the policy in this aspect. His method appears to have been to attempt to preserve order in Europe by minimising, by

refusing to contemplate the possibility of war, by a kind of prudishness which was shocked at the bare notion that any one should imagine the *status quo*, however intolerable it might happen to be, could furnish a *casus belli*. Clough's lines were quoted as applicable to his efforts :—

“Neither battle I see, nor arraying, nor king in Israel,
Only infinite jumble and mess, and dislocation
Backed by a solemn appeal, ‘For God’s sake do not stir there.’”
—*Fort. Rev.* May, 1877.¹

There were many people who would be for Isolation if it should come to the point of actual war, but who were anxious that the English Foreign Office should participate to prevent the outbreak of war, and such people, it seems, were even willing that England should flourish the policeman's staff a little, if this would have the desired effect.

But as events developed themselves they were presented with the same problem which had been proposed by the ancient Watchman of Messina :—

“How if a will not stand?”
“Why then take no note of him, but let him go; and presently call the rest of the watch together, and thank God you are rid of a knave.”

Meanwhile they had enormous faith in the efficacy of Lord Derby's sedatives, a faith much greater, it appears, than his own.

I deeply regret what has come to pass; but I believe that in our endeavour to maintain peace between Turkey and Russia—an endeavour which we made through a sense of duty—we were engaged in the solution of an impossible problem.—*Lord Derby*,² *H. of L.* April 24th, 1877.

Following out the Police policy along this line of development, it runs into “Isolation,” and ceases to be distinguished from it. Yet these two policies were founded on very different conceptions. The Police policy is based on views that postulate the existence of a community of States having obligations towards one another which it is the interest and duty of all to see are not utterly disregarded. The Isolation policy is based on views that regard independent States as being with regard to each other in a condition of anarchy. In short, the one is based on, and the other ignores, International Law. In connection with this blurring of the distinction between the Isola-

¹ By Mr. Courtenay “Our Eastern Policy.”

² *Post*, chap. xv. § 3.

tion and Police policies we notice a tendency to bespeak support for the Government on the ground that theirs was the peace policy. This was chiefly urged in contradistinction to the Emancipation policy of their opponents. But to call the Government policy a peace policy was to give it an epithet which begged the question in its favour. "Isolation," the distinctive policy of the professed peace party, might indeed appropriately be called a policy of peace, inasmuch as it started with the refusal to engage England in war in connection with the matter. But that was not the way in which the Government policy (claimed by some as a peace policy) was presented. It was a policy which was to unite the preservation of England's neutrality, if not of the peace of Europe, with England's pretensions to take part, as a great Power, in the police of Europe. The maintenance of order was, it is true, the aim and object of the Police policy; but as the event showed, the object was not to be attained except by the removal of the exciting causes of war on the one hand, or on the other by a serious menace of the staff, which would involve quite as much probability as would the policy of Emancipation that England might have to resort to actual force. To call a mere sedative policy a policy of peace was either to take credit for the mistaken assumption that mere sedatives would be effectual, or else to imagine that the policy in question was essentially an Isolation policy, however decently disguised.

It seems, however, that through fear of opposing a policy of peace, not a little public opinion was alienated from the policy of Emancipation, and enlisted on the side of a policy which, under the plea of keeping the peace, might easily develop into what was distinctly a war policy, the policy namely, of Support of Turkey.

The divergence between the three distinct policies which emerge when the tentative policy of Police is exhausted is wide. "Emancipation" and "Support" are diametrical opposites, while "Isolation" lies not so much midway between as in an altogether different region. The contrast between the two first was epigrammatically put, while the "violet" views were yet in their embryo stage.

Here, with many minds the Eastern Question means how to keep the Turk in. In the lands where the Turk is something more than a name, the Eastern Question means how to turn the Turk out.—E. A. Freeman, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1875.¹

Nevertheless, there were certain aspects in which the difference even between "Emancipation" and "Support" was apt to be

¹ "The True Eastern Question."

obscured. This confusion arose from an ambiguity in such terms as "Reform," a word which was often used to describe each of these two opposite policies. According to the anti-Turkish view, bad government was the root of the evil: what more plausible than to say "Reform will be the cure"?

Everybody was for an amelioration in the political state of the Provincials, and if "Reform" was understood in its wide sense to mean amelioration, every one was for "Reform." But a mere reform of the Turkish methods of government was another matter. Thus there was often a failure, through this unfortunate ambiguity, to distinguish between a policy of securing a better government to the Provincials by emancipating them from Turkish rule, and a policy of inducing or helping the Turks to mend their political institutions. The former was a "violet" policy; the latter was a "red" policy, and is connected with the notion of Turkey as being, in contrast to Russia, a tolerant, liberal and reforming Power which has been noticed as a factor of philo-Turkism, and which is directly antithetical to the notion that the Turk is non-European. This "Reform," in the sense in which the word was identified with the "violet" policy, had no necessary connection with a constitution or representative institutions, or even with political liberty. It aimed at placing the Provincials under a Government which would govern after the European fashion; whether after the fashion of the most despotic of European governments, or the most liberal, was a question which might be postponed.

In Austria the Slav vainly beats against the bars of his cage, but he can still live as a man. In Turkey he cannot live as a man. . . . All these barbarous proceedings of a Tartar horde against a Christian people act of course differently on Russian nerves from political oppression in Austria.—*General Rostistaff*.¹

"Reform," in the generic sense of "Improvement," was what the Emancipation policy was aiming at; but that policy was founded on the view that the evils from which the Provincials suffered, were inherent in their subjection to uncontrolled Turkish sovereignty. "The Turk cannot reform," was a cardinal dogma of anti-Turkism. What this meant was, that no reform of the Turkish administration in the narrower specific sense in which the word is opposed to revolution, no reform, in short, which would leave the administration of the Christian Provinces Turkish, would meet the necessities of the case.

¹ "The Eastern Question," quoted in *Fraser's Magazine*, Oct. 1875.

On the other hand, from the Turkophil point of view, it was part and parcel of the policy of Support, to help the Turks to reform their administration. We may call reform in this sense Red, or Mahometan Reform.

We shall find the policy of Support, in its particular aspect of "helping the Turks to reform," recommended to the anti-Turkish party as a policy embodying all that was essential in their demands after those demands had been reduced to practical and reasonable shape. Nay, the organs of the Red party professed themselves as surpassing their opponents in their zeal for "Reform" and "Good Government," inasmuch as they were for rejuvenating the whole Turkish Empire, whereas the proposals of the violet policy were directed exclusively to particular Christian Provinces. This very question whether remedial measures were to be applied to the whole of the Turkish Empire, or only to the specially affected portion of it, was perhaps the best touchstone to distinguish between the opposing policies.

A touchstone was sometimes required, for the apparent verbal agreement about the necessity of reform of the Turkish Government covered a wide divergence of policy when it came to the question whether there was to be any real authority set up over and above the Turkish Power. As was often said, the whole question turned upon guarantees. The anti-Turkish party were for curtailing the Turkish Power in those Provinces where its unrestrained exercise had proved itself incompatible with the security of the Christian inhabitants. The Turkophil party were for reform which would leave the Porte's sovereignty unimpaired throughout the whole Turkish Empire.

It is curious to notice that a favourite suggestion for carrying out this policy was to introduce a large English *personnel* into the Turkish administration.

The Turks committed a blunder in not taking English officers into their service. Had they done so the sympathy of England would have been with them, and victory would have been on their side. The Turkish soldiers are sober, patient, and very enduring. Many English officers will testify to this. When Mr. Gladstone talks about driving the Turks out of Europe, he does not know the Turks, and he does not know his own countrymen, who would never allow such injustice to be done. English popular feeling has unfortunately run in the wrong line. ("No, no.") The proper course would have been for England to say "Turkey must govern her subjects, Mussulman as well as Christian, better. She shall be assisted in doing so by England, who will facilitate the Sultan taking into his service Englishmen, accustomed to govern mixed

racés in India. The revenue shall be collected, and the laws put in force by English Commissioners in the service of the Sublime Porte.—*Col. Lloyd Lindsay*.¹

If this device for transforming the Turkish Government by making it act through subordinates who should govern in European fashion could have been adopted, we should reach a point where "Red Reform" would, to a certain extent, approximate to Emancipation.

The Turkophils would not, it seems, have been unwilling that the Turkish Power should be to a large extent superseded by that of an English bureaucracy, provided it were done in this unacknowledged and unofficial manner, and especially if all foreign "influence" except English influence should be excluded from those regions. But this was not a matter to be settled between England and Turkey alone, and the policy of reforming Turkey by providing her with an exclusively English bureaucracy did not become a practical one.

Public Opinion, on the whole, succeeded in distinguishing singularly clearly the "Red Reform," incident to the policy of Support, from Emancipation, and hardly ever accepted the one for the other, at all events for long, however plausible the professions with which it was presented.

[If public opinion had an opportunity of expressing itself distinctly, it would insist very emphatically upon one condition as essential to any satisfactory settlement, viz.: that the carrying out of the reforms, whatever they are, shall in nowise depend for its fulfilment on the will or the energy of the Government at Constantinople. The finest scheme of government that philosophic statesman ever drafted would be of no use to the Christians in the Turkish provinces if it were left for its practical application in the hands of Turkey. The particular name is not of great importance. It is of the utmost importance to know by what influence and through whose hands the system is to be applied.]
—*D. N.* Oct. 30th, 1876.

Speaking broadly, Public Opinion concentrated its attention on the broad policy of curtailing Turkish sovereignty as the one thing needful, and did not busy itself with ideas of the grade of complexity that may be called "solutions." It was sufficient that the Turkish Power should be so far excluded from interference with the lives and rights of the Provincials as to render impossible a repetition of such scenes as had occurred. The questions *how* it was to be excluded and *what* was to replace it were left for those to consider whose business it was.

¹ At Reading, *T.* Oct. 9, 1876.

Some of the opponents of "Emancipation" were prone to distress their opponents by forcing this problem upon them, and taunting them with allowing their minds to leave their task half done. What the latter were clear about was that whatever nominal authority or sovereignty should be left to the Turks their power should be practically superseded.

This result might be attained either by annexing the provinces in question to some other Power (though to this course there might be strong and overpowering objections on other grounds), or by giving them autonomy under some name, such as calling them Hospodarates, or, again, by the undertaking of some supervision of their administration on the part of the great Powers. Such "solutions," in various forms, and with various modifications, were put forward and discussed from time to time.¹

The "solution" to which the anti-Turkish party inclined was best expressed by a phrase that was often adopted in the resolutions passed during the first agitation, namely, to give the disturbed provinces "practical independence." On the other hand, this section of Public Opinion was ready to acquiesce with Mr. Gladstone in accepting the solution proposed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of an international commission to guarantee the promised reforms, and to supervise and control the Turkish officials in carrying them out.²

With regard to the policy of Support, it was sometimes insisted that active measures might be taken for resisting Russia, quite apart from any support of Turkey. It was suggested that Gallipoli or Constantinople might be occupied by England, to guard her own interests, or those of Europe, against Russia. But unless taken as a step towards a general settlement of the East, involving the extinction of the Turkish Power in Europe, a point of view which was hardly that of those by whom such measures were advocated, such a course was too closely allied with "Support" to be distinguished from it in considering the practical results.³

¹ See an interesting article, "Solution of the Eastern Question," *T.* Nov. 23, 1876. Compare Mr. Grant Duff's "nostrum" (his "dream" as he wrote), viz. : to leave the Sultan a titular dignity, and to place the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh at Constantinople to administer Turkey with a bureaucracy.—*T.* Sept. 11, 1876.

² No doubt Mr. Gladstone's opinion that such a solution would amount to emancipation had a great effect in determining the acquiescence of the "violet" section of opinion; but it would be a mistake to suppose that this section were ready to take any cue from Mr. Gladstone at this time. Compare the dissatisfaction excited by his reference to the integrity of Turkey until his meaning was made clear.

³ Compare next § "Egypt." See also Chap. XVII. as to momentary possibility of the distinction becoming practical.

§ 2. *Egypt.*

In addition to the four policies which have been distinguished, a fifth, which must also be recognised as the embodiment of some volume of opinion, emerged amid the conflicting counsels of the time. This was the policy which would add Egypt to the list of English possessions.

As an answer to the questions raised by the disturbances in the Christian provinces it was irrelevant. The suggestion of such a policy does not arise, as is the case with the other four, from a mere inspection of the list of notions.

But though the policy which for the sake of brevity we may call "Egypt" was not in itself a solution of the difficulty about the Christian populations of Turkey in Europe, it might perhaps render a solution easier, by reconciling England to a settlement which she might otherwise feel obliged to oppose as imperilling the security of her possessions.

Thus the policy "Egypt" has a certain connection with various factors of opinion of the most different complexions, and consequently scattered about in different parts of the scale. If, for instance, England, by common consent, could secure herself in this manner against the consequences she feared from the break-up of the Turkish Empire, the odious necessity of maintaining an intolerable yoke upon innocent peoples might no longer be imposed upon her. This was distinctly the feeling which flashed up at the time of the purchase of the Canal shares in 1875.

From another point of view the attack on Turkey by the Provincials and by Russia was regarded as the signal for international anarchy. If all respect for public law or the rights of other States was at an end, it would not do for England, in the impending shipwreck, to be behindhand in seizing for herself the plank of safety, or it may be, her share of the spoil.

Lastly, by others the virtual acquisition of Egypt by England was not regarded so much as taking part in a general partition of Turkey, as a means by which England and Turkey might be drawn into closer union, and a step in the policy of supporting Turkey.¹ The actual carrying out of such a policy by Lord Beaconsfield's Government in the summer of 1878, substituting Cyprus for Egypt, helps us to realise the conception.

¹ Compare the protest of the *Spectator* (June 9, 1877, *post*, chap. xvi. § 1) against the assumption that it could be anything but an act of hostility to Turkey, and note especially the remark that Great Britain could pay the tribute to no State on earth.

Thus while the policy "Egypt" seems incompatible with most of the notions which lie about the middle of the scale, anti-War, Order and Legalism, it was connected in some of its forms with factors of anti-Turkism and of anti-Russism, and moreover it was very closely allied with the hankering after a strong foreign policy, and the cry for British interests, which we find in connection with the anti-Russian view.

We have no necessary sympathy with this effete despotism, this government of women and slaves which has weighed like a nightmare on Eastern Europe for 400 years. It is our interest alone which we consider, and the shortsightedness of the Porte itself may compel us to change our policy. . . . Perhaps circumstances may be too strong for us, and Turkey break up in spite of our efforts. In that case, no scruples, which will assuredly not occur to any of the other great Powers, should prevent us from benefiting by the accident, and obtaining at least Egypt and the Euphrates route as our share of the spoil.—Leppel H. Griffin, *Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1874.¹

Mr. Grant Duff says—[Our efforts should be directed to have placed at Constantinople whatever European Prince the European Powers think the most convenient, or the least inconvenient. Otherwise as a *pis aller*, we must have Egypt, and a coaling station in Crete].—*19th Cent.* July, 1877.

With this may be compared the opinion of M. de Laveleye:—

England must occupy Egypt and Cyprus if Russia annexes Armenia. I say Cyprus and not Crete.—*Fort. Rev.* July, 1877.

But perhaps the most prominent spokesman of the policy "Egypt" was Mr. Edward Dicey, who says:—

[Granting that the preservation of our Indian Empire is important we must protect ourselves from the mere possibility of Russia's getting a footing at Constantinople or in the Euphrates Valley. No precaution within our power can place us in so strong a position as we now occupy. The presence of an inert, unaggressive and friendly Power on the Bosphorus is the best buffer between Russia and ourselves. But, wisely or unwisely, we are not prepared to fight for Turkey, and we must look out for something else.] Russia, from the days of Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour, has advocated a partition of the Turkish Empire, in which Egypt should fall to the share of England; and I have reason to believe suggestions of such a scheme were made within the last few weeks. [The title to the Canal rests with the Sultan, the Khedive, and the Company. As to the Sultan] we cannot afford to shape our action in deference to the wishes of a moribund Power. [The Company would be compensated. Practically all rights could be bought for 15,000,000*l.* The Khedive would

¹ "Present State of the Eastern Question."

exchange the suzerainty of the Sultan for English protection. France *now* would not mind, that is why the present moment is advantageous.] It would be mere hypocrisy to contend that the primary motive with which I advocate the occupation of Egypt is a desire to benefit the condition of the people. [Still they would be benefited.]¹—*19th Cent.* June, 1877.

Mr. Dicey replies to some objections which had been brought against his article. He says :—

[The proposal has met with a great response. He does not grumble at Muscovite aggression. They have as much right to extend their dominions as we ours, or as little.]—*19th Cent.* Aug. 1877.

At the same time an important contribution to the controversy appears from Mr. Gladstone.

It is not to be denied that the territorial appetite has within the last quarter of a century revived among us with an abnormal vigour. [Ministers foster it; the newspaper press panders to it]. It is my firm conviction that as a rule enlargements of the empire are fraught with serious danger. [Parliament has too much to do. There are too few of us to manage and defend much more than we have already. But see] the aspect of these schemes before the high tribunal of international law and right. [We have had the *status quo*, Turkey's independence and integrity, and the treaties of 1856, held up to us as our proper objects. Now the consecrated ensign is "British Interests." But why should we make the Turk a victim to them? Turkey may well say "Save me from my friends."]—*19th Cent.* Aug. 1877.²

Mr. Dicey rejoins,³ and simultaneously appears a further protest against the suggested policy.

Fall the Ottoman Empire will, by corruption if not by the sword; and its fall will apparently bring on a crisis in the destinies of England, which will be called on to decide whether out of the wreck she will take Egypt. . . . The present helplessness of France no doubt is our opportunity, but we are credibly assured that her jealousy will be at once aroused and that her hostility awaits us in the end. . . . It is probable that in the present mood of the nation aggrandisement will carry the day. We say mood, and it does not seem that there has been any definite change of conviction such as new arguments produced since the time when more moderate views prevailed. But the nation is now flushed

¹ "Our Route to India."

² This article was republished in pamphlet form "by permission" in June, 1884. The anonymous preface states that only one passage has been omitted, as being liable to misconstruction and unnecessary, and that, although Mr. Gladstone might be inclined to modify slightly one or two phrases, the entire substance seems applicable to the present situation.

³ *19th Cent.* Sept. 1877.

with wealth . . . it is infected with the military spirit. . . . The aristocratic party is in the ascendant, and British aristocracy as well as Russian despotism is willing to divert the mind of the people from progress at home to aggrandisement abroad. . . . That there are special classes—administrative, military, and commercial—which have a special interest in a policy of aggrandisement no one needs to be told; our ears ring with vociferous demonstration of the facts. . . . [Putting aside the question of morality, would the occupation of Egypt be for our interest? In truth the question of morality] does not present itself in a very serious form as far as the occupation of Egypt is concerned. The general concurrence of the Powers at all events, if it could be obtained, might relieve us from any misgivings on that score. The Khedive is to the mass of his unhappy subjects not a national sovereign, but an alien oppressor. . . . [Is India a source of strength to us?] The whole foreign policy of England quivers with alarm for India. We are constantly drawn away from that which would otherwise be the manifest line of our interest by that besetting fear.¹ [He argues that aggrandisement is a danger both to our political institutions, and to our national character, which suffers from being brought into contact with subject races.]—Goldwin Smith, *Fort. Rev.* Sept. 1877.

Perhaps it would be too much to say that "Egypt" was adopted as an actual policy by any large body of Public Opinion. Still it was present to the public mind as a possible policy, which at any moment might come to the front in some form or other. And, indeed, England has become involved in the destinies of Egypt in a manner of which it is impossible to foretell the upshot.

We have now considered the divers answers which Public Opinion returned to the question, "What had better be done?" And in them we get ultimately three distinct policies competing for adoption. The claim of any one to prevail was founded upon its claim to be the preponderating opinion of the country, taking into account all those circumstances which ought to be reckoned in the evaluation of Public Opinion. Now that we have made the acquaintance of these *dramatis personæ*, so to speak, it will be our aim to trace the course of events from this point of view, to mark the wax and wane of rival policies, to compare the course of the English Government with the policy which embodied the preponderating opinion, and to endeavour to ascertain to what extent Public Opinion was really master of the destinies of the country at a momentous crisis.

¹ Compare the passage where the Reviewer speaks of the possible necessity which the possession of India may lay upon us to hinder progress in European Turkey as an "immorality to which that *damnosa hereditas* has committed us."—*Fort. Rev.* July 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs."

APPENDIX TO PART II.

TABLE 1.

| 1. Standard of Conduct. 2. Conception of England's rôle. 3. Nature of Motive. | | | NOTIONS grouping themselves into broader VIEWS. |
|---|---------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. | 2. | 3. | |
| Inter-national Law. | England a European Great Power. | Sentimental. { moral. aesthetic. | <p>ANTI-TURKISM.</p> <p>PRIMARY FACTORS.</p> <p>§ a. Crusading spirit.</p> <p>§ b. Historic instinct.</p> <p>§ c. Humanity.</p> <p>SECONDARY FACTORS.</p> <p>§ d. England's special responsibilities for Turkey's behaviour.</p> <p><i>Turkey our watch-dog.</i> <i>Turkey supported by our money.</i> <i>Policy of Crimean War makes us responsible.</i></p> <p>§ e. Nationality the best foundation for states.</p> <p>§ f. The open sore must be healed.</p> <p>§ g. The concert of Europe must be preserved.</p> <p>§ h. A barrier can be erected against Russia.</p> |
| Interest. Morality. | England an Island. | Diplomatic. Sentimental. moral. | <p>ANTI-WAR.</p> <p>§ a. War is a sin.</p> <p>§ b. War is a mistake.</p> |
| International Law. | England a European Great Power. | Diplomatic. | <p>ORDER.</p> <p>§ a. The greatest of English interests is peace.</p> <p>§ b. Danger of a European scramble.</p> <p>§ c. Danger to France.</p> <p>§ d. Fear of a Jihad.</p> <p>§ e. Fear of a massacre.</p> |
| International Law. | England a European Great Power. | Diplomatic. | <p>LEGALISM.</p> <p>§ a. Divine right of sovereign states.</p> <p>§ b. Legalistic non-intervention.</p> <p>§ c. Treaty legalism.</p> |

TABLE I.—continued.

| 1. Standard of Conduct. 2. Conception of England's rôle. 3. Nature of Motive. | | | NOTIONS grouping themselves into broader VIEWS. | |
|---|---------------------------------|-------------------|---|--|
| 1. | 2. | 3. | | |
| International Law. | England a European Great Power. | Diplomatic. | ANTI-RUSSISM AND PHILO-TURKISM. | |
| International Law as subserving British Interests. | | Diplomatic. | EUROPEAN. | |
| British Interests. (Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | England an Asiatic Power. | Diplomatic. | <p>§ a. { Russia big and aggressive. A disturbing element in Europe.</p> <p>§ b. { Turkey a weak power in danger. Keeps the peace in the Balkan Peninsula.</p> <p>§ c. { Russia represents Holy Alliance. Turkey a liberal and progressive power.</p> <p>§ d. { Russia systematically faithless and cunning.</p> <p>§ d. { Russia threatens Constantinople. The Turks the best police of the Bosphorus.</p> | |
| British Interests. | | Diplomatic. | MARITIME. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Diplomatic. | <p>§ e. Russia as threatening the Rule of the Straits inimical to England's maritime power. The rule a factor of naval balance of power. The rule keeps Russia from threatening route to India.</p> <p>§ f. Turkey as commanding the Straits a useful ally.</p> | |
| British Interests. | | Diplomatic. | ASIATIC. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Diplomatic. | <p>§ g. { Russia inimical to England in Asia. Turkey auspicious.</p> <p>Russia threatens invasion of India. Russia threatens to excite disaffection. Support of Turkey conciliates Mahometan population. Russia closes markets of Central Asia against English trade.</p> | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | § h. NON-DIPLOMATIC. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Turkey free-trading. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Tradition of the services. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Notion of Russian cruelties. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | (Poland : Turkestan : English wounded in Crimea.) | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Notion of Russian intolerance. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | (Special grievances of Roman Catholics and Jews.) | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Russia religiously hypocritical. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Turkey favoured from desire to avoid intolerance. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Turkey favoured from actual preference for non-Christians. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Dislike of enthusiasm. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | Turks non-philistine. | |
| British Interests. | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | The Russian coarse and repulsive. | |
| Connected with Bias towards high-handed Foreign Policy and Disraeli Toryism.) | | Quasi-Diplomatic. | The Turk a "gentleman." | |

TABLE II.

| VIEWS. | CORRESPONDING POLICIES. |
|--|--|
| ANTI-TURKISM | EMANCIPATION. |
| ANTI-WAR | ISOLATION. |
| ORDER | <i>If actually a sedative policy only, merges into _____</i> |
| LEGALISM | |
| POLICE. | |
| | <i>If use of the staff seriously intended, merges into _____</i> |
| ANTI-RUSSISM AND PHILO-TURKISM | |
| | SUPPORT. |

NOTE TO TABLES.

The above tables are intended to show how the "Notions," arranged in their order, group themselves into "Views," and how from these views definite "Policies" resulted. The letters in Table I. refer to the sections of the respective sub-headings of Chapter IV. in which the notions are discussed *seriatim*. For the sake of convenience of reference this table is sometimes spoken of as a "spectrum" where "violet" corresponds to anti-Turkism and "red" to philo-Turkism.

Table I. is also intended to exhibit how notions lying in different parts of the scale are connected with more general considerations. It is not to be expected that the whole scale should

be definitely mapped out in this manner, yet some such connections can be traced. Where this is the case, the connections are worth noticing, because they may afford some clue to the ebb and flow of Public Opinion, by showing how circumstances which gave currency to some maxim, or excited some instinct, would tend strongly to reinforce a particular policy; and how in this manner, Public Opinion might be played on by any hand which could manipulate its stops. It is as if we could make some general propositions about the different colours of the spectrum and the eyes to which they were visible, and the treatment which would render the colour-blind eyes more sensitive to them.

In the first place it is pretty obvious that the conception of the rule of conduct underlying such notions as "Humanity" was general Morality. Coming to the notions which make up "Legalism," it is no less obviously International Law. For such a notion as conciliating the Mahometan population of India by supporting Turkey, it is Interest. At the extreme red end of the spectrum we seem to have got into a region where the criterion is a mere æsthetic like or dislike. So also, the suggestion of historic fitness with regard to the destiny of Constantinople, a suggestion which enters into the notion spoken of as the "Historic Instinct," the violet end of the spectrum, may perhaps be regarded as an æsthetic factor founded on taste.

Thus the notions towards either end of the scale are founded on considerations of a more general character than those occupying the centre regions. These last contemplate the exigencies of an actual political system, and (though not necessarily ultimately contrary to morality) appeal to some other criterion of conduct than morality at first-hand. We may perhaps say the criterion to which they appeal is interest, or else some general maxim of international conduct. Hence we call them "diplomatic." The "non-diplomatic" notions seem to be based directly on a sentiment, whether that sentiment be of a moral, or again of what may be called an æsthetic nature. Hence they may be spoken of as "sentimental," using the term as synonymous with "non-diplomatic." But it is to be observed that such moral considerations merge into considerations which, though not "diplomatic" in the sense mentioned above, are really political, in the sense of supplying adequate motives on which to found political action. As, for instance, when it is conceived of as a matter of religious duty to avoid war, or on the other hand to succour the oppressed. The distinction between the

diplomatic and non-diplomatic notions answers roughly to the antithesis sometimes drawn between "policy" and "sentiment." But we notice that the æsthetic factors of philo-Turkism more properly deserve the term "sentimental," as used in common parlance to connote frivolous or inadequate motives, than the factors of anti-Turkism which were often so called, seeing that the latter were, for the most part, founded on moral considerations.

The portions of the scale where the Asiatic factors of anti-Russism and philo-Turkism occur, answer to the conception of England as an Asiatic Power, or the imperialistic conception, and the related doctrine of "British Interests." It is not surprising to find in connection with the "red" policy the rise and active dissemination of this doctrine, and that this again is connected with the biases towards Disraeli Toryism and a High-handed Foreign Policy.

* * The statement on p. 142 as to the coasts of the Black Sea previously to 1774 must be understood generally, for it appears that there was a temporary exception between 1699, when Azoff was ceded to Peter the Great at the peace of Carlowitz, and 1711, when the Czar was forced to restore it at the peace of Falczi. See Holland's lecture (referred to *ante*, p. 117) p. 4.

PART III.

COURSE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND EVENTS.

CHAPTER VI.

INTRODUCTORY.

It was in the early days of the July of 1876 that English "opinions" about the events which were taking place in the East first gathered that force and volume which entitled them to rank as "public." There was at that time a transition, so far as the generality of people were concerned, from a state of apathy and almost of torpor with regard to all kinds of politics, to a state of keen interest in one particular branch of politics, namely, a problem in foreign affairs. The transition was so sudden that we can almost fix on the very "moment of awakening." It would seem at first sight that the narrative should start from this point, but to appreciate the attitude of Public Opinion when it awoke it is necessary that we should know something of the mood in which it went to sleep, and likewise something of the influences which troubled its repose.

§ 1. *First aspect of the Conservative Ministry.*

With 1873 closed a period of exceptional activity in organic legislation. The question before the constituencies in January 1874, was, as they then thought, whether they would immediately enter upon another such period, and the constituencies emphatically answered *No*. To represent this shrinking from further changes as nothing but the resistance of harassed interests, is to take a very imperfect view of the situation. No doubt the harassed interests constituted a formidable nucleus of opposition; but there was, in addition, a widely diffused aversion from the immediate prospect of further legislation such as was expected from the Liberal Ministry if armed with a fresh majority. This aversion was deeply rooted, however much it might have the

appearance of being merely sentimental. The country wanted time to think. In fact the Liberal Ministry of 1868 shared the common fate of reforming bodies, to exhaust themselves in the moment of fruition.

The late Liberal Government used up and expended their majority in fulfilling their pledges and redeeming their promises, even though temporary unpopularity followed that large expenditure of Liberal energy—

“One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name!”—*Mr. Lowe*.¹

The Disestablishment of the Irish Church, the Elementary Education Act, the Irish Land Act of 1870, the University Tests Act, the Ballot Act and the Abolition of Purchase in the Army, the Act legalising Trade Unions in 1871—these, with many less important measures, may be taken collectively as constituting the wave of reform which was the direct outcome of the extension of the Franchise in 1867, and which the Parliament of 1868 was elected to carry to its completion. But even before that Parliament came to an end it is clear from many symptoms that there was something like a feeling of satiety in regard to such reforming zeal.²

Mr. Disraeli recognised and was fully prepared to take advantage of this temper. Two leading notes run through his principal speeches at this time; one, harmonising with the growing distaste for further extensive political reconstruction; the other, pointing to schemes of social amelioration.

A great scholar and a great wit 300 years ago said that in his opinion there was a great mistake in the Vulgate, and that instead of saying *Vanitas Vanitatum omnia Vanitas*, the wise king really said *Sanitas Sanitatum omnia Sanitas*. After all, the first consideration of a Minister should be the health of the people. A country may be covered with historic trophies, with museums of science and galleries of art, with universities and with libraries, the country may even be famous in the annals and action of the world, hut, gentlemen, if the population every ten years decreases, and the stature of the race every ten years diminishes, the history of that country will soon be the history of the past. . . . As I sat opposite the Treasury Bench, the Ministers reminded me of one of those marine landscapes not unusual

¹ At Retford, April 18, 1876.

² *Punch* (if our recollection is correct) hails the end of a session about this time in verses which run something as follows:—

“Now Parliament’s over, and I’ve to fear
No more legislation, at least this year.”

on the coasts of South America. You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a flame flickers on a single pallid crest. But the situation is still dangerous. There are occasional earthquakes, and ever and anon the dark rumbling of the sea.¹

[After saying a policy of confiscation had been substituted for the policy of concurrent endowment he went on] You have had four years of it. You have despoiled Churches. You have threatened every corporation and endowment in the country. You have examined into everybody's affairs. You have criticised every profession and vexed every trade. No one is certain of his property, and no one knows what duties he may have to perform to-morrow.²

All these institutions and all these principles, which have made this country free and famous, and conspicuous for its union of order with liberty, are now impugned, and in due time will become great and burning questions.³

For nearly five years the present Ministry have harassed every trade, worried every profession, and assailed or manacled every class, institution and species of property in the country. . . . All this they call a policy, and seem quite proud of ; but the country has, I think, made up its mind to close this career of plundering and blundering.⁴

During the five years that we spent in opposition we endeavoured to impress upon the country our sincere convictions that the time had arrived when political change was no longer required, but that its intelligence and energy should be directed to the improvement and elevation of the condition of the people. We impressed upon the public mind that Sanitary Reform, for example, was the great object and need of the day, including in that phrase so little understood, most of the civilising influences of humanity.—*Mr. Disraeli*.⁵

In view of something very like the completion of the old Liberal programme, many Liberals might incline to think the time was at last come to accept the advice Earl Russell once gave, and to "rest and be thankful." It was on such grounds as these that the *Edinburgh Review*⁶ represented the election of 1874, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, as a Whig victory.

On the other hand, according to a very different view, Mr. Gladstone was defeated because he was not sufficiently forward in

¹ At the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, *T.* April 4, 1872.

² Speech on adjourned debate second reading Irish University Bill, *H. of C.* March 11, 1873.

³ Speech on declining to form an Administration on Mr. Gladstone's defeat on the Irish University Bill, *H. of C.* March 20, 1873.

⁴ Mr. Disraeli's letter to Lord Grey de Wilton, *apropos* of the Bath election, October, 1873, *Annual Register*, 1873.

⁵ At the Mansion House, Aug. 4, 1875.

⁶ "The Past and the Future of the Whig Party," April, 1874.

proposing further legislative changes, and especially ecclesiastical changes. It was said that the Dissenters were alienated by the clauses of the Education Act which were favourable to denominational schools. It was asserted that the election of 1874 was after all not so fatal to advanced Radicals as to moderate Liberals.¹ But it may well have been the case that the constituencies that had made up their minds in 1868 in favour of such measures as universal compulsory secular education, disestablishment of the Church, and household suffrage for counties, saw no reason to change their minds in 1874; while constituencies which in 1868 had only been prepared to go the length of the 1868 programme, refused in 1874 to give a vote which might possibly commit them to further lengths. The Liberal Ministry in February, 1874, had against it all the weight of the general distrust of further changes in the abstract, without enlisting the enthusiastic support of those who desired some definite change in particular.

It is almost unnecessary to add that it seems a very insufficient explanation of Mr. Gladstone's defeat in 1874, to ascribe it to Liberal disorganisation. This there was, no doubt; but it was really not so much a cause as a symptom. Nor should too much weight be attached to the commercial prosperity of the country. To some extent it may have influenced the result directly by producing what Mr. Goschen called "the weariness of fastidious prosperity,"² and indirectly by discrediting the Liberal cry of economy, and making people indifferent to Mr. Gladstone's promised abolition of the income-tax. As for such statements as that of Mr. Goldwin Smith that "the two great Liberal sentiments of justice and humanity are declining,"³ or that of Mr. Grant Duff that "we are in a bad decade,"⁴ they must go for what they are worth.⁵

¹ Professor Goldwin Smith thinks the programme of reforms compatible with aristocratic government was exhausted in 1874. Thus he agrees with the *Edinburgh Reviewer* in thinking that the alliance between Whigs and Radicals could not last, but the two writers differ in their hope and belief as to the ultimate result.—"Defeat of the Liberal Party," *Fort. Rev.* July, 1877.

² See Clayden, *England under Lord Beaconsfield*, ch. ii. p. 25.

³ *Fort. Rev.* July, 1877.

⁴ *19th Cent.* May, 1878.

⁵ Mr. Justin McCarthy (*Hist. of Our Own Times*, ch. lxii.) appears just to hit the mark:—"Many causes indeed concurred to bring about the fall of the Liberal Administration. It had committed grave faults itself; some of its members had done it serious harm. Various powerful interests were arrayed against it. But when all allowance has been made for such considerations, it will probably be seen that the most potent influence which bore down the Gladstone Government was the fact that people in general had got tired of doing great things."

Whilst however there was satiety of heroic legislation there was a well-marked appetite for improved administration. In matters of administration the mistakes or misfortunes which must happen to every Government invariably bring about a time when people begin to wish for new men.

The *Spectator*, writing at a date when the Government policy had developed itself, remarked:—

People in 1874 thought it did not matter which party administered; now they have found out that it does.—(Sept. 20, 1877.)

[Disraeli's] was to be a Cabinet of administration, and by his skilful management of his own party and his adroitness in the conduct of public business, he was to prove himself its lawful head Even his deficiency in political earnestness was held to be an advantage for the efficient discharge of these delicate and somewhat trying duties.—*Brit. Quart. Rev.* July, 1875.

Nor can it be doubted that the election was a protest against the supposed Liberal policy of minimising the influence of England in foreign affairs and of loosening the bond with the colonies. More activity abroad and less at home was a prominent note of Mr. Disraeli's election address; though his selection of the Straits of Malacca as a point on which to assail the foreign policy of the Liberal Ministry was *caviar* to the general.

This then, we take it, was the main significance of the Conservative victory of 1874.

Mr. Gladstone's retirement from the leadership of the Opposition, and Lord Hartington's accession to that position, point to the conclusion that the Liberal party was disposed to accept the rule of quiescent criticism laid down for it by the *Edinburgh Review*.

And the new Premier, what was looked for from him? In 1874 he was hardly taken seriously. The *Pall Mall Gazette* found it possible to write of him in jocular strain, soon after the general election:

“How we have been running a muck-muck,
We see by this inopportune
Unexpected success of the buck-buck
Buckinghamshire buffoon.”

Perhaps it was expected that his vivid and interesting personality would do something to break the dead level. He would be a relief from the terrible earnestness of Mr. Gladstone. So calm was the outlook, some thought it a safe opportunity to give him the spell at the helm which he had well earned by a long

course of patient and good-tempered watchfulness in opposition. He was to temper Conservatism with epigrams. He was to amuse.

On the whole, we may say, that during the first two years of the new Administration the country was getting pretty much what it bargained for at the general election. "Beer and Bible" had been in effect the hustings cry, so it was said, of the Conservatives; and in the first session of the new Parliament the licensed victuallers were appeased by an extension of the hours of closing which had been imposed by the Act of 1872, and the anti-Ritualists were gratified by the Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874.

In the first and following Sessions, something was done to give effect to the maxim *sanitas sanitatum*, by various Acts which extended existing provisions with respect to Factories, Artisans' Dwellings and the Adulteration of Food and Drugs.¹ Moreover, the Act of 1871 which had legalised Trade Unions, was followed in 1875 by an Act relaxing the law of conspiracy in favour of persons engaged in trade disputes, and in 1876 Lord Sandon's Act was passed, supplementing the existing Education Acts, particularly with respect to the provisions for compulsory attendance. In none of these measures did the Legislature take anything like a new departure; but the case is rather different with respect to the Act of 1875, which gave validity to the claim of agricultural tenants in England to be compensated for unexhausted improvements, in default of agreement to the contrary, and the important Act of 1876 relating to Commons.²

Again, the Acts for preventing loss of life at sea (the first of which, associated with Mr. Plimsoll's name, was repealed the year after it was passed, and replaced by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876), constituted a large extension of the principle of State supervision over merchant shipping. In taking this step, however, the House of Commons was moved by a very special impulse.

¹ The Public Health Act of 1875 was almost entirely a re-enactment and codification of existing provisions.

² Compare the preamble of the Act of 1845, which recites that "it is expedient to facilitate the inclosure and improvements of commons and other lands now subject to rights of property which obstruct cultivation and the productive employment of labour," with the preamble of the Act of 1876, which takes into account the health, comfort and convenience of the neighbourhood, and deprecates inclosure in severalty, unless it can be shown to be for the benefit of the neighbourhood as well as of private interests. The contrast marks quite a revolution in opinion on this head during the interval. In 1876 many Liberal members desired to go further than the Home Secretary would allow, in giving effect to the considerations pointed to in the preamble of the Act of that year, *viz.*, by preventing inclosure, except under the Act, even when the Lord of the Manor and the Commoners all agreed.

Measures of this class constituted a certain amount of what may be called condition-of-the people legislation, that is to say, legislation intended to countervail some of the mischiefs attending unchecked industrial development and unregulated competition. Legislation of this kind the Premier was disposed to claim as belonging peculiarly to the Conservative party, and indeed, in so far as such measures interfered with freedom of contract, or encouraged reliance on the action of the State, they appear to be opposed to the principles of the older Liberalism.

Still, in point of fact, most of the measures of this kind passed in the early years of Mr. Disraeli's government were really legacies from the late Ministry. They were not treated as questions between the two parties. They were passed with the good-will of the Liberals, if indeed the impulse did not come from them.

There were indeed a few Acts where the element which the *Spectator* (Sept. 25, 1875), called the "Tory virus" of the Government showed itself (*c.g.* the Endowed Schools Act, 1874, as first introduced, and the Army Exchange Act, 1875). There does not appear to be any particular significance in the Act of 1876, which after two postponements of the operation of the Judicature Act of 1873, restored to the House of Lords its appellate jurisdiction. But we can imagine some ingenious historian of the future, who should light upon it as a solitary fragment, thereupon proceeding to explain the election of 1874 as a great revindication of the power of the aristocracy, which a demagogic minister had attempted to subvert.

The term "Tory" is used, it must be noted, in the phrase just quoted in the sense oligarchical, devoted to class interests, repressive. It would appear that this is the sense in which the word is commonly used by Professor Goldwin Smith. Of Toryism in the special sense in which we have used the word in connection with Personal Government,¹ there was as yet no talk. The reactionary element in the Government, however, was by no means strong, and it is to be noticed that so far from the Premier's being represented as adding to its strength, he is looked upon as one of those by whom the evil tendencies of certain others are held in check.² Thus it was looked upon as only what was to be expected

¹ *Ante*, p. 61.

² In a curious article in the *Spectator* of Feb. 12, 1876, we get Mr. Disraeli, Sir Stafford Northcote, and Mr. Cross enumerated as the "good boys" in the Cabinet; while on the other side, stand as "Tories," Lord Derby (who ought to know better), Lord Salisbury, Lord Sandon, Mr. Ward Hunt and Sir Charles Adderley.

from him when in the debate on the Address, 1875, he took occasion to administer a snub to certain advocates of reaction in the press, and elsewhere.

This is a most ingenious course which I have noticed among many honourable gentlemen opposite . . . of seeking out the most violent speeches made by the most uninfluential persons in the most obscure places, and the most absurd articles appearing in the dullest and most uninfluential newspapers, and saying these are the opinions of the Conservative Party.¹—*Mr. Disraeli, H. of C.* Feb. 5, 1875.

Two incidents occurred in the summer of 1875, in both of which we find the Government encountering an agitation connected with sentiments of humanity. These were the issue of an Admiralty Circular respecting the surrender of fugitive slaves taking refuge on board men-of-war in foreign territorial waters, and the announcement that the Government would not proceed with the Merchant Shipping Bill. These events did something, perhaps, to impress people with the belief in the Government's "Tory virus" and to give them a reputation of cynicism, but at the same time the sequel seemed to show that the Government would yield—if somewhat grudgingly—to Public Opinion, whenever it got aroused on any subject. In fact the Government appeared willing, if hardly anxious, to do anything which was demanded, not so much by the House of Commons, as by Public Opinion, as soon as they could be sure of its drift. This attitude of the Government is very noteworthy.

The original Slave Circular (dated July 31st, 1875), was suspended early in October, and withdrawn in November. A second circular was issued in December. This was but a modified edition of the old one. If the Government hoped that people (perhaps then less alive on the subject than three months before) would believe that they had got what they wanted, the hope was disappointed. The agitation was renewed, and the Government early in 1876 had recourse to a Royal Commission, which did not report till later in the year, when the subject had been almost forgotten.²

¹ See Mrs. Gamp's expostulation (Mrs. Gamp is the *Standard*):—

"And it's many the time I've been called dull and stupid by Radical spite. They're that bragian and bold and owdacious! but Benjamin, pride o' my 'art, For you for to turn and to sting me like this, makes your Sairey to smart!"
—*Punch*, Feb. 27, 1875.

² *Punch*, Feb. 19, 1876, draws the Premier as the good-tempered conjurer performing "The Extinguisher Trick." "Here you perceive 'Fugitive Slave Circular'

Mr. Disraeli alluded to Mr. Plimsoll's indignation at the announcement that the Government would not proceed with the Merchant Shipping Bill, and the consequent action of the Government in introducing and passing the Act which went by Mr. Plimsoll's name, as follows:—

In consequence of that dramatic scene which occurred in the House of Commons, which had a beneficial effect in eliciting some public sentiment which we had for six weeks looked for in vain, I asked them [the Cabinet] to assemble, and they unanimously agreed that we should ask for some further statutory powers. The Bill was introduced, and the feeling of the country was so great, that it assisted what was the policy of the Government, and we were enabled to do that in ten or twelve hours which otherwise we could not have done in ten or twelve days. We have been successful. I have been sneered at by what I call political sceptics, because in the House of Commons I said, it was not under pressure of Public Opinion, but by the aid of Public Opinion that we have carried this measure, but I repeat the observation because it is the truth.—*Disraeli*.¹

It cannot be said that the popularity of the Ministry was great during their first two years of office. In fact, as things are in this country, a Government that lays itself out to do little must generally find itself in a very difficult position. Such a Government is something like a man trying to go very slowly on a bicycle. From a Government that does much, many mistakes are excused; people's attention is so much occupied by more important matters, that it hardly reaches these mistakes at all. But a Government that gives itself out as a Government of administration is naturally expected to administer very well. Moreover those who busy themselves with politics have in this case little to attend to but those mistakes of administration which are inevitable under any Government, and, however profound may be the general torpor of the political world, pretty much the same number of newspaper leaders have to be written. It may be questioned how far it is well that a premium should thus be placed on legislative activity, however spurious and artificial.

In the result, the credit of the Government on the whole was waning, and in the autumn of 1875 people were feeling somewhat

No. 2, No. 1 having disappeared already! I now take this cone into my hand (it resembles an extinguisher, and it is called a Royal Commission), I place it over the 'Circular,' and, hey, presto! on raising it again 'Circular' No. 2 will have disappeared!"

¹ At the Mansion House, Aug. 4, 1875.

disappointed with the Premier, and were beginning to think that he was hardly living up to his reputation. During a large part of the year he appears to have been seriously out of health.

The reputation which had been built up by years of skilful strategy and patient waiting in opposition, has been all but destroyed by a year and a half of indolence and vacillation, feeble counsels, and unwise words in power. . . . Slowly but surely a belief in his decline is spreading, and unless there should be some extraordinary revival of energy the world at large will soon confirm the judgment which astute politicians on both sides of the House have formed that Mr. Disraeli's premiership is a failure, and we fear we must add that his work is done.—*Brit. Quar. Rev.* July, 1875.

[A Conservative member is quoted as saying—"There is not much left of Dizzy except his cheek."]*—Spec.* Aug. 7, 1875.¹

Through the spring of 1876 the Government was losing rather than gaining popularity, and when in the Budget of that year an additional penny was put on the income-tax, there were some who thought that the days of the Disraeli administration were numbered. Still there was no great amount of active hostility to the Government. The unpopularity at the time of which we have been speaking was nothing deep-seated, or positive. Public Opinion was still enjoying the holiday which it had, as it thought, secured at the election of 1874 to banish concern for everything relating to politics. The spirit of the time seems not inaptly rendered in some lines adapted for the occasion from the *Dunciad*:

"Say how the goddess hade Britannia sleep,
And poured her spirit o'er the land and deep,
More she had spoke, but yawned—all nature nods,
What mortal can resist the yawn of gods?
Wide and more wide it spread o'er all the realm
E'en Palinurus nodded at the helm.
The vapour mild o'er each Committee crept,
Unfinished measures in each office slept,
Exchanging colonels dozed out the campaign,
And sinking ironclads perplexed the main."²

¹ Compare Bagehot's *Biographical Studies*, p. 366. He contrasts Mr. Disraeli as leader of a ministry in a majority, with the parts he had previously filled. "So far from being first-rate he was ninth-rate . . . and this collapse is no accident in Mr. Disraeli's career, but a thing essentially characteristic of the man." (Reprinted from *Economist*, 1876.)

² Sir William Harcourt's Speech at Oxford. Dec. 30, 1875.

§ 2. *Decline of Russophobia.*

Meanwhile, with regard to the state of Public Opinion on foreign affairs, circumstances had for some years previously done much to discredit the old tradition of supporting Turkey as a barrier to Russia, and to bring the popular mind to a state singularly open and receptive of a new doctrine. In the first place there was something like an anti-Turkish propaganda. The tradition was vigorously assailed by a writer here and there, who, knowing how widely diffused were the views against which he contended, looked upon himself as one "crying in the wilderness." Of these Mr. E. A. Freeman may be taken as the most ardent representative. The following account of the state of the public mind during the hibernation of the Eastern Question probably represents the view of Mr. Froude:—

[The writer devotes himself to an examination of the question whether in truth there was any good and sufficient reason for the jealousy with which for upwards of forty years England had watched over the territories of the Sultan as if they had been her own.]

That small section of Englishmen which hold any opinion at all about the state of Turkey may be divided into two classes. One regards the Turkish conqueror as tyrannising over vastly larger populations of patient, industrious Christian rayahs, forcing them to obey a law which disposes of life, property, and honour without any fixed adherence to the rules of sound reason or of common experience, and is founded on the precepts of a religion which they disbelieve and detest; neutralising one of the finest climates and devastating one of the most fertile soils in the world by oppressive taxes and arbitrary administration. The other school consists of the disciples of those imaginative travellers who . . . "coming home bring back with their chibouques and their scymitars a zeal for the cause of Turkey."¹

[The writer finally reduces the reasons for the traditional policy to two: the safety of India, which is supposed to be endangered by the growing power of Russia, and the necessity of keeping open our communications by way of the Suez Canal. The second object would be gained by a league of European Powers to support Turkey. But if we see the greater part of the league fall away, let us call to mind the partial nature of our interest in its general objects. . . . If, after all, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire should become inevitable, it would be positively criminal in us not to establish our power on the isthmus of Suez.]—*Fraser*, Feb. 1871.

¹ The quotation is from Kinglake's *Crimca*, Cab. Ed. vol. i. p. 37.

It will be noticed that those who have, as the writer thinks, any opinion at all, consist of specialists of two classes, and that they represent the two extreme views of our scale. It is natural enough that when people generally are incurious only those views should survive which are of an extreme nature.

Then again, besides the literary propaganda directed against it, the tradition was not always spoken of with respect in high places. As early as 1864, Lord Derby (then Lord Stanley) used expressions which were afterwards quoted again and again :—

I believe the question of the breaking up of the Turkish Empire to be only a question of time, and probably not a very long time. The Turks have played their part in history ; they have had their day, and that day is over ; and I do not understand, except it be from the influence of old diplomatic traditions, the determination of our elder statesmen to stand by the Turkish rule, whether right or wrong. I think we are making for ourselves enemies of races which will soon become in Eastern Europe dominant races, and I think we are keeping back countries by whose improvement we, as the great traders of the world, should be the great gainer, and that we are doing this for no earthly advantage, either present or prospective.—*Lord Stanley*.¹

The year 1867 appears to mark the date when the new views began to come to the front :—

The Cretan Insurrection, and the facts which transpired as to the savage manner in which the contest was waged by the Turkish Government, were the beginning of that awakening in the public mind of this country, which has since controlled the conduct of its Government in a far more important crisis.—*Argyll*, vol. i. p. 122.

It is somewhat difficult at first sight to discover how the progress of opinion was modified by the lawless and high-handed manner in which Russia, in November, 1870, announced that she would no longer be bound by that part of the Treaty of Paris which neutralised the Black Sea. Such action on Russia's part might seem calculated to rehabilitate the tradition by exciting distrust. And indeed, at a later time it did appear that this act, taken in connection with the proceedings of Russia in Asia, had made a very deep impression on the English mind. But when at the Conference of 1871 the English Government agreed to the Treaty of London, it might fairly be assumed that in the eyes of the statesmen then in power the objection was rather to the form than the

¹ At Lynn, Oct. 19, 1864.

substance of the Russian demand. The provision for which the Crimean War had been prolonged was given up, and ministers explained that with changed circumstances it had lost all the virtue it once had. What could be a more natural inference than that the traditional support of Turkey itself was growing obsolete? Then, again, the strategic conditions of the problem had been materially modified (though people might perhaps ask in whose favour) by the making of the Suez Canal. Thus, although from one point of view the negotiations of 1870 afforded fresh fuel for the ever-smouldering fire of Russophobia, yet from another point of view it was the beginning of a *rapprochement* between England and Russia. Two contributions to the controversy elicited by the events of 1870 may be specially noted. Letters appeared in the *Times* of November 19, 1870, from Mr. J. S. Mill and Mr. J. A. Froude, both deprecating war with Russia on any such grounds as were then being canvassed. Mr. J. S. Mill followed up his letter with an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1870, on "Treaty Obligations."¹ While condemning the manner of the Russian demand, he pointed out that the practice of concluding treaties for an indefinite period, and regarding their conditions as binding for all time, no matter how inappropriate and burdensome they might become, inevitably led to the breach of treaties and was most detrimental to international morality.

At the same time that the desirability of supporting Turkey was thus being more and more questioned, people were losing faith in its possibility. The sick man was thought to be getting very sick indeed. There was a very shrewd notion abroad of the financial rottenness of Turkey, and people in general could not dissociate the idea of financial collapse from general political collapse.

I am afraid that no one who looks to the East can doubt that trouble is gathering there. . . . Fifteen years ago we refused to see in time what was then obviously impending, and the result was that, to everybody's dissatisfaction, we drifted—it was a very happy phrase—into the Crimean War. I do not think that the dangers which threaten the Turkish Empire arise from the same source now as then. It is rather internal than external peril by which that empire is threatened. No foreign alliances, no European guarantee, can protect a Government against financial collapse, or against rebellion in its own provinces. . . . But an indifferent government is better than none. And if I could venture to hope

¹ Reprinted in *Dissertations and Discussions*, vol. ii. pp. 119-129.

that any words of mine, whether uttered here or elsewhere, would reach those Christian populations of the East, with whom I sincerely sympathise—(hear, hear)—I should say to them, "Fair aspirations may be natural, but remember this—that anarchy is not progress, and that it is not wise to pull down that for which you have not provided any substitute."—*Lord Stanley*.¹

Things cannot go on five years longer as they have been doing in Turkey since 1856. [*Russia and Turkey*.—*Fraser*, June, 1875.]

Subsequently to 1871 the *rapprochement* between England and Russia proceeded without a check as far as the European relations of those countries were concerned. Without laying undue stress on the personal relations of dynasties, we may note the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh with the Princess Marie of Russia, and the visit of the Czar to England in 1874. In May, 1875, a very near approach indeed occurred. The exact nature of the proceedings that then took place is, as yet, only matter of conjecture. But it seems certain that England and Russia joined hands to restrain Germany from attacking France, whose rapid recovery from the consequences of her late defeat was exciting surprise and alarm among the conquerors of 1871. Of course the whole facts could not be made public, but people knew, or shortly came to know, something of them, and this knowledge tended to promote a friendly feeling.

The Governments of England and Russia are at this moment on better and more confidential terms than has been seen for the last five-and-thirty years. It is recognised throughout Europe that a good understanding between the rulers of these two great empires is of the utmost importance to the peace of the world and to the security and independence of more than one of the minor States of the Continent.—*Ed. Rev.* July, 1875.

[The *Golos* (understood to be Prince Gortschakoff's organ) about this time proposes a definite alliance between England and Russia for the maintenance of peace in Europe. It deprecates England's distrust of Russia in Asia; the one obstacle to union between the two countries in Europe.]

The situation which seems to point to the conclusion of such an alliance . . . is the result of the military preponderance [of Germany]. It is therefore but a new phase of the ever-varying combinations to maintain the balance of power, which forms the true key of modern history.—*Fraser*, Oct. 1875.

[The *Pall Mall Gazette* advocated such an alliance (June 17, 1875.) The *Spectator*, it is curious to observe, took the opposite view, saying that Russia always wants to turn amity in Europe to account to neutralise enmity in Asia (June 19, 1875.)]

¹ At Lynn, Nov. 13, 1868.

While the whole structure of European Russophobia was thus being slowly undermined, something similar was going on with regard to that variety of the sentiment which had special reference to Asia. We have already alluded to the charge of faithlessness against Russia to which the annexation of Khiva in 1873 gave rise.¹ But the mere fact of such a territorial acquisition, even had it been ever so lawfully made, was enough to excite those people for whom the subject of the advance of the Russian frontier seems to have a strange fascination.

Those who had devoted any special attention in England to affairs in Central Asia appear to have been divided into two schools. The more passive school were for remaining inactive till Russia had actually reached a point at which British interests were directly threatened. The more active school, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the danger of such a movement by advancing to meet Russia and checking her advance at an earlier stage.² Between these schools, in 1875, a literary controversy broke out which raised an echo in Parliament and in the newspaper press. The advocates of a forward policy found an able and a vigorous champion in Sir H. Rawlinson, whose book, *England and Russia in the East*, was published in the spring of 1875. The other side was taken by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1875, in the same article to which we have just referred as marking the very friendly relations existing between England and Russia at that time. On July 6, 1875, a debate was raised in the House of Commons by Mr. Baillie Cochraue, which is noteworthy by reason of the speech of Mr. Bourke, which was considered as marking the abandonment by the Government of what was known as the "Neutral Zone Policy."

In the general upshot, people were inclined to acquiesce in what they took to be the official view, "There is room for us both; let us be on good terms with our future neighbours;" and this changed tone was joyfully recognised by the Russian newspapers.³ Nor was English equanimity permanently or greatly disturbed by the news of the departure from Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, of a strong Russian expedition, ostensibly scientific, for exploring the old bed of the Oxus.⁴ From time to time during the autumn the subject of this expedition reappeared in the columns of the daily

¹ See *ante*, p. 139. For a discussion of this matter see Argyll, ii. 301-311.

² See article in *Quart. Rev.* April, 1876, p. 440.

³ See Berlin telegram, *T.* July 27, citing *Moscow Gazette*.

⁴ *T.* July 10. Berlin telegram.

press, but on the whole, in spite of some exceptions,¹ the tendency of the time was to deprecate and discredit alarm or hostility.

[Had the intelligence (about the expedition) reached us a few days earlier, it would have given a deeper note of alarm to the debate on Central Asia. . . . We must assume that the fate which has overtaken Khiva will some day overtake Merv. . . . We say it frankly, because we cannot bar the way. "Masterly inactivity" is safest for us.]—*T.* July 12, 1875.

While the notion of the decrepitude of Turkey tended in the main to discredit the traditional policy of supporting her, there was a section of public men, many of whom afterwards became conspicuous as extreme advocates of the "red" policy, on whom it had the directly contrary effect. They contended that England should interfere to save Turkey from herself by advice, by pressure, by providing English administrators. They advocated for ourselves a policy, the counterpart of which, when pursued by Russia, threw them into a frenzy of suspicion and hostility. They were all for renewing the old struggle for "influence" at Constantinople which Kinglake so graphically describes. Their views were expressed in a series of letters from Mr. Butler Johnstone, which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette* from July 24 to Aug. 23. He contended that Turkey was in a critical condition by reason of the corruption of her rulers, but that pressure from England—pressure which we had a moral, a political and a diplomatic right to exercise—would put things right. Of course we cannot undertake the government of Turkey, he said, but we can and ought to insist on a reforming vizier's being placed at the head of affairs, and kept there. Safety lies in a return to the policy of Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha.

For what amount of derogation from the sovereignty of the Porte this party was prepared it is difficult to say. Probably we shall not be far wrong if we say just so much as could actually, though not ostensibly, be transferred to the English Ambassador or English officials. At this time they were clear in their repudiation of treaty-legalism. This comes out clearly in a debate in the House of Commons on June 18, which was an anticipation of the various "Treaty-debates," and which seems to have arisen from the following circumstance. The Evangelical Alliance had

¹ [e.g. *P. M. G.* Sept. 25. They say Russophobia may be defined as some small capacity for discerning the true course of events in Central Asia, and for understanding its bearing on British interests. Now we are all Russophobists. The only serene philosophers left are Mr. Grant Duff and the student of Central Asian politics (perhaps identical with him ?) who writes in the *Times*.]

despatched a mission to Constantinople charged to present a very influentially-signed memorial to the Sultan, calling his attention to cases of religious persecution in violation of the Hatti Scheriff of 1856. Lord Derby declined to interfere to secure its reception, and the mission was refused an audience on the plea of its non-official character. The Hon. Mr. Yorke moved for papers relating to the Porte's engagements, and in the debate which ensued, it was argued from both sides of the House that under the treaties we had the right to interfere, while Mr. Bourke, speaking for the Government, maintained the contrary position.

Mr. Yorke spoke of the wretched state of Turkey. Still the country contained elements which, if rightly used, might bring about a restoration. But what right had we to interfere, and how far, in Turkey's internal affairs? He thought we had such a right, we had vast interests there and had lent money; the real object of the Crimean War was to take from Russia the pretext of single-handed interference and to introduce European civilisation. Russia was again gaining an exclusive influence in Turkey by means of her ambassador General Ignatieff. "He supported all the vassals against their suzerain at the same time that he supported the Sultan in his despotic acts, and he might indeed be described as the Mephistopheles of Turkey."

Lord Francis Conyngham had been to Constantinople to present the memorial to the Sultan. The influence of England at Constantinople, he said, was at its lowest ebb.

Sir H. D. Wolff upheld the view that Turkey did expressly enter into an engagement with Europe in 1856, and lamented that ever since a certain resolution in the House of Commons in 1864, our ambassadors in Turkey had been regarded as mere agents. He hoped Lord Derby would enter on a salutary course of advice and assistance at Constantinople.

Mr. Evelyn Ashley cited Lord Palmerston's authority against the position that we were prevented by the Treaty of Paris from interfering in these matters. There could be no doubt that the treaty gave us the right of exercising such a moral pressure on the Porte as would suffice.

Mr. Bourke said that Clause 9 of the Treaty of Paris distinctly lays down that the Powers have not the right to interfere collectively or separately. We should be showing a bad example if we interfered in the internal affairs of Turkey, when it was the object of the signatories to put an end to such interference. Quite apart from the Treaty of Paris and our international obligations, it would be very imprudent to discuss the internal affairs of a friendly Power. He proceeded to paint the condition of Turkey in glowing colours.

Mr. Butler Johnstone.—Does the Government mean to say that Art. 9 does not give them the right to see the provisions of the Hatti Humayoun are observed? It was a strange thing to hear

from a British Minister that his duty was limited to this :—"We will give advice in an otiose easy way, sound advice when it is asked for ; but we will not put ourselves about to do it"—in a matter which so nearly concerns British interests as the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Lord John Manners towards the end of the debate made some attempt to qualify what *Mr. Bourke* had said.—*II. of C. June 18, 1875.*

This debate was thought to have had some effect in moving the Government to use its influence at Constantinople to press reforms upon the Porte.

The late debate in the House of Commons on the internal affairs of Turkey, her finance and her relations generally to European diplomacy, has already begun to bear some fruit. . . . The echo even reached the ears of the Sultan. [The correspondent speaks of an audience granted by the Sultan to Sir Henry Elliot on Aug. 12.] This audience has caused general satisfaction here, and indeed it is one of the most important that has been held for many years.—*Constantinople Correspondent, T. Aug. 24, 1875.*

The antithesis between reform of the Turkish Administration, "Red Reform," as we have called it,¹ and emancipation, or getting rid of Turkish administration altogether, or at least of subjecting it to a restraining supervision, had not yet developed itself. At a later stage it became important, though frequently obscured by the use of the ambiguous word "reform" in the general sense of amelioration. In the subsequent controversies the pro-Turkish party in England were fond of attributing all the evils of Turkey to subordinates,² and always professed themselves zealous for "reform."

§ 3. *The whole Period mapped out.*

After July 1875, people began in increasing numbers to give their attention to the Eastern Question. From that time onwards a number of shocks occurred no one of which was sufficient by itself to startle the popular mind into full consciousness, but all of which tended gradually to bring it nearer to the notion that before long the Eastern Question would become a pressing one. Once indeed, when the Suez Canal shares were bought, interest and attention seemed fairly roused ; but when the significance of the step was elaborately minimised by Lord Derby, people became apathetic again, as a sleeper who had been disturbed by a false

¹ See Part II. *ante*, p. 178.

² See *Argyll*, i. 145.

alarm. The final awakening was the result of two great and nearly simultaneous shocks—the news of the Bulgarian atrocities, and the apparent imminence of sudden war with Russia. We may fairly speak of the year intervening between the two Julys as “the Period of Incubation.” It has a peculiar interest, for then all, or nearly all, the different factors of opinion on the Eastern Question were brought forward, not indeed with the energy or volume which attaches to Public Opinion properly so called, but often rather in the shape of “doctrines.” Still there they were, ready to be caught up as soon as the minds of large numbers of men were directed to them. The forms were there, and only waited till the energy should come to animate them.

The chief characteristic of Public Opinion during this period is the smallness of its volume. But we may notice too its docility and readiness to depend on Government and the specialists. Perhaps it may be added that the various suggestions offered from time to time during this period as solutions of the problem appear to have a certain airiness, as if emanating from people who did not as yet feel that they had to face practical difficulties at close quarters.

Again, though perhaps none of the factors of the problem were left altogether unnoticed, yet these factors were only to a small extent combined or correlated. People did not at once appreciate their significance or their bearing one on another, hence some vacillations naturally followed. People inclined to policies which were radically different, one one day, and another the next, just as each seemed to be suggested by the incident that happened to be uppermost, and this without any particular sense of inconsistency. Nor was it clear how parties would polarise, which party would range itself on the one side, and which on the other. Indeed it was not clear that the divisions of opinion would run along party lines at all. We get in this period curious anticipations of the subsequent course taken by Public Opinion. It was a sort of rehearsal of the great drama that was to come, but without colour, movement or passion, and with some tentative shuffling of the cast.

The tendency of events to run through something like a regular cycle is a striking characteristic not only of this incubation period but of the whole epoch. Like causes produced like effects. History repeated itself at short intervals. The lost opportunity returned again and again. It was as if players in a game of chess

had brought the game to a deadlock by running through a recurring series of moves and counter-moves.

One phenomenon of Public Opinion recurred with such un-failing regularity that we can safely lay down an empirical law respecting it. Whenever there seemed a probability that Russia was about to use force to compel the Porte to relinquish its sovereignty over the Provincials, there was a sudden access of suspicion and hostility against Russia, even on the part of those who, while Russia was quiescent, admitted that the question would never be solved without compulsion.

As in adopting the simile of the spectrum we have taken red to denote the region where anti-Russism is found, we may perhaps speak of the fact that an access of anti-Russism invariably accompanied such conditions as the law of Erubescence.

If, then, we take a rapid survey of the time with which we are concerned, for the purpose of mapping it out according to the leading characteristics of the periods into which it falls, we have to begin with:—

The “Incubation Period,” from July 1875 to July 1876.

This was followed, as we shall see, by a period when Public Opinion was strongly aroused; and as the principal subject which it fastened on was the atrocities (the word now became a kind of technical expression) committed on the Bulgarians by the Turks, we note this as the “Atrocity Period,” and mark its limits as extending from a “moment of awakening,” early in July, to about the middle of September. We note further that the latter part of this period is a sub-period of violent agitation, having as its object to force the Government to adopt a “violet” policy.

Next we have a period of extreme complexity, which, on the whole, is one of *Reconciliation* between Public Opinion and the Government. This “Reconciliation” culminates in the meeting of the Constantinople Conference, December, 1876, and the belief that Lord Salisbury went there to promote a “violet” policy.

The “Conference Period,” which followed, is one that exhibits the gradual disillusionment of Public Opinion, and an expectation on its part of a renewal of the contest with the Government, but this time in the Parliamentary arena.

The “Parliamentary Period” (February to May 1877) is marked by the failure of Parliament to give adequate expression to the desire of Public Opinion for a “violet” policy; and we note in consequence a tendency to a renewal of out-of-door agitation; but the period

ends with the announcement by the Government of a policy of "Conditional Neutrality."

The period of the "Conditional Neutrality" gives place to the "Armed Neutrality," when, on the fall of Plevna, the English Government begins to stir (December 1877). This is a period of strenuous resistance to the "red" policy; but Public Opinion is now fiercely divided. The period closes early in February 1878, with the failure of resistance in Parliament (under the influences of the capital example of "erubescence") and the breakdown of agitation out of doors.

This conquest of Public Opinion by Lord Beaconsfield brings in the Dictatorship. The particular Eastern Question of the day finds its solution in the Treaty of Berlin ("Peace with Honour," July 1878), a Janus-like treaty, with one face "violet" and one face "red."

The triumphant return of Lord Beaconsfield from Berlin is followed by the "Presidential Period," during which Public Opinion desists from efforts to influence the course of the Executive during the remainder of its term of office. A polemic war arises, partly retrospective, partly with regard to the new developments of the Government policy in Afghanistan and South Africa. But there is little or no effort to control the Government, and no agitation proper. The polemic has reference mainly to the approaching General Election. The General Election comes (March 1880) and Public Opinion takes its revenge on Lord Beaconsfield.

CHAPTER VII.

INCUBATION PERIOD.

FIRST PHASE (TO FAILURE OF THE CONSULAR MISSION).

§ 1. *Outbreak of Revolt in Herzegovina.*

PUBLIC OPINION was in the condition which has been described ; with regard to politics generally, dormant ; with regard to the Eastern Question in particular, affected by the lingering tradition, but at the same time docile and receptive, when, in 1875, disturbances broke out, and the attention of those whose business it was to chronicle passing events for the public was thus of necessity drawn to the East. We can almost watch the very process by which opinions crystallised, so that what was vague and almost chaotic in July, by October had assumed something like the shape of one of the definite notions we have distinguished as constituting Public Opinion. To look through the newspaper files is like listening to a number of people thinking aloud, as they grope after the solution of a problem which they as yet but partially grasp.

Very early in 1875 there was an affray between the Montenegrins and their Turkish neighbours, which was spoken of as the "Podgoritzza Affair." It attracted little attention, but the comments of the *Spectator* are worth noticing :—

[The affair] would not matter to anybody, but that the Montenegrins have the sympathies of more important people. [France is in no position to aid, England is most unwilling to fight again for Turkey . . . and the Sultan will in all probability yield. The result will be that Russia, Germany, and Austria will be masters in Constantinople, and will be able to secure the independence of the provinces north of the Balkans whenever occasion arises.] We have no disposition to be alarmists, and care nothing about the fate of Montenegro ; but we cannot watch the present condition of affairs without a sigh over the impossibility of making Englishmen understand the danger of the position.—*Spec.* Jan. 23, 1875.

About the same time, Roumania, though nominally subject to the suzerainty of Turkey, negotiated a commercial treaty with the three Imperial Powers, and the three Powers had insisted on concluding it with Roumania directly, without any reference to the Porte. Through the session of 1873 Lord Stratheden and Campbell was continually bringing up this matter in the House of Lords¹ and insisting that it was an infringement of the Treaty of Paris, and on July 26th he succeeded in raising a debate of some importance. He was followed by Lord Rosebery, who said it clearly appeared by the correspondence that Lord Derby regarded the pretensions of Roumania as quite inadmissible. He seemed to complain that Lord Derby had backed up his vigorous words by no vigorous action. Lord Derby refused to treat the matter as of any importance, but the comments of the press show that the tradition of supporting Turkey was by no means forgotten.

The *Times* thinks Lord Derby is right in saying the matter has no immediate significance. But as showing the tendencies which prevail in Eastern Europe the controversy is instructive.—(July 28th.)

The *Daily News* says: The public must not make the mistake of thinking anything less than the break up of Turkey is ultimately in question. If Roumania makes commercial treaties she will make others, and so will the other vassal states.—(July 26th.)

The *Daily Telegraph* thinks the debate is opportune in view of the disturbance in the Herzegovina. Turkey's demand to have her suzerainty recognised is only fair and reasonable.—(July 26th.)

The *Pall Mall Gazette* and *Morning Post* say: The Holy Alliance is bent on weakening and humiliating Turkey.—(July 28th.)

Montenegro and Roumania soon dropped out of sight, but towards the end of June an insurrection broke out in Herzegovina, which soon spread to Bosnia, and attracted a gradually increasing attention.

We catch the first mention of the matter in the *Times* of July 14th. A telegram from Buda Pesth, dated July 11th, spoke of alarming reports of an insurrection in the Herzegovina, which, however, according to official information, were very much exaggerated. A little later it was telegraphed from Constantinople, "The disturbances in the Herzegovina are extending."²

¹ Feb. 15 and 25, March 18 and April 19.

² *T.* July 21.

The news did not at first excite much attention, and the *Times* does not appear to have thought it worth a leader.¹

The first impulse of most of the London daily newspapers was to assume a legalistic position—to stickle for the independence of the Sultan; to see in any disposition on the part of Russia or Austria to come to the aid of the Provincials evidence of some sinister design; and to test the “sincerity” of those Powers by their endeavour to make easy the way for Turkey to maintain her domination.

The *Daily News* speculates on the “sincerity” of Austria and Russia in wishing to avoid a “catastrophe,” and hopes both Powers will impress the representatives of excited populations with the fact that they will be left unaided to deal with difficulties they carelessly provoke.—(Aug. 4th.)

The *Daily Telegraph* and *Standard* about this time say the question is, Are Russia and Austria backing up the insurrection?

The *Daily News* thinks the diplomatic activity in the domestic affairs of Turkey is perhaps more serious than the insurrection itself, and complains that “the three Powers consider themselves entitled to tell the Sultan how he must govern his subjects.”—(Aug. 21st.)

The *Spectator* attributes the rising to the oppressive way in which the taxes are collected, but makes the apparently legalistic comment, “Rebellion is of course rebellion, in the Herzegovina or elsewhere.”—(July 31st.)

A week later we find the *Spectator* writing in rather a different tone. It is as if new light had come to it, while all the rest of the world was still in darkness. Hence the writer is ironical, not to say cynical. He assumes that no one in England would listen to a proposal for emancipation, and yet he speaks of it in a manner as if he would suggest that after all this is a point which might be reconsidered.

Supposing the British public able for half an hour to surrender their belief that the existence of Turkey is essential to their interests, and the Turkish Government, therefore, always in the right, they would see a scene in the Herzegovina which might interest them a little. The peasants in that province, driven mad by a form of oppression which is called gathering the taxes, but which is exactly equivalent, in slaughters, in plunderings, and in defilement of women, to subjection by an Asiatic army once a year, have risen upon the Turks and driven them into the fortresses; and as Turkey is collecting a horde to punish them, and

¹ But we may note a curious allusion on July 21. Repudiating Sir Henry Rawlinson's alarmist views about Central Asia, the *Times* says the real danger is elsewhere. England and Russia are apt to have different views about Turkey, and may quarrel again as they have done before.

can and will take a cruel vengeance, they are looking round for friends. [Prince Milan (of Servia) has hurried to Vienna to explain his view of the elevation of the provinces south of the Danube into a hereditary Principality after the Roumanian plan, with himself as Hospodar.] That compromise might be accepted by Turkey if she were pressed hard enough. [It would really, though not nominally, strengthen Turkey. . . . But France is paralysed, England thinks her debtors quite right in crushing anybody who objects to pay taxes, and the Prince is defeated. He could do the work alone easily enough, but if he raised the standard the great Powers would march armies to secure peace. . . . Peace will be maintained inviolate, which suits the Holy Alliance . . . and the peasantry who object to double taxes levied by fire and sword will pay for all, and English creditors of the Sultan will be relieved of a dread—and all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.]—*Spec.* Aug. 7th.

On August 14th, the *Spectator* renews the suggestion of a "violet" solution in an article which it is interesting to compare with the utterances of its unregenerate days. The writer refers to a manifesto issued on July 23rd, by the commissioner for the suppression of the insurrection (Dervish Emir Pacha), and communicated to the *Standard* by its correspondent at Vienna.

The manifesto, if it referred to people within the limits of English tourists' visits, would raise the most passionate indignation. The people of the Herzegovina are, in fact, to be slaughtered till order reigns once more, and then England and France will resist the proposition to raise the provinces into a Hospodarate. It is in English judgment better that iniquities of this kind should go on unchecked than that Turkey should be beaten in a diplomatic contest.—*Spec.* Aug. 14th.

It was on the same day that the *Times* had what appears to be its first leader on the matter. The position it took was remarkable. There was no trace of legalism—no trace of philo-Turkism. It was not wanting in sympathy for the Provincials; it insisted simply and solely on the necessity of European peace.

[It thinks the insurrection, though serious, will be quelled. The friends of the insurgents hope that other Powers will be drawn in]. We cannot share their wishes. . . . The momentary hope that the Turk would repent and live cleanly has long since been discredited. But the value of peace in the East of Europe is immeasurably greater at the present time than the welfare of the Herzegovina. It must wait. We say this in no spirit of cynicism but in a temper of pitying veracity. . . . The insurgents would do well, therefore, to lay down their arms and trust even to the Turks, tempered as their severities will be by the interference of the Christian States.—*T.* Aug. 14th.

For some time past, as we have seen, grave misgivings had existed as to the financial prospects of Turkey. In the latter part of August the effects of the insurrection began to show themselves distinctly in the stock market. A correspondent of the *Times*¹ attempted to reassure investors by a prophecy that the revolt would easily be put down at a cost of perhaps 500,000*l.* The lack of anything like efficient public interest, however, is not to be ascribed to any belief in prophecies of this sort, and not entirely to apathy. It was in a great measure owing to the belief that the matter was "under care." About the end of the third week in August it became known that "a modified mediation," as the phrase went, had been undertaken by the three Powers, and it seems to have been generally understood that the English Government was prepared to acquiesce, if not to take part in their action. The form which the "modified mediation" took was the so-called Consular Mission. The consuls were to be sent to the scene of the insurrection, and were to strive to bring about an accommodation between the insurgents and Server Pasha, acting as special commissioner for the Porte, and in this mission the English consul took part.² With regard to the policy really pursued by the English Government at this juncture, people at the time knew very little. Lord Derby, in fact, invoking purely legalistic principles (though probably himself animated by "order" rather than by "legalism,") was addressing himself to two objects; first, to prevent other Governments from affording aid or comfort to the insurgents; and next to prevent the matter from being taken in hand by the European Powers, or at all events to reduce intervention to a minimum.

On August 12th, 1875, Lord Derby writes to Mr. Ffrench (*Chargé d'affaires* at Vienna):—

Her Majesty's Government would be glad to learn that the Government of Austro-Hungary had taken steps to secure the peace of the frontier, and to prevent the disturbances in Herzegovina from receiving support and encouragement from Austrian territory.—*Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 12.

On the same day, Lord Derby writes to Sir H. Elliot, Ambassador at Constantinople:—

Her Majesty's Government are not aware whether your Excellency may have any opportunity of advising the Prince of

¹ "One who knows European Turkey," *T.* Aug. 20.

² See Argyll, i. p. 136, for an account of the Consular Mission and the negotiations respecting it.

Montenegro to restrain his subjects from aiding the insurrection. Should such an opportunity offer they do not doubt that you would avail yourself of it, and they wish you to direct Her Majesty's agent at Belgrade to use his best efforts to counteract any dispositions which may be apparent in Servia, to aid or foment the disturbances. At the same time Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the Turkish Government should rely on their own resources to suppress the insurrection, and should deal with it as a local outbreak of disorder rather than give international importance to it by appealing for support to other Powers.—*Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 13.

Again, Lord Derby writes to Sir H. Elliot, August 24th :—

Your Excellency states that [the three northern Powers] propose that Consuls should be delegated by the Embassies to proceed to the scene of the insurrection and inform the insurgents that they must expect no support or countenance from their Governments. They are also to advise the insurgents to desist from hostilities but to make known their complaints to a Commission. The delegates are not to go further than this, but are to leave the rest to the Turkish Commission. . . . Her Majesty's Government have given the proposal thus made their serious consideration, and now authorise your Excellency to join the other ambassadors in sending Consuls to the scene of insurrection as proposed. Her Majesty's Government consent to this step with reluctance, as they doubt the expediency of the intervention of foreign Consuls. Such an intervention is scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte over its own territory, offers an inducement to insurrection as a means of appealing to foreign sympathy against Turkish rule, and may not improbably open the way to further diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of the empire. Since, however, the Porte has begged your Excellency not to stand aloof, Her Majesty's Government feel that they have no alternative. They desire, at the same time, that the Turkish Government should understand that the assent of Her Majesty's Government is given at their own instance, and that Her Majesty's Government would have thought it better that the Porte should have dealt with the insurgents without foreign intervention of any kind.—*Turkey* ii. 1876, No. 16.

The attitude of the English Government was hardly understood at the time. From the information before them, people might well suppose that the English Government, without perhaps taking any very active part, was prepared to view with complacency, to say the least, the efforts of other Powers to induce the Porte to make concessions to the Provincials—even to the length of emancipation. At all events, during the last week in August, the *Times*, which, as we have seen, on the 14th thought the matter was best left alone, came to be the advocate for a large measure of emancipation—not,

to be sure, the policy so-called in the terms of our technical nomenclature, (for as yet there was hardly any question of our own country taking any initiative in that direction), but a solution of the problem in that sense. Again we find September 5th to be an important date with reference to the *Daily News*, as marking a similar development of opinion on the part of that organ.

[Something must be done. If Server is empowered to make the best settlement possible he will readily consent to the transformation of Bosnia into a tributary principality. Self-government for Bosnia and the Herzegovina must come, and it would advantage the Porte for it to be at once arranged.]—*T. Aug. 23rd.*

[Turkey is in a dilemma. If she puts down the rebellion in her own way, if she "acts with decision," she will be denounced as cruel, and the feeling of their people will drive Austria and Russia to interfere. If she tries to do it otherwise people will say she is not in earnest. For the moment it seems the difficulty will be got over by the mediation of the three Powers. The right of Turkey to deal with her own rebels will be treated as extinct, and the Christian subjects will be given to understand that in any future quarrel the three Powers will shield them. This may be proper and necessary, but it is scarcely less disastrous to the independence and integrity of Turkey than the success of the revolt.]—*P. M. G. Aug. 23rd.*

The *Daily Telegraph* says a certain proposition has been made by Austria and endorsed by Russia and Germany to terminate the insurrection—(Aug. 24th): and again, sees no reason why we should hold aloof. "We cannot possibly refuse our assistance to an endeavour to uphold the *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire."—(Aug. 25th.)

The *Times* says: Austria and Russia should take a bold course and settle the matter "while the iron is hot." Not much is to be hoped from Server. Every statesman knows that sooner or later the Herzegovina and Bosnia must receive a real if not a nominal independence.—(Aug. 27th.)

The *Spectator* says: The *Times* has turned round upon itself after its fashion, and recognises that there is but one solution of the difficulty in the Herzegovina consistent either with continued peace or the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.—(Aug. 28th.)

The *Pall Mall Gazette* speaks of the unexpected zeal of the *Times* on behalf of the Christian population of South Eastern Europe.—(Sept. 4th.)

The *Times* alludes to a disagreeable suspicion that each Power has some concealed design.—(Aug. 31st.)

The *Daily News* says: It would be an immense advantage if Bosnia and the Herzegovina could be placed in a position something like that of Servia, either spontaneously or by the energetic action of the Powers. "The experiment of upholding the old

state of things in Turkey for the sake of the general tranquillity of Europe has been tried, and it has conspicuously failed."—(Sept. 5th.)

The *Pull Mall Gazette* says: We have neither the power nor the knowledge to do anything useful. We could not carry out our traditional policy of supporting the Turks even if we were anxious to do so. Moreover, if we could, it is doubtful if it would be wise. "The old policy was based on a belief that if the Turks were judiciously helped they would judiciously help themselves; but there are few people who entertain that belief now." We are in the dark, and had best not move.—(Sept. 10th.)

§ 2. *First English Meeting in favour of the Insurgents.*

Presently the further idea made its appearance, that some active duty in the matter lay, if not on the English nation, yet on individual Englishmen. The immediate occasion of this was a proclamation issued by the insurgent leaders in which they set forth their grievances, saying death was better than a continuance of such things, and appealing for assistance to the Slav nationalities, and likewise to "every honest man without distinction of race or nationality."¹ As if in response, there took place in England a movement which, both in itself and in the controversies of which it was the occasion, in a faint and dim way curiously foreshadowed the events of a twelvemonth later. The movement began with a letter from the veteran Earl Russell, which appeared in the *Times*.

I have been reading my despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer, of September 1861.² I have read likewise the appeal made on behalf of the Christian rayahs in your paper of yesterday. I remember many years ago attending a meeting at Lord Fitzwilliam's in Grosvenor Square on behalf of the Greek insurgents. I subscribed 50*l.* on behalf of those insurgents. It is too late to call a meeting in London, but I am ready to subscribe 50*l.* on behalf of the insurgents against Turkish misrule.—(*Earl Russell, T. Aug. 28th, 1875.*)

It is in connection with Earl Russell's letter, and the movement of which it formed a part, that we get the first sign of a splitting up of Public Opinion into different streams and of a conflict between them; and in the comments which were made we have some of the issues foreshadowed about which a furious controversy was to rage later on.

The *Economist* referring to Lord Russell's letter said it was almost inconceivable that one who had been Prime Minister and

¹ See *T. Aug. 26*, Berlin telegram.

² Quoted by Argyll, i. p. 111.

Foreign Secretary should have penned such a letter, and speaks of the "degrading eccentricities to which he has abandoned himself in his old age." As for the proposal to open a subscription in London on behalf of the insurgents, it thinks it not merely unwise but probably illegal.—(Sept. 4th.)

The *Morning Post* and *Daily Telegraph* about the same time also commented severely on the letter.

Notwithstanding Lord Russell's judgment that it was too late in the year, a meeting was actually held at Willis's Rooms on September 9th. The *Times* next morning spoke of it as "a meeting which is described as 'not a crowded one' and which certainly could not boast the presence of any distinguished person." It seems however, to have been unanimous and enthusiastic. A second letter from Lord Russell was read, in which he repudiated the notion that it was enough to obtain promises from the Turkish Government, and bore testimony to the fact that Lord Palmerston had been as indignant as himself at the apathy of the Porte. Earl Russell quoted Palmerston as saying we could not be expected to go to war for a dead body. As for the strong attacks which had been made upon him for his first letter, he contented himself with the simple remark, "I must continue to desire that the cause of civil and religious liberty may prosper all over the world." It is not unworthy of notice that the aged Whig chief was the first statesman of Cabinet rank to move in the path which a little later became the highway of the Liberal party, and that his connection with the movement appears to have been the latest act of his long political life.¹

The Willis's Rooms meeting pledged itself to assist in every legitimate way to obtain the removal of the wrongs suffered by the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to appeal for aid on behalf of the destitute fugitives. Prominence was given to the charitable side, but in the speeches of Mr. Lewis Farley (who was an active promoter of the meeting) and the Rev. William Denton, the view was taken that a practically independent though tributary Government for the disturbed provinces was the only solution, and that some foreign intervention was inevitable. The predominating sentiment with which this movement was regarded was probably that it was indiscreet and inopportune, especially having regard to the diplomatic action which was being taken in favour of the Provincials.²

¹ See *post*, chap. x. § 5, and chap. xii. § 1.

² Compare Sir H. Wolff's letter, Part II. *ante*.

The *Times* expresses its fear that the cause of the Provincials is not likely to be advanced by such assemblages. The speeches at the meeting will be read with that generally favourable inclination which attached twenty years ago to speeches of exactly the opposite tendency, and the change, which corresponds to a still more decided movement of opinion in Continental countries, is ominous to the Turkish State. . . . The task of the Powers is arduous enough, but it is the general interest, and we believe the general wish to succeed, and the English people may be content to wait and see what is doing.—(Sept. 10th.)

The *Daily Telegraph* taking its stand upon the sacredness of sovereignty claimed for the Porte, as for ourselves in Ireland and India, the right to keep out of the hands of "ignorant and misguided men, rebels at heart, the question of the continuance of sovereignty;" sneered at the meeting, and at Earl Russell's letters as "the climax of ignorant credulity;" asked if the rayahs had "any grievances substantial enough to justify rebellion," and advised their sympathisers to clear their minds of cant, "the cant of race, the cant of national faith, the cant of nationalities."—(Sept. 10th.)

The *Pall Mall Gazette* spoke of the "unwise persons who assembled yesterday to hear an unwise letter from Earl Russell."—(Sept. 10th.)

§ 3. *The Problem recognised as Serious.*

Meanwhile the affairs of the insurgents seemed in no way of getting happily settled, and the war correspondents began to gather to the fighting. Their letters went far to answer the question of the *Daily Telegraph*, whether indeed the rayahs had any grievances which justified rebellion.¹

When questioned as to their special grievances they all said the same thing—the Turks robbed them—took whatever they wanted—their animals, what they had in their houses, and even their daughters when they took a fancy to them, and they never saw them any more. Into this grievance we inquired most particularly,

¹ The letters from the *Times* correspondent are by far the most important. Their value is recognised by Freeman, "True Eastern Question," *Port. Rev.* Dec. 1875, p. 769. Letters from the *Times* correspondent will be found as follows:—

| | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Times</i> , Sept. | 2nd, letter dated Aug. | 29th, from Trieste. |
| " " | 13th, " | Sept. 3rd, " Ragusa. |
| " " | 14th, " | " 8th, " Cattaro. |
| " " | 21st, " | " 11th, " Cettinge. |
| " " | 27th, " | " 13th, " " |
| " Oct. | 2nd, " | " 23rd, " Risano. |
| " " | 5th, " | " 28th, " Ragusa. |
| " " | 8th, teleg. dated Oct. | 6th, " " |

and some later ones. See also "A Trudge to Trebinje," in *P. M. G.* Nov. 13.

because it will be found to be the true tidemark of Turkish oppression. In some provinces taxes may be intolerable, and justice unattainable, and yet the Mussulman will not venture to carry away the women. They all assured me, both women and men, that it was common. . . .—*Letter from Risano, T. Oct. 2nd.*

I have had a long conversation with Ljubobratic, the insurgent leader, to-day. He says that the Herzegovinians will accept from the Turks nothing less than autonomy, but if the Powers propose reforms of a radical nature they will accept them, if the execution is intrusted to Montenegro. The insurgents are not discouraged in the least, and are confident of passing the winter in arms. . . . He has no fear that the poorer Mussulmans will be unable to live with the Christians when peace is restored. He desires the good offices of England, but sooner than submit to the Turks again, he will leave Herzegovina a depopulated desert.—*Letter from Ragusa, T. Oct. 8th.*

About the end of August a change of Ministry took place at Belgrade, and the war party was believed to have got the upper hand. "Sympathy," wrote the *Times* (Sept. 1st), "has gained the victory over prudence in Servia." Through September it seemed that Montenegro and Servia were on the point of making open war on Turkey; at the end of the month, concentrations of both Turkish and Servian troops took place near the frontier. At this time we hear much of the difficulty of *restraining* Servia. The danger that the area of disturbance would thus be increased was recognised by some as a new reason for urging concessions on the Porte. There seems to have been a disposition materially to underrate the fighting powers of Turkey.

A campaign against Servia would make her bankrupt in three months.—*Spec. Sept. 4th.*

People exaggerated the political importance of her financial difficulties. They had heard so often of late that Turkey was "rotten" and "effete" that they were beginning to believe her no match for the young and rising nationalities if they were allowed vigorously to attack her. This mistaken estimate (which prevailed again when Servia did actually declare war in the following summer) helps to explain why people who desired to see the Provincials set free, began by merely protesting against a *red* policy, and for some time did not think it necessary that England, or, for the matter of that, the other great Powers, should do more than look on approvingly, while the Provincials and the semi-independent States wrought out their own deliverance. Meanwhile it would appear that a separate effort was being made at

Constantinople by Russia, and, perhaps, other Powers, to settle the affair by pressing the hospodarate solution. It is remarkable how much approbation this scheme received in the English press, and how it was regarded as quite a *moderate* plan, almost of the nature of a compromise. Still, the threatening attitude of Servia caused some amount of "erubescence."

The *Times* says : Some people connect the development of the warlike spirit in Servia with the energy with which Russia is insisting on reforms and concessions in the Herzegovina. We do not believe in this ingenious theory. However this may be, it is clearly England's duty and policy to support by all the means of persuasion in her power, the counsels of Russia at the Porte. There is a question to be solved, and the solution depends much on our influence. There is no suggestion of force. Of necessity Turkey is amenable to the great Powers.—(Sept. 17th.)

The *Pall Mall Gazette* says that it does not see why we should use our influence in this direction, even if we have any, which it doubts. They say this out of no dislike to the particular settlement in question. On the contrary, they believe that to make those provinces a tributary State is on the whole the best thing that can be done with them. That the gradual detachment of one province after another must in the end break up the Ottoman Empire is of course obvious.—(Sept. 17th.)

The *Standard* says : The desideratum is something which will not encroach upon the integrity of Turkey, and yet protect the Christians from maddening oppression. This is, it is believed, the object Count Andrassy has in view. If Russia sincerely supports it Europe is to be congratulated, and Turkey cannot and will not hold out.—(Sept. 17th.)

The *Daily News* says : If there are any European diplomatists at Constantinople who have the Sultan's ear, it is to be hoped they will explain to him how much real good to him underlies the Russian proposal for forming Bosnia and the Herzegovina into a tributary state, and urge him not to make it impossible to defend the policy of upholding the integrity of his empire.—(Sept. 17th.)

The *Pall Mall Gazette* says : Englishmen have ceased to believe that the Ottoman Power can serve as a permanent barrier against the advance of Russia. England and Russia approach the question from different points of view, but England "arrives at a conclusion which for immediate purposes is identical with the Russian conclusion, that is a limited autonomy" for Bosnia and the Herzegovina.—(Sept. 24th.)

Lord Derby has, we fear, neither the courage nor the wish to take a leading part in remodelling the traditional policy of England on the Turkish question What with the excessive caution of Lord Derby, the preoccupation of Prince Bismarck with other interests, and the bitter jealousies of Austria and

Russia, we confess we feel no little fear that Turkey may succeed in defeating even the moderate proposals of the insurgent leaders. . . . Perhaps the best chance we have of some more substantial result may be due to the accounts of fearful atrocities on both sides, with which the correspondence of the Austrian papers is now filled. . . . As the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church, so the outrages which result from monstrous political arrangements may not improbably prove the best security for a final remedy. With such atrocities to awaken popular feeling, Lord Derby will not find it easy to make good to Parliament any case for simply bolstering up anew the power of the Turk; and this is a consideration, we hope, which may induce even him to take up a bold and statesmanlike attitude.—*Spec.* Sept. 11th.

There can be no doubt that Russia is pressing for some substantial concession to the insurgents, or that this circumstance is regarded by many Englishmen as a sufficient reason why England should thwart that policy. But it is our true policy to support the representations of Russia while holding to our own view of the best mode of giving effect to them.—*Spec.* Sept. 18th.

The *Daily Telegraph*, on the other hand, advises Turkey to hit out boldly that she may see who her foes are (Sept. 21st), and on the next day says the Herzegovinian "rebels" have not yet lost confidence. The only explanation is a potent ally in the background.—(Sept. 22nd.)

§ 4. *Hoped-for Solution by Turkish "Reform."*

But about the end of September a cloud came over the bright prospects of the Provincials. The endeavours of the consuls to bring about a reconciliation had failed. This is recognised by the *Times* (Sept. 28th).

Moreover, the insurgents seemed to be deserted by their powerful friends. Germany, as the *Times* put it (Sept. 25th), opened its mouth to say that it had said nothing and had nothing to say. The Servian Parliament passed a vote which was regarded as a resolution to at least postpone the outbreak. The *Times* and *Standard* (Sept. 22nd) both speak approvingly of their "good sense" in refraining from war. And shortly afterwards Prince Milan dismissed his warlike ministry.

The change in the attitude of Russia was marked by an article which appeared in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*,¹ announcing, with every appearance of satisfaction, that the Turkish Grand Vizier was about to introduce reforms for all parts of the Empire, and all nationalities alike.² On that account, said the Russian organ, the

¹ For which see *P. M. G.* Sept. 29.

² *Post*, p. 232.

foreign cabinets would do well to abstain from ostensible pressure, to show confidence in the Sultan, and confine their attentions to helping to pacify the insurrection and to examining suitable institutions.

The *Times* says: It is startling to find the Russian Government organ singing the praises of Turkey. Probably the explanation is that Russia's plan is disliked by Austria, and that Germany, who does not want to endanger the triple alliance, has induced them to postpone the discussion of their differences. Russia can afford to bide her time, for events are fighting on her side.—(Sept. 30th.)

The *Standard* warmly approves the line taken by the Russian Government organ, and says had such views obtained in July, and had the Porte been left to deal with her own subjects in her own way, perhaps the revolt would not have attained such importance.—(Sept. 30th.)

A letter from Garibaldi appeared in the *Times* of October 13th bespeaking sympathy for the insurgents from the point of view of the sacred rights of man.

The insurgents have no allies left except the Montenegrins and a few Italians belonging to the cosmopolitan army of the Revolution.—*Spec.* Oct. 16th.

The insurgents being left in this forlorn condition, the rebellion died down to a guerilla contest. Turkish reform, the stock alternative to emancipation, was once more the order of the day; and as Russia appeared satisfied with the prospect, people in England seemed to think they had liberated their consciences, and that there was nothing more to be said. It was at this juncture (October 7th) that Lord Derby made the first public English official reference to the matter at a banquet at the Liverpool Town Hall. He spoke in a tone calculated to convey the impression that he regarded the incident as over.

There are two countries which of late have been attracting a good deal of attention. In Turkey, as you know, disturbances have been going on for some time past—disturbances which have been greatly magnified in importance by popular report, for the simple reason that they occurred at a time when there was not much else to write about; but still serious in this sense, that in these countries there is always a good deal of loose gunpowder about, and a very small spark may lead to a very large explosion. The armed force of the insurrection has never been considerable; indeed I fancy one of the difficulties of the consuls who were lately sent on a mission of conciliation was to find the insurgents whom they were to conciliate. It was hoped, no doubt, by the leaders

of the movement that they would have the support, either secret or avowed, of the Great Powers. In that hope they have been disappointed. The Great Powers, without exception, have shown their sense of the difficulty of the situation, and of the inexpediency of pulling down where you cannot build up. I don't think, therefore, we shall hear much more of the armed insurrection. As for the steps that may be taken to prevent another outbreak by the removal of grievances I don't apprehend that there will be any reluctance on the part of the Porte to grant considerable administrative reforms. The difficulty will be to find men to execute them. It is proposed by some persons that the provinces in question should have granted to them a local autonomy like that of Roumania and Servia. That is an idea which I think will not find favour in the eyes of many of the parties concerned. Local autonomy is very well where you have to deal with only one religion and race, but where Mahometans and Christians are mixed together, or not very equal in strength, leaving them to settle their own internal affairs simply means leaving the stronger of the two parties to oppress and possibly to exterminate the weaker. Much may be done in the way of removing abuses and lightening taxation, but it is useless to deny that, do what we may, elements of discontent will remain. It is only in a high state of civilisation, and not always then, that two rival religions can get on side by side in the same country. The state of things does not, as I conceive, admit of a good radical cure, but alleviation is possible, and the rest may be left to time. And now I come to a question which is of more immediate and direct interest to ourselves. In the case of Turkey we have only to do our duty by other Powers. Our own interests, though very real, are indirect, and the decisions taken do not rest wholly with us. [He goes on to say that in China, on the other hand, we have claims and interests of our own; that he had hoped up to the last moment to come bringing the news that a pending Chinese difficulty had been peaceably settled, but such was not yet the case.]—*Lord Derby*, Oct. 7th.

Thus, with an impression that what attention had been aroused by the affairs of Turkey might be diverted to other matters, the first phase of the Incubation Period comes to an end.

CHAPTER VIII.

INCUBATION PERIOD.

SECOND PHASE (TO END OF PARLIAMENTARY RECESS).

§ 1. *The Turkish Repudiation.*

BUT if people were beginning to let all concern about the state of things in Turkey pass out of their minds, their thoughts were soon brought back to that part of Europe with a wrench. The event which effected this was the Turkish repudiation. This was announced in a second edition of the *Times* as it happened on the very day when Lord Derby spoke at Liverpool.¹ The world was informed that during the five years from January 1st, 1876, the interest on the Turkish public debt was to be paid half (that is three per cent.) in cash, and half in bonds bearing five per cent. interest.² It is true that for some time past a collapse of Turkish finances had been looked for as imminent. But now that repudiation was actually announced it caused a profound sensation. The question at once arose what was to be done. Bondholders held excited meetings. England and France were to threaten Turkey into paying her debts, or perhaps Italy was to be called in; the dismissal of the Vizier Mahmoud was to be demanded. Such were some of the suggestions. They were all soon seen to be impracticable. A curious rumour arose to the effect that the Sultan had offered Mr. Gladstone 50,000*l.* to put the Turkish finances straight.³ It is only important as indicating a belief that England was somehow coming to the rescue. The act of repudiation was attributed to Mahmoud Pasha, the grand vizier. His appointment,

¹ Oct. 7th.

² The amount of the debt was £200,000,000, and the amount thus saved, therefore, £6,000,000 a year. The bonds were issued at par, but fetched in the market about 30 per cent. of the par value.

³ A Vienna telegram of Oct. 13, in the *Daily News*, seems to be the source of the rumour.

about the middle of August, was the first apparent Turkish concession to the pressure of Russia and the other Powers, a pressure which brought about the Consular Mission. Mahmoud was supposed to be under Russian influence, and now the notion was set on foot that this repudiation was a subtle device suggested by Ignatieff with the express object of crippling the borrowing power of Turkey and thereby weakening her for ever. The influence of financial interests was so conflicting that it is impossible to say that the fact of Turkish indebtedness to English people influenced the public mind in favour of any definite policy. If the first effect of the repudiation was still further to weaken the weakening hold of the traditional policy of supporting Turkey, there seems to have been some vacillation of feeling after the first fit of anger was over, and a partial return to the old policy of support. It was as if the first thought of the creditor had been to take his debtor by the throat and say "Pay me that thou owest;" his second to set Turkey up in business again in the hope that she might yet pay a fairly good composition. It is difficult to trace any coherence in the attitude of the press on the question of intervention for the bondholders.

The *Daily Telegraph* about this time seems to have advocated intervention.

The *Daily News* seems to think that the arrangement the Porte proposes is the best for the creditors. If Turkey pays them half and goes on with financial reform, thus daily improving their security, the creditors will not be so badly off after all.—(Oct. 23rd.)

[The Turkish stock is widely diffused among the class which, under all modern kinds of government, has obtained the largest share of ultimate power.] It must be remembered that up to this time . . . the stir Turkey has made in Europe has never implied even the smallest degree of interest in the country or the people. . . . All through Europe the Turkish repudiation has stung the democracy in its tenderest point. In England a pledge to urge the claims of Turkish bondholders would probably be the most effectual hustings cry—Liberals and Conservatives might alike give such a pledge. . . . The general result of her financial collapse would be to make Public Opinion tender at the least, to any plan for allowing Turkey to be absorbed by any Power likely to prove solvent. [The writer goes on to speak of Greece and Russia as if they were rival candidates for the reversion of Turkey—dependent on the suffrages of the bondholders—saying the event will not help Greece much. The most unabashed of all insolvent states, Russia, would have a

better chance ; but the constant increase of her debt ought to make sanguine people pause.]—*P. M. G.* Oct. 21st, 1875.

Mr. A. J. Wilson speaks of the bondholders as “blinded by greed,” and urges the Government to resist the appeals to intervene on their behalf. [The country cannot be drawn into broils for a cause like this, and if it resists, the energy with which poor bondholders lament themselves and abuse Turkey will do no harm. Turkey has forfeited whatever goodwill she ever possessed in this country and in France. The insurrection and other questions now will be settled without any reference to the supposed rights of Turkey. Perhaps the best chance even for the bondholders would be in making emancipated principalities the administrators of the affairs of Turkey. The emancipated principalities might amongst them take up a fair proportion of the debt.]—*Macmil.* Dec. 1875.

Meanwhile the strong anti-Turkish feeling that had been excited in England had attracted the notice of the French journalists. An article, written by Mr. John Lemoinne, attracted not a little attention in England.

Every one must have been struck by the rapidity and facility with which England has thrown her traditional Eastern policy overboard. And the public has seen the country for which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had so long been a dogma, become suddenly the first to call for the dismantling of the crumbling edifice.—*Journal des Débats*, Oct. 13th.¹

Both the *Times* and the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the latter as explicitly as the former, repudiated the notion that the preservation of Turkey was ever regarded as an end in itself by England.

It is a mere playing with words to say that our traditional policy has been the “integrity” of the Ottoman Empire . . . [as evidenced by the case of Greece and the Danubian Principalities.] The one point on which we insist . . . is that the Turkish Government shall not be hastily overthrown, and that its provinces shall not be offered as a prey to the jealous Powers which surround them. . . . Whatever revolution is to be consummated in the East of Europe we are anxious that it should be gradual, and that an established Government should not be overthrown on the mere chance of some more satisfactory organisation emerging from its ruins.—*T.* Oct. 15th.

[*M. Lemoinne* confounds form with substance]. The motive of English policy in the East has not changed ; the particular action dictated by that motive undoubtedly has changed. In 1875 as in 1854 it is the object of England not to allow Russia to become paramount in Europe, and especially not to allow her to become paramount in a way which would give her

¹ See *Times*, Paris telegram, Oct. 14.

the command of our communications with India. . . . If the traditional policy of England in the East is to be pursued, it must be pursued by other instruments than the Turks. At present, however, these other instruments are not forthcoming, and the object of England is to postpone the overthrow.—*P. M. G.* Oct. 15th.

Meanwhile the Turkish Government had endeavoured to palliate the effect of their repudiation by coupling with it that promise of reform which, as we have seen, had seemed to reconcile Russia to the failure of the Consular Mission. A circular despatch from Safvet Pacha, dated October 7th (the day on which the news of the repudiation reached England), appeared in the *Times* of October 23rd.

[The circular calls attention to the promulgation¹ of radical and indispensable reforms, which the Porte had decided to put into execution at once throughout the Empire. It lays stress on the financial benefits which may be expected. These promises of reform, "a striking and spontaneous proof of the generous sentiments of his Imperial Majesty," are held out to the creditors, who are told that "the traditional honesty of the Sublime Porte . . . will more than ever influence all its acts," that "the Imperial Government would prefer to succumb . . . rather than forfeit its dignity and high reputation," and that the payment of their coupons was to be reduced one-half.]—*Reuter's Telegram.*

This overture of the Porte was received with the most openly expressed incredulity. This outspokenness contrasts strangely with the apathetic silence with which the first mention of the new Turkish promise had been received three weeks before. The silence then was due no doubt to the expressed belief of Russia in the possibility of Turkish reform.

We readily acquit Safvet Pacha of any intention to be satirical. . . . [He] falls back on the goodness of [the Porte's] intentions, and he seems to fancy that he has done enough to soothe the apprehensions of Western exchanges when he has paraded the "reforms" which are to regenerate the Empire. Unhappily for him, we published along with his circular two commentaries² on these reforms from correspondents who write with an experience of Turkish life. . . . The evidence of these witnesses is almost identical, and it exactly confirms what we have often said about the hopelessness of the expectation that

¹ By an instrument known as the *Irâdê* of Oct. 2.

² The letters referred to were one from a Turkish correspondent at Constantinople, dated Oct. 14, and one from the *Times* special correspondent at Ragusa, dated Oct. 16.

the Turkish Empire can be reformed. Both correspondents emphatically assert that the promises of amendment are absolutely worthless. . . . The emptiest of all the promises, however, is that the Christians will henceforth be adequately represented in the Provincial Council and in the great Council of State. . . . In truth it [the Porte] dares not take a step which would inevitably lead to the overthrow of its own authority.—*T.* Oct. 25th.

§ 2. *The Russian Volte-Face.*

Just as the month of October was ending, Russia abandoned the tone of acquiescence in Turkish Reform adopted by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* a month before, and reverted to a policy of "Emancipation." The change was marked by the publication of an article in the Russian official gazette of October 29th, quoted in the St. Petersburg telegram of the *Times* of October 30th.

This Russian *volte-face*, as it was called, gave rise to the first clear instance of the phenomenon which we call "erubescence." The action of Russia was variously explained. According to one theory the sympathies of the Russian people were the motive power. According to another, the Russian Foreign Office, having seen the financial ruin of Turkey, and the discrediting of her in England, was now prepared to strike the blow which it had long been meditating.

But however this might be, the immediate presence of the idea of Russian intervention caused in England a certain revulsion of feeling. It seemed too incredible a thing that Russia would move without an *arrière pensée* towards Constantinople. For a time the dread of Russian aggression seems to overshadow the urgent necessity of securing good government for the Provincials, and we find many hints that England's true policy is to hold aloof from entangling engagements, and to be ready to act as occasion might require.

[The policy of pretending to trust the Ottoman Government is apparently coming to an end, and no one can foresee how far the new policy of interference will be carried.]—*D. N.* Nov. 1st.

[Russia has lifted part of the veil. She puzzled everybody a month ago by speaking of the Grand Vizier's schemes as if she believed in regeneration. The present article brings us back with a wrench to the old way. They say "an end must be put to the present sad condition of the Christian population of Turkey." Here a note is struck with the real ring of the old Russian opinion.

Some speculations follow, as to what amount of intervention Russia contemplates.] This country will meanwhile prefer to wait on events, free from illusions, but free also from embarrassing engagements.—*T.* Nov. 1st.

[At last we have the explanation which we have all along led our readers to expect of the financial *coup d'état*. No doubt Mahmoud Pasha, to whom the suggestion came as a great relief from pressure, determined on the act in good faith. But even bondholders will not regret it more than the Turkish Government when they see its full bearing. Its first result was to violently alienate the Western Powers. This is exactly what Russia and her allies wanted. We find the conspirators are not slow to seize the opportunity.]—*Post*, Nov. 1st.

There is a deep and growing suspicion that the warning to Turkey denotes at least a wish to begin a new chapter of intervention, at the place at which the Crimean War abruptly put a stop. . . . No one supposes Russia has abandoned any of the hopes which led her to that war. But the goal of Russian ambition is unfortunately Constantinople, and to speak plainly that is a post which we cannot permit her to occupy.—*T.* Nov. 5th.

No sooner had the Divan decided to destroy the credit of the Empire, and thus paralysed their own means of putting a large army in the field, than the Russian Government executed a violent *volte-face*. [Russia seems to be urging tributary autonomy for the provinces,] but in considering Russian action, it is always necessary to discuss the question whether the apparent object of her diplomacy is also the real one. Is the Russian Foreign Office undoing all that General Ignatieff has done in the last five years, . . . in order to constitute Bosnia a separate State under an united guarantee? . . . It is possible that, as these States are Slav, she believes it will not be difficult, when the time is ripe, to gather them all under her flag, and entirely approves any increase in their number, and especially an increase in extremely small, and therefore weak and jealous aggregations. It is possible, we say, that this is her policy, and if it is, we wish it every success, for Russia will in that case use her great strength to liberate European Turkey, only to find herself faced by a federation much stronger than the Sultan, much more important to Europe, and much more likely to find effective allies. But it is a little difficult to believe that Russia can be so mistaken, that she can seriously intend to sacrifice her ascendancy at Constantinople for so limited an end, or that she would have selected such a moment without much broader purposes in view. A policy of doing nothing with firm civility is England's *rôle* for the moment, and for the management of such a policy if he adopts it, the bitterest Radicals may have the heartiest confidence in the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.—*Spec.* Nov. 6th.

The National Russian Party, represented by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* and the *Moscow Gazette*, has naturally been in-

dignant at the extremely mild measures which are all that Russia can adopt if she is to act in concert with Austria and Germany. [The party of action is too strong to be despised even by a despotic Government, which felt that] something must be said to convince the Russians that there is no difference of principle between the Government and the national party. . . . That Russia intends as soon as she is strong enough to change the condition of the Christian population of Turkey, has never been doubtful, and the fresh declaration of her purpose with no date fixed for its accomplishment may not prove to have materially hurried matters forward.—*P. M. G. Nov. 1st.*

§ 3. *The First Guildhall Speech.*

The Cabinet held its first meeting after the recess on November 4th, and at the Lord Mayor's dinner (November 9th) the Premier made his first allusion to the state of affairs in Turkey.

It would be an affectation to pretend that a partial revolt in a province of European Turkey has brought about a state of affairs, which in that part of the world very often becomes critical. In the present instance, the wise forbearance of the Great Powers immediately interested in the question, a wise forbearance to which I beg to offer my most sincere testimony, and which cannot be too highly appreciated, produced an effect so happy that at one moment, some months ago, we had a right to believe that this serious disturbance would immediately cease. My Lord Mayor, an unfortunate event, which I will not dwell upon, the financial catastrophe of one of our allies, revived the expiring struggle, gave a new aspect to all the circumstances, and created hopes and fears in quarters and in circles which before that did not exist. It is impossible to deny that circumstances of this character are critical, but for my own part, I have still great confidence in that forbearance to which I have referred. I believe that it will continue to be exercised, and I have myself, not only a trust, but a conviction, that means will be ascertained, which will bring about a satisfactory result—a result which will be consistent with the maintenance of peace, and which will be satisfactory to the public opinion of Europe. My Lord Mayor, I will not contemplate any other result, and therefore I will only say that the interests which the Imperial Powers have in this question no doubt are more direct than those of Great Britain, but though more direct, they are not more considerable, and those to whom the conduct of your affairs is now intrusted are deeply conscious of the nature and magnitude of those British interests, and those British interests they are resolved to guard and maintain.—*Mr. Disraeli.*

It is curious how much up to this time Mr. Disraeli had kept himself in the background, and, moreover, how his reputation had seemed to be declining.

Hitherto, all through the autumn when foreign affairs were being discussed, Lord Derby was the one figure which stood out in the imagination of the journalists as distinct from the impersonal "Government," and as having some human idiosyncrasies. But on Lord Mayor's Day 1875, Lord Derby said but little, and Mr. Disraeli came to the front; from that time onward with intervals of partial retreat ("*recueillir pour mieux sauter*" perhaps), Mr. Disraeli began to loom larger and larger to the public eye.

The effect of the Premier's speech seems to have been twofold: he spoke of disquieting facts, but he spoke of them as of one who saw his way. His tone gave the impression that the Government were adequate to the occasion, and from all quarters there came in reply assurances of confidence and support.

The *Times* compliments the Premier on the increased sobriety of his tone.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* says the speech was listened to "with profound interest and much relief."—(Nov. 10th.)

The *Times* next day notes that the Premier does not bid us expect that peace can be restored to Turkey by any efforts of her own.

The *Daily News* is pleased at the Premier's recognition of the importance of British interests in Turkey, hopes that the settlement which he looks forward to will be, not like that of 1856 founded on a prodigious fiction, but one the foundation of which has proceeded upon the strictest reference to the facts of the case. (Nov. 11th.)

The *Economist* says that some slight alarm has been caused on the Stock Exchange by the Premier's speech.—(Nov. 13th.)

Mr. Disraeli's speech at the Guildhall differs markedly in tone from his previous speeches in the same locality, and his usual speeches anywhere. It is not audacious, it is not epigrammatic, it is not bombastic. . . . It is the speech of a man who feels himself face to face with a heavy responsibility, about which he cannot say much; who knows that the immediate future is not clear, and who, were not the dangers of publicity so great, would relieve his own mind by giving his audience a warning.—*Spec.* Nov. 13th, 1875.

The Colston banquets at Bristol occurred shortly after Lord Mayor's Day, and it happened that the prominent guest of the Anchor Society was the leader of the Opposition. The opportunity thus afforded for further comment on the Premier's speech did not pass unutilised, and again, a few days later, Mr.

Forster spoke at Bradford. There was nothing in the tone of the Opposition leaders to indicate dissatisfaction with the Premier's expressions.

The Marquis of Hartington contrasted Lord Derby's language, when he "appeared to be hardly aware of the gravity of the circumstances" with the words of the Premier. These last, he said, "adequately expressed the general feeling of Englishmen." But he struck a note of warning. He alluded to the duty which an Opposition might have to discharge in respect to foreign policy, and proceeded to observe—"No one knows better than does Mr. Disraeli that the foreign policy which this country wants, is, as Mr. Bright has recently expressed it, "not a spirited foreign policy, but a just foreign policy." ¹

The Daily Telegraph rebuked the Duke of Beaufort for the "boyish extravagance," with which at the "Dolphin" Colston dinner he had called the Premier's speech an exhibition of "simple, quiet, gentlemanlike English determination, which said, 'If you punch my head I'll hit you again,'" and congratulated the Marquis of Hartington on his support of the Government. "The day has long gone by when foreign affairs could become the pretext for factious manœuvres" . . . as far as Imperial matters are concerned "We are absolutely united."—(Nov. 15th.)

[The Liberal party is prepared to give the Government every assistance in foreign affairs irrespective of party, but the Government ought to treat the country with perfect frankness. We have already spent as much blood and treasure as we can afford for the sake of Turkey. Never was the country stronger, we were never more ready for war, and never more unwilling to go to war unless forced. We must preserve our communications with India. As regards Turkey, our sole wish is that the subject population should have the best treatment possible; that their position should be settled with regard to justice, and the preservation of peace. We ought to be watchful but not suspicious, nor to assume that other Powers mean an attack.]—*Mr. Forster at Bradford*, Nov. 22nd.

§ 4. *Purchase of the Suez Canal Shares.*

But while there thus seemed no prospect of anything but unanimity among men of all parties at home as to our foreign policy, what was the kind of solution which people were beginning to look for and prospectively to approve?

The necessity of supporting Turkish rule had already begun to be recognised as hateful, and people were glad to catch at any escape from it. The writers who from time to time had been drawing attention to the state of Turkey, and preparing the public

¹ At Anchor Society dinner, Nov. 14.

mind to abandon the old tradition, had in many instances gone on to suggest the policy "Egypt" in some form, as that which was to take the place of the policy which, as they contended, had become obsolete. When the article in the Russian official gazette, which was taken for the death-warrant of Turkey, appeared at the end of October, we find the policy "Egypt" coming strongly to the front. There were various causes which contributed to this. It flattered the bias for a strong foreign policy; it seemed to afford some hope of a solution of the Khedive's financial difficulties. There was a vague notion that by her bad conduct in general and by the repudiation in particular, Turkey had forfeited all claim. If her territory was to be redistributed, England must secure herself—not necessarily by an extensive annexation—but at all events so far as her Indian communications were concerned. These considerations had more or less weight, but the chief merit of such a settlement was after all that it would solve the "eternal Eastern Question," and solve it in a manner not adverse to the interests of humanity.

The way in which the first note was struck was curious, but perfectly characteristic of our country and our time. It was not brought out by the startling complication of disasters and signs of disaster that lately revealed the fast approach of dissolution to the Turkish Empire. That ought to have done it, rather than the more speculative matter that did move our imagination and open our eyes and mouths at last. It came to pass that the Prince of Wales made a pleasure trip to India. He tarried at Alexandria on the way, and there was magnificently entertained by the Viceroy of the country, and, on taking up his route, he decorated the Viceroy's eldest son with the Star of India—on the Queen's behalf, of course. This was precisely the sort of incident to kindle British fancy; it took fire accordingly, no doubt being largely fed from the too visible conflagration of the Grand Turk's finances. The Star of India guided the newspaper press, club-room debaters, and, above all, a vast body of interested bondholders, to the fact that Egypt must be nobody's to take, nobody's to hold, if not [our own]. . . . Before long, the English at Alexandria will be as familiar a subject of discussion as the Russians at Constantinople. And why should it not be? Stated plainly as it is here, we have no doubt that even now it startles many a mind as something too improper for speculation. [In speaking of the possession of Egypt by England, territorial possession is not necessarily implied]. What we require is positions where force can be always maintained, and where it can be speedily exerted.—*P. M. G.* Nov. 3rd.¹

¹ "Egypt for the English."

[It is not becoming of England, as the Power which assumes to be guided by morality rather than interest, and which pretends to guide the Public Opinion of the world, to speculate as to what we shall do about Egypt when the time for a general break-up shall arrive. Still in view of possibilities suggested by recent official circulars, we have a right to discuss the question. We have as good a right to interfere in Egypt as either of the Northern Powers in Turkey. So there is clearly some excuse for those who have begun to speak of the reversion of Egypt.]—*Standard* [Nov. 4th].

[Mr. Disraeli's words signify that in view of events in the East] England may be suddenly compelled to form most serious resolutions. It may be taken as certain, more especially since the Premier's speech, that the Turkish financial default suddenly reinvigorated those Russian statesmen who look to the possession of Constantinople as necessary to the future of their empire. . . . The conduct of Turkey has released us from the necessity of consulting any interests except those of Great Britain and the world at large, and both point to the same line of action—the taking some definite securities that Egypt shall pass into no other hands. . . . [If the three Emperors, managing to stick together, decide that Turkish oppression must cease,] England will have no alternative but either to check their designs at the cost of an immense war, or to protect her route to India by occupying it herself. We do not believe that if driven to such a choice the statesmen now at the head of affairs will hesitate which to choose.—*Spec.* Nov. 13th.

[Mr. John Lemoinne tells us we have deserted Turkey merely because she can no longer pay her English bondholders, and because the construction of the Suez Canal frees us from all dependence on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for the safety of our road to India. Our foreign policy is pure selfishness from beginning to end. But English denunciations of Turkish misrule are not so cynically selfish as he would represent. From this country came the first description and denunciations of Ottoman rule in Herzegovina.]—*T.* Nov. 26th.

Such was the direction in which men's thoughts were turning when their attention was arrested by an unexpected *coup* on the part of the English Government.

We have to-day to make a somewhat startling announcement. The British Government have bought from the Khedive shares of the Suez Canal to the amount of 4,000,000*l.* sterling, and the Egyptian Government is authorised to draw upon Messrs. Rothschild for the amount. . . . We seem to trace in the business the hand of Mr. Disraeli. . . . No waiting for Parliament, no feeling of Public Opinion, no mysterious hints to prepare the city and the country for something remarkable. . . . It is

impossible to separate in our thoughts the purchase . . . from the question of England's future relations with Egypt, or the destiny of Egypt from the shadows which darken the Turkish Empire.—*T. Nov. 26th.*

This act fairly roused Public Opinion for a time, and its verdict was one of well-nigh unanimous approval. The act was taken for a new departure; and when, a few days after the announcement of the purchase, the English Government despatched Mr. Stephen Cave to Cairo, at the request of the Khedive, to give advice and assistance, this seemed no more than might have been looked for. The purchase was looked on as an indication that between the two alternatives of resisting all interference with Turkey on the one hand, and participating in a new settlement which should be favourable to the Provincials on the other, the Government had made their election in favour of the latter. And thus some impulse was given to the progress of "violet" opinions. It seemed for a moment as if the Conservative party had followed the lead offered to them by Lord Stanley at Lynn eleven years before, and had definitely adopted as a principle of their foreign policy the repudiation of the traditional support of Turkey, a policy which henceforth might be remembered only in connection with a worn-out Whiggery. It seemed, too, as if in so doing the Conservative party had doubled their popularity and secured at a stroke an overwhelming support. One cannot help speculating on what the subsequent Party history might have been, if this indeed had been the line along which, at this juncture, Mr. Disraeli had guided the party which he led.

One marked effect of the purchase was to direct attention to the Premier himself. The act seems to have been regarded from the first as in a peculiar sense his own. By a single stroke he had revealed himself and his policy to the English nation. There was a complete understanding, so it seemed, established between them. No words were necessary.¹ Now, perhaps, the Premier's brilliant peculiarities were regarded as for the first time in their proper place. Here was a juncture where it seemed they might be not merely harmless, but of service to the nation.

An act so prompt and opportune . . . will gratify the country, not only on account of the ultimate material advantages promised,

¹ See *Punch*, Dec. 11. Mr. Disraeli is crossing the desert with the key of India in his hand. On the other side of the picture is the Sphinx. Something like a wink is being exchanged between them which seems to say the riddle has been rightly guessed.

but because it gives assurance that we have a Government of spirit and initiative.—*T. Nov. 27th, 1875.*

The Government has recovered by a single act of far-sighted courage the reputation damaged by the many failures of the present recess . . . It is no light thing for a British Minister to promise £4,000,000 sterling, and engage in an enterprise which may cost millions more, without consulting Parliament, and that the Cabinet has ventured to do this is an evidence of energy which is as unexpected as it is agreeable. . . . The country would, we believe, applaud the act even if it were less wise than it is, in its satisfaction that the Government had acted in one foreign affair with energy, speed and secrecy, and its content will not be diminished as it reflects on the wisdom of the act itself. . . . Mr. Disraeli has saved Egypt, moreover, from a collapse which might have precipitated all manner of questions with disastrous haste, and has announced, as we conceive, the commencement of a novel and sound course of action in the East.—*Spec. Nov. 27th.*

Even the political importance of the step will scarcely impress the public so much as the thought of the extreme delight with which Mr. Disraeli must have done what he has done. It is in his own style of gorgeousness. In a moment he interferes in the East, he commits his country to a new adventure, he bandies about his millions like halfpence. He gives an order on the Golden Lions of the Throne of Judah, and bids a Viceroy draw at sight on Sidonia for four millions. To have lived to make a Duke, which was the dream of Vivian Grey, is nothing compared with having lived to realise the magnificent visions of Couingsby.—*Sat. Rev. Nov. 27th.*

Every one is gratified when a man of note is able to work out in real life that conception of his career which has been elicited from him as his own ideal in his previous writings. . . . What makes this last move of Mr. Disraeli's specially characteristic of his political ideal, though by no means of his practice, is that it was done without consulting Parliament, in the strong conviction that Parliament would gladly accept his lead. Now Mr. Disraeli has in his books often urged the notion that Parliamentary government is a mere transition-stage between the personal government of old times and the personal government of new, and that "an educated nation recoils from the imperfect vicariat of what is called a representative government." But though this has been his literary opinion, it has hitherto been a literary opinion only, and this is almost the first instance of his taking a great and sagacious resolve when he has invited Parliament to follow him, instead of first feeling the pulse of Parliament.—*Spec. Dec. 4th.*¹

The great event of the month has been the practical notification to Europe of a vital change in English official opinion. The

¹ "Mr. Disraeli from a new side."

first article in the programme of a serious statesman in England was the maintenance at any price of the Ottoman Empire. To-day, enlightened by experience, England recognises that she has been wishing what was impossible.—*Fort. Rev.* Jan. 7th, 1876.¹

It need surprise no one to find war raging next spring between the great Powers of Eastern Europe. We ourselves have supplied the strongest incentive to strife in the purchase of the Suez Canal Shares . . . By that act, in effect, England recognises that the partition of Turkey is inevitable.—*Fraser*, Jan. 1876.

The English public have been so habituated to an attitude of supine indifference to foreign affairs that for the Government in one and the same year to interfere effectively for the maintenance of peace in the West, and to acquire a new and influential position in the East, was to excite an unwonted feeling of national satisfaction . . . Argue as critics may as to the details of the purchase . . . the sound instinct of the whole country settled the question on the very first day of its announcement, that it was the right thing, done in the right manner at the right moment.—*Blackwood*, Jan. 1876.

The broad popular view was one of approval of the transaction on the ground that it had a distinct political import, and indicated that the Government saw their way to secure our communications and our interests, independently of Turkey. Thus attention was drawn away from the question of European Turkey and the Christian provinces. If they were thought about at all, they were thought of as provinces which might be left to work out their own salvation, aided perhaps by powerful friends, but unhindered if unhelped by us. People's thoughts were diverted to discussions as to the precise significance of the purchase. On the face of it, it might mean anything, from a mere financial speculation up to a deliberate design to annex Egypt bodily. A mere financial speculation would not, indeed, have aroused much enthusiasm. But on the other hand, though abroad the tendency was to adopt the largest interpretation, the English papers began to repudiate any such construction as our foreign critics would put upon the transaction.

The *Moscow Gazette* declared that England had taken the lead in partitioning Turkey, and that Russia and the other Powers had better lose no time in joining in. England, they thought, was now willing to accept the terms offered by the Czar Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour.²

¹ "Home and Foreign Affairs." Compare Sir R. Rutherford Alcock's article in the same magazine, p. 56.

² See *T.* Dec. 10th for translation of the article.

[M. Lemoigne accuses us of a wish to confiscate Egypt, and asks why France should not in like manner confiscate Belgium. By our purchase of the shares we have silenced this criticism, and shown that our sole wish is to keep the Canal open.]—*P. M. G.* Nov. 26th, 1875.

[It is a mistake to criticise the purchase (as Mr. Fawcett¹ appears to do) simply as a commercial speculation. On the other hand, foreign critics err by imputing to us too wide designs. . . . We can understand why our neighbours should suspect a design to deal with Egypt as the East India Company dealt with Hindostan, but they may dismiss that fear.] No party in this country—Tory, Liberal, or Radical—has the slightest intention or wish to add Egypt to our over-grown dominions. The House of Commons has set its face against nothing more than conquest. . . If other States should intrigue for a mastery over Egypt we must protect ourselves; if they respect its independence so shall we.—*T.* Dec. 2nd, 1875.

The fact is, that as soon as the questions were raised people began to be very much puzzled as to the exact meaning of the act of the Government and the position they intended thereby to acquire. Lord Derby added to the perplexity by presenting the transaction in a light quite different from that in which it was generally regarded.

The eternal Eastern Question is before us again . . . and I, for one, have no idea that the year 1876 will see it finally settled. . . . What we do or determine in it will be frankly laid before Parliament. In our diplomacy, as far as the action of this country is concerned, there will be no mystery, and no reserve. [He went on to speak particularly of the purchase.] I hold that to have been a wise step. . . . It would not have been a wise nor an honest one if it had borne the construction which has been occasionally placed upon it. [He disclaimed] a wish to establish a protectorate over Egypt, an interested reversal of our policy on the whole Eastern Question, or an intention to take part in a general scramble. . . . We have obtained additional security for a free and uninterrupted passage through Egypt to India. . . . An opportunity was afforded . . . there was no deep-laid scheme in the matter. . . . As to the financial aspect of the bargain, that is not the most important. I see no reason why the State should lose a penny by it in the end.—*Lord Derby.*²

¹ See Mr. Fawcett at Hackney, Nov. 30th, *post*, p. 246.

² Meeting of Conservative Working Men, Edinburgh, Dec. 17th, 1875.

In answer to Mr. Labouchere, Mr. Gladstone said in Parliament (March 31, 1881):—It is stated that the present value of the Suez Canal Shares is about £78. At the time the shares were purchased for £23 1s. 8d., their price in the market was about £30, the difference being the sum set down by the Government in their calculation against the postponement of profit on the shares till 1894. The share profit is now considered to be worth in the market £58 on the £20 share receiving profit con-

Lord Derby, when he thus reduced the matter, not, to be sure, to a merely financial issue, but to the acquisition of a control over the Canal, laid himself open to be asked, "Can the British Government do more than any private persons owning the same shares? If so, how much more?" Thus he did much to dash the warm approval of the Government policy, and to encourage criticisms directed to inquire, how far it was possible that the transaction should go beyond mere finance, without assuming that character which Lord Derby so carefully deprecated. The answer to the question "How much more?" would perhaps be the measure of the extent to which the Government was committed to the policy "Egypt," and no clear answer to this was forthcoming. But people were very loth to believe that Lord Derby presented the transaction in its true light. If, indeed, it meant no more than Lord Derby would have people believe, why then it would be a grave question whether there was anything in the merits of the transaction to outweigh the various objections to which it was open. Lord Derby's speech was regarded partly as a sort of conventional diplomatic disclaimer, partly as the outcome of his own idiosyncrasy, and it became the occasion of not a little sarcastic comment.

The Eastern Question had been settled by a *coup d'état* upon the Stock Exchange, and Turkey was abandoned to her fate. Egypt was annexed. The Bulls of England had vanquished the Bears of Russia. Moab was to be our washpot, and over Edom we had cast out our shoe. France and M. Lesseps were confounded. We are a very great people. . . We all of us felt six inches taller than before. We spread our tails like peacocks in the sun, and were as pleased as children at our soap-bubble, iridescent with many hues. But all of a sudden this beautiful vision melted away; the Egyptian mirage evaporated, the great political phantasmagoria faded like a dissolving view.—*Sir William Harcourt*.¹

The utterances of Lord Derby on foreign policy never content us . . . because he seems to us always to underrate, or even despise, the first duty of an English Minister—that of carrying the nation with his policy. . . A Minister who never utters his real thoughts, who keeps his plans to himself, and who treats every step in his policy as an unimportant detail, fails to enlist the nation in its favour, and lacks the immense support which a democracy, once aroused, can lend. [What is the end of Lord

tinuously, but when the period to which the profits are deferred on the 176,000 shares is taken into account—about thirteen years—then it may be said to be relatively about £27 a share more than in 1875, and consequently there may be said to have accrued £4,750,000 gain on the purchase of the shares. (Opposition cheers.)

¹ At Oxford, Dec. 30, 1875.

Derby's explanation?] The *Pall Mall Gazette*, which, throughout the Egyptian affair, has been in favour of decision and energy, replies that Lord Derby speaks *ex officio*; that, as Foreign Secretary, he is bound to be most cautious in statement, and that, in fact, he is hoodwinking possible adversaries. [But nobody is hoodwinked except the English people.] Russia will not believe the commercial enterprise story for a dozen Lord Derbys: France will not believe it: the world generally will not believe it. . . . We very much doubt, if the purchase of the shares is an isolated act, whether it is a defensible one. The Government as a mere shareholder is in a false position. . . . How is it possible for anybody, Tory or Liberal, to be energetic in defence of such a policy as that?—*Spec.* Dec. 25th.

Lord Derby may say as much as he pleases that it is neither wise nor honest to wish to establish a protectorate over Egypt; but in reality the possession of a moral, but not the less effective, political ascendancy in Egypt, and in reference to the Canal, is a cardinal point in English foreign policy essential to the security of our Eastern interests.—*Blackwood*, Jan. 1876.

If the purchase of the shares is an act of no immediate importance in itself the case is quite different when we think of the effect it may have in Europe. . . . Its reception by the public is taken to prove, in spite of all the words of Lord Derby, that England is ready in certain contingencies to seize Egypt.—*Fort. Rev.* Jan. 1876.¹

It is from Lord Derby's Edinburgh speech that we date the commencement of a belief in two sections in the Cabinet, a Disraeli section and a Derby section. According to this belief the former is audacious and active, the latter cautious and minimising. If the former startles and excites Public Opinion, the latter makes it its mission to soothe and tranquillise it.

I am raising, says Mr. Disraeli, an action of ejectment as reversionary claimant of that great property. "Oh dear no!" says Lord Derby, "we are only going to maintain an old right of way."—*Spec.* Feb. 26th, 1876.

Although the general attitude of Public Opinion towards the action of the Government had been one of approval, certain undertones of criticism had made themselves heard even from the first. The Opposition, as in duty bound, began cautiously to approach the new phenomenon, and to search out its vulnerable points. The fact that Parliament had not been consulted was at once remarked upon.² Complaints were often made about the

¹ "Home and Foreign Affairs."

² The London correspondent of the *South Wales Daily News* (Dec. 21) mentions a rumour that orders had actually been given to prepare the Houses for an Autumn Session in case of adverse opinion on the purchase.

unsettlement of the stock markets,¹ caused by the action and rumoured future action of our Government. But it is worth remarking that from first to last not a syllable was breathed in England, in any quarter deserving of the slightest consideration, to insinuate that Ministers had ever been tempted to make any profit on their own account out of the immensely valuable secrets and influence in their possession.

The *Economist* recommends its readers to suspend their judgment on this remarkable step.—(Nov. 27th.)

Lord Sandhurst (one of the earliest critics in the field) advised that the shares should no longer be held by the State, but sold. We should be relieved from a mischievous anomaly, and an unprecedented arrangement in the application of the State resources.—(In *T.* Dec. 3rd.)

Mr. Fawcett was very anxious in what was now said about it not to prejudice the question. In his opinion, the public was not yet sufficiently informed to form a correct estimate of the wisdom or the policy of the purchase of those Canal shares. They did not know what effect it would have on the policies of Europe, or in what way it would be received by the great Powers. He was bound to say that even if a small portion of the consequences which some of its most enthusiastic admirers attributed to it were likely to result from it, he should look upon the proceeding with grave misgiving. Before the transaction had been announced twenty-four hours, the glittering prospect was held out to them of interfering and meddling in the affairs of Egypt, and a protectorate and a suzerainty were talked about. It would be unjust to the Government for a moment to suppose that they meant anything of that kind until they had heard their explanation. But for many reasons Parliament ought to assemble as soon as possible. They must never lose sight of the fact that the very moment a single shilling of their money was spent without the consent of their representatives, the constitution was for a time suspended, and it could only be restored by asking the House of Commons to give the Government a bill of indemnity. He hoped when the matter came on for discussion in the House it would be treated without party bias.—*At Hackney*, Nov. 30th.

Lord Hartington touched on the subject, but reserved full criticism, as "he had not had the opportunity of consulting his political friends." However, he remarked that—

Up to this day no information has been given to us by the Government. . . . But, gentlemen, despatches have been published in France [from which we learn the view Lord Derby wishes the

¹ See Granville's and Hartington's speeches, Debates on the Address in both Houses, Feb. 8th, 1876.

French Government should accept]. Nothing can be more diametrically opposed to the popular view than the view which is taken by Lord Derby in these despatches. Still it would not be fair to assume for certain that what Lord Derby has thought necessary to declare to the French Ambassador is the whole intention of the Government in this matter.—*At Sheffield*, Dec. 15th.

Sir George Campbell argued against the acquisition of fresh responsibilities in Egypt, and spoke of the popular opinion in favour of the purchase as “only skin-deep.”—*Fort. Rev.* Feb. 1876.

Mr. Forster challenged Lord Derby to explain how by the purchase we had gained additional security for our passage to India.—*At Bradford*, Jan. 24th, 1876.

Sir William Harcourt had commented in the same sense at Oxford on Dec. 30th.

Meanwhile criticisms such as these were criticised in their turn with a certain degree of impatience.

Sir William Harcourt appears to drive at this: Our power over the Suez Canal and our own route to India depend on our command of the Mediterranean. If we have that, shares in the Suez Canal are superfluous. If we have not that, shares in the Suez Canal are no use. . . . That is the real gist of *Sir W. Harcourt's* criticism, and we take it to be a very mistaken gist, though it is quite true that Lord Derby has only himself to thank if it is accepted by Parliament as a just criticism on what has happened. . . . The reason it was right for us to buy the Suez Canal shares was that in all probability it will be a political necessity for us to deal with the Canal on political, and not on mercantile, considerations. We are in a far stronger position if, when we come to interfere with the commercial policy of a great Company, we are simply doing what we have bought the right to do. We wish to eliminate the collision which is always likely to arise between the proprietors in a commercial concern and the policy of statesmen dealing with a great political instrument. Nothing embarrasses the popular British judgment as to any great question of policy more than a sincere doubt whether we are dealing straightforwardly with conflicting commercial interests honestly acquired.—*Spec.* Jan. 1st, 1876.

The real reasons for the purchase of the Canal shares lie, in our opinion, on the surface. But it does not follow that they are reasons which can be produced. . . . A foreign policy is not a thing to be laid out for inspection like the articles of association of a joint-stock company.—*Spec.* Jan. 29th, 1876.

Meanwhile *Mr. Gladstone* had kept silence. Rumours, however, arose at the end of January that he would oppose the purchase.

The *Spectator* addresses an earnest remonstrance to him. It beseeches him not to break up his party.¹

The Blue Book on the Canal shares was presented to Parliament on the opening day of the session. The correspondence contained in these papers begins on November 15th, 1875. In 1874 the English Government had had some dispute with the Canal Directors and M. Lesseps, and the Company threatened to stop the way. The Khedive, under British pressure, prevented this. But the prospect that the Khedive should lose influence over the Canal disturbed Lord Derby, and he requested General Stanton at Cairo to make inquiries. General Stanton replied that the Khedive was in pressing need of £4,000,000, that he intended to pawn (really to sell) his shares for that sum to certain French capitalists (that is, practically, to the French Government). Lord Derby on Nov. 20th informed M. Gavard, of the French Embassy, that such an arrangement would be most distasteful to the British Government, that the British interest in the Canal was four times that of the rest of the world. The only two checks that could be brought to bear on the Directors of the Canal were that of the Khedive and that of the Porte. It was impossible to see how far in the future the control of the latter could be counted on as efficacious. Hence the British Government could not regard with indifference any act by which the Khedive would diminish his influence.

Soon afterwards the Khedive tried to sell his rent-charge of 15 per cent. on the net profits of the Canal. Lord Derby declined to buy, and directed General Stanton to say that the Khedive might sell if he liked, but that "Her Majesty's Government would regard as a violation of the Firman of the Porte" (authorising the Canal) "and as inconsistent with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, any act of the Khedive dispossessing himself of the control over the Suez Canal." A clear separation is here made between the right of property in the Canal and the territorial right. The position was in fact as if the English Government should say: "We have not bought any territorial rights. But it was of importance to us that the territorial rights should be exercised in a manner agreeable to us. We cannot control the exercise of the territorial rights as long as the proprietary rights are in the hands of others, because we cannot press the Khedive to interfere with other people's property. But

¹ "Mr. Gladstone's Line on the Suez Canal," *Spec.* Feb. 5th.

we can with a fair grace influence the Khedive's dealings with a concern in which we are the chief proprietors."¹

On Monday, Feb. 14th, the matter came before Parliament on Sir Stafford Northcote's application to borrow £4,080,000 from the Commissioners of the National Debt, and to assign to them the 5 per cent. interest (£200,000) to be paid by the Khedive, thus paying off the whole, principal and interest, in thirty-five years. At the instance of the Opposition the debate was adjourned for a week. But meanwhile the tone of Public Opinion showed itself distinctly hostile to the line of criticism which the Opposition were taking. The debate took place on Monday, Feb. 21st, when Mr. Gladstone took the lead on the Opposition side. He attacked both the manner of the purchase and the results of it.² As to the *manner*, he showed that Messrs. Rothschild (who had received £80,000 for finding the money) had been paid at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum. Again, we had no security for the Khedive's promised 5 per cent.; and we might, in certain contingencies, have to sue in French law-courts; and so on. As to the *results*, our influence was limited to ten votes, the maximum allowed to any one shareholder. Mr. Disraeli attempted to defend the manner of the purchase. It was questionable if we could legally have got the money from the Bank of England. But the important part of the Premier's speech was the peroration, in which he brushed aside the smaller issues and based his defence of the purchase on high political grounds, bringing the matter back at least to where it stood before Lord Derby's minimising speech at Edinburgh.

What we have to do to-night is to agree to the vote for the purchase of the shares. I have never recommended, and I do not now recommend this purchase as a financial investment. If it gave us 10 per cent. of interest and a security as good as the Consols, I do not think an English Minister would be justified in making such an investment; still less if he is obliged to borrow the money for the occasion. I do not recommend it either as a commercial speculation, although I believe that many of those who have looked upon it with little favour will probably be surprised with the pecuniary results of the purchase. I have

¹ Compare *Spec.* Jan. 1, 1876, *ante*, p. 247.

² Mr. Gladstone published in the newspapers of Feb. 24, a syllabus of twenty-seven questions put in his speech in the Suez Canal debate. Most of these are financial, but some went to the broader aspect of the question, *e.g.* (18) What assurance has the Queen's Government that we shall not be open to the suspicion of having views of territorial aggression? (19) Has the Government ascertained that we do not give a handle to any State having hostile views against us in the East?

always and do now recommend it to the country as a political transaction, and one which I believe is calculated to strengthen the Empire. That is the spirit in which it has been accepted by the country, which understands it though the two right honourable critics may not. They are really sea-sick¹ of the "silver streak." They want the Empire to be maintained, to be strengthened, they will not be alarmed even if it be increased, because they think we are getting a great hold and interest in this important portion of Africa, because they believe that it secures to us a highway to our Indian Empire and our other dependencies; the people of England have from the first recognised the propriety and the wisdom of the step which we shall sanction to-night.—*Mr. Disraeli, H. of C. Feb. 21st, 1876.*

These words seemed to warrant as fully as any words could, even the largest of the anticipations at first based on the purchase of the shares, and it was with the Premier's tone, rather than that of Lord Derby and the Opposition, that the feeling of the country chimed.

The *Times* remarks that the Opposition have got no good from the adjournment:

Their appeals have met with no response from the public in the interval. . . . As it proceeded the feeling prevailed that there was no real power in the attack. The influence of public opinion seems to have affected the leaders of the Opposition; they are clearly conscious that the country is not with them; they reason without hope of persuading, and this imparts something acrid and irritable to their tone. The criticism on the purchase has taken from the beginning, and perhaps can only take, the form of an examination of details.—*T. Feb. 22nd.*

However, it soon became pretty clear that if the Government had ever contemplated an entirely new departure in the policy of this country, they had looked back after putting their hand to the plough. On March 23rd it was announced that the report of Mr. Cave (who had returned from his financial mission to Egypt about the time when Parliament met) must be withheld.

Further action in the way of assisting the Khedive was suspended, chiefly, it was thought on account of the susceptibilities of France and Italy. The popularity which had accrued to the Government gave way to a feeling that the performance by no means bore out the anticipations which had been aroused.

Sir H. D. Wolff called attention to the proposed arrangements as to the Suez Canal. When the purchase was made the whole country approved the conduct of Government, there was

¹ Sea-sick; so in Hansard and *Times*.

criticism, but no serious opposition, "on the contrary, it was regarded by the country as a great political act." He hoped that the purchase would not lead to a great financial complication. Nothing had been done in fulfilment of the scheme originally sketched out in Parliament.

Sir Stafford Northcote replied, and entered into elaborate explanations.

Mr. Rylands said:—At least the discussion will have one useful result. It will make people more alive to the fact that the country was deceived in its expectations that the purchase would give England any political influence in the East or any controlling influence over the Canal.—*H. of C.* May 5th.

Mr. Disraeli will be drowned in the Nile if he does not take care.—*Spec.* April 1st.

Until one Minister after another had, with a unanimity which was visible through all the contradictions that characterised their explanations in detail, laboured hard to hammer the conception of the "stroke" into people's heads, [*i.e.* that it was "only a bit of commercial speculation"] no one thought of accepting it in that sober light. There was a cap-throwing and huzzaing over it the land through, as an indication that the Tories had at last given us "a spirited foreign policy;" that we had given the challenge direct to Russia and Austria henceforth to count with England in their projects for dividing the carcass of Turkey between them. As we interpreted at home so did Europe. . . . We almost despair of a Ministry, which by its conduct in this wretched Suez Canal affair, really betrayed that it rated the influence of England infinitely lower than any Power in Europe. Its ignorance and light-heartedness are dumbfounding to the minds of ordinary men. The spectacle that the vapouring of the Premier presents at such times is food for bitter reflection enough. What, then, has England come to, that she should incontinently slap faces all round, and say, with a light laugh, It is nothing? . . . That our leaders should look as innocent as lambs over the business and express their surprise that anybody should think that England has any spirit or influence left drives us to despair.—*Fraser*, May.

Thus the policy "Egypt" as an outlet from our Eastern difficulties sank for the time into the background. It seems probable that the effect of the incident as a whole was enormously to weaken the hold on Public Opinion of the "red" policy by familiarising men's minds with the notion of England's being able to regard the break-up of Turkey with equanimity, and thus indirectly to strengthen the tendency to adopt the "violet" policy of emancipation. This surmise must be taken for what it is worth, but if it is well founded it is a strange reflection that Mr. Disraeli, by

his own act, did so much to bring about that state of Public Opinion which he afterwards so strenuously combated, and which so much embarrassed him.

§ 5. *The Andrassy Note.*

The transaction of the Canal shares to a great extent drew off the attention of people at home from the progress of the series of negotiations which culminated in the Andrassy Note. It is clear that a fresh wave of insurrection took its rise about the time of the Turkish repudiation. Mr. Disraeli at the Guildhall represented the latter event as the cause of the former, while Lord Derby, as we shall see directly, reversed the sequence of cause and effect. The revived activity of Russia at the end of October was regarded by many as a link in the same chain of events. The subsequent course of the insurrection, however, for a while attracted little attention.

The fit of "erubescence" occasioned by the publication of the article in the Russian official gazette¹ was very shortlived. The cause which earliest operated to abate it was the knowledge that Russia was not acting alone, but on common ground with Austria and Germany.

[The three Powers have invited Austria] to frame a proposition setting forth what guarantees can be demanded, and what control should be jointly exercised by the great Powers to insure the carrying into effect of the Sultan's promises. Count Andrassy is now engaged in elaborating such a proposition.

[An impression is gaining ground that the Porte will not soon put the insurrection down, and that Austria will be commissioned to intervene, in the spring, with an armed force on behalf of the great Powers.]—*Berlin Telegram*, *P. M. G.* Nov. 3rd, 1875.

In this state of things great interest attached to the position of Austria. The general conception of Austria's policy at this crisis seems to have been what was probably not far from the truth;—namely, that it was primarily an *order* policy; a policy based on reluctance to encounter a disturbance, at all events as long as the risk of loss in a changed condition of things seemed to overbalance the chance of a prize. It is worth while to notice the resemblance and the difference between this policy and the policy of Lord Derby. They were alike in making "order" the one thing aimed at; but Austria, though willing to starve the insurrection by hindering supplies from reaching the insurgents, was ready, to all appearance, to join in extorting from the fears of the Porte some-

¹ *Ante*, p. 233.

thing which would bring the insurrection to an end by removing the grievance. To the extent then that at the moment they were both pressing schemes of emancipation on Turkey, Austria was on common ground with Russia. Moreover, Germany it seemed had now given her adhesion.

The fact that the three Powers were marching together was, to be sure, capable of more than one significance. The question was, how close was their agreement and what was its basis? On the one hand, it was taken by some as an indication, that the Holy Alliance had come to a full understanding as to the adjustment of rival claims, and was engaged in a conspiracy to partition Turkey. On the other hand, it was noted that in the event of any annexations the interests of Russia and of Austria would almost certainly clash, and the fact of their agreement seemed to point to the conclusion that no such measures were in contemplation, whatever pressure it might be intended to put upon the Porte in favour of the Provincials. Then again it was believed that the alliance would not bear the strain if action were to be pushed too far. Austria, it was thought, would curb and mitigate the impatience of her yokefellow, and thus reliance on Austria's minimising influence operated to allay suspicion of Russia.

The *Spectator* describes the two Powers as pressing an emancipation policy upon Turkey. Austria reluctantly and "peacefully," Russia with ardour and menaces (Nov. 6th). And again: The general impression outside is that Russia is getting ready but is not ready; that Austria is ready but very unwilling.—(Nov. 20th.)

The *Daily Telegraph* thinks Austria must be opposed to either a Russian protectorate over European Turkey, or a Slavonic autonomy on her borders, and in this sense the alliance of the three Powers is a pledge of peace and a guarantee against Russian aggression.—(Nov. 8th.)

In other quarters, where the conviction had struck deep that the position of the Provincials lay at the root of the evil, and that some action stronger than mere diplomatic parleying must be resorted to, distrust of Russia suggested Austrian occupation as an alternative to Russian coercion, as a method for securing emancipation. Thus we note among the solutions proposed with this end in view, a rivalry at this time between the "Austrian occupation" and "Hospodarate" solutions. The *Times* leant to the former,¹ the *Spectator* continued to argue for the latter.

¹ The notion of Austrian occupation seems to have been suggested for the first time in the *Times* of October 9th. See also *Times* of Nov. 24th and 26th and Dec. 1st.

Nothing but a foreign army of occupation can save Herzegovina from the risk of a catastrophe. It is becoming clearer every day that the Turkish troops are totally unable to put down the rebellion. . . . Austria could not do a better service than by repeating in Bosnia and Herzegovina the act of police which she performed in 1854. The Porte would of course protest, and at first perhaps refuse to withdraw its own troops, but a State which exists on sufferance must be peremptorily informed that it wastes time by putting on airs of independence. The intervention must be made with the concurrence of the Great Powers; but all of them, we believe, will soon see that it is an absolute necessity.—*T. Nov. 19th.*

If the *Times* has been inspired it is clear enough that the course the English Government contemplates is to support Austrian claims to the reversion of European Turkey as against Russian.—*Spec. Nov. 27th.*

The day after Lord Derby had said what he had to say on the purchase of the Canal shares to the Conservative working men at the evening meeting in the Corn Exchange,¹ he was presented with the freedom of the City of Edinburgh. He took this opportunity to touch on the pending negotiations, in a speech which seemed to be, in the main, an exposition of his idea of the political characteristic of the period:

We have at this moment before us [not the English Cabinet alone, but the various Cabinets of Europe] a question, the final solution of which nobody clearly foresees, and in regard to which I suppose nothing more is possible at present than temporary expedients to meet the emergency of the time. . . . An outbreak in the Turkish dominions, slight in the first instance, not encouraged by foreign Powers, and which might have been easily put down by prompt action, was neglected until it grew into a serious insurrection. [Even then, it seemed likely to yield when repression was at last employed. Three months ago the best-informed persons did not expect it to last or spread. But then came the financial collapse of Turkey, and the insurrection gained ground. Even now it is not formidable in military resources, and the accounts of insurgent victories are exaggerated, but the excitement among the adjoining population is so great that the area of disturbance may be indefinitely enlarged.] The Governments of Austria and Russia are, I believe, perfectly sincere in wishing to prevent that. [At the risk of being thought credulous, he gave them credit for wishing to see peace and order restored.] You see by the newspapers that a plan is about to be proposed by Austria as a basis for the pacification of these disturbed provinces. The purport of that plan I do not yet know, and if I did I should not be justified in making it a subject of public discussion here. But this you

¹ *Ante*, p. 243.

will all feel, that the difficulty of dealing with the internal affairs of a foreign country is in any case immense. [He alluded to some of the questions which occurred, not to lead to a foregone conclusion, but that the grave difficulties might be appreciated of the work which European diplomacy had been compelled to undertake.] You may wish us well through it, but don't be unreasonably dissatisfied if the solution arrived at is not all that we might desire.—*Lord Derby*.¹

[Lord Derby has taken the measure of the British public.] Calmly has he surveyed us and calm are his conclusions. It is that for the next session, and for several sessions to come, we shall all be more than content to employ ourselves in wiping away small arrears of legislation and Blue Books. With regard to the Eastern disturbance the less we do there—that is, the smaller the scale of our interference—the better. Besides, Austria has taken the matter in hand, and we may wait to see how she fares in it. Lord Derby evidently believes that in a succession of the mildest hints he has just hit the political temper and wishes of the great majority of the people. . . . We thank him for the compliment. Let it be written in our epitaph that our only wish was to die putting our house in order.—*T.* Dec. 21st, 1875.

As a premonition, apparently, of the impending note which was to embody the demands Austria had undertaken to formulate, General Ignatieff had an audience with the Sultan early in November. As a counter-blast to the new project of interference the Turkish Government promulgated a fresh scheme of reform.²

The comments of some of the English newspapers on Ignatieff's interview are curious, and show how far opinion was as yet from having crystallised. The *Daily News* and *Daily Telegraph*, for instance, appear to have exchanged parts, if we judge by the positions they afterwards took up.

[Ignatieff seems to have delicately explained to the Sultan that his empire is doomed. The game is a pretty one for Western observers—it merits the attention of our statesmen, for it is being played at the risk of serious British interests.]—*D. N.* Nov. 6th.

[The real evil lies in the system of government at Constantinople. The line of Ottoman despots must reform themselves and their surroundings or History will draw its pen through their outworn arrogance.]—*D. T.* Nov. 6th.

¹ Speech on being presented with the freedom of the City of Edinburgh.—Dec. 18th. The *Times* commented somewhat sarcastically on this utterance.

² See *Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 50.

The rough draft of the proposals appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 10. The firman is dated Dec. 12. It appears that Midhat Pasha, then Minister of Justice, wished to add to these promises a change which if achieved would have anticipated the constitution of Jan. 1877, namely, the creation of a central elected council at Constantinople. But this was rejected and Midhat resigned.

The representative of the Czar showed the urgent demand for reform. Our own ambassador gave the same message to His Majesty more than two months ago. He uttered no threats, and General Ignatieff seems to have been equally polite. The Sultan has been invited to set his house in order—that is all. Thus the Turkish policy of England and Russia is for once identical. [Turkey, Russia and England have travelled far in the last twenty-two years. The integrity¹ of the Ottoman Empire is a thing about which the Great Powers have ceased to battle, for the simple reason that any real integrity has ceased to exist. As to Constantinople, we believe that Russia is further from that prize than she was on the eve of the Crimean War. Austria could not let Constantinople pass into the hands of Russia. The mutual jealousies and the mutual necessities of Austria and Russia furnish therefore strong guarantees of peace even in the critical state of Turkey.]—*T.* Nov. 9th.

[It must be exceedingly provoking to those who have been announcing and speculating on the almost immediate collapse of the Turkish Empire, to find that not only is it *in statu quo*, but that it gives evidence of retaining both its independence and its position. The Porte will certainly resist any attempt at military occupation, high-handed dictation, or any attempt to extract unusual guarantees.] In fact the Turkish question can be treated alone by the ordinary methods of diplomacy. All drastic remedies are simply out of the question.—*Morning Post*, Dec. 14th.

[It is as difficult to tell whether the Firman is valuable or not as to tell whether the prospectus of a new company is likely to turn out a bubble or a good investment. In this case the very liberality of the terms makes us suspicious.]—*D. T.* Dec. 16th.

[There is ground for hopefulness, since Turkey will feel the *necessity* of now making some serious efforts at reform, for it has to meet the inexorable demands of the three Emperors—and it has alienated from itself the support of England, France and Italy.]—*T.* Dec. 17th.

The “Andrassy Note” was dated Buda-Pest, Dec. 30th, 1875, and was communicated to Lord Derby on Jan. 3rd, and the substance of the Note appeared in the English newspapers of Jan. 5th, 1876. The specific measures proposed for the revolted Provinces in this celebrated instrument were as follows :—

Religious liberty full and entire.

Abolition of the farming of taxes.

A lawful guarantee that the product of the direct taxation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be employed for the immediate interests of the province, under the control of bodies constituted in the sense of the Firman of December 12th.

¹ *Sic*, but independence is meant.

The institution of a Special Commission, composed of an equal number of Mussulmans and Christians, to superintend the execution of the reforms proposed by the Powers, as well as of those proclaimed in the Iradé of October 2nd, and Firman of December 12.¹

Lastly, the amelioration of the condition of the rural populations.

[*Count Andrassy continued :*] The first four points could and should be immediately carried out by the Sublime Porte ; the fifth by degrees, as soon as possible. [The indefinite promises of the Iradé of Oct. 2nd and Firman of Dec. 12th can only excite aspirations without satisfying them. Spring will see the insurrection revive. The only chance to avoid fresh complications is in a manifestation from the Powers, making firm their clear determination to arrest the movement which menaces to involve the East. This end cannot be obtained by the simple measure of an injunction addressed to the Governments of the Principalities, and to the Christian subjects of the Sultan. It is absolutely necessary that the Powers should be in a position to appeal to acts, that their action may be grounded on facts and not on programmes. The greatest difficulty is the Christians' deeply-rooted distrust of every promise of the Porte. It is therefore absolutely necessary to obtain from the Sultan's Government, by means of an official Commission, the confirmation of his intentions with regard to the whole Empire, and his acceptance of the points specified above, the special object of which is the pacification of the revolted Provinces.] Undoubtedly the Christians would not by this method obtain the form of guarantee they appear to demand at this moment, but they would find a relative security in the very fact that the reforms accorded would be recognised as indispensable by the Powers, and that the Porte would have pledged itself to Europe to carry them into execution. Such is the firm conviction resulting from a preliminary exchange of ideas between the Cabinets of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany. [The Austrian Ambassador was] directed to bring this view of the case to the Court of St. James, and to obtain its concurrence in the work of peace, the success of which our efforts tend to assure. If, as I hope, the views of the English Government accord with our own, we should propose, out of consideration for the dignity and independence of the Porte, not to address our advice to the latter in the form of a Collective Note, but to confine ourselves to inviting our Representatives at Constantinople to act conjointly, and in an identic manner towards the Sultan's Government in the sense of what we have set forth.—*Andrassy Note.*²

On Jan. 19th the decision of the English Cabinet to give a "general support" to the Note was made known "by a sort of

¹ See *ante*, p. 232, as to the Iradé of Oct. 2nd, and p. 255, as to the Firman of Dec. 12th.

² *Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 55.

communiqué to the London daily papers,"¹ and on Feb. 13th Sir Henry Elliot wrote² that four out of the five points had been unreservedly accepted by the Porte, and the object aimed at by the remaining point (the application of the produce of the taxes to local purposes) was to be attained by another arrangement. Thus it might well seem to the English public that the English Government had actually engaged in a policy of controlling the exercise of Turkish sovereignty over the revolted Provinces, a policy therefore, which, so far as it went, was one of Emancipation; and moreover, that this policy was succeeding.

The significance of the step, however, was not quite what it appeared to be on the face of it.³ In not holding aloof from the communication to be made by the other Powers, the English Government was acting in accordance with the expressed desire of the Porte,⁴ and in notifying the step to Sir Henry Elliot, Lord Derby took care to point out that

Her Majesty's Government do not therefore consider that the proposals of Count Andrassy conflict with the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris; they look on them as being in the nature of suggestions or recommendations for adoption by the Porte in its endeavours to put an end to the insurrection, and as not involving any interference in the relations existing between the Sultan and his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his Empire.⁵

Moreover, Lord Derby's acquiescence appears to have been given in exchange for an assurance by Count Beust that if the suggestions were carried into effect, the Austrian Government would use their best exertions to prevent the spread of the movement and to induce the insurgents to submit, or, should they persist in continuing the struggle, would effectually preclude them from receiving assistance from beyond the frontier.⁶

In the comments of the Press while the negotiations were pending, a disposition may be traced to criticise the transaction from several standpoints. There were some who protested against any interference with Turkish sovereignty; others were averse to England's mixing herself in engagements of which they

¹ *Spec.* Jan. 22nd, 1876.

² *Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 93.

³ "The British Cabinet reluctantly assented to its form, but carefully repudiated the meaning which could alone give to it any value."—Argyll, i. p. 167.

⁴ *Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 60. Elliot to Derby, Jan. 13th.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 73. Derby to Elliot, Jan. 25th.

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 72.

did not see the end, and which might in certain contingencies involve her in the disagreeable necessity of imposing a settlement on the unwilling Provincials; some took exception to England's being asked to concur in a document which she had had no hand in framing, but on the whole the action of the English Government was approved as a step in the right direction.

[At the treaty between England and France at the outbreak of the Crimean War each renounced territorial gain. A European intervention in Turkey on this basis we have no moral right to oppose.]—*D. T.* Nov. 5th.

[If the three Powers and Turkey agree upon some scheme, which the insurgents refuse, this will place the insurgents in the wrong, and the Great Powers would have to range themselves on the side of Turkey.]—*D. T.* Nov. 8.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* puts the "Jehad" argument in an article entitled "What the Turk can do."

"Nothing but a foreign army occupation can save Herzegovina from the risk of a catastrophe," said the *Times* the other day in one of those articles which do such extraordinary mischief abroad and at home. But suppose the Turk's answer is—"Nothing on earth shall hinder a foreign occupation of Herzegovina from being a catastrophe to Europe." If this occupation were commenced the Sultan would have it in his power to put all Europe into turmoil by precipitating the Eastern Question before the Great Powers were prepared. The Sultan both from his political and *Pope-like* position is able and almost certain to make a desperate resistance.—*P. M. G.* Nov. 22.

Mr. E. A. Freeman argued against the supposition that Turkey would make any serious resistance to armed intervention, and characterised the notion as an "after-thought."—*In P. M. G.* Dec. 15.

A leading article in the *Times* is significant of the manner in which many were prepared to accept the situation.

We should criticise the Note on its merits, and though it might have been more polite to call us in while the negotiations were yet in progress we should not let this stand in the way. [The three principles involved are :—1. The continuation of the Porte's authority (nominally at any rate). 2. The introduction of reforms. 3. Security for their enforcement.] On the first point there is not likely to be any difference of opinion. Whatever may be the ambition of Russia, or the fancies of some Austrian politicians, it is recognised as the basis of European action that the countries comprised within what is known as the Turkish Empire shall not be appropriated by any neighbour. . . . The phrase, "the integrity of the

Turkish Empire," still expresses a recognised principle, inasmuch as no province is to be broken off from the main body and transferred to the Military Empires in its neighbourhood. [With regard to the second point, it is a question whether the reforms proposed by the Emperors shall be preferred to those granted in the recent Firman. They can hardly be *wider*, though it is certainly true that they may be more practically useful in consequence of being more *definite*. Really the important point is the third—the question of *guarantees*; this if insisted upon must in reality amount to an infringement of the perfect independence of Turkey as recognised in the Treaty of 1856. The ninth article of the treaty would thus most certainly be completely rescinded, and this Turkey will certainly plead.] We state the case thus plainly. . . because we are prepared to urge that the proviso of the treaty should be rescinded, that the Powers should intervene if necessary, in the common interest, and that the Turkish State should be considered as needing the tutelage of Europe.—*T.* Dec. 24th.

An actual or supposed suggestion that it was advisable that England should hold entirely aloof, as well as the suggestion that by adopting the line of policy contemplated by the Andrassy Note the Powers would be contravening their Treaty obligations, elicited a protest of some importance from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

The *Times* has been advocating inaction in regard to Turkey. This is not a just conclusion to arrive at from the acknowledged grounds that Turkey is weak, misgoverned and fanatical. Some of the Turkish ministers have the prudence to bend rather than to break under a serious pressure from without for reforms, nor is the Mussulman population so unmanageable as to cause serious alarm lest these reforms could not be carried out. [The necessary measures are:]—A superintendence of mixed organisation internally, and a joint conventional pressure from without. . . . These measures reduced to a system would doubtless amount to tutelage; but the Turkish Empire has long been virtually in that state, which if it had been steadily, as of right, enforced, would have saved the Porte from its present embarrassments. . . . Stress has been laid in some newspaper articles on that clause in the Treaty of Paris which has an air of binding the Powers to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey. But the engagement is, in truth, limited and conditional. The Christian plenipotentiaries promised only that the communication of the Sultan's reforms should not be held to warrant such interference. But other rights to interfere belong to the Powers, especially to those who either sided with the Porte in a moral sense, or spent their money and shed their blood for the Sultan's cause in the Crimean War.—*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's letter in T. Jan. 3rd, 1876.*

The *Times*, on the eve of a Cabinet Council, thinks we ought to join with the other Powers; it would be a serious matter to encourage Turkey to resist, by refusing to do so.—(Jan. 17th.)

The course of the *Daily Telegraph* was peculiar, and it already evinces indications of a disposition to attempt to infer, from the course of diplomacy, an obligation to render active assistance to Turkey.

It hopes the Porte will reject the Note, and rather lose part of its territory, than consent to have its full right of sovereignty cut down.—(Dec. 28th, 1875.)

It speaks of Andrassy's reforms as proceeding on Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's principle—the need of something more than the Sultan's pledge—and calls them statesmanlike, moderate, and practical. No hostile criticism is to be feared from England, France or Italy.—(Jan. 4th, 1876.)

It anticipates the plan will commend itself to English public opinion, Jan. 13th; but again, it asks whither is the Note leading us? To the erasure of another clause in the Treaty of Paris? It still professes the hope, however, that the Government may see their way honourably to join.—(Jan. 17th.)

It speaks of the obligation of the signatories of the Note, if the insurgents reject the olive branch, to afford their sympathy to Turkey, if nothing more.¹—(Jan. 23rd and 27th.)

From another point of view the Note was criticised as not likely to be effectual.

If the details of the telegram are authentic a great wrong will have been done—just hopes will have been raised only to be disappointed. [If the recommendation of administrative reforms means nothing more than a recommendation, it] is as if we recommended the lion to eat straw and as if the lion promised to eat it. . . . The Powers can preserve peace in one way, by setting free the revolted lands—no other way can preserve it.—*E. A. Freeman*, *P. M. G.* Jan. 7th.

The *Spectator* recognises it as a redeeming featnre that the adhesion of England is a second warning to the Turkish Government (the first having been the purchase of the Suez Canal shares), that they are not to rely on British support in every event.—(Jan. 22nd.)

¹ *Punch*, Jan. 29th, has a cartoon entitled "Turkey Pie." Britannia, besitating to join the three Emperors, "Well really—I suppose I must—Good gracious—what would Pam have said!" Also "A passage from an International Drama."

First Emperor. . . . Pray sit down.

Britannia (firmly). But my little business transaction with the Khedive?

First Emperor. Is forgiven—nay, approved.

Britannia (hesitating). And my traditional policy?

First Emperor. Is forgotten.

[And if all our kind friends in the rest of Europe are but pleased with our present disinterested arrangements, Austria, Russia, Germany and England, ought to live happy ever after!]

Two magazine articles may be specially noted as signs of the times, showing the discrediting of the traditional policy of supporting Turkey. In one, Mr. Freeman put the whole anti-Turkish case, and appealed to Public Opinion to support an Emancipation policy.¹ From quite a different point of view a writer in *Blackwood's Magazine* abandoned the tradition of supporting the independence and integrity of Turkey.

The sacred duty involved in that phrase "the balance of power" and its preservation, which was perpetually present to the minds of our immediate fathers has now lost nearly all its significance. . . . No sooner was peace established [in 1856], and non-interference secured by treaty, than all objections to the protectorate were put in abeyance, and all notion of Turkish independence, which it was the object of the war to assert, was practically forgotten. Russia, France, and England have interfered in Turkey *ad libitum*. . . . Turkish Independence is a mere diplomatic expression. . . . Under these circumstances it would seem that England's interest in this Eastern Question is far less relatively to other Powers than it was in 1853. She has ceased to be a contentious disputant. . . . It would seem that Russia is as anxious as we can be to delay a crisis. Both Powers therefore approach the subject with radically different views from those which prevailed twenty years ago. England no longer affects to believe in the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; it is in a condition of moral, financial, and administrative decay. Whether the disaffected provinces achieve their independence under the guarantee of other Powers, whether Austrian occupation ensues, or whether a viceroy appointed by the Powers supersedes Turkish misrule, there is nothing to invite the active intervention of England. . . . England will probably regard the question and its remote contingencies from the point of view of a great Asiatic Power, the integrity of whose empire depends on the supremacy of the seas and the security of its route to India. Whatever M. John Lemoinne may say about cynical selfishness and indifference to political morality, the day is past when England will go to war to support the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. [After an allusion to the alliance and jealousies between the three empires, the writer continues] We believe it to be a wise policy for England to dissociate herself as much as possible from these old world intrigues, and from busying herself with the vicissitudes of a decrepit and decaying empire like that of Turkey. —*Blackwood*, Jan. 1876.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* admits that ninety-nine persons out of a hundred would agree with Mr. Freeman's proposition that Turkish

¹ "The True Eastern Question," E. A. Freeman, *Fort. Rev.* Dec. 1875, *ante*, p. 78.

rule provokes and justifies insurrection. But they differ as to the certainty that the Turk would go peacefully if ordered out. For the present we must be content with palliatives.—(Dec. 10th, 1875.)

The singular resemblance between the situation at this juncture and the situation a few months back, when the Consular Mission was on foot, is only one instance among many of the periodic character of the whole series of events. We see in the conduct of the English Cabinet, in their protests that the action of the Powers in presenting the Note was to be taken as confined to offering advice, the same strong treaty-legalism, which characterised their attitude with respect to the action of the Consuls. As in the autumn, so now, the belief that the matter was “under care” tended to allay any feeling of keen interest or anxiety out of doors, and there was something like a general consensus approving the course which it was believed the Government had taken.

Since the acceptance by England of Count Andrassy’s Note, the interest in the immediate proceedings of diplomacy has declined. The public has been content to know that the Queen’s Government would not stand aloof at an important crisis in European politics, and thereby render any effective interposition difficult at a future time. . . . But the decision to support the proposed reforms having been once taken, it is felt to be only just to the Queen’s Government that it should be left to carry on the negotiation in its own way.—*T.* Feb. 2nd, 1876.

If, then, we endeavour briefly to review the situation at the eve of the meeting of Parliament, we may say that the Eastern Question certainly absorbed more attention than it had done six months before. Of course the total amount of political energy is greater in January than in August. But, on the other hand, the total amount of energy in this particular January was very small. We find everywhere references to the pervading dulness of the times.

The *Times*, writing on the political outlook of the New Year, says—that everything, except in Turkey, is so quiet that Europe might seem to be wrapped in profound peace.—(Jan. 3rd.)

The *Spectator* speaks of the Parliamentary recess then about to terminate as “the dullest we ever remember.”—(Feb. 5th.)

But of what political energy existed the Eastern Question probably absorbed the largest share. There had been an under-current of uneasy foreboding expressed by *Punch* in its New Year’s cartoon, in which Father Time appears pointing out its task to the

Infant 1876. That task is to deal with the great serpent which typifies the Eastern Question. The Turk, sick to death, lies grovelling on the ground, while over him hover threateningly the three Imperial eagles. But there was a general disposition to assume that the New Year had already performed its task by producing the Andrassy Note. The setting in of this comfortable belief that the matter was in the way of being satisfactorily arranged corresponds with the end of the recess, and marks the close of the second phase of the Incubation Period.

CHAPTER IX.

INCUBATION PERIOD.

THIRD PHASE (TO THE AWAKENING OF PUBLIC OPINION).

§ 1. *Opening of Parliamentary Session 1876. Mr. Gladstone's Speech cuts the Liberal Party adrift from the Policy of supporting Turkey.*

THE meeting of Parliament which took place on February 8th, 1876, was calculated to bring out and define the attitude of the political parties towards the question of Turkey and the subject provinces. Hitherto, although, as we have seen, a great diversity of view was apparent, notions of all shades from red to violet finding expression some here some there, yet these differences did not run with the lines of party cleavage. Neither Liberals nor Conservatives as such were identified with the notions represented by any particular part of the scale. The only matter in which there had been a tendency to party criticism of the action of the Government was the purchase of the shares, and this is hardly an exception; for though it is true that many were inclined to draw the inference that the Government had definitely abandoned the policy of defending Turkey, yet it was not to this aspect of the matter that the criticism was directed. But now the time had come when the Government must subject the matters which had been occupying them during the recess to the scrutiny of the organised parliamentary Opposition, and when the organised parliamentary Opposition must in the face of the world take their line in reference to two specific questions of foreign policy—the question of the shares, and the general policy of the Government with regard to the Eastern Question as evidenced by their conduct respecting the Andrassy Note. If we add to these two questions the debates arising out of the Slave Circulars and the Royal Titles Bill, we have named all the matters of general policy which excited

any kind of Parliamentary interest until we come to the events subsequent to the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, when opinion was passing beyond the incubation stage.

With the discussion in Parliament on the purchase of the shares we have already dealt. As to the Andrassy Note, there was but little before Parliament met to indicate the line that parties would take; but the general impression was that the Government had determined to sanction the policy of extorting from Turkey securities for the good government of the provinces, and it was thought not impossible that the Opposition might identify themselves with the traditional "red" policy, and attack the Government on the ground that they were countenancing interference with Turkey.

The *Spectator* anticipates that the Opposition may give trouble in regard to Foreign Affairs. But fortunately for the Government, many of the old Whigs like Earl Russell, and in some as yet unknown degree Mr. Gladstone himself, have a strong sympathy with an insurrection against the Turkish Power, and therefore, presumably, will support the Government in the policy which (as the *Spectator* then supposed) the Andrassy Note has inaugurated.—(Jan. 12th.)

On the eve of the meeting of Parliament we find the *Times* anxiously deprecating any attack from a pro-Turkish position on the part of the Opposition.

[Turkey would be quick to catch at any words of encouragement, and she might be fatally deceived if a powerful minority in the House of Commons were to censure Lord Derby's conduct. An Opposition, as well as the Ministry, is responsible for the exercise of English influence abroad. There is no reason to think Lord Hartington will be less prudent than Mr. Disraeli was during the American War;] but it is more difficult to foresee what might be done by some of his followers who are proud of their freedom from control. It is unfortunate also, that the Liberal Party in the House of Commons has so few masters of foreign affairs—Mr. Gladstone is apt to look purely at the theology or finance of other countries, Mr. Forster is absorbed in the 25th Clause of the Elementary Education Act; and although Mr. Grant Duff carries about with him a large magazine of facts, he does not apparently know what to do with them. [In giving a general support to the Andrassy Note, Lord Derby has made no change in the ends of our Eastern Policy, though the means differ from time to time. In the case of Syria, Lord Russell, speaking for the Ministry of Lord Palmerston,] the statesman who is regarded as the very incarnation of our Eastern Policy, [proposed to make a change greater than any as yet suggested by the Andrassy Note, by virtually seeking to render the province independent of Constantinople.

True, twenty years ago no English statesman would have sanctioned the Andrassy Note, but] the paradoxes of twenty years ago are the commonplaces of to-day, for we have all reached a new climate of opinion. . . . The Liberal Party will be false to one of its most honourable traditions if it should forget some less strictly political facts [It] has some reason to boast of the support which it has given to oppressed populations. But the sufferings of the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Italians were slight compared with the detestable oppression which the Christians of Turkey have for ages suffered.—*T.* Feb. 7th.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* commenting on this article complains that while the Note was under consideration the *Times* minimised, whereas now they maximise, the significance of the English Government's assent.

All this anxious deprecation of possible hostility and all this eagerness to defend the Cabinet against apparently improbable criticism is and can only be a part of the same policy—the policy which seeks to draw the English Government beyond the line which they have marked out for themselves, and to do so in the most insidious of all ways, namely, by insinuating that whether they like it or not, they have overstepped that line already. [The writer hopes the Government will not be so drawn on.]—*P. M. G.* Feb. 7th.

The official leaders of the Opposition in the debates on the Address in both Houses, showed at least a certain uneasiness as to how far the action of the Government could be reconciled with the sovereign rights of Turkey and our treaty obligations, and seemed half inclined to constitute themselves the champions of Treaty Legalism, and to join battle on this ground. But any such disposition was checked by the remarkable speech in which Mr. Gladstone offered his support to Mr. Disraeli's Government in carrying on an Emancipation policy.

Lord Granville wished to know whether we had any part in the negotiations which led the three Powers to frame the Note, or were we only consulted when the Note was settled? The next question, of the gravest importance, was whether the Note did or did not infringe the provisions of the Treaty of 1856 as revised in 1871? He thought that what they learnt to have been done disclosed no infringement, and that neither Lord Clarendon nor Lord Palmerston ever considered that the treaty precluded us from attempting in common with other Powers to obtain from the Porte the fulfilment of the promises admittedly embodied in the treaty.

Lord Derby was aware that the course the Government had adopted might be attacked from two opposite points of view.

Some might think any interference in the internal affairs of Turkey indefensible on principle, and in breach of treaty engagements. His answer was twofold. In the first place *volenti non fit injuria*. In the next place he did not think treaty obligations applied to such a case as the present. "You do not as a rule enter your neighbour's house without his leave; but if his house is on fire, if he cannot or will not put it out, and if the fire is likely to spread, you are not likely to be scrupulous about committing a trespass." On the other hand, there were many persons whose opinion was deserving of all respect, who think nothing ought to be done to avert the general break up of the Turkish Empire. But this was not a matter within our own power; and if without committing ourselves too deeply we could stave off a war between the Mahometan and Christian populations of Turkey, we should have done a good work for ourselves, for Turkey, and for civilisation.—*H. of L.* Feb. 8th.

Lord Hartington said no doubt a step had been taken in the direction of increasing the independence of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which was likely ultimately to favour a solution of the difficulty, though not in the direction indicated by Lord Palmerston, namely, reform of the Turkish administration. "I am not disposed to raise any preliminary objection to the action which Her Majesty's Government has taken. I have no doubt that as far as it was in their power they have taken steps to maintain the independence of the Porte." He thought Lord Palmerston, who was himself one of the greatest supporters of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would not have been averse to such interference as appeared to have taken place. He cited his dictum to the effect that the reference in the Treaty of Paris to the Firman gave the Allied Powers (if the Firman should remain unexecuted) "that moral right of diplomatic interference and remonstrance with the Sultan which I am perfectly convinced would be quite sufficient to accomplish the desired purpose."¹ He trusted the papers would show that the intervention had not exceeded those limits pointed out by Lord Palmerston on that occasion.

Mr. Disraeli said if we had refused to sanction the Andrassy Note, we should have placed ourselves in a state of isolation, and the Sultan would probably have rejected it; it would not do for us then to tell the Sultan we gave him advice, but were not prepared to support him when he acted on it. Besides, it was the desire of the Porte, however much they might be opposed to receiving such a Note, that if such a Note was presented England should not stand aloof. The fear that England was embarked on an intervention without limit was groundless. If this attempt should fail, England was quite free; and would act "as far as her present administration is concerned, as becomes those who wish to maintain the Empire

¹ Quoted from Lord Palmerston's speech in the debate on the Treaty of Paris, *H. of C.* May 6th, 1856.

of England, its independence and its freedom in all those quarters which are affected by this great controversy."

Mr. Gladstone said he had no authority, nor did he assume to explain, but he could not discover the implied censure which some members appeared to think Lord Hartington suggested on the Government for adhering to the Andrassy Note. The reasons given by Mr. Disraeli were enough to justify them, but he hoped the Premier did not intend to convey that there were no other, and broader and deeper motives for the step, than those he had assigned. At any rate he wished to explain his own view of the position. To do so he must go back to the Crimean War. Lord Palmerston knew that a redress of grievances within the Turkish Empire was a vital and essential condition of its integrity and independence. The war would never have been entered on, anxious as people were to stop Russian aggression, unless they thought they had conclusive guarantees for the redress of their grievances. The solemn instrument by which the Sultan pledged himself was one of the fundamental facts. His proposition was that after all this it was impossible to fold our arms and say the relations of the Sultan and his Christian subjects are no concern of ours. "I am most grateful, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government instead of being actuated by that principle, a principle totally inconsistent with the facts of history and the most obvious and elementary obligations of national duty, have given in their adhesion to the Austrian Note." He would not enter into the question whether or not the promises of the Ottoman Government had been shamelessly broken, but if they had really failed in their fulfilment, Europe would expect some other sort of security.

Mr. Butler Johnstone complained that Mr. Gladstone, under cloak of approving the Government, recommended a policy directly contrary to theirs.—*H. of C.* Feb. 8th.

The importance of Mr. Gladstone's speech is very great. It cut the official leaders of the Liberal party adrift from the old policy. The result of the debate seemed, in spite of a protest here and there that the intentions of the Government were entirely misunderstood, to be that the old policy was to be abandoned by the Government, with the hearty approval of the bulk of the Liberal party, even if there was some disposition to hesitate on the part of the Opposition leaders. It is evident that if Earl Granville and Lord Hartington had definitely decided to stickle for the independence of the Porte, as something which precluded the European Powers from recognising and dealing with the deep-seated causes of the revolt, they would entirely have failed to carry not only the country, but a great part of their party with them. There were not wanting clear indications that it was from Mr. Gladstone that the bulk of the independent Liberal party would take its cue, and

this not because they were prepared blindly to follow his lead, but because they were already inclined to be in sympathy with the views which he enunciated.

Lord Hartington spoke in a tone similar to that of Lord Granville. . . . On the other hand, the remarkable speech of Mr. Gladstone makes up for any coldness or reserve on the part of the recognised leaders of the Liberal party. . . . Mr. Gladstone's generous language will find an echo among every class of his countrymen. He showed last night that he still represents the Liberal party in one of their most worthy qualities—their hatred of tyranny and oppression wherever they are to be found. His speech proves that if the Government proceed in the undertaking they have begun, they need fear no hindrance from the Liberal Opposition.—*T. Feb. 9th.*

The foreign policy of Great Britain may be drifting, as it usually is, but it is drifting in a direction which, in our judgment, Liberals may cordially approve. We hold that according to the settled principles of that party, they ought to wish that Turkish rule in Europe should finally cease. . . . The termination of their rule, either by insurrection or external attack, is a result as much to be desired as the overthrow of Bourbon rule in Naples, and this country is bound to desist from giving it further help.—[The writer then reviews the chief speeches at the opening debate, and after speaking of Lord Granville, continues] Mr. Gladstone, however, who, not being an aspirant for office was less bound by diplomatic reserves, was more outspoken, and his speech, we trust, will yet prove to be only the first expression of the awakened conscience of his party.—*Spec. Feb. 12th.*

Thus we note as the result of the meeting of Parliament the fact that Mr. Gladstone introduces as it were a powerful reagent into the floating and inchoate body of Liberal party opinion, which at once causes it to precipitate itself. And thus the Liberal party gives up the legalistic interpretation of the Treaty of Paris and the policy of supporting Turkey, and becomes thenceforth prepared to offer a frank support to the policy of favouring some measure of emancipation for the Provincials. We note too that Mr. Gladstone came to the front as in a special sense the spokesman of this new development of the party policy. Of his speech on the opening night of the session those showed themselves strangely and culpably forgetful who afterwards represented Mr. Gladstone as having lain by until he saw that a great storm of unpopularity might be directed against the friends of Turkey, and as then doing everything he could to arouse this feeling for the purpose of embarrassing the Government.

§ 2. *The Royal Titles Bill.*

Thus while the attitude of the Parliamentary Opposition was critical as to the purchase of the shares, and on the whole friendly to the part the Government was supposed to be taking in the Andrassy negotiations, on neither of these points did any lively Parliamentary contest arise. But there was a source of strife at hand.

The Queen's Speech, referring to the hearty affection with which the Prince of Wales had been received in his progress through India, stated that Her Majesty had been advised to assume, under the authority of a Bill to be brought in, a title derived from India. This proposal attracted little notice for a time, and the first impulse was to approve, though Earl Granville gave a signal of objection in his speech on the Address.

The public will be quick to credit Mr. Disraeli with this happy idea.—*T.* Feb. 9th.

But the more people looked at it the less they liked it, and before the matter was settled, it gave rise to much hostile newspaper criticism, and to the first warm Parliamentary contest since the General Election.

One effect was to divert attention from the Eastern Question, with which no one at the time dreamed it had any connection.

When it became definitely known that the title contemplated was that of "Empress," the feeling of distaste became noticeable. The arguments then brought forward against the measure fell mainly into two categories.

First there was the *æsthetic* argument, that the step was in bad taste. It was said that Disraeli was going to "electro-plate the Crown." It was pointed out that "Emperor" was a title unfortunately associated with the enterprise of political adventurers, and that by its adoption something would be lost of that historic dignity which formed the truest support of the Crown of England.¹

Next there was the *constitutional* argument. This treated the violence done to historic traditions, as something more than an affair of good or bad taste. The step was an innovation; apparently in the direction of personal government; and the danger of such an innovation might rebound on the Crown itself.

¹ See *Punch*, April 1st (cartoon): "No, no, Benjamin, it will never do! You can't improve on the old 'Queen's Head!'" See also at p. 128 parody of "King John," Act. iv. sc. 2.

The important thing for us to notice about this controversy is that it was the first instance in which Mr. Disraeli's Government showed any determination to withstand any strong expression of out-of-door opinion. To be sure, Mr. Disraeli asked for evidence that Public Opinion was opposed to their measure, but the Government had given way to less pressure in the cases of Mr. Plimsoll and the Slave Circulars; and this determination on the part of the Government relentlessly to apply their majority was a somewhat unexpected development. Mr. Disraeli took occasion to enunciate doctrines about prerogative which most people, though they might have been prepared for his enunciation of them by various passages in his writings and speeches, regarded as heterodox. What is more, under the shelter of these doctrines he withdrew from Parliament the selection of the actual title to be assumed. There was an under-current of suggestion about the whole affair, that the personal wish of the Monarch was to be conclusive.

Again, the matter served to bring Mr. Disraeli into prominence as distinguished from the rest of the Cabinet. For no one doubted that his was the moving spirit.¹

Lastly, by his speech on the third reading, Mr. Disraeli astonished everybody by advocating the measure as a counterblast to the advance of Russia in Asia.

[Mr. Pease has said the title of Empress has been rejected by the country.] I say you ought to be able to give some proof of this. However artificial may be the organisation by which [petitions] are produced, they still, to a certain extent, represent public feeling. . . . [There has been no petition]. . . . Have there been public meetings? . . . I remember asking Mr. Walter—father of one of our colleagues now in the House of Commons. . . . “How do you ascertain what is Public Opinion?” He said, “Well, the way I ascertain Public Opinion is this. Petitions may be got up, and meetings may be got up, or the country may feel a good deal without expressing its opinion either by petitions or public meetings; but there is an infallible test, and that is the post-bag.” . . . Mr. Walter then had the conduct of one of the most powerful journals of the country—those journals which it is now the fashion to quote in the House of Commons—it never was done when I first entered it. He said, “I receive a hundred letters a day and more when there is anything stirring in the country. And I thus understand and find out what is Public Opinion from the post-bag. It is that which tells me what the feeling of the country is, and I know it before petitions or public meetings. They follow it.” Well, I think a Minister of State has as many

¹ See Clayden, p. 196 and following, for details of the progress of the Bill.

letters as the editor of a newspaper. [He proceeded to quote two which he had received; one from a school-girl, who gave her geography-book as an authority for the title Empress of India; the other from a Nonconformist minister, who quoted to the same purpose *Whitaker's Almanac*]. . . . The frontiers of Russia, I will not say a rival Power, but the frontiers of Russia, are only a few days' march from those of Her Majesty in India. . . . This announcement . . . will signify in a manner which cannot be mistaken, that the Parliament of England is resolved to uphold the Empire of India.¹—*Mr. Disraeli, H. of C. March 23rd.*

This extraordinary announcement was received with astonishment and irritation, slightly qualified by amusement and incredulity. A mine had been sprung upon the unsuspecting public. Now, as if by an electric flash, a number of ideas hitherto quite disconnected were fused together; and a new light was cast on the Government policy.

Few after once reading them, will be likely to forget the pages in which Mr. Kinglake has described the growth of the *Times* as a political power.²

In the present day it may be said that to breathe words of peace amidst anger, of confidence amidst panic, to prophesy, as long as possible, smooth things, to avert by a timely repudiation the evil effects of any proceeding scandalous to the national feeling, or dangerous to the national stability, is, in the main, its mission. And there are certain special moments when, raised by a distinct sense of danger and responsibility, it seems to rise to its grandest height.

Ac veluti magno in populo cum sæpe coorta est
Seditio, sævitque animis ignobile vulgus;
Jamque faces et saxa volant, furor arma ministrat;
Tum, pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant,
Ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet.

At such times the great newspaper is wont to publish its words

¹ The annexation of the Khokand by Russia in February had attracted some attention, and on May 5th Mr. Baillie Cochrane brought the matter forward in the House of Commons. The debate is chiefly remarkable for the repudiation by Mr. Disraeli of the Russophobic views which the speech just alluded to had caused to be attributed to him. The *Times* reviewing this debate says:—Be quiet and keep your eyes open is the real lesson taught by the discussion. It doubts whether there was a single speech which were not better unspoken. Disraeli's indeed may do some good. "But this is principally because it may serve to correct the false impression created by his speech on the third reading of the Royal Titles Bill a month ago." (May 6th.)

² Vol. ii. pp. 233-241, Cab. Ed.

of grave and earnest remonstrance on two consecutive days. Such an occasion had come now.

At the last stage of the Royal Titles Bill in the House of Commons Mr. Disraeli has produced the single real argument he has advanced in its favour, and it is with profound regret we feel constrained to say that the revelation thus tardily vouchsafed makes the proposal more dangerous than ever. The Bill is put forward as the first step in a new policy of coping with the advance of the Russian power in Asia. . . . The thing is almost inconceivable but it is true. It is with a feeling of painful foreboding that we protest against a policy conceived in a spirit of unparalleled recklessness, to the adoption of which Parliament is sought to be committed by a method which may be used for the education of a party, but must not be permitted to hoodwink the nation.—*T.* March 24th.

The Prime Minister on Thursday night quoted testimony well known to ourselves as to the way public opinion may be tested. . . . We speak upon evidence that cannot be misunderstood, when we say we do not remember an occasion when the repulsion excited by the conduct of a Minister has been more strongly marked and more decisive. . . . The First Minister of the Crown has affixed to the Royal Titles Bill a significance quite unwarranted by anything . . . said during the progress of the proposal through the House of Commons. . . . The serious question before us now is, by what means is this fatal policy to be checked, of which the Prime Minister boasts this measure to be the exponent. . . . The Emperor Alexander is a man of ability, and would laugh at this absurdity, but that he must needs think the Prime Minister of England cannot intend this empty defiance to stand by itself. . . . Do Mr. Disraeli's colleagues know the purport of his designs, and do they approve them? These are momentous questions, and they are not put forward lightly nor without a cause.—*T.* March 25th.

It will be noticed that the criterion of public opinion put forward by Mr. Disraeli and accepted by the *Times*, is at most only a criterion of one level of public opinion, namely, the opinion of those in the habit of writing letters. Now there seemed to be some indication that there was a stratum of opinion that would *not* view with dislike the adoption of the more grandiose designation in question. The speech of Lord Salisbury on the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords on March 30th showed a distinct disposition to meet any such display of feeling in the country half way, and to recede from the position taken by ministers in their pledges to both Houses, that the Imperial title was only for use in India.¹

¹ "For external application only" (Lord Rosebery in the debate of April 3rd).

At the commencement of his speech Lord Salisbury threw the *onus probandi* on those who objected to the new title. This seems like an abandonment of the point of view of genuine Conservatism. In fact in Lord Salisbury's speech we discover (though not very clearly marked) the two chief features of the new political growth that began to attract attention: the first, an unsettling of constitutional landmarks; the second, an appeal to a grade of opinion lower than that which may be considered as educated. And these correspond with the two lines of argument brought against the Bill, namely, that it was unconstitutional and that it was vulgar.

We may date from this time a new view of the Government, or rather of a section of the Government of which Mr. Disraeli was the head. We have seen that hitherto one of the notions about Mr. Disraeli had been that he was to oppose reactionary measures. People said "he is no Tory," meaning that there was nothing bigoted or reactionary about him. But from the time when people directed attention to the Royal Titles Bill, and especially after the Bill was transferred to the House of Lords, we find considerations of a quite other description urged. People became aware that they were witnessing a new political birth. The elements that met in this new birth were two. The first was the attempt to ground on the feelings and prejudices of the "residuum" a structure of personal government. And the second was the finding a special field for the exercise of this personal government in the department of foreign affairs. As yet this second element was not seen. And yet it was faintly foreshadowed in that sentence in which the Premier connected the new title with the repression of the Russians in Asia. And so people began to revise their political nomenclature. By degrees they began to apply the name Tory in its older and more proper sense, and to recognise that it was possible to be a Tory without being a Conservative, and *vice versâ*.

[The Tory party *ought* to dislike innovation.] Mr. Disraeli may reply, and justly, that he never was a Tory, that he only finds brains for the Tories. . . But we may rely upon it that though he is Conservative of nothing, the English people is Conservative of many things. . .—*Spec.* March 11th.

[Mr. Disraeli conceived very early in his career the notion of] a policy which should magnify the Crown on the one hand, and the wishes of the masses on the other, and should make light of the constitutional limitations on either. [It proceeds to point out the difficulties in the way of such a policy in England, owing to the continuity of classes and the strength of Conservative

feeling.] But Mr. Disraeli never was a Conservative, and cannot appreciate this Conservatism.—*Spec.* April 8th.¹

Had any ordinary person been asked, a year ago, what he thought about slaves taking refuge on board a Queen's ship, about the comparative value of Queens and Emperors, or about the wisdom of getting mixed up with the finances of States apt to be involved, he would have answered at once that the slaves could not be given up, that our Queen was worth all the Emperors in the world, and that the less we had to do with bankrupt exchequers the better. An unexpected violence to these feelings has constituted the staple and almost the whole work of more than a third part of the session. . . . Undoubtedly a change has come over the legislation of the country. A short time ago the nervous faction of the public had to shudder at a succession of grim realities. Political executions were the order of the day. Under the present ministry pleasing illusions have taken their place, and demonstrations warranted to mean as little as possible and end in nothing at all. . . . The most probable theory of our position is that Englishmen must be amused.—*T.* April 10th.

Most people are saying that the Government has suffered terribly since the reassembling of Parliament, and if we were living in 1866 most people would be right. [But as it is, public opinion does not matter, or rather it hardly exists. The agitation against the Royal Titles Bill is of the feeblest kind. The householders] sit watching Mr. Disraeli as if he were the leading player in a pantomime whom they had nothing to do but observe. . . . Keen and experienced observers say that this House of Commons differs from every other of recent years; that it has wonderfully little confidence in either party, that nobody has "got hold" of it yet; that it has not a notion what it wants, or whom it likes, or what it would prefer to do. . . . On many subjects, notably Egypt, ministers are as timid as if they knew they were leading a minority. The House puts no check upon them, but it gives them neither momentum nor support. As is the House, so, for all that appears, are the electors.].—*Spec.* April 8th.²

[No one knows the real feeling of the nation about the Royal Titles Bill. Probably the majority are apathetic.] We have never felt very much alarmed at the so-called danger of Democratic tyranny, but we should feel a great deal of alarm at the danger of Democratic indifference, of the people's complete abdication of the political government, while formally retaining it. . . . If you give, under the name of self-government, to the masses the right to decide on matters on which they entertain no wish and have no intention of expressing a wish, you get none of the advantages of self-government, and you get none of the advantages of arbitrary

¹ "English Imperialism."

² "The Tone of the House of Commons."

government. The people, of course, do not decide what they take no interest in, but they have all the responsibility of the decision which comes from some other quarter, and so they throw their ægis over those who do decide.—*Spec.* April 15th.¹

In the upshot, we notice a strong tendency to believe that the Government was thoroughly discredited, at least with the middle and educated classes.

Mr. Bagehot contrasted *Mr. Disraeli's* performance as the leader of a majority with his former exploits. "So far from being first-rate he was ninth-rate. He seemed to resemble those guerilla commanders who, having achieved great exploits with scanty and ill-trained troops, nevertheless, are utterly at a loss and fail when they are placed at the head of a first-rate army."—*Economist*, Aug. 1876.²

We may fully concede that *Disraeli* never appeared at his best except as the leader of a minority. But he had yet to exhibit himself as a master of one branch of the art, namely, as the leader of a minority of Public Opinion.

§ 3. *The Andrassy Note has not settled matters. Increasing recognition of the necessity of some intervention.*

Meanwhile the accounts which kept coming from the East showed that the *Andrassy Note*, too, had failed to solve the question. The insurgent leaders met at *Mostar* directly after the acceptance of the Note by the Sultan and agreed to continue the insurrection. At the same time the attitude of Austria towards the insurgents appears to have undergone a change. Her neutrality ceased to be "benevolent." Doles of food and money which had been given to the Christian refugees who had fled across the frontier were withdrawn, and more stringent measures were taken to starve the insurrection by preventing supplies from crossing the frontier. This change appears to have been entirely to the satisfaction of the English Foreign Office, and Public Opinion appears to have acquiesced,³ perhaps because it wished to be rid of the affair on any terms—perhaps because it assumed the "concessions" of Turkey, of which much was made, ought to content the insurgents—not a little, probably, from the utter discrediting of Turkey and the belief, at this time general, that the insurgents

¹ "The Dangerous Blanks in the Wishes of a Democracy."

² "Mr. Disraeli as a member of the House of Commons." Reprinted in *Bagehot's Biographical Essays*.

³ See *Fort. Rev.* April, 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs."

by their own strength could achieve their own freedom ; but most of all from the fact that little attention was paid to the matter. The policy of Austria at this time finds its expression in the instructions given to Baron Rodich, the Governor of Dalmatia.

[He was] intrusted with the double task of preventing the further entrance of sympathisers into Herzegovina, and negotiating with the insurgents themselves for an abandonment of their enterprise.—*T.* March 9th.

But the insurrection refused either to be starved out or lulled by persuasion. Some conferences took place, but Baron Rodich was not able to persuade the insurgent leaders that the concessions of the Porte and the proposed reforms were anything but illusory.¹

Therefore he published an address in which he rebuked the insurgents for the attitude they assumed. This address excited great irritation in Russia. A war between Russia and Austria was considered within the probabilities of the immediate future. It was rumoured that the Czar, oppressed by work, anxiety and constitutional melancholy, intended to abdicate. The accession of the Czarovitch, it was believed, would immensely strengthen the war party in Russia, where the semi-inspired press was beginning to declare that Turkey had failed in her promises, and that Russia would throw no obstacle in the way of the Provincials working out their own deliverance.

Meanwhile the insurgents gained some not unimportant successes in the field. Servia raised a forced loan and prepared to call out its militia. Roumania too began to arm.

¹ The demands of the insurgents when they met Baron Rodich appear to have been as follows :—

1. That one-third of the land should be made over to the Christian population.
2. The concentration of Turkish troops into certain specified garrisons, and the withdrawal of them from the rest of the provinces.
3. The resettlement of the refugees in their homes, the rebuilding of houses, churches, &c., with food for a year and freedom from taxation for three years.
4. The retention of arms by the Christian population until the Mussulmans should also be disarmed, and until the reforms promised were in process of execution.
5. The full association of the Christian leaders with the functionaries of the Government in the execution of the promised reforms.
6. That the funds devoted to the resettlement should be placed in the hands of a European Commission.

These conditions, save that the first is omitted, correspond pretty nearly with those published as the insurgents' demands, in the *Times* of April 8th (see Paris telegram).

The Duke of Argyll points out that these terms (with the omission of the first) formed the basis of the Berlin Memorandum. See his book, vol. i. p. 169 and following, for an account of these negotiations. It was sometimes said at this time that the insurgents demanded *autonomy* (*Spec.* Mar. 11th and April 29th), but this statement seems to be hardly justified by the facts.

It is pretty clear that during April some amount of attention was being excited again by the insurrection. People were beginning to recognise not merely that the Andrassy Note had failed, but that its failure must be the prelude to some further action.

[It is seldom that events follow one another in so strictly logical a manner as they have done since the presentation of the Andrassy Note.] The Porte was told that it must mend its ways, and, at the same time, that no matter how solemnly it might promise to mend them it would not be believed. Thereupon the Porte makes the required promises, and calls on the insurgents to lay down their arms. The insurgents reply that their estimate of the Porte's assurance is exactly that formed by the three Northern Powers; and that they decline to lay down their arms without some guarantee that they will really get what the Sultan has undertaken to give them. [Thereupon Austria] rates them soundly. [Russia ostentatiously abstains from seconding this act of Austria.] Matters have returned to the position they were in before the presentation of the Andrassy Note, except so far as the contents of that Note make it more difficult for the authors of it to allow events to go their own way. The effect, therefore, of the Andrassy Note has simply been to aggravate the symptoms which it was professedly designed to mitigate. . . Intervention of some sort therefore it seems as though there must be. . . A guarantee has to be provided which shall not only insure the execution of the reforms which the Porte has promised to concede to the revolted subjects, but insure it in such a way as shall content the conscience of the Russian people, and at the same time convince the Porte that its position will not be made permanently worse by assenting to it. Such a guarantee must be a military occupation of some kind, because nothing short of this can control Mahometans and Christians with an equally firm hand, or satisfy the insurgents and those who sympathise with them that they will not suffer by laying down their arms. Yet it must be such a military occupation as shall not appear to the Porte in the light of a thinly disguised invasion, or justify the fear that when the occupation is at an end it will turn out to have been only another name for dismemberment.—*P. M. G.* April 17th.

[The vague uneasy fear that something was going to happen, which prevailed in Eastern Europe last week was the natural consequence of the apparent failure of the prudent efforts made to smooth down the trouble in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Andrassy Note was a memorial of good intentions. It has not succeeded. We are so far removed from the agitation that we may think and speak of it without panic. Perhaps the Powers immediately surrounding will be content to "establish a cordon" and let the combatants settle their difficulties among themselves.

The Czar is believed to support this policy. We ought to be able to use our purely neutral position to remove any difference which might arise between Austria and Russia by recommending counsels in which both could agree.]—*T.* April 18th.

[Owing to Turkish bankruptcy the Christian populations have a better chance of delivering themselves than they ever had before. What is wanted is that the Powers should hold their hands and allow the Turk and the subject Christians to fight it out.] The Turk beaten, as beaten in the long run he would be, if those he has ground down so long are worthy to live at all, [we might get a solution satisfactory to Western Europe, which wants not Austria or Russia on the Bosphorus, but a new Southern Power, peacefully inclined and not aggressively strong.] If our statesmen were to grasp firmly what would be the best event for Europe from this struggle, and to take the side of the subject races as steadfastly as England ever took the side of the Turks, and take it in time, Turkey might be gradually dismembered, and yet Russia kept from exclusive domination on the Bosphorus. . . . It would be a policy worthy of the traditions of England . . . but we dare not hope to see it in these days. While the spirit of indifference is supreme at home, and suffers our destinies to be in the hands of a man who feels nothing in his heart of the greatness, the ambition, or the ancient renown of the realm, all that we can expect is histrionic make-believes that flutter Europe for a moment with excitement soon changing into the laughter of contempt. Yet as we write an opportunity appears to offer for an effective intervention in the interest of peace and the oppressed. . . . [The only satisfaction in contemplating England supine and without a policy is the notion that Russia on the Bosphorus would break up.]—*Fraser*, May, 1876.

At this point matters were precipitated by an event in Turkey, the first of a series that burst like so many thunderclaps upon the still half-drowsy ear of Europe. This was the massacre of the French and German Consuls at Salonica on May 6th. They fell in a religious riot—a riot which seemed to point to a growing restlessness of the Mahometan spirit under the apathy of the Sultan.

This event showed clearly enough the explosive condition of Turkey. But we find that a certain divergency manifested itself as to the inferences to be drawn from it. On the one hand it seemed to point to the necessity of interference. On the other hand we find coming into prominence as an argument against interference, the danger of arousing Mahometan fanaticism. This is a view much dwelt on by the *Pall Mall Gazette* about this time. The danger which was contemplated appears to have been two-fold. First, there was the danger of local outbreaks and massacres

of Christians; next, there was the danger of a Jihad, the fear that a united Islam, heated to madness by religious zeal, might turn upon its foes and bring about an internecine religious war on a tremendous scale. It was the first of these fears for which there now appeared to be most ground, and it was this which was most present to people's minds. It is impossible to avoid comparing it with the occurrences, not known in England as yet, that were actually taking place at the time.¹

[So far as we can judge the outbreak has no political significance. For a long time there has been a talk of deeds of violence on the part of the Turkish population. The first thought is that this is the first flash of the coming storm. There is reason to believe that the Turks are restless under the indignities to which their race and creed are exposed, and under the tutelage to which foreign Governments condemn them. It is not impossible that before the present political troubles end, as they only can end, in the weakening of the Sultan's hold on the provinces now in revolt, we may witness some outbreaks of Moslem fanaticism. But there is no proof that the fanatical fury of the crowd at Salonica was inspired by recent political events. It is a sort of thing that might have happened at any time.—*T.* May 9th.

The *Times* shortly, however, assumes a different tone; it speaks of "this momentous crisis in the affairs of Eastern Europe," of the fears of a general assault on the Christian population. "Travellers we are told are leaving *en masse*—resident Europeans are sending away their families. Such an event (as a massacre of Christians) would be the death-blow of the Turkish power. It would indeed be the most effectual solution of the Eastern Question. All lingering regard for the Sultan's independence, all hesitations caused by divergence of views and possibly by mutual distrust would vanish at once before the absolute necessity of putting an end at once to the crimes of a barbarian horde. We know how quickly an occupation by European troops followed the massacre in Syria. An occupation would ensue as quickly in the present case, and who could say whether it would ever come to an end? To such an operation on the part of Europe the Porte could offer no serious resistance. The days are past for a Jihad.—(May 13th.)

The immediate result of the Salonica occurrence was that it became necessary in the view of the European Powers to take steps in order to provide for the safety of European sojourners in Turkish ports, and accordingly a war-ship or two from each naval Power was sent to the scene of the disturbance. That this had been done was known almost simultaneously with the news of the

¹ The massacre of Batak took place on May 9th.

massacre. On May 18th it was announced by Lord Derby in the House of Lords that in consequence of communications received from our Ambassador at Constantinople, the Mediterranean fleet had been ordered to Besika Bay, that one ship had been sent to Salonica, and a gunboat to Constantinople.

While some amount of attention was thus being again drawn to the East, both by the persistence of the revolt and by the massacre of the Consuls, news came that the Chancellors of the three Empires had met at Berlin (May 9th), and that their conferences had continued during some days. Curiosity was excited about the scheme which they would propose. Would it be in the direction of "Order" or of "Emancipation"? No one seemed to imagine that England would stand in the way, if the Emperors had some scheme for securing the latter; and if in some quarters little was hoped in that direction from the new effort, it was not supposed that any obstacle would be interposed by England. It was thought not unlikely that England might repeat her adhesion to a futile Consular Mission, and a futile Andrassy Note, by an adhesion to a futile Berlin Memorandum.

The *Spectator* believes the autonomy of the discontented provinces will ultimately emerge at the Conference, as that which will divide the Powers the least.—(May 13th.)

The *Times* speculates as to the course the three Powers will adopt. Whatever end may seem good to them they cannot get it adopted unless they go the length of showing themselves ready to *enforce* it if need be; and the same telegrams that tell us that the three Powers have come to an agreement as to what should be done, give us to understand that this scheme of common action does not involve any employment, or even demonstration, of force. Thus nothing is really effected. It surely ought to be evident to all men that the Porte cannot execute the reforms that have been promised. . . . As for the part we are to play, we may, at all events, prevent a settlement being *delayed* while time is spent in the pursuit of unavailing measures of didactic remonstrance. It would seem, in fact, that there really is an opening for us to be useful. What Austria and Russia really need is a friend who will make them face the truth.—(May 15th.)

At this juncture there appeared a second letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which it appears was written before he had heard of the murders at Salonica.

With a hope that England will now at length take a more decided part in the Conference, and that the Conference, enlightened by recent experience, will extend its views to the full range of that question of which the Herzegovinian insurrection is only

a fragmentary exponent, I shrink not from placing on record an outline of such remedial measures as in my judgment offer the only prospect of bringing the Eastern difficulty to a peaceful solution. [He details seven specific reforms, and adds as the eighth] That the preceding articles shall be made the substance of a convention between the Sultan and his allies, the Mediating Powers, and that the effective execution of the same be placed under the superintendence of a mixed, responsible Commission.

[He goes on to say—The *right* of foreign Governments to carry their interference to this length is justified by the magnitude of the issues involved.] If something more positive in point of right is required we must take into account the Porte's unfulfilled engagements, the services, attended with much cost of life and treasure, which the Allies, or some of them at least, have rendered in recent times to the Empire, and the sacrifices which they are still eventually bound to make on its behalf. . . . [As to the danger of the resistance which Moslem fanaticism might offer], such a resistance is, no doubt, possible, but it would be full of danger to the Turks themselves, and the experience of a century encourages a very different expectation. Let it not be forgotten that the actual position of Turkey is one of tutelage displayed unmistakably from time to time. [He speaks of the serious consequences of a failure to come to some arrangement, and proceeds to say that *another* solution] if not more agreeable to the Porte, at least more decidedly remedial, has been thrown out quite recently by the public press. It was even described as likely to become an object of discussion at Berlin. Herzegovina and Bosnia might be put into a state of vassalage to the Sultan, similar to that in which Servia stands. A belt of such principalities, including Moldavia, Wallachia, and Montenegro, interposed between Russia and Austria on the one side and Turkey on the other, might operate as a protection to the Ottoman dominion in Europe, and a pledge of durable peace in that quarter. [The tribute arising from such States, if properly arranged, might relieve the Sultan of his financial difficulties.] When great interests are at stake, and the complications almost, if not quite, as great, the human mind, when not depressed by the difficulty, takes an unwonted spring, and, as in the famous example of antiquity, cuts the knot which it sees not the way to untie.—*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe* in *T.* May 18th.

§ 4. *Effect of the Rejection of the Berlin Memorandum on Public Opinion.*

Such were the expectations with which the result of the deliberations of the three Chancellors was awaited in England. That result was soon embodied in the celebrated Berlin Memorandum,¹ the

¹ *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 248, Enclosure 2 ; see Argyll, p. 192 and following.

effect of which may be indicated by saying that it pointed, perhaps a little more explicitly than had the Andrassy Note, to ulterior intervention of some kind. But the English Government was preparing a great surprise—and about May 20th it became known that Lord Derby had rejected the propositions of the three Emperors.¹

Hitherto there had been a general impression, founded on a belief that the European Powers were substantially agreed, that a solution of some kind or other would speedily be reached. But this act at once dispelled the pleasing illusion, and revealed a serious divergence of purpose between England and the three Emperors. But in what direction exactly the policy of England was diverging was as yet matter of conjecture. The papers were not laid before Parliament till the beginning of July,² and meanwhile Ministers refused to go beyond such very general statements as that they did not consider the proposals likely to effect the object in view. Questions were asked in both Houses on May 22nd. Lord Derby expressed his regret, and his inability to give further reasons, and denied that the Government had been at all influenced by the fact that they had not been consulted in framing the document.

There was a strong disposition to believe the Government had done right, but the grounds of approbation were very various. Though the wind was blowing from all round the compass, in some mysterious manner it seemed to be converted at every point into a favouring gale for the Government. In fact, Public Opinion was still docile, and inclined to the presumption that in a question of foreign affairs the Government of the day was right.

The mere fact that England had vindicated her importance was enough to win the suffrages of many. There was a very strong objection to the Holy Alliance's taking upon themselves to deal with the matter in this manner, instead of concerting their measures with the other Powers.

Of course the public was still very much in the dark as to the exact nature of the proposals made from Berlin. From rumours and telegrams two things mainly were gathered: there was to be an armistice and there was to be an International Commission. Was there any better hope from this than from former

¹ It is not unworthy of notice that the *Daily Telegraph* of May 18th was able to announce that the Berlin Memorandum would in all probability be rejected, giving as the reason that it was unfair, and adding that it was "becoming" for England to demand justice for the Turks.

² The *Times* of July 4th prints the full text of the Berlin Memorandum.

efforts which had proved futile? Accordingly we find at first a disposition to approve the decision of our Government in refusing to concur in the proposed scheme, on the ground that it was hardly likely to be effectual, and the Government was urged to come forward with a proposal for a real measure of emancipation. But this notion was short-lived, and speedily gave way to the impression that somehow the English Government had assumed an attitude of opposition to Russia, and of more or less support to the Turkish Government against her. The tendency of English Opinion to polarise about the two ends of the scale, or, to change the metaphor, to divide into two camps, a pro-Turkish and an anti-Turkish camp, begins to be recognised. Such a polarisation was clearly commencing at this time; and must be connected with the "erubescence," which, as we shall presently see, set in during the next few weeks. Thus the impression that in rejecting the Berlin Memorandum the English Government was actuated by a "violet" policy drops out, and gives place to the impression that they have in view something like an Anglo-Turkish alliance, which an important section of Public Opinion, it was evident, would be very far from approving.

[It cannot be the duty of England to stand irresolutely apart, and allow the fate of the East to be decided without her; and it will be neither honourable nor expedient to encourage the Sultan to a defiance in which we should certainly not support him in the hour of need. A temporary reserve must not be understood as an abnegation of England's position, or as an attempt to withstand a settlement.]—*T.* May 20th.

The *Daily News* regards the scheme of pacification as *incomplete*. The scheme looks as if it was put forward by Governments which want to gain time either for advancing some object which they are not yet prepared to avow, or to come to an understanding on points as to which they are not at present agreed. Our Foreign Office, however, cannot be asked to accept a Bill in blank, however respectable may be the drawers.—(May 20th.)

The *Spectator* says a Commission such as proposed, if ineffective, would drive the Christians to despair by increasing the hostility of their enemies; while if efficient, it would constitute an *imperium in imperio* of the worst kind.—(May 20th.)

If the consequences of accepting the new proposals of the Powers would be to kindle in half a dozen points throughout the Ottoman Empire the flame which has burst to the surface at Salonica, and since, it seems, at Piodor, the responsibility of pressing these proposals at Constantinople will be proportioned to the results which wait upon such a policy. [Probably the chief object of the recent meeting at Berlin was to decide what

should be done in the event of the refusal of the proposals. England is right in refusing her sanction if she has not been informed of the ulterior steps contemplated. Moreover the proposals themselves are probably] of a more stringent nature than those to which our Government gave a cautious and qualified adhesion in the Andrassy Note. [Moreover the Porte itself is opposed to them, so that] our accession to the side of those who are preparing to put such pressure on Turkey would have an entirely different meaning.—*P. M. G.* May 20th.

The *Post*, takes almost exactly the same line as the *Pall Mall Gazette*.—(May 20th.)

The position which the Government has assumed is not easily assailable. It is in accordance with a foreign policy which has been praised and practised by each Party in succession. . . . To avoid entangling alliances or engagements of which we cannot see the end is almost certainly safe, and does not want a certain air of dignity. . . [Lord Derby was right in saying that the Memorandum was not likely to effect its object. It sprang out of a divergency of sentiment between Austria and Russia.] Count Andrassy went to Berlin pledged to oppose Russian plans which tended to more or less radical changes, beginning with virtual tutelage of the Turkish Empire, and ending with its dismemberment. [In the result this more extreme scheme was abandoned, and the new scheme simply proposed to find guarantees for the execution of the reforms already formulated in the Andrassy Note. But the new scheme though Austrian in principle is Russian in detail, and the suspicions with which a British Minister may regard it arise from the probability that the details may overmaster the principle. But the *Times* trusts that their present inactivity will not be represented by our own Government, or understood by foreign Governments, as an abandonment of the position which was assumed by the Treaty of 1856, and maintained by the support of Count Andrassy's Note]. . . . The question is sometimes argued as if we had no further interest in Turkey because we have lost our illusions about the Turks. It is admitted that we should not stir to defend them against their Christian subjects or indeed against anybody. . . . To prevent the absorption of Turkey by any European Power may be taken as the chief end and aim of our policy. Now we say that this will not be attained either by abstaining from Eastern affairs, or by assuming such an attitude as shall encourage the Sultan's Government to resist the reasonable, as well as the unreasonable demands which may be addressed to it. . . . If, by keeping apart, we prolong the struggle, we shall effectually play what is supposed to be the game of Russia. . . . Every month which passes makes more probable some horrible occurrence which would seal the fate of the Turkish Empire. . . . We ought to be able to see that all this delay and circumlocution arise from the fact that no reform effected under Turkish authority will satisfy the insurgent populations, or per-

manently pacify the country. It is independence and not reform that is sought. The three Powers know this, but think it convenient for the present not to say it. If we know it too, we cannot do better than speak it boldly, and seek a safe and speedy settlement in that direction.—*T.* May 23rd.

The irresolute take refuge in the common-places of non-intervention. We are told that it is not our duty to aid in the enfeeblement or destruction of the Ottoman Empire. . . . On the other hand, it is not our duty to interpose for the maintenance of a dominion, the ill-effects of which are no longer doubtful. The conclusion must be that it is our duty to do nothing, and merely to assume such a dignified attitude towards the parties as may awe them into good behaviour. We must take the liberty of saying that this is imbecility. . . . But in politics all is still under the dominion of preconceived theories which are made current by phrases incessantly repeated. Thus the interest of England in supporting the Turkish Empire is taken for granted by numbers who have never considered by what means the settlement of Eastern Europe has been maintained so long. . . . We would maintain that the policy which liberated Greece, which made Servia independent, and which united the Danubian Provinces has been a successful policy. . . . Why should the benefits which arise from this process of wholesome disintegration be supposed to have now ceased? Why should not Herzegovina, under an administration conducted by its own people under the suzerainty of the Sultan, begin a course not less promising than those of the States which have already emerged from subjection?—*T.* May 30th.

The *Fortnightly Review*¹ hoped that this occasion might bring a fresh step towards the establishment of the solidarity of Europe—an approach to what the reviewer spoke of as a United States of Europe governed by an Amphictyonic Council for the settlement of international questions and particularly Eastern ones.—(June, 1876.)

Lord Derby will be supported, we imagine, by the English people almost unanimously; by sympathisers with the Christians of Turkey, no less than by sympathisers with the Turks, in his refusal to concur in a proposal at once dilatory and mischievous. Whether the tone and motive of Lord Derby's refusal, when once it becomes known, will be equally popular, we have the greatest doubt. [The suspicion of some will be aroused by the apparently trustworthy statement that he has protested against the breach of her neutrality by Montenegro. Those who believe that the oppressions of the Turks in Herzegovina were at least as serious as the misdeeds of the Neapolitan Government in 1860, will not judge these "violations of neutrality" more severely than they did that committed by Garibaldi in that year. As far as the writer can judge Lord Derby] has not opposed these proposals, as they ought to

¹ "Home and Foreign Affairs."

have been opposed, in the interests of the insurgents themselves, but solely in the interests of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. We strongly suspect that Russia has not proposed [the Hospodarate] solution for the very reason that it is to a considerable extent remedial. [If Great Britain had urged this course she would probably have been successful.]¹ We greatly fear that when Lord Derby's share in the negotiations comes out it will please no one. . . He can hardly satisfy the pro-Turkish party without having done something to avert the impending catastrophe in Turkey. . . He can hardly satisfy the pro-Christian party without having done something . . . for the security of the Christian provinces from Turkish misrule, and this apparently he is unwilling to do.—*Spec.* May 27th.

[Up to the date of the Memorandum] all Powers appear to be animated by the most sincere desire for the pacification of a handful of armed insurgents. [But after the refusal of England] the whole scene changes. . . The insurgents and their grievances are forgotten; Europe is interested in a totally different spectacle, namely, Russian intrigue foiled by English firmness. [But Europe is bound to do something.] It would be a monstrous conclusion if Turkey should be allowed to settle scores with her rebellious subjects and disloyal vassals in any manner that she pleases. The atrocities which have been committed already, the arming of Bashi-Bazouks and of wild Circassians would be a worse scandal than the triumph of Russian intrigue. . . Nothing comes out clearer in the prolonged discussion upon this subject than this, that the independence of the Ottoman Empire means simply that Europe insists upon its independence of Russia. [With that proviso Turkey is virtually under tutelage.] If the paramount claims of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey can be enforced in no other way, we hope that the influence of the English Government and opinion will be thrown in the scale in favour of autonomy. [This scheme has grown in favour as time has advanced.]—*Blackwood*, July, 1876.

The English people are sick of being considered dead, and were so delighted with the surprise of the Continent, and with the weight at once attached to English opinion, that they hardly cared to inquire in whose behalf all this energy had been displayed.—*Spec.* June 17th.

History will perhaps see one of the decisive turning-points of modern civilisation in this quiet and fearless act.—*D. T.* June 10th.

Another circumstance which must be connected with the change of opinion in England with respect to our relations with Russia, was the movement of the fleet at this time. When Lord

¹ The anti-Russian view among the advocates of "Emancipation" is very noticeable at this time. Cf. *Fraser*, May, 1876; also the *Times* about this period.

Derby first spoke of the despatch of the fleet to Besika Bay at the instance of our ambassador at Constantinople, the collocation of his sentences was such as to suggest the inference that the contingency for which the ambassador was anxious to provide, was one in which our ships of war might serve as a protection, or perhaps a refuge, from an outbreak of Mahometan fanaticism. Moreover the other maritime Powers had sent war-ships to Turkish waters to co-operate, as it seemed, in whatever measures the state of Turkey might render needful. It had been taken for granted at that time that the crisis was on the point of being dealt with by the European Powers; and most people expected every day the announcement of the new programme. That England, as the first maritime Power, should be in a position to take the lead in any maritime demonstration which that programme might render necessary, was no more than was fitting. But the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum by England made it apparent that the fancied unanimity among the Powers did not in fact exist. Moreover the English squadron at Besika Bay was rapidly increased to something out of all proportion with any mere measure of police, as if to cope with some formidable antagonist.¹ The *Daily Telegraph* about this time spoke exultingly of the strength of our Mediterranean squadron, comprising altogether more than twenty first-class ironclads.

A dozen of these will be in Besika Bay in a fortnight ready to dispute the passage of the Dardanelles with all Europe, should that policy be resolved upon.—*D. T. May*.

[Probably nothing is meant by it except a vague warning that British interests, especially at Constantinople, will be carefully protected. Still it will mislead people, particularly the very persons whom it is most necessary we should not mislead, viz., the Turks themselves.]—*Economist*, June 10th.

The British Government has taken a course which gives it a powerful influence on European opinion, and causes this country to be looked upon as the leading champion on the side opposed to Russia in any possible division of the Powers. . . . The nullification of a conference, accompanied by a naval demonstration, causes every clause of every treaty we have signed, to assume a peculiar significance. We are no longer in the position of those who by their demeanour confess themselves to be merely the formal signatories of these important documents. France and Italy tacitly declined the task of enforcing respect for the old engagements, and our Government is supposed to have stood alone in declaring them inviolable.—*T. June 16th*.

¹ Compare Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet, *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 40.

The Turks imagine that the cloud which for a year past has overshadowed their nation is lifting. . . . The unexpected demonstration of England has given them new life. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum told the Porte that it still had an ally, and the people, who are moved by anything material and tangible, took courage at the news that a formidable British fleet was at the entrance of the Dardanelles.—*T.* July 8th.

§ 5. *The Turkish Revolution.*

Meanwhile a series of events was occurring in Turkey, which had an important influence on English Public Opinion, though at first sight they appeared merely to afford additional evidence of the precarious state of the country and its Government. Their influence contributed to rehabilitate, for a time, in many quarters, the well-nigh expiring belief in Turkey. Conjoined with the effect of our resistance in the matter of the Berlin Memorandum, it contributed to produce the anti-Russian tone of sentiment which we find strongly developed in the month of June, and to give to the movement of our fleet the appearance of being a menacing or even hostile act.

A few days after the Salonica massacre a demonstration was made by a formidable body of Softas, young divinity students of Constantinople. In the result the Sultan was forced to dismiss Mahmoud, the councillor of the repudiation, and the tool, as it was said, of Ignatieff, and to appoint Mehemet Rushdi Grand Vizier, and Hussein Avni generalissimo. Midhat, too, was shortly afterwards given office. The new ministry appears to have been really a combination of the two active political elements which existed in Turkey as opposed to the merely *fainéant* policy of Mahmoud. Of these two elements one was the high Mahometan, or Old Turkey party, headed by Hussein Avni; the party which sought for regeneration in a return to the strict law of the Koran, and to which all the ways of the Giaour were abhorrent. The other was the party headed by Midhat, the pupil of the great reformer Fuad, the Young Turkey, or Western, party, the party of those who were willing to lay the nineteenth century under contribution and to assume a varnish of Western civilisation, if they might haply thereby rescue from dissolution the power of the Porte. The change was fatal to the Sultan. On May 30th the news came that Abdul Aziz had been deposed, and that Murad V. reigned in his stead. It was at first imagined that

Midhat Pasha would become Grand Vizier under the new Sultan. This expectation was, however, disappointed. Within a week the deposed Sultan was dead, dead "of a pair of scissors" as was said. The surgeons certified that he had killed himself, the world believed that he had been murdered, and the truth remains a dark mystery.¹

Again a few days (June 15th) and another violent change in the persons of those in authority. Hussein Avni, the representative of Old Turkey, and Raschid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were assassinated by one Hassan Bey, who, as was said, had some private grudge to avenge. After this Midhat became the dominant spirit in the Cabinet. Immediately a number of promises of reform were promulgated. Financial reforms were first set forth. The new Sultan had given up large sums from the Civil List. An armistice of six weeks was then offered to the insurgents. And, lastly, a new Constitution was advertised as in preparation. The essential part of this new Constitution was the creation of a national representative assembly, in which Christians as well as Mussulmans should have a voice. We have noticed already a similar attempt of Midhat's in the autumn of 1875, which then led to his resignation. This second attempt was equally futile. It was not till January, 1877, that Midhat achieved this part of his objects. It played an important part in the counterblast then uttered to European proposals.

It will be observed that this series of events, beginning with the rising of the Softas, constitutes a revolution, having for its object to revivify Turkey, and to shake off foreign tutelage. In the first act of the drama, the two sections which have this end in view, represented respectively by Hussein and Midhat, to a certain extent march together, but the high Mahometan party takes the lead. The movement of the Softas was distinctly intended as a Mahometan revival. In the victory of Midhat over his rivals we see the second phase of the revolution, which is marked by the ascendancy of that party which wished to enable Turkey to resist Europe by meeting Europe on her own ground, and by adopting European policy and methods. In this sense the rise of Midhat marks a *nationalist* movement as distinct from that purely Maho-

¹ In 1881 Midhat and various accomplices were tried for the murder of the Sultan. Midhat was condemned to death (T. June 30th, 1881). The Constantinople telegram of the *Times* speaks of the "gross irregularity and flagrant illegality of the proceedings" (T. July 5th. Compare *D. N.* June 29th and July 6th, 1881). The sentence was afterwards commuted to banishment.

metan movement with which the activity of the Softas is to be identified.

We note that this revolution, regarded as a convulsive struggle of Turkey against the prospect of fresh foreign interference, was, to begin with, a successful one, for the Berlin Memorandum was never presented. It was to have been presented by the ambassadors of the five Powers (Germany, Russia, Austria, France and Italy) who had acceded to it. But the Sultan Abdul Aziz was dethroned a few hours before the ceremony was to have been performed. This delay was fatal to the Memorandum. The project, already weakened by the resistance of England, expired; and although attempts were made during the month of June among the three Powers to agree upon some fresh instrument to be presented to the new Sultan, these attempts were futile.

In the next place we note that in England the idea at once came to the front that Turkey had at last turned over a new leaf, and ought to have another chance given her. We find a good deal of speculation in England about the Softas, and about their aims and ideas, and the nature of the prospect their action had opened up. It was clear that the change was a triumph of activity over lethargy, of life over death; but what did life and activity in this case mean? Some believed that the revival of a sincere and conscientious Mahometanism would conduce to better government in Turkey altogether, and that it might furnish the best solution of present troubles; while others thought that Turkey was like a patient suffering at once from extreme weakness and high fever. You dare not feed her; that would be to produce an access of fever: you dare not starve her; that would be to see her sink.

There is little doubt that the accession to power of Midhat contributed to carry the rehabilitation of Turkey in English opinion still further. The question which was raised immediately upon the Softas' revolution was, "Can Turkey be well governed on purely Mahometan principles?" The question which the policy of Midhat raised was rather a different one, "Can Turkey secure good government by becoming Europeanised?" The latter conditions offered a far more specious promise than the former if they could be realised; but their realisation was far more dubious. The partisans of Emancipation in England and elsewhere were disposed to deny the *satisfactoriness* of reform in the former of the above

senses, and the *possibility* of it in the latter. But in England the distinction between a revivifying of the Ottoman Power, and an improvement in the condition of the Provincials by withdrawing them from direct Ottoman rule was always liable to be confused, because the ambiguous term "Reform" was used sometimes for one, sometimes for the other. On the whole there was a strong disposition to believe that Turkey had at last satisfactorily reformed herself, and ought to be supported.¹

That the revolutionary party are resolved on reform in a European sense seems to be understood on all hands. At the same time it is agreed that the new party is sternly determined to maintain Mussulman ascendancy throughout the Empire, and hence arise some fears of fanaticism. Moreover, they are deeply embittered against Russia as represented by the machinations of General Ignatieff, and likely to oppose to the uttermost any attempt to wrest the insurgent territory from the Sultan's dominions; and this brings misgiving to the mind of those whom (certainly without meaning to offend) we may call the Humanitarians. [It is hard to see how the promise of the new *régime* can be denied or disregarded.] The Sultan's deposition is a crowning justification of the course the English Government adopted with so much wisdom and firmness.—*P. M. G.* May 31st.

[The revolution means reform of a genuine nature, and that is a circumstance that may alike astonish and confound the enemies of Turkey.]—*Morning Post*, May 31st.

[It is far from possible to say that the future presents no fresh difficulties, but Englishmen will be inclined to trust the strong and steady hand which has hitherto steered so ably, and Turkey certainly may henceforth be regarded as having a new chance for regeneration. She must make an earnest attempt to restore her credit by effacing the acts and language of Mahmoud, which were really those of Ignatieff.]—*D. T.* June 1st.

[The revolution will enable Turkey to comply with a better grace with all the legitimate demands of the Christian Powers, and to give more substantial securities for the fulfilment of her pledges of reform. It is impossible not to feel an increased sense of satisfaction at the policy which has enabled England to hold the position she now does in the midst of these Eastern complications. We have maintained our liberty of action, and have at this moment perhaps a more important voice in the affairs of Europe

¹ The new Sultan, Murad, proved himself hopelessly incapable from the first. When he in his turn was deposed at the end of the following August the *Times* said: "Three months have sufficed to dissipate the hopes that were excited when he was called to wear the sword of Othman, and to expose the utter falsehoods which were then put into circulation in praise of his qualities. This poor drunkard, whose body and brain are worn out with self-indulgence, was heralded as the promise of the redemption of Islam."

and in the direction of the issues of peace and war, than we have had at any time during the last half century.]—*Standard*, June 1st.

The *Daily News* notes that in the conjectures now hazarded the feelings of the Christian subjects of the Porte are either quite ignored, or are glanced at in a half-contemptuous way, as though they really counted for nothing. Yet the only hope for Murad seems to be to strain his present popularity, if need be, with his own Turkish subjects, and surprise the world by treating with the insurgents.—(June 5th.)

The *Spectator*, writing of the first stage of the revolution, notes that the European correspondents who report this event talk of great changes to be accomplished in the method of government, but being forced to employ words which have to Europeans a customary meaning, they create in the West an erroneous impression. The difficulties of the new Sultan are very great. He cannot satisfy the party that has raised him, and also do what seems to be expected in the West.—(June 3rd.)

[There is a resolve that Russia shall not with impunity tear up the Treaty of 1856, and renew her policy of aggression where the Crimean War interrupted it; but there is, on the other side, a deep conviction that no political interests of our own, no so-called traditions of statesmanship, should induce us to disregard the principles of justice and humanity. A Government which does not communicate this feeling to the Porte will but very imperfectly represent the British, or the French, or the Italian people. We may, then, assume that the Government of the new Sultan will be warned that a change more radical than any yet effected in the Empire is the only chance of salvation.]—*T.* June 6th.

Mr. E. A. Freeman insists on his position, "The Turk cannot reform. If he would reform he must first cease to be a Turk."—(in *T.* June 7th.)

[It is notorious that the movement which placed the present Turkish Ministers in power was a declaration against foreign pressure exerted to obtain better government for non-Mussulman populations. No ambiguity, however, can long attach to the policy of the Turkish Government on this question. If they should think fit to set the opinion of Christendom at defiance much misery may be the result, but the end will not be the less certain.]—*D. N.* June 7th.

[The accession of the new Sultan gave the Porte an advantage, and the British policy a success. Everything had been arranged by the Russian Government with reference to a reign debased and odious. The success of our Government is conspicuous. Their resistance to the demand of which five of the Powers had agreed at the instigation of Russia is followed by events which necessitate retreat, or at least hesitation on the part of the signatories. The six Powers and Turkey start afresh. The past is in some sense wiped out.]—*T.* June 23rd.

§ 6. *The Servian Declaration of War.*

But if people in England were disposed to hope the best of a revived Turkey the revolution appears to have inspired the Provincials with the courage of despair. They knew that the movement itself was the outcome of opposition to the one influence that promised them hope. They knew well that a revived Turkey, far from being willing to accord them that European protection, in which, short of practical independence, they saw their only security, would desire nothing better than once more to subject the already autonomous tributaries again to the rule of Turkish officials. The Turkish Revolution may thus be said to have borne twofold fruit. Half of its results we have already seen in the fate of the Berlin Memorandum and the effect on Public Opinion in England. The other half consisted in its effect on the action of the Provincials and their friends.

The echo of the commotion to which the renewed fears of the Provincials gave rise reached England in the shape of rumours of an offensive and defensive alliance between Servia and Montenegro,¹ in which, as it was at first said, Roumania and Greece had joined. Servia, it was reported, would anticipate the attack expected from Turkey; 6,000 insurgents were in Bulgaria, supplied with arms from Servian arsenals, and advancing on the Turkish camp at Nish; General Tchernayeff and many other Russian officers were in Servia as volunteers. A feeling which was very prevalent about this time is well exemplified by a cartoon which represents the harmless Turk going his own way while the dogs of war—Herzegovina, Servia, Montenegro and Bosnia—are straining to fly at his throat. The Russian holds them in in the leash, while the constable, John Bull, warns him to be careful not to let them slip.²

It was becoming more and more evident throughout June that the matter was not likely to be settled peaceably, and the imminence of war gives its chief characteristics to the state of opinion at this time. But there was still considerable vagueness as to *what* war was imminent. Some, when they spoke of "war," meant only a struggle between Turkey and her tributaries. This by a resolute insistence on the nominal tie might be denied to be a matter of international consequence at all, on the ground that

¹ See Berlin telegrams in *Times* of May 31st and June 1st and 2nd.

² *Punch*, June 17th.

it was solely a matter of the internal affairs of a sovereign State.¹ Others had in view the greater conflict which would ensue should Russia enter the lists, and the question began to agitate men's minds whether England in that case would appear as champion on the other side.

A corresponding ambiguity attached to the word "peace." When during the month it was said, "there will be peace," there were probably few who were not prepared to regard it as good news. Obviously if the alternative were a European conflict (and there was generally a lurking suggestion that this was the case), it was difficult to realise the benefits that could compensate for so great an evil. The fear of a European conflagration appears at this time as an argument against coercion of the Turk—an element quite distinct, as we have seen, from the fear of Mahometan fanatical outrage, or of a Jihad. But if "peace" meant simply that Servia and Montenegro would not cooperate with their brethren to secure that independence which was regarded as the only hope of relief from their wrongs, then there were many who would regard "peace" as by no means the greatest possible good, especially if it did but defer a settlement essential to the ultimate tranquillity of Europe.

There were two main views as to the policy that was open to England at this crisis. One was that England should support Turkey through thick and thin, and against whomsoever might attack her. The other was that England should press on the other Powers of Europe to agree to let Turkey and the tributary States fight out their battle on a fair field and without favour—within a "ring-fence," as it was said. Many people believed at this time that this would result in the Provincials achieving their own independence; and to this belief we may no doubt to some degree attribute the absence of any suggestion that we ourselves should engage more actively in furthering the work of emancipation. The approval of an ultimate solution in this sense in certain quarters, makes it clear that as yet it was not in any way supposed to conflict with Conservative party obligations.²

On the other hand, the fact that States like Servia and Montenegro were thus daring to throw down the gauntlet, was taken as a sure indication that they counted on Russian assistance, open assistance in the last resort if they were beaten, covert

¹ See Lord Derby, *H. of L. June 15, post*, p. 300.

² e.g. *Blackwood's Magazine*, July, 1876, *ante*, p. 288.

assistance in any case ; if indeed their hostility was not altogether factitious and the result of Russian machinations.

By some, to be sure—though this also was "controverted—the existence of a popular force in Russia favourable to Serbia was fully acknowledged. But whilst to some this appeared as a sentiment calling for our sympathy, others saw in it a dangerous and revolutionary element, which only went still further to fortify suspicion of Russia.¹ At the same time it was noted with a kind of aggrieved sense of unfairness, that Serbia would hardly in any case be allowed to suffer the full penalty of her temerity.

[When the fewness of the populations of those principalities is considered, it must be obvious that they cannot contemplate war without outside aid.]—*D. T.* June 3rd.

The courtesies of debate and the etiquette of diplomacy have hitherto obscured the truth, but there is no longer any reason why the fact should not be proclaimed that the insurrection is, four parts out of five, intrigue. Nothing is more certain than that the conflict from first to last has been sustained by Powers who are about as anxious for the independence of oppressed Bosnians as they are for the independence of oppressed Poles. That the Christians—such Christians as they are!—have been cruelly treated, that their wrongs were more than enough to justify rebellion, is true ; that they themselves began the rebellion by an outburst of spontaneous desperation may also be true, though we doubt it ; but that in dealing with the insurgents Turkey has had nothing to do but to satisfy a demand for good government in its own territory is an assumption utterly at variance with all we know of the matter. [They may be right who declare that justice and humanity can never be extended to the Christian population by any Turkish rule ; but they go much too far when they ask that in accordance with their judgment a war should at once be commenced to free from Turkish rule every Christian community now under its authority. Other communities have to be considered. To roast the Turks may be a holy work—but were they even worse than they are we should hesitate to take part in it, since a bon-fire has to be made of Europe for the purpose.] *P. M. G.* June 7th.²

[The *Pall Mall Gazette* argues that the subsidence of Serbia and Montenegro³ shows the artificial nature of the forces by which they were moved.] It being necessary that the tempest should cease, the managers themselves are compelled to come

¹ As to popular Russian sympathy for Serbia see Kinglake (Cab. Ed.), introduction to vol. i.

² Compare *T.* June 10th.

³ About the middle of June such a subsidence appeared probable, but the pacific inclination proved to be in appearance only.

forward, and while arresting it, to reveal the machinery that controlled the storm. New light has been cast on the insurrection. The idea that it was a local movement, in which the various Powers of Europe could have only a benevolent interest in various degrees, was the more acceptable and pleasing one, but it has faded and is fading from every observant mind. The notion that it would be so good a thing to leave the malcontents to "fight it out" with Turkey, and (of course) beat her, and then form themselves into a confederation of independent States strong enough and patriotic enough to form a bar to Russian encroachment—that idea, always to our mind a foolish one, is also dissipated by the light newly shed upon the whole imbroglio. Supposing such a result probable, it is at least clear that it could not have seemed likely to Russian statesmen, or if so, they must have been very confident that they could easily break such a combination down or turn it to account at the proper moment.—*P. M. G.* June 12th.

England, as has been often said, but not too often, is a great Mahometan Power. It was impossible for her to look with complacency upon the prospect of a war of religion which would not only disturb Europe, but regions where England's interests are of vital importance.—*P. M. G.* June 21st.

[The instigators of disaffection are very busy, and are following the familiar course of inflaming the minds of sympathisers outside as well as within the Ottoman Empire, by apocryphal narratives of atrocities committed on the Christian population of that province.]—*D. T.* June 26.

The *Post*, referring to some remarks of the Russian *Golos* upon the attitude of Serbia towards Turkey, from which it would appear that if in the duel Serbia should prevail against Turkey non-intervention is to be maintained, but if Serbia should be worsted in the fight she is to be saved from the effects of her policy and her failure, asks whether after a statement such as that, it can be doubted that Russia is at the back of Serbia in all that she does.—(June 28th.)

The *Saturday Review* observes that one of the many difficulties of the Eastern Question consists in the impossibility of allowing any Christian population to be subjected or restored to Mahometan government. The readiness of the Servians for war is in a great measure explained by their confidence of immunity. In the last resort they are secure from absolute subjugation, while success may be rewarded by an increase of territory and power. It is not surprising that the Turks bitterly resent the provocation offered by enemies who fight on unequal terms.—(July 1st.)

Of course Turkey must reconcile her sovereignty with civilisation if it is to endure, and she has given fresh pledges to make the attempt, which pledges, however, have been instantly met by an alarmed resolve on the part of the Slav leaders to try and render all reforms impossible by chronic warfare. It throws some light upon the false sentiment which is talked about these pious

crusaders, to know that when Ljubibratics first came to Nevesinje to get up the agitation, he was beaten by the Christians, and sent away without his clothes. Since then "our co-religionists" have been persuaded that they really do stand much in need of Turkish blood, and hence the present business. . . . Those, briefly, who confound Slavism with Christianity merely play the game of the most reckless and unsanctified ambitions on foot, and it is against such folly that we have offered the plea of fair play—even for the Turks. So long as an improvement under the existing order of things is at once possible and promised by the Turks, there is ground for hope. It is also the way by which treaty-law can be maintained and the vital interests of this country guarded Servia was practically free, and had nothing to complain of; let her have her pugnacious will, but unaided, and try honestly whether the Turk is effete or not, and then, perhaps, it may be time to talk about the establishment of a Slavonic kingdom.—*D. T.* July 3rd.

It will be remembered that Lord Derby had somewhat gone out of his way six months earlier at Edinburgh to assure his hearers that the country should be kept most amply informed of the policy and intentions of the Government.¹ But now ministers seemed most persistently to avoid giving any clue as to what their policy actually was. All questioning in either House was met by dilatory pleas—and the leaders of the Opposition did not seem inclined to insist on a full disclosure.

Mr. Bruce gave notice that on June 23rd he would call attention to the affairs of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.—(May 26th.)

Lord Derby, on the eve of the Whitsun Recess, refused papers, saying the Government would be able to speak with more confidence when the House met again, a fortnight later. *Mr. Disraeli*, on the same day, in answer to Lord Hartington said he had no particular information to give. It would be affectation to deny that the state of affairs was critical. "H. M. Government have taken such measures of precaution as they thought were necessary to maintain the honour and interests of the country, and that policy of precaution they intend to pursue." —(June 1st.)

The *Marquis of Hartington* again asked for papers; he disclaimed any wish unduly to press the Government, or to suggest that their policy was distrusted, but hinted they might explain the main object and scope of their formidable naval demonstration. *Mr. Disraeli* refused, in the interests of peace, to give any explanation, and went on to say it had been officially notified to the Government that the Berlin Memorandum would not be presented.—(June 9th.)

¹ *Ante*, p. 243.

Lord Derby said, in reply to *Lord Delawarr*, that a war between Turkey and Servia would be considered an internal quarrel, in which we were not bound to interfere by our treaty obligations, which only guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire against external aggression.—(June 15th.)

Mr. Chaplin asked *Mr. Bruce* if he intended to proceed with his motion. *Mr. Bruce* was willing to postpone it if the Premier was of opinion that a discussion would be injurious to the public service. *Mr. Disraeli* appreciated the sage forbearance and patriotic reserve which had been extended to the Government in circumstances of difficulty. *Lord Hartington* said the time had come when it would be prudent and politic for the Government to make further communications to the House.—(June 22nd.)

Allusions to the Atrocities begin in the House of Commons on June 23rd.¹

Lord Stratheden and Campbell moved for papers. *Lord Hamond* argued that interference in favour of Turkey would be justified. *Lord Napier and Ettrick* appealed to *Lord Derby* to adhere resolutely to the policy of *Lord Palmerston*. *Lord Derby* refused papers and deprecated discussion. "I have heard it suggested that we are supposed to be thinking too much of the interests of the Turks, and too little of that of the non-Mahometan races. I am utterly unaware of any foundation for that charge. No one supposes that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in any form within Europe is possible, if there are to be permanent disaffection and discontent among the Christian races."—(June 26th.)

Sir Stafford Northcote, in answer to a question from *Mr. O'Reilly*, touching a report that British ships had landed provisions, arms and money for the Turkish troops, replied that there was not the smallest foundation for any such statements. "Her Majesty's Government observed a strict neutrality, and expected other Powers to do the same."—(June 27th.)²

We seem to catch indications now of the notion that if things could only be hushed up the difficulty would be got over, and of a tendency to regard the Berlin Memorandum as being itself the malady instead of merely one of the symptoms. Hence the determination not to present it had for the moment a sedative effect on public opinion in England, and was put down as a success to the policy of our Government; while six months earlier, when attention had been more directed to the source of the evil in the condition of the Provincials, the presentation of the Andrassy Note had had a similar sedative effect.

The *Times* appeared to take the view that the Government

¹ *Post*, chap. x.

² It was reported that this sentence was written by *Mr. Disraeli*, and read *verbatim* by *Sir Stafford Northcote*.

had achieved a success in procuring the withdrawal of the Note and to acquiesce in the Premier's estimate of the necessities of the situation; but in other quarters the Government begin to be blamed for their reticence, and the Opposition for their abnegation. The *Spectator* appears to be one of the first among the newspapers to accentuate this point. Now, too, the Premier's personality again comes to the front, and people were startled to find how little they knew of his inner mind in relation to the question.

We cannot but doubt, in spite of Lord Granville's dislike to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, whether the Liberal leaders are right in abstaining so rigidly from discussion on foreign affairs, and especially on affairs in European Turkey. [As to the station of the fleet at Besika Bay] the Government, although not giving the country the faintest hint of war, deems it right to place itself in the position which it would hold if war were imminent, and itself certain that it would be compelled to take an early part in it. . . . All the while though the situation has become so serious as to preoccupy all Governments, to give rise to serious negotiations in Paris, and to send down the British funds, under financial circumstances tending strongly to enhance their price, neither Parliament nor the nation has received any hint that danger is in the air, and no one outside the Cabinet has the least idea of the policy upon which Lord Derby is intent.—*Spec.* June 3rd.¹

The *Spectator* says no one knows what the Premier's foreign policy is. You might almost as well ask what are the views of the Grand Lama. The writer speaks of the leaning to Mahometanism which is betrayed in many of his novels, and refers to a speech of his on the eve of the Crimean War, of which the main thesis was that Turkey should be trusted out and out. He may come out some morning with a policy of restoring the Porte in its primeval strength to the European family. It is unlikely but possible; and if so we should have only our apathy to thank.—(June 10th.)

The *Daily News* says Mr. Disraeli is to a great extent his own Foreign Minister, and probably the mismanagement of public business in the House of Commons, which creates as much secret grumbling on the Conservative side as open remonstrance among Liberals, is due to the fact that his heart and mind are in Constantinople. There is, indeed, a certain perverse consistency, the consistency which belongs sometimes to an irrational dream, in the conduct of foreign affairs by the present Government, which seems to indicate that it has its source in a single mind, and that not the calm and sagacious mind of the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We catch some trace of the Asian mystery about it. Her Majesty's Ministers have the unfortunate art and habit of beginning well and then going on badly. Thus there is

¹ "Lord Derby's Silence."

reason to apprehend that the firm purpose of resisting the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey which the refusal to join in the Berlin Memorandum and the gathering of the Mediterranean fleet in Besika Bay conveyed has received a wrong twist and bias. The idea seems to have seized hold of the popular mind in Constantinople that England has pledged herself to Turkey, and has, in vulgar phrase, undertaken to see her through her troubles. The English Government may not be responsible for the impression made; but it will be responsible for allowing it to remain if effectual steps are not taken for dispelling it.—(June 22nd.)

[Ministerial responsibility is all very well; but, in the face of the events which are now happening, it does not abolish parliamentary responsibility and national responsibility. So far is this from being the case, that Ministerial responsibility seems to need quickening by parliamentary, and even, it may be, by popular action.]—*D. N.* June 23rd.

[The Government has been successful so far, and merits confidence. If there were danger of *war* it would be their duty to communicate with the House; but as long as they can say that negotiations are taking a peaceful course discussion may be postponed.]—*T.* June 23rd.

The *Economist* urges the necessity for a full discussion in the House of Commons on our Eastern policy. Lord Derby (it says) is cautious; but Mr. Disraeli is not to be trusted. He is fond of great *coups*. He likes a theatrical policy, and it would be just like him to do something which would be so decided a demonstration for Turkey that we might find ourselves committed to a warlike policy without ever having wished it, or even having considered the question. We are sure of this, that if England acts deliberately, England will never attempt to prop up the rotten Government of Turkey in Europe again. But it is quite possible that England may not act deliberately. And it is to prevent that great evil that we deprecate any further continuance of what Mr. Disraeli calls the “patriotic reticence” of Parliament.—(July 1st.)

As June wore on, stronger and stronger misgivings showed themselves among the “violet” party as to the action of the Government; and the question what the Government were doing and what they ought to be doing led at this moment to an incipient newspaper war which, however, had none of the acerbity of a later stage.

There is serious danger that we may drift into a defence of Turkey against the will of the nation. . . . So utterly silent do both sides remain that the body of the people are unaware that serious matters are toward, and are trusting to Lord Derby's prudence, to keep them out of the mess. We do not doubt his

prudence but we do doubt whether he is master in the Cabinet, whether he thoroughly knows the public feeling, and whether he is not capable of being led into acts which the Turks would accept as virtual pledges of support. The question asked by Lord Hartington on Friday meant very little and the answer if it signified anything—signified that England was bullying Serbia into moderation, which is most unsatisfactory.—*Spec.* June 10th.

Her Majesty's Government has exhibited considerable skill and some courage in supporting the wrong cause. [The Turkish Government is] on the whole worse than that of King Bomba in Naples. Throughout the whole action of the British Government there is no trace of a belief that the insurgents are in the right, at least as much in the right as ever the Italians were. . . . What then would we have had the Government do? We would have had it do precisely what it has done, with this rider openly and seriously added, that it had no intention whatever of interfering between the Porte and its subjects, that it would prevent the Russian Government from claiming any part of European Turkey, but that if Serbia or Montenegro or the insurgent provinces by their own efforts and the efforts of such sympathisers as the English were to Garibaldi, could overturn the Sultan and set up free States in its stead, they would have no resistance whatever to dread from the people of this country.—*Spec.* June 17th.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* criticises the *Spectator* and *Daily News*, saying that though the nation appears to be content with the policy of the Government, yet a certain section of the Liberal party are "angered" by it. In the present case sentiments honourable to those who hold them are driven out of the place they deserve to hold by the fraudulent action of other Powers. The *Spectator* is quite wrong in saying that our Government has supported the wrong cause. What they have done is to support neither "cause." They are compelled to look far over and far beyond this forced quarrel.—(June 24th.)

The *Saturday Review* says no plausible plan has yet been devised for the security of the Mussulman population if the Government of the Porte were overthrown.—(June 24th.)

That aspiring little State [Serbia] is apparently anxious to be the Piedmont of the Eastern peninsula. It makes peaceful professions, and accompanies them by military preparations. [Whilst the writer has little faith in the possibility of constitutional reforms in Turkey he] would sincerely deplore any outbreak which should prevent a fair trial of such expedients as Turkish statesmanship can devise or as the ingenuity of European counsellors may suggest to it.—*D. N.* June 26th.

During the last ten days of June there was a tone of growing inflammation in the journals, due to the imminence of war, which had plainly become inevitable, and which, in fact, was commenced

by Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey on the 1st or 2nd of July.¹

To go to war for the support of Turkey, or simply to leave her to her fate, were regarded as the alternatives between which this country would have to choose, and choose speedily. Here was a simple issue, the importance of which every one could understand, but about which hardly any one had considered. Yet it was by no means clear that the Government was not about to commit us to the former alternative, in the not improbable event that Russia should give any moral support, still more if she should appear as an open ally of Serbia. Towards the end of the month it was rumoured that a direct understanding had been arrived at between Russia and England that neither of them should intervene.

The *Post* and the *Standard* condemn the war unreservedly, the former as a virtual violation of the Treaty of 1856, the latter as a disgrace to our European civilisation. But the *Standard* regards the war as after all one of comparatively small dimensions, and this view is also taken by the *Daily Telegraph*, which speaks of it as a quasi-domestic quarrel. The *Daily Telegraph* moreover goes the length of saying that the widespread opinion that Serbia will never provoke the risks of warfare without assurances of powerful support must be treated as a surmise merely until positive evidence compels us to admit it as proved. When it is proved, and not till then, the Treaty of 1856 will be violated, and the situation would at last be wholly and seriously altered.—(June 30th.)

Were the meaning of the contest visible to the majority of Englishmen as it seems so visible to ourselves, we should have no doubt either of the side which would engage their sympathies or of the action they would compel their Government to take; but their perception is clouded by a great intrusive fact. They distrust Russia, and they think that Russia is at the bottom of it all. . . . The British Government perceiving this, we believe, in danger of taking steps which will immensely increase the Turkish chance of retaining the Christians under Osmanli rule. Now are the people of this country content to endorse or endure such a policy? The *Daily Telegraph*, which has often a very accurate knowledge of the wishes of dominant persons in the Tory Cabinet, says "Yes," because the Christians of European Turkey are a disloyal set of ruffians. The *Pall Mall Gazette*, well informed as to Tory feeling generally, says "Yes," for Russia, in fostering the insurgents is, in the first place, working for herself, and Russia is a power always hostile to Britain, and, in the second place, she is

¹ Prince Milan issued a proclamation to his people announcing the commencement of war on June 30th.—*Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 532.

² Berlin telegram in *Times* of June 27th.

violating the great European compact which protects the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." And Lords Hammond, Napier, and Campbell say "Yes" for the same reasons, and for the sake of the hold the Khalif possesses over the Mussulman population of our Indian Empire. We, on the contrary, like the *Times* and the *Daily News* representing for the nonce all sections of English Liberalism, say "No," because such action is immoral, is contrary to the best interests of Europe, and so is not in accordance with the permanent interests of Great Britain. On the moral or, as the *Pall Mall Gazette* calls it, the sentimental side of the dispute there can, in our judgment, be no doubt whatever.—*Spec.*¹ July 1st.

The month ends with a feeling that war is in the air. The *Times* recognises that the mere "Order" policy, on which for the last few days it had been building, has crumbled beneath its feet, and again seems tending towards "Emancipation."

[The benevolent purposes of the last month have failed of their object like those which preceded them. We have seen in Italy, in Germany, in the Northern States of America, &c, long periods of uneasiness and agitation which could only be terminated by a trial of strength. We are bound to believe that the Russian Government has done nothing to incite the demonstration of the Servians, but on the other hand we may be morally certain that the Emperor will not visit them with severe condemnation or threaten them for their hostility to his ally the Sultan.]—*T.* June 30th.

The state of Public Opinion on the eve of its awakening, and its relation to the Executive, are sketched in a striking article in the *Spectator*, entitled, "The Weakness of our System in Foreign Affairs."

We have a Prime Minister and Cabinet who are the elect of the Parliament, a Parliament which is the elect of the nation, and these meeting in constant, frequent, and anxious deliberation. Nevertheless the Parliament knows nothing of what the Ministry are doing, and the nation knows nothing of the mind of Parliament, and all for a very good reason, that whatever either Ministers or Parliament may think is kept religiously to themselves. . . . An admirable apparatus for maturing public opinion when it is unformed, and getting at the public opinion which is already formed, is in the most perfect order; only it does not act exactly when it is most important that it should act, and act in time. There are but a few days left, probably, in which opinion can be so expressed as to have a grave effect on the course of the Executive. If the Government should be called upon to act before the nation has a mind of its own, or is aware that it has a mind of its own, on the policy we ought to pursue, the action it might take would

¹ See also *Fort. Rev.* July, 1876, "Home and Foreign Affairs."

probably be quite sufficient to determine the public opinion till then uncrystallised. "Act first and think afterwards" is supposed to be the motto of a rash man. But it describes something very like the practical conduct of this great Parliamentary nation, when it has any matter to consider about which the masses of the people know nothing and feel less. First they trust the Government up to the very last moment, then when the Government decides to do something, and the formidable logic of blows begins to take effect, it is practically too late to consider what ought to be done, as if the question were an abstract one. What their position requires the people to think, for the most part they do think, and think without any further reason for thinking so than that the Government acted before they, at least, had heard anything about the matter. . . . An accidental Prime Minister like Mr. Disraeli, the last, we will venture to say, whom the nation would choose for a mere dictator at an epoch of a great and momentous foreign crisis, acting on an irresolute and uninformed state of the public mind which naturally produces an irresolute and uninformed Parliament, issues the mandate, and this nation's vast influence is thrown into whatever scale he chooses, and stays there, the *tabula rasa* becomes a historic record, the blank paper is covered with the chronicles of great efforts made by a mighty and active people, and Parliamentary institutions turn out a result more strictly one of political chance than despotic institutions themselves. . . . Where Parliamentary institutions yield a blank popular mind, and the chief of the hour is at the top only as the man of greatest tact and talent in a particular party, of whose general principles on foreign policy hardly anything is known, the apparent resolve of the nation is the mere accident of an accident, and not in reality a national or popular resolve at all. . . . Popular Government is a rude thing at the best. But it is tried under monstrous disadvantages when the people, unaware of any particular danger, leaves everything to the representatives of the people; and when the representatives of the people, though aware of a very particular danger, leave everything to the Government, and when the Government means two men, of whom one is a riddle and the other a plastic mind for the riddle to mould.—*Spec.* July 1st, 1876.

Thus with war in the air, with an "accidental Prime Minister," and with a still half-slumbering people, the period of Incubation closes.

CHAPTER X.

ATROCITY PERIOD (WAR IN THE AIR).

§ 1. *Public Opinion awakes.*

WE now enter upon a period which presents a strong contrast to that which had just closed with regard to the distinctive characteristics of Public Opinion. Whereas, during the "Incubation Period," opinion had been scanty in quantity, docile, trustful of Government, undigested, vacillating, it now became voluminous, self-confident, suspicious of Government, and, at least to a certain extent, systematic and constant.

We must date from the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum the first unsettlement, and secret misgivings felt as to the ministerial policy. The first endeavour of Public Opinion was to understand and to bring itself up into line with the Cabinet, rather than to alter the Government policy. It was not till it became apparent that the Government, after all, had not discarded the traditional pro-Turkish policy as obsolete, that the effort began to bring the Government up into line with Public Opinion.

There is one point which must never be forgotten, namely, that throughout the whole of the Incubation Period, the volume of political opinion was comparatively small and its voice scarcely heard. During the month of June it had been growing with a steady *crescendo*. At the beginning of July the public interest in politics suddenly becomes keen, and, moreover, Public Opinion is now no longer content to remain passive and dumb, or to follow the lead of the Government blindly. It struggles hard, at first, to find voice, and subsequently to get itself organised, in order that it might influence, and (when matters went so far) in order that it might turn, the course of the Executive. It is this circumstance, as is indicated by the name which has been given it, which is

especially characteristic of the period. It seemed hardly to occur to people through the whole of the Atrocity Period, and indeed for some time after, to question its own right to guide, or to doubt that it would be obeyed if it could find voice.

The transfiguration of Public Opinion was so sharp and well defined, in one word such an *event*, that the first two or three days of July may be assigned as the "moment of awakening." A leader in the *Times* of July 4th may be taken as marking it:—

The country has been quiet; it might seem, to a careless observer, almost apathetic. Until lately it was as if the weariness and indifference which affected the popular view of every domestic question had extended to the feelings with which people regarded the skirmishing and diplomacy of the East. This apathy, however, has been only in appearance. The public has been quiet because it has believed that no Government would commit itself to a policy of armed interference in Eastern affairs without giving Parliament and the public a full opportunity of consideration. Until the last few days there was nothing to change this disposition, for the business had not passed beyond the phase of negotiation, however great might be the divergencies between the parties. But suddenly the position of the question changes materially. By the action of Servia and Montenegro a state of war has been called into existence which may at any time require a prompt decision. It cannot be doubted that the Servian crusade tends to increase the jealousy between this country and one of the great Powers, which is suspected of not being a stranger to the design. In these circumstances it clearly becomes advisable that Parliament should be informed of what has passed, and of the general views of the Government. The outbreak of a war which, if not suppressed by the Turkish arms, must inflame the whole Christian population of the Turkish Empire and endanger the peace of Europe, may be looked upon as a fitting stage of the business for explanations and consultation. A new act of the drama has come to a conclusion. All that relates to the Andrassy Note, the Berlin Conference, the Memorandum which it produced, the deposition of the Sultan, and the new departure consequent upon it, belongs to the past, and may now be permitted to serve the useful purpose of throwing a light on the present. The papers are voluminous, but the interest of the country has suddenly become intense on the subject, and there will be no want of readers for all that the Queen's printer may produce.—*T. July 4th.*

The awakening was the result of two great and nearly simultaneous shocks. The impression suddenly got abroad that the Government was about to commit the country to a war with Russia, and at the same time Turkey presented the world with a

capital instance of the character of her rule, in the Bulgarian atrocities. The attitude of the country when it thus awoke was that of a traveller who has fallen asleep, and who wakes to find his charioteer unconsciously, as the traveller thinks, pursuing a course which leads straight to a precipice. The traveller's first effort is to convey to the coachman's mind his own appreciation of the situation.

So for the first fortnight of the Atrocity Period we find Public Opinion alarmed at the prospect of our being involved in a contest with Russia, and pressing on the Government that they should do nothing to commit us to the armed support of Turkey. This sub-period we call "War in the Air." It is important to notice the salient points of two great influences to which Public Opinion was exposed during the Atrocity Period. The greatest of these was the narrative of the atrocities¹ as it was unfolded point by point. The other (second in importance) was the course of the Servian war. During the time of "War in the Air" the original story of the atrocities was uncorroborated from fresh sources of information, and great doubt was thrown upon it in official quarters. But from the first it took a great hold on the popular mind, which resisted the official attempts to explain away or minimise. The end of the sub-period is marked by various efforts to open up new sources of information as to the facts. The same point of time nearly coincides with the collapse of the Servian offensive movement.

To this succeeded the sub-period when Public Opinion was looking to Parliament as its organ and "waiting for guidance;" and meanwhile, with such guidance as it got (chiefly extra-parliamentary) was slowly coming to the conclusion that the mere negation of the "red" policy was not enough, and that an active "violet" policy was necessary. The sub-period was mainly one of suspense. As to the atrocities little was added to the evidence before the public; people were waiting for confirmation through the various commissions of inquiry, but the tendency was to an increasing belief in the substantial truth of the original narrative. Meanwhile as regards Servia, the question now was whether she

¹ It was the particular acts which were committed in Bulgaria, or rather in a district chiefly inhabited by Bulgarians, south of the Balkans, and now included in Eastern Roumelia, which came to be known specifically as "The Atrocities." But "Atrocities" seems to have become a kind of technical word for any similar cruelties (see Mr. E. A. Freeman, letter *D. N.* July 20th, 1876), and at a later date when it became fashionable in some quarters to sneer at those who dwelt upon the "Atrocities," the English language was enriched with the word "Atrocitarian."

would be able to hold her own, and as time went on the balance inclined more and more against her.

The commencement of the last phase corresponds with the harvesting of the new crop of information about the events in Bulgaria and with the prorogation of Parliament. Parliament had barely time to take a glimpse and speak a word about the new information before it separated. Strong confirmatory evidence of the substantial truth of the first accounts of the atrocities now arrived in detail, and the public mind was roused to an extraordinary pitch of feeling by the glowing descriptions which were contained in the letters of Mr. MacGahan, who had been specially commissioned by the *Daily News* to proceed to the district and investigate. During the same phase we have Servia brought to her knees, and a misgiving arises that unless Turkey is checked in some way the atrocities of Bulgaria will be repeated on Servian soil. This last phase then constitutes the kernel of the period, the sub-period of the "First Agitation," when Public Opinion having crystallised demanded a "violet" policy with extraordinary energy and vehemence.

§ 2. *Narrative of the Atrocities.*

The earliest hint in any English newspaper about the specific crimes which subsequently came to be spoken of as the "Bulgarian Atrocities," appears to be a letter in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, June 16th, from a correspondent at Constantinople, "R. R." He speaks of "the late rising in Bulgaria which has been stamped out with ruthless severity by the Turks." But the first communication of importance, as measured by the attention it attracted, is a letter dated June 16th, from the Constantinople correspondent of the *Daily News* (Mr. Pears), which appeared in that paper on June 23rd. On July 8th—his chiefs having meanwhile inquired of him by telegraph with respect to his first communication—a second letter from Mr. Pears appeared in the *Daily News*, confirming the story and giving further particulars, and on the same day the *Times* had a letter from its special correspondent dealing with the same subject. These letters spoke of accounts which had been coming to Constantinople (at first as dark rumours whispered about, but gradually assuming definiteness and consistency) of horrible atrocities committed in Bulgaria. The cruelties had not altogether (though they had in the main) been confined to the side

of the Turks; but that which threw the balance altogether against them was that the Turkish Government had been unable or unwilling to prevent their own *employés*—Bashi-Bazouks, unworthy of the name of soldiers—from committing them. A feeble revolt broke out in Bulgaria in May. It had been suppressed by letting loose bands of Bashi-Bazouks, chiefly Circassians,¹ to put it down in their own way, in other words, to massacre, ravish, plunder, and destroy through the villages of the district. The result was what might have been expected. A fertile province was laid waste, at least sixty, or as some said, more than one hundred Bulgarian villages (the names of many of them were given) had been utterly destroyed. Crowds of unarmed and inoffensive men, women, and children had been massacred in cold blood. Even the Turkish

¹ There was a good deal of controversy as to the precise description of the men who were guilty of the atrocities, and the responsibility of the Porte for them. In this view, the facts brought out by the later investigations as to the omission of the Porte to punish the chief criminals, and with regard to the employment of regular troops, were important.

A correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* supplied the following :—

Into these provinces in the years 1860 to 1864 something like 150,000 Circassians entered, by permission of the Turkish Government, when the ever-advancing arms of the Russians compelled them to leave their own country on the southern slopes of the Caucasus. Half-barbarous savages, these Circassians had no mind to till the ground for their living, and so, brigands by nature, they became also brigands by art, and entered into an engagement with the Turkish Government as irregular troops of the Sultan, or in other words they became Bashi-Bazouks—*i.e.* wearers of the red cap or fez. To these were joined plenty of the ne'er-do-weels and scum of other provinces, of course all alike Mussulmans. These men are the curse of the country. Under discipline in the field they are excellent soldiers, being, so to say, born to fight—they had been fighting the Cossacks for quite a century before they left Circassia; out of the field they are lawless brutes, preying upon their peaceful neighbours, and living by the strength of their thieving arms. Of course a very slight hint that they might fall upon any Christian, especially if he is weak in himself and strong in cattle and crops, is obeyed with good-will and savage exaggeration of the order. . . . Such are the men in whose hands was placed the punishment of the few Bulgarians who had been incited by well-known means to rebel against the Turkish Government. The situation in Constantinople became more and more critical as the moment for deposing the Sultan drew on. This was in May, and, not unnaturally, the insurrectionary sparks which were being constantly fanned in every way began to stir a little. "Then," writes one from Philippopolis, "telegram after telegram arrived from Constantinople at Philippopolis (the present capital city of the Bulgarians), pressing on the authorities to keep strict order in their districts;" which commands they obeyed by turning the Bashi-Bazouks upon the culprits, innocent and guilty alike, with results that are known to all the world; results which, with every allowance made for exaggeration, are yet horrible to contemplate. . . . The feeling of the "old party" among the Turks—a party with a rather loud voice at Constantinople—is that by annihilating the Bulgarian element, or by at least weakening and diminishing it both materially and morally, they will thus ward off the intervention of European Powers in the affairs of Turkey. In the Bulgarian people many thinking minds, and those who know this people best, see the good stuff which will make the future support and stability of the Turkish Empire; this good material they are fast proving themselves to be by the extraordinary progress they have made in the last ten or twelve years. The Bulgarian, however, is no soldier, and he thus offers to this party in Constantinople the weak spot on which to begin hammering. And they do hammer.—*Letter signed B., P. M. G. July 18th, 1876.*

boys boasted of how many infidels they had killed. The slain were numbered at 12,000 as the lowest estimate; some said 25,000 or 30,000; and Turkish papers published in Constantinople mentioned the figure 40,000. Horrible tortures had been inflicted on thousands more. Women had been ravished wholesale. Young women and children—more than 1,000 of them—had been carried off, to be kept in the harems or sold as slaves. Countless families had been robbed of everything they possessed, houses were plundered, the inhabitants tortured for money, and the richer Christians compelled to disgorge their property by threats of being denounced as insurgents. The wholesale executions of men supposed to have been implicated were incessant. At least 10,000 Bulgarians were in prison undergoing tortures. Nor were these horrors things of the past. The reign of terror continued. A Pole who was brought into Constantinople under a guard of Bashi-Bazouks described them as slashing at every Bulgarian they met. Men and women were afraid to go into the fields to reap the harvest, the larger towns were crowded with starving refugees, who were exposed to abuse of all kinds at the hands of the dominant race.

Such in substance was their story. The moral was not omitted. The correspondent (*Daily News*, June 23rd) went on to say that though the English Ambassador had used his influence to put an end to the cruelties, the Turks openly asserted that they could rely upon English help to put down the various insurrections. England (says a Turkish journal) will defend us against Russia, while we look after our own rebels. But, continues the correspondent, we must either cease to give them support, or if our interest require us to give them a certain support we must exact good treatment. Anyhow the massacres must be stopped. England cannot afford to let Russia pose as the single friend of the Christian population.¹ The immediate effect of the publication of these accounts in the English newspapers was a widespread resolution, that if the Turkish Power was capable of such things, the Turkish Power should have no countenance or support from any English Ministry. The circumstances had supplied the occasion for the notion "Humanity" to come to the front as a main factor of Public Opinion, and to demand the abandonment of the "red" policies. The direction

¹ The letters in the *Daily News* of June 23rd and July 8th, appeared at full length in the *Blue Books* (*Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 501 and 534). See also Argyll, i. 218, and Clayden, p. 181, for portions or summaries.

in which the stream was setting can hardly be better described than by quoting the protest of the English Ambassador at Constantinople against it.

We may, and must, feel indignant at the needless and monstrous severity with which the Bulgarian insurrection was put down, but the necessity which exists for England to prevent changes from occurring here which would be most detrimental to ourselves is not affected by the question whether it was 10,000 or 20,000 persons who perished in the suppression. We have been upholding what we know to be a semi-civilised nation, liable under certain circumstances to be carried into fearful excesses; but the fact of this having just now been strikingly brought home to us all cannot be a sufficient reason for abandoning a policy which is the only one which can be followed with a due regard to our own interests.—*Elliot to Derby*, Sept. 4th, 1876. *Turkey*, No. 1, 1877, No. 221.

But in the estimation of the newly-aroused body of Public Opinion the atrocities did afford a sufficient reason for ceasing to support Turkey. The shrewd anticipation of the *Fortnightly Reviewer* who wrote at the end of June was almost immediately proved to be well founded.

It is certain that a policy of intervention on behalf of Turkey might easily land the Government in serious unpopularity. In a country with household suffrage it is a grave thing for a Government to back a Power that does not pay its debts, that cruelly oppresses its subjects, that is putting down the efforts of Christian populations to win their own liberty. It would not be difficult, we mean in popular constituencies with simple emotions, to make the policy of protecting such a Power seem supremely odious. If the atrocities alleged against the Turkish troops in Central Bulgaria in May prove to have really happened, no English Minister will dare to lift a finger for Turkey.—*Fort. Rev.* July, 1876.¹

The first impulse was to fly to Ministers for information, first as to the facts, and secondly as to what they intended to do in view of the facts. June 23rd, the date of the appearance of the first of these letters in the *Daily News*, fell on a Friday, and on the very same night Mr. Forster gave notice of a question, which accordingly he put in the House of Commons on the next Monday, when the Duke of Argyll also brought the matter forward in the House of Lords.

The *Duke of Argyll* referred to the circumstantiality of the report in the *Daily News* of June 23rd.

¹ "Home and Foreign Affairs," dated June 27th.

Lord Derby said they had heard of acts of cruelty committed on both sides; but on nothing like the scale spoken of by the correspondent in question. It was true that Bashi-Bazouks had been employed in the suppression of the insurrection. In consequence of reports as to the conduct of these troops, a representation was made to the Porte by Sir H. Elliot on the subject. The answer was, the employment of these Circassian troops had been discontinued. He added that as the Duke of Argyll thought the evidence sufficient to justify him in bringing the matter before the House he would make inquiry.—*H. of L.* June 20th.

Mr. Forster said it seemed to him important, in forming an opinion on affairs in Turkey, in which we appear just now to be unfortunately much involved, that if such allegations are true we should be aware of them, and that if false we should not be misled by them. He added, since Friday he had received information, not from the *Daily News* office, but from a quarter certainly not prejudiced against the Turkish Government, which appeared to him to confirm the substantial truth of these distressing statements.

Mr. Disraeli. We have no information in our possession which justifies the statements to which the right hon. gentleman refers. [The troubles began by strangers burning the villages in Bulgaria, where there were a number of Bashi-Bazouks and Circassian settlers, but where the Turkish Government then had no regular troops.] I have not the slightest doubt myself that a war between the invaders and those Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians was carried on with great atrocity, and one can easily understand that under the circumstances such outrages as those to which the right hon. gentleman alludes might possibly have occurred. No quarter I believe was given, and no doubt scenes were enacted which we must entirely deplore. [Sir H. Elliot's attention was called to the state of things in May. He immediately communicated with the Porte, which at once ordered some regular troops to repair to Bulgaria, and steps to be taken by which the action of the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians might be arrested.] Very shortly after, the disturbances in Bulgaria seemed to have ceased. That is all the information I have to give the right hon. gentleman on the subject, and I will merely repeat that the information which we have at various times received does not justify the statements made in the journal which he has named.—*H. of C.* June 26th.

These were only the first of a number of interpellations.

Lord Derby, replying to Lord Granville, said after the Duke of Argyll's question he had written, but as the statements had been repeated and were exciting a strong feeling in the country, he had that morning telegraphed to Sir Henry Elliot.—*H. of L.* July 10th.

Mr. Disraeli, in reply to Mr. Forster, said no reply had yet been received from Sir Henry Elliot, nor could there have been. With respect to the reports to which Mr. Forster referred, he hoped

for the sake of human nature that further information would show the statements to be scarcely warranted. They were in constant communication with Sir H. Elliot, who was not a man to be insensible to such proceedings. "We are also represented in the seats of disturbance by gentlemen, as Her Majesty's Consuls, eminent for their abilities and high character—at Belgrade, at Ragusa, at Cetigne, and at other places; we are in constant communication with these gentlemen, and certainly no information of the kind has as yet reached Her Majesty's Government. That there have been proceedings of an atrocious character in Bulgaria I never for a moment doubted. Wars of insurrection are always atrocious. . . . I cannot doubt that atrocities have been committed in Bulgaria, but that girls were sold into slavery or that more than 10,000 persons have been imprisoned I doubt. In fact, I doubt whether there is prison accommodation for so many, or that torture has been practised on a great scale among an Oriental¹ people who seldom, I believe, resort to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner. (Laughter.)

Mr. Forster pointed out that the *Daily News* had published a second long letter in answer to an inquiry sent from London, doubtless by telegraph; and suggested that if not already done Sir Henry Elliot should be communicated with in the same way. He referred to statements from Turkish and Continental sources, that the moral support of Her Majesty's Government is given to a Power which is perpetrating these atrocities. "This is humiliating to the sense of honour of the country and revolting to the consciences of Englishmen."

Mr. Evelyn Ashley observed that the places whence the Premier stated that he had received Consular communications were not in the district in question or near it, and asked if information had been received from Adrianople and Philippopolis.

Mr. Mundella thought that we were left entirely in doubt as to what has been done by the Government, but with such a magnificent fleet as we now had in the Bosphorus we ought to know all about it.

Mr. Disraeli. I have stated that all the information we have received will be found in the papers which will soon be on the table, and I believe that information is ample. . . . I must again repeat that I never for a moment denied that there had been atrocities in Bulgaria or the other places mentioned, but when I was asked with regard to the atrocities particularised in some public journals. . . . when called on to say whether we had received information of such particulars, I felt it my duty to tell the House that we had received no such information. [That atrocities

¹ *Times* report has "historical"; and so Mr. Disraeli appears to have been understood. On Aug. 11th, in the H. of C., Sir William Harcourt accused the Premier of levity and sarcasm, citing his reference to "an historical people," whereupon Mr. Disraeli interjected, "No, Oriental."

See *post*, § 5, for Mr. Disraeli's letter in T. of Sept. 7th on the incident, and his disclaimer of any intention to raise a laugh.

had been committed in Bulgaria would be clear from the papers, but none of the details on which the Government were challenged to say whether they had information had reached them] although we are in constant communication with our Ambassador at Constantinople, and with our representatives at Ragusa, Cetigne, and other places named by the hon. member for Poole. We have received no accounts in which these details are mentioned. That is the answer I made to the House, and I don't wish the answer to be misunderstood. I do not say that atrocities have not been committed; I believe they are inevitable when wars are carried on in certain countries and between certain races. I answered the question addressed to me directly.—*H. of C.* July 10th.

The ministerial reply was not regarded as satisfactory either in or out of the House. The dilatoriness of the Government in procuring information, coupled with their non-disclaimer of the rôle of protectors of Turkey, were regarded as ominous, and it was noted that the *Daily News* had found no difficulty in communicating with their correspondent, with respect to the accounts he had forwarded, and in getting his reply.

Both Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli remarked yesterday that an answer could not possibly have come yet from Sir Henry Elliot. Of course in the regular and beaten way of diplomacy, it could not have come. But, as Mr. Forster stated, the latest letter of our Constantinople correspondent was a reply to a telegraphic inquiry with respect to his former communication, and the wires of the telegraph are at the disposal of Governments as well as of journalists. . . . It is not satisfactory to be told in the same breath, "We have not yet got any clear information about the doings of Turkey, and we do not as yet think fit to give you any clear information as to what we are doing for Turkey." . . . It may be that the number of the slaughtered is not always correct to a figure in the reports which reach our correspondent. It may be that the Bashi-Bazouks in general are not very fond of torturing people, and usually, as Mr. Disraeli puts it with a charming quaintness worthy of the Hôtel de Rambouillet, "terminate their connection with the culprits in a more expeditious manner." It is not the question whether they have murdered or tortured a few more or a few less. . . . The substance and the tone of Mr. Disraeli's remarks seem alike to show that he does not adequately appreciate the grave responsibility which rests upon him, as upon every member of the Cabinet; but upon him as the head of the Government far more than upon any one else. The question is are we, or are we not, giving our moral support, and thereby undoubtedly a strong hope of our more effective support, to the Power which is sanctioning these atrocities? [If not], then, of course, we might be ready to admit that Mr. Disraeli and Lord Derby have no more right to be questioned about the

crimes committed in Bulgaria than about those perpetrated in Dahomey. But the Government must really get the converse of the proposition into their minds. They must perceive that at present they do stand in the ugly and unfortunate position of being accounted the patrons and protectors of Turkey. That is the fact which gives to the stories we read their terrible significance for us. . . . If Ministers are silent, or speak in ambiguous language, it is time for the nation, through other channels, to make its voice heard in indignant protest and rebuke.—*D. N.* July 11th.

We must repeat that Mr. Disraeli's language is not marked by that sense of responsibility which we dare say he feels, but which he fails to impress upon those who hear or read it. He is sometimes called a master of phrases, but he is just as much their slave, and the antithesis which he has invented between Policy and Sentiment leads him to regard the Bulgarian outrages as deplorable but inevitable incidents of a great and statesmanlike scheme. The fallacy which contrasts policy and sentiment is not intellectually more respectable than that by which quacks disparage theory in favour of practice. The real comparison should be between good and bad policy, and between healthy and unsound sentiment.—*D. N.* July 12th.

[Let Mr. Disraeli] exhibit a little more of a peremptory disposition to question our own diplomatic staff, though it must be by telegraph, in order that we may soon know the truth, and be prepared to take such action as the truth warrants.—*Spec.* July 15th.

Sir Henry Elliot's replies to Lord Derby's inquiries, the first a despatch dated July 6th, inclosing reports from M. Dupuis, the vice-consul at Adrianople, and the second, a telegram dated July 14th, were both received on July 14th.

The excesses committed in the suppression of the insurrection . . . have, unquestionably, been very great, as was inevitable from the nature of the force which the Porte was, in the first emergency, obliged to employ, but it is equally certain that the details which have been given, coming almost exclusively from Russian and Bulgarian sources, are so monstrously exaggerated as to deprive them of much claim to attention. . . . The Turkish ministers . . . deny that the cruelties have been upon a scale at all approaching to what they are represented; they point out that the horrors committed on Turkish women and children are passed over in silence; and they plead that they have no alternative but to use the irregular force at their disposal to put down an unprovoked insurrection fomented from abroad.—*Elliot to Derby*, July 6th, 1876.¹

There can be no doubt the instigators of the insurrection began by committing atrocities on Mussulmans and burning Bulgarian

¹ *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 538.

villages, with the view of creating exasperation between the two races. In this they succeeded, and when the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians were called out they indulged in every kind of misconduct, killing and outraging numbers of innocent persons. . . . [He had not been able to verify the reports of wholesale slaughter, which came mostly from quarters not entitled to much confidence]. . . . Bulgarian children have certainly been sold, but I cannot find that there has been anything like a regular traffic in them. Until I received your telegram I had heard nothing of cartloads of heads being paraded, or young women publicly sold, but I will make every possible inquiry. It was supposed here that the abuses had been put a stop to for some time.—*Elliot to Derby*, July 14th (telegraphic).¹

On July 17th, being questioned again by Mr. Baxter, the Premier made a long statement, and read Sir Henry Elliot's replies, and also a number of despatches which had been received before Lord Derby had instituted his inquiries. It appeared that Sir Henry Elliot had reported the rising on May 4th,² and kept the Government furnished with information obtained from the Consuls.

On the 16th of June Sir Henry Elliot telegraphed³ that "the Bulgarian insurrection appears to be put down, although with cruelty, and in some places with barbarity. I am not disposed to accept the accounts which come from sources to which it would not be difficult to trace the origin of the movement, and which are exaggerated to a degree which must deprive them of the slightest credit; but there is evidence that the employment of Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks has led to atrocities which might have been expected." [As to the origin of the disturbance, Mr. Disraeli, repeating the account he had given before, attributed it to the action of invaders, who came to organise an insurrection, burning and ravaging all villages whether Mussulman or Christian, if the inhabitants refused to join them. He represented that there was a large non-enlisted peaceful population of Circassians, and that these were the persons who had first defended themselves by any means in their power, and then retaliated against "invaders."] That is the origin—so far as the Government has information—that is the authentic origin—of the insurrection in Bulgaria. . . . The Circassians are described in the public journals, and I know in conversation, as irregular troops of the Turkish Government. They are not the irregular troops of the Turkish Government, or of any other Government. These are the men, or the descendants of the men, who twenty years ago commanded the sympathy and admiration of the House of Commons. . . . In consequence of

¹ *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 541.

² *Ibid.* 117, No. 252, received May 15th. See Argyll, i. p. 210 and following as to this stage of the correspondence.

³ This is a mistake. No. 443, received June 16th, was not a telegram, but a despatch dated June 8th.

their country being yielded up to Russia. . . . there was a considerable migration of the population, and they were portioned out in various parts of Turkey, not only in Europe but in Asia. They have cultivated farms, and built villages, and I think during the whole period there has been no complaint of these men, but, of course, we know what Eastern populations are. We know that the Circassian population is a very bold, courageous, and armed population, and naturally, if their villages were burnt and their farms ravaged, it is not a matter of surprise that they should take affairs into their own hands, and endeavour to defend themselves. It is necessary that the House should be made aware of that. There prevailed there a guerilla warfare of local vengeance and personal passion, and there is no doubt that from that time, which was towards the end of May, scenes took place during this guerilla warfare of a description from which with our feelings we naturally recoil. . . . There is no doubt from the evidence before the House that the acts on both sides, as necessarily would be the case under such circumstances, were equally terrible and atrocious.—*Mr. Disraeli, H. of C. July 17th.*

For a moment there was a tendency on the part of the Conservative press to treat Mr. Disraeli's account of the matter as disposing of the anti-Turkish notion founded upon it.

We cannot expect much from the candour of those who have been betrayed into making the "atrocities in Bulgaria" a handle for a party attack upon an English Ministry; but we may fairly expect all other persons to admit that this statement puts the case, so far as the Turkish Government are concerned, in a very different light from that in which it has hitherto been viewed. They were confronted, as they say, by an unprovoked insurrection—an insurrection forced by agents from without upon a peaceable population with fire and sword; and they resorted to the only means at their disposal for suppressing it. They employed the irregular forces, which were the only ones forthcoming, and they enlisted in their service, or allowed to enlist itself, the revengeful spirit of a race who had themselves suffered outrage at the hands of the incendiaries. . . . There is little to be gained by weighing the cruelties on one side against the cruelties on the other. For us, it is the side which begins—and, be it observed, gratuitously begins—a war of massacre and fire-raising which we ought to visit with the strongest reprobation; and the present is a fair opportunity for inviting those who are always calling upon us to put humanity before politics to practise the principle they preach.—*P. M. G. July 18th.*

The *Standard* says that Mr. Disraeli's statement disposes of the sensational stories to which we have been treated in such abundant measure relative to the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria. It hopes that the lesson which has now been taught them will not

be lost upon its contemporaries ; that in future they will keep their sympathies better under control, and especially that they will maintain a guard over their credulity.—(July 18th.)

The *Morning Post* hopes that now that, so to speak, the saddle has been put upon the right horse, we shall hear no more of these "Turkish atrocities."—(July 18th.)

After the detailed statement made last night in the House of Commons by the Premier respecting the famous "atrocities in Bulgaria," we cannot suppose that the rational part of the British public will have any doubt of their genuine character. Whatever happened on the slopes of the Balkan between the beginning of May and the middle of June had its origin in a flagitious attempt, the work of Servian intruders, to provoke an insurrection. [These shocking events were a misfortune to the Turkish authorities which their opponents were not slow to seize.] From that source came the grossly exaggerated narratives, the glaringly fictitious anecdotes which have been not unsuccessfully applied to manufacture political capital out of the best feelings of human nature. We have it now, on the best authority, that nothing occurred during the brief insurrection which justifies the lurid fictions paraded as facts through all Europe. The Servian intruders on whose behalf our "moral support" is demanded, began the series of villanies by arson and murder ; they are really responsible for the grave crime of initiating an indefensible mode of conflict, which brought ruin and misery upon peaceful and industrious communities.—*D. T.* July 18th.

On the other hand, replies such as these were hardly likely to reassure those who wished to be satisfied as to the character of the Turkish rule, if the influence of this country was to continue to support it.

We do not know whether the public would have heard much, or anything, about these facts but for our correspondent, and the correspondents of other journals. . . . In substance the whole of Sir Henry Elliot's reply amounts to a declaration that, so far as the Ambassador can judge, the excesses in Bulgaria which were described by our correspondent, and corroborated by other journals and by private letters, were not quite so black as they were painted. . . . The levity, to use no stronger word, of [Mr. Disraeli's] language and demeanour when speaking of the atrocities which he could not deny, has shocked the public sentiment in England by a certainly unfounded, but nevertheless unfortunate, suggestion of an almost Oriental indifference to cruelty. It was but too likely to predispose the British agents in Turkey to a similar indifference, qualified only by the pro-Turkish partisanship which Mr. Disraeli scarcely concealed.—*D. N.* July 18th.

The *Times* notes that one fact which there was a disposition to deny in the despatch of July 6th is admitted in that of July 14th :

"Bulgarian children have certainly been sold, but I cannot find out that there has been anything like a regular traffic in them." The distinction does not amount to much.—(July 18th.)

The interest excited in England by the barbarities committed in Bulgaria seems, to one who knows the normal condition of things in Turkey, surprising; but that they should be doubted on account of any intrinsic improbability is still stranger.—*Special Correspondent at Ragusa, T. July 27th.*

Public Opinion was now too thoroughly roused to be satisfied with negative reports, and immediately on the receipt of Sir Henry Elliot's replies, Lord Derby telegraphed to Mr. Dupuis (the English Vice-consul at Adrianople) to proceed at once to the district and to report.¹ The next day he instructed the Ambassador to send a secretary or else Vice-consul Wrench with Mr. Dupuis,² and on the 19th Sir H. Elliot telegraphed that Mr. Baring had started to make the inquiries.³

About the same time the American Minister at Constantinople sent Mr. Schuyler, the American Consul-General, into the same district for the same purpose. Moreover the Turkish Government sent an extraordinary Commissioner (Edib Effendi), and announced that he had full powers to suppress and punish excesses.

The *Daily News* too, which on July 18th had spoken of Mr. Disraeli's statement as a "reply" to its correspondent's letters because, as it said, from the first he assumed the attitude of one whose function it was to disprove their truth, despatched a special Commissioner of its own, Mr. MacGahan, into the district to investigate and report fully on the matter.

In the course of his speech in the debate of July 31st,⁴ Mr. Disraeli alluded to a subject which, he said, he thought ought not to have been introduced into that debate:—

I mean the atrocities alleged to have been committed in consequence of the invasion of Bulgaria. I think on this occasion it would be quite out of keeping to enter into any controversy on that subject. Admit that all the Bulgarian atrocities that have been brought under the consideration of the House are genuine, and admit that they have all been committed by one side—and I am not prepared to make either of these admissions—everybody must feel that this is a question completely outside that which

¹ The telegram to Dupuis (*Turkey*, v. 1876, No. 1) was presumably sent after and in consequence of the receipt of Sir Henry Elliot's despatches on the 14th. It is dated 5.30 P.M. The Duke of Argyll (p. 221) thinks that the deputations (see *post*, § 4, as to these) which waited on Lord Derby on the same day had something to do with it.

² *Turkey*, v. 1876, No. 4.

⁴ See *post*, Chap. XI. § 4.

³ *Ibid.* No. 8.

we are called upon to decide now, that is, whether the House approves or not the policy of the Government in the late negotiations. [One charge against the Government, however, he must notice—that the Foreign Office had kept back a Consular report¹ respecting the massacre.] Neither my noble friend, the Secretary of State, however, nor myself, considered that report was one which at all justified the statements which were made. . . . I never adopted that coffee-house babble brought by a Bulgarian to a Vice-consul as authentic information which we ought to receive. . . . [After vindicating the course of the Government as that which they were called on to pursue for the sake of our interests and our empire, as conducive to peace and as one which they believed would lead to the progressive improvement of the population of the Turkish Empire, he said] If there is to be nothing but confusion, if we are to have nothing but struggles and war, if secret societies and revolutionary committees are to ride rampant over those fair provinces, I shall cordially deplore such a result as much as gentlemen who attack me for my want of sympathy with the sufferers of imaginary atrocities.”—*Mr. Disraeli*, in *H. of C. July 31st*.

The question of the atrocities perpetrated by Christians and Mussulmans in some districts of Bulgaria has become so weighty a State affair that I find myself compelled, greatly against my inclination, to return to the subject. . . . The first answer of Her

¹ In the H. of C. Aug. 11th, Mr. Forster said he was surprised at Mr. Disraeli's answer on July 10th (*ante*, p. 314, 315), when he had the information conveyed by the despatch in question. Mr. Disraeli said that he had not seen that despatch, from circumstances he could explain. The report alluded to was one from Consul Reade, dated Rustchuk, June 16th, and received by Lord Derby on June 28th. (*Turkey*, iii. 1876, inclosure in No. 500.) Mr. Reade reported that from information which had reached him it appeared that the Circassians were committing atrocities, chiefly amongst the villages near the Balkans, which kept the whole of that quarter in a state of the greatest terror. It was even said that these Circassians were kidnapping children of Bulgarians killed in the late affairs. Mr. Reade added that he was really inclined to think that the object in the lately disturbed district of Tirnova was] to diminish the number of Bulgarians as much as possible, for the Circassians seemed to be acting with the connivance of the authorities.

Not relying on Christian information, Mr. Reade had endeavoured to ascertain from Mussulmans whether the reports were true. Having heard of the arrival at Rustchuk of a Mussulman, a native of Plevna, who was present in the district during the whole rising, the Consul got a trustworthy Bulgarian, who introduced himself into a *café* where the man was in company with various other Turks, to find out what the man had to say on the subject. A note of the conversation was made by the Consul's informant, a copy of which he appended to his report. The Mussulman boasted that even schoolboys killed their five or six Bulgarians, so what he himself had done might be imagined. “A bimbashy (major) present asked him if they had taken rifles from those who were killed. He replied that ‘They had not even a hoe with them, much less rifles!’ The bimbashy then said that they must have killed innocent people. He replied, ‘Yes, very few had arms.’ Another present remarked that 5,000 or 6,000 must have perished innocently. He answered ‘If you had said 25,000 or 26,000 you would have been more correct.’ He added, ‘It is a great loss to the country, as most of them were tax-paying people.’ He also said that at Plevna no Christian could go to his field or vineyard for fear of being robbed or maltreated: and that the people of Nicopoli and Shumla are preparing letters of thanks to their Kaimacams for not having armed the Circassians in their districts.”

Majesty's Government was, as you know, that they had no information on the subject from their Diplomatic or Consular agents; and more lately, the second, that their information was to the effect that the reports had been greatly exaggerated or were absolutely false. This has set the foreign Press at Constantinople on its mettle . . . so that some conflict between journalists and diplomatists may be looked forward to, conducive, let us hope, to the advancement of the interests of truth.—*Special Correspondent at Therapia*, 1st Aug. 2nd.

Further letters from Mr. Pears, the Constantinople correspondent, criticising and replying to Mr. Disraeli's statements, and bringing fresh evidence in corroboration of the accounts given in the original letters, appeared in the *Daily News* of July 25th, 29th, Aug. 2nd, 15th, and 25th.

Thus there set in a sort of competition, in which the respective efficiency of the agencies employed by the Government, and of the English Press, not only for finding out but for keeping the public acquainted with what was going on in Turkey (and this the public considered it behoved them to know, that their policy might be shaped accordingly), were pitted against one another. It was almost inevitable as a contest of this sort went on that something like a partisan interest in the competitors should be aroused in the onlookers. People began to regard the profession of diplomacy and any special organisation of the State for the purpose of dealing with foreign affairs as an effete and antiquated method, which tended to harm rather than good, in the case of a self-governed country like England.

I would here ask whether there is any use in putting any more questions to men who have made up their minds not to answer them. I would even ask why the Foreign Office is supposed to know more about these matters than other people. I am not aware that there is any magical power in the Foreign Office. If there is, it is certainly used not so much to get hold of truth as to hide the truth. It seems to me that a correspondent of the *Times* or the *Daily News* has just as good means of finding out the truth as any one whom the Foreign Office can employ, and it also seems to me that there is much greater likelihood that the truth which he finds out will be honestly given to the public. In fact, this way of treating the Foreign Office as a kind of oracle possessed of mysterious sources of knowledge, is a survival from a state of things which has passed away. The public now knows what happens just as well as a Foreign Secretary can know it, and is no longer dependent on such scraps of information as it may suit the purposes of the Foreign Secretary to dole out to it.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman* in *D. N.* July 13th.

There was a deeply rooted suspicion that it was intended that the English official inquiry should turn out as favourably as possible to the Turks, and the appointment of Mr. Baring to conduct it, or rather of his dragoman, Mr. Guaraccino, was severely criticised.¹

Mr. Gladstone [expressed the hope that the inquiry into the Bulgarian outrages would be something better than a sham.] The accounts I receive inspire me with an apprehension that the person who has been chosen to conduct the inquiry is not well suited for the purpose; that neither his disposition nor his history points him out as in the slightest degree likely to go to the root of the matter.—*H. of C.* July 31st.

While everything official was thus regarded with critical suspicion, the letters of the *Daily News* commanded the public confidence.

Happily, the letters of our correspondent, including the important communication which we publish to-day, render the English reader independent of Mr. Guaraccino.—*D.N.* Aug. 2nd.

By the end of July there was no longer any doubt that terrible atrocities had taken place, and the Government were in this dilemma: either their information was defective, and inferior to that of the *Daily News*; or they were trying to soften it down in order to render Public Opinion kinder to the "red" policy.

We must come to the conclusion that the truth of the statements made with respect to what are called the atrocities in Bulgaria will be substantially confirmed. The outcry has gone on too long, the testimony has been too various, derived from too many sources, and yet too consistent, not to be true in the main. The official persons talk of exaggeration; let this be allowed.—*T.* Aug. 2nd.

The mass of evidence for them is greater than the mass of evidence for the massacre of Glencoe. That atrocities have been committed is affirmed by Sir Henry Elliot, by General Ignatieff, by Consul Dupuis, by the correspondents of the *Times* and *Daily News*, by the artist correspondent of the *Illustrated London News*; by the authors of the letters forwarded to be read at a public meeting in Edinburgh, and published with perhaps blamable courage by the *Edinburgh Daily Review*, letters which, if the writers' names were appended to them would set England on fire—by five correspondents of foreign journals, two of them at least

¹ See correspondents of *T.* and *D. N.* : *D. N.* July 25th and 29th, *T.* Aug. 2nd, and *D. N.* leader Aug. 2nd.

pro-Turkish; and by the American missionaries in Bulgaria, who are so assured of their case that they have summoned Mr. Schuyler to verify it.—*Spec. Aug. 5th.*¹

The telegrams from Mr. MacGahan, who had been sent out by the *Daily News*, began to appear in that paper on Aug. 7th.

The investigation into the atrocities is proceeding rapidly. Mr. Baring will probably report that not fewer than sixty villages were burned and twelve thousand people killed. I do not know what view he will take of the insurrection. Many prisoners have been released since we arrived. Mr. Baring is honestly desirous of obtaining the truth, but is always accompanied by a Turkish escort, which frightens the peasantry. Mr. Guaraccino, the interpreter, is unfairly prejudiced. . . . I have just seen the town of Batak, with Mr. Schuyler. Mr. Baring was there yesterday. [He then goes on to describe what he saw, a description elaborated in the letter which appeared in the *Daily News* of Aug. 16th, and to call attention to the promotion of Achmet Aga, who did all this.] The statement that the Bulgarians committed atrocities is utterly unfounded and shamefully false. Mr. Schuyler thinks that less than two hundred Turks were killed, nearly all in open combat. There is no proof yet that a single Turkish woman or child was killed or violated. The reports of Mr. Schuyler and Mr. Baring will corroborate this telegram. There is urgent need of relief for the starving and helpless families.—*MacGahan's telegram in D. N. Aug. 7th.*

The appearance of Mr. MacGahan's telegram caused the matter to be again brought forward in the House of Commons.

Mr. Bourke, in answer to Mr. Anderson, read extracts from Mr. Baring's despatch of July 22nd.²

Lord Hartington: I think it is becoming apparent that after all there has been very little exaggeration of these atrocities (hear, hear); and full as was the despatch which the hon. gentleman has just read of horrible accounts of what has occurred in Bulgaria, it was dated as far back as the 22nd of July, whereas the accounts in the *Daily News* extend to the 31st of July and the 1st of August. We are all of us tolerably well aware of the responsible character of the mission of the gentlemen sent out as Correspondents by leading London journals; but, if necessary, there are in this House those personally acquainted with the representative of the *Daily News* in Turkey, who would testify to the general trustworthiness of any statement he has made. It is hardly credible that, while personally accompanying Mr. Baring, this newspaper Correspondent should misrepresent the things that he had himself seen.—*H. of C. Aug 7th.*

¹ *Punch* draws Britannia maintaining "Neutrality under Difficulties," and puts the words into Disraeli's mouth—"Bulgarian Atrocities! I can't find them in the Official Reports!"—(Aug. 5th.)

² Inclosure in No. 27 of *Turkey*, v. 1876.

What passed last night in the House of Commons shows the astonishment and horror which these deeds have aroused. Mr. Anderson introduced the subject, and one member after another rose to express his indignation, and to protest against an attitude of indifference on the part of our Government, and still more against the tone of apology which has been detected in official communications. Mr. Bourke undertook to excuse the Government, and said all, perhaps, that it was possible to say. But it amounted to very little. The House was assured that the Prime Minister was not disposed to treat the subject with levity, but, on the contrary, would give it his anxious consideration. Then the old plea of exaggeration was put in once more, and the newspaper correspondents were taken to task, as persons who were satisfied with a very small amount of evidence and took a great deal of their information at second hand. We may venture to suggest to official speakers that with respect to this business the time is past when this style of apology will have any effect.—*T. Aug. 8th.*

The report of the Turkish Commission¹ was published early in August. It was at once seen to be worthless.

The real charge was that the Turks had been guilty of a barbarity so widespread, so systematic, so prolonged, and so wanton, as to be excusable by no code of right and wrong above that of mere savagery. Such is the accusation which Edib Effendi had to meet, and he meets it by a denial of astonishing comprehensiveness. It is little more, he gives us to understand, than a collection of shameful falsehoods. . . Bulgarians, Special Correspondents, and Consuls have been guilty of stupendous fabrications, and the Turkish Government has set an example of mercy to all Christian States. [But the accusations are distinct and specific—names, dates and places are given. The opinion of Europe will not be influenced by anything so vague and evasive as Edib Effendi's report.]—*T. Aug. 7th.*

A further set of papers² was presented to Parliament about Aug. 10th, which had the effect of increasing the dissatisfaction felt with the English Ambassador at Constantinople.

The *Times* says: These papers deal with the massacres of Bulgaria, and bring the intelligence down to within the last forty-eight hours, but it cannot be said they add much to our knowledge. We find it asserted as positively as ever that there has been gross exaggeration, and that those who have related the story are the most credulous or malignant of mankind. Nothing can convince Sir Henry Elliot that there has been anything beyond a little inevitable severity. [The writer goes on to cite from Sir Henry Elliot's despatch of July 25th his reference to a letter in the *Levant Herald*, which Sir Henry spoke of as "containing some

¹ *Turkey*, v. 1876, No. 29.

² *Turkey*, v. 1876.

interesting details as to the origin of the late Bulgarian insurrection, and to some extent justifying the severe measures which attended its suppression": also the passage in which Sir Henry Elliot wrote: "I have reason to believe that the credulity of the correspondent of the *Daily News*, whose letter on the subject of the Bulgarian atrocities attracted so much attention in England, has been imposed upon by two Bulgarians." Thus we find that to the last the theory of the Embassy is that the story of the massacres is a fabrication for political purposes. Edin Effendi's explanation is in effect that, if the Bulgarians were murdered they must have murdered each other; and perhaps that is the conclusion to which British diplomacy has arrived. But the ignorance must be what is called invincible, for the means of information were easy. A chief object in the selection of those papers is to make it appear that the Bulgarians are primarily responsible for all that has happened, and that the deeds perpetrated by the Turkish troops, if not justifiable, were excusable, or at least inevitable. For this purpose we have introduced the impudent romance of Edin Effendi and the "Historical Retrospect" of the *Levant Herald*.—(Aug. 11th.)

The subject was mentioned once more in the House of Commons on the eve of the prorogation.

Mr. Ashley alluded to the Premier's silence on Aug. 7th. The Premier ought to be glad of the opportunity of making a statement, for, while the truth of the atrocities was generally acknowledged, it was imputed to him that in addition to abetting the concealment of facts, he still adhered to the position of sceptical apathy which he took up at the outset. . . . The information received by the Press was rapidly supplementing that which the Foreign Office could supply. *Mr. Ashley* proceeded to read a private communication which he had received from Constantinople, in which a number of Turkish officials were named, and the part they had taken in the atrocities described (*Shefket Pasha*, *Tossoun Bey*, *Hafiz Pasha*, and others). Some of them had been promoted or decorated, while *Aziz Pasha*, late Governor of Philippopolis, whose justice and philo-Bulgarianism were well known, had been removed from office. *Mr. Ashley* asked that the Government should take steps to ascertain whether these statements were correct.

Mr. Bourke felt bound to admit that the Government really had no idea of the events which had occurred in Bulgaria until attention was called to them in the House, and he gladly took the opportunity of saying that the Government and the country were very much indebted to the newspaper correspondents through whom those events had become known.

Sir William Harcourt said: From the First Minister of the Crown down to the Consul at Adrianople there seemed not to be a man who, at the moment when the East was occupying the

attention of the country, knew that those massacres and horrors were going on. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, indeed, admitted with admirable simplicity that the Government had learnt all about them from the newspaper correspondents. He was glad, he must say, at all events, that after being denounced in that House and vilified in the Conservative Press, it was at last acknowledged that the reputation of England, which had been neglected by Her Majesty's Government and overlooked by our representatives abroad, had been vindicated by the newspaper correspondents.

Mr. Disraeli denied that the Government had been ignorant of what had been occurring in Bulgaria. "You come to say we were ignorant of all that was occurring, and did nothing to counteract it, because we said in answer to questions that the information which had reached us did not warrant the statements that were quoted in the House. These are two entirely different questions. I maintain that the statements made to Parliament in putting those questions were not justified. On the 13th of July, Lord Derby telegraphed immediately to Sir Henry Elliot quoting the statements made in the *Daily News* of that day and asking whether they were true. All the statements are untrue." —*H. of C.* Aug. 11th.

The position which the Premier took up was to treat those who were opposing a pro-Turkish policy something as if they were plaintiffs in an action, who must be pinned down to the "particulars" which they had delivered. Thus there arose a great controversy, not only as to the accuracy of the accounts transmitted by the *Times* and *Daily News* correspondents generally, but especially with respect to the following points.

(1) The alleged parading of the heads of murdered women and children by Bashli-Bazouks.¹

(2) The statement that women and children had been publicly sold.²

¹ See Belgrade telegram in *D. N.* of July 13th. This is the statement alluded to by Mr. Disraeli on Aug. 11th. See *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 13.

Subsequently (*D. N.* Aug. 30th) Mr. MacGahan vouches the Italian Consul at Burgos as an authority for the fact that sacksful of heads were emptied in the street at Tamboli.

² For the allegations under this head see Belgrade telegram spoken of above; also *T.* July 8th, "More than 1,000 Bulgarian children have been taken and sold as slaves. They have been sold publicly in the streets of Adrianople and Philippopolis."—[Letter cited by Constantinople correspondent.] See also *D. N.* July 8th, where Mr. Pears says he is informed young girls may be bought for three or four liras each at Philippopolis, and quotes a correspondent who states that many young women have been carried off, in some cases for a few days only, in others perhaps to form part of their captor's harems, and that many children have been carried off to be converted to Mohammedanism or kept as drudges.

(3) The statement that thousands of Bulgarians were in confinement in prisons and other places, undergoing indescribable tortures.¹

(4) A story of the burning of forty or fifty Bulgarian girls in a stable near Kalofer, mentioned by Mr. Pears in his original letter, (*D. N.* June 23rd) as a rumour. In his second letter (*D. N.* July 8th) he said the rumour had been confirmed, and gave the substance of a long account of the incident from the *Courier d'Orient* newspaper.²

(5) Another point in controversy was whether the accounts of the havoc, when they represented that "at least 25,000 perfectly innocent persons had been massacred," and "that a large number of villages, differently stated as being between 60 and 100 had been burnt,"³ did not grossly exaggerate the destruction to life and property.

¹ For these allegations see letters of Constantinople correspondents in *T.* and *D. N.* July 8th. See *ante*, p. 315, as to Mr. Disraeli's replies to inquiries on these points.

² Mr. Pears alludes to the story again (*D. N.* Aug. 15th), commenting at length on the evidence, and saying that in spite of Mr. Disraeli's statement that there was not the slightest foundation for the report, this particular story is not and will not be disproved.

Subsequently Mr. Evelyn Ashley communicated to the *D. N.* (about Sept. 9th, 1876) a letter from a correspondent of his, an English Vice-consul in Bulgaria, who, he said, wrote as follows about the much-discussed story of the burning of forty girls:—"The original statement was founded on the misunderstanding of a colloquial Turkish phrase; to burn in Turkish is *vakmak*, but this verb is constantly used in the sense to ruin. . . . The forty girls were taken by Bashi-Bazouks from the village of Radi-keni, and were carried off by them into the mountains of the district of Gabrova—they were never more heard of. I understood how the mistake arose in a rather curious way. I had asked a young man, named (he gives the name, but I suppress it), whose father is a wealthy Greek merchant at Philippopoli, to come and tell me what he knew for certain of the occurrences in that district, and at last I inquired if he knew about the forty girls; he said he knew well that so many had been carried off from such a village. And did they burn (*yakmichlarmi*) them? I asked. Burn them? Certainly they did (*yakmichlarmi? evet*), was the reply. This staggered me, but I recollected the current locution, and inquired in Turkish whether they burned them with fire. To this the answer was 'No, but not one of them returned to their village.' Mr. Gladstone (*Lessons in Massacre*, p. 51) says—"The *Courier d'Orient* was suppressed for criticising the declaration by Lord Beaconsfield of the falsity of the story. . . . It was false. In every case of terror such as this, however large the truth may be, it is sure to be exaggerated here and there by fable."

³ So Mr. Baring summarises the statements on this head, which found their way into the English newspapers. Mr. Pears (*D. N.* June 23rd) wrote:—"It is too soon yet to attempt to ascertain, with any degree of exactness, the number who have been killed. An intelligent Turk, who has just arrived, estimates it at 18,000. Bulgarians speak of 30,000, and of the destruction of upwards of 100 villages." In his second letter (*D. N.* July 8th) he said no one in Constantinople hesitated to believe that many thousands of innocent men, women, and children had been slaughtered, and that at least sixty villages had been utterly destroyed. He did not pretend that the statistics could be given with accuracy. Nowhere to his knowledge had the estimate of killed been put lower than 12,000.

Mr. Baring devoted a great deal of space to the consideration of these controverted allegations, with the following results.

(1) As to the cartloads of heads, he says it is utterly untrue they were ever paraded in the streets of any town, but the heads of some of a band of insurgents who were defeated by Bashi-Bazouks were brought into Sofia on bayonets and poles.

(2) It is not true that women and children were publicly sold; but many women had been carried off.

(3) The evidence as to torture was very conflicting. There is no doubt that the overcrowding in the prisons at Philippopolis was terrific.

(4) He was not able to discover anything authentic as to the story of the burning of the forty girls.

(5) The difficulty of obtaining a reliable estimate of the numbers massacred was immense, but his estimate was that about 12,000 persons perished in the sandjak of Philippopolis. Fifty-one Bulgarian villages were burnt in the same sandjak (that is in the districts of Philippopolis and Tatar-Bazardjik), also four monasteries. Besides these seven Turkish and mixed villages were burnt by the insurgents.¹

But it was felt that after all the controversy whether a few incidents happened exactly as had been reported to correspondents at a distance from the scene was a somewhat barren one.²

¹ Subsequently Mr. Stoney, principal agent in the Philippopolis district of the Central Relief Committee for the Bulgarians, drew up a list, which gave the number of men, women, and children killed at 3,694, and the number of Bulgarian villages wholly or partially burnt at forty-nine. Vice-consul Calvert, in forwarding this list, observed that these figures tallied closely with those compiled by the Rev. Mr. Clarke (an American missionary). Mr. Layard (May 2nd, 1877) in transmitting this report characterises it as "undoubtedly the fullest and most trustworthy statement that has yet been furnished upon this subject," and adds it is some relief to find that the number of victims was at first enormously exaggerated.—*Turkey*, xxv. 1877, No. 264. See *Turkey*, i. 1877, No. 683, for Mr. Baring's criticism of Mr. Clarke's figures and adherence to his own. Mr. Baring's method, where no better means existed, was to deduct the number left alive from the estimated original population. In this manner he arrived at the figures 5,000 as representing the loss of life at Batak alone. Mr. Stoney's figures were stated to be founded on house-to-house visitations. If this means that he took the names of those whom friends or neighbours stated to have been killed, it seems clear that his total would be far under the mark, as omitting cases where, for instance, whole families had been massacred. As his list shows that every house in Batak was burnt, it is not easy to see how he applied the method of house-to-house visitation in such a case. On the other hand, Mr. Calvert points out that his inquiries were made when the panic had worn off, and when numbers of runaways, at first counted as dead, had returned.

² A somewhat similar controversy arose with respect to impalements. Mr. MacColl, dating from Belgrade, Sept. 21st, writes to the *Times* (Sept. 28th, 1876), stating that Dr. Liddon and himself, on their way thither along the Bosnian frontier, observed some sharply-pointed stakes in front of a Turkish military station, and were told on inquiry that they were used for impaling the Christian insurgents of Bosnia. "In fact any Bosnian Christian found with arms in his hands was, and is now, exposed to

The important matter was whether the charge brought against the Turkish Power of systematic inhumanity such as Europe could not tolerate, was founded on facts; and as to this Public Opinion on the evidence before it came to an almost unanimous verdict of guilty.

The *Times* remarked it was impossible to reconcile Mr. Bourke's language with Mr. Disraeli's, but it preferred the Under Secretary in his agreement with facts to the Prime Minister in contradiction to them.—(Aug. 12th.)

Thus when the substantial accuracy of the *Daily News* report became apparent, when the Government's first answer, "We have no information of anything of the kind," had to be modified bit by bit as their tardy reports came in piecemeal, till their whole story differed but little from that originally told in the *Daily News*, and when at last the Under Secretary confessed as much and owned the obligations of the country and of the Government to the newspaper, Public Opinion recognised that the Government was either ignominiously beaten in the competition, or had been disingenuously striving to prevent the facts appearing in their true colour. Neither alternative was calculated to increase the confidence of Public Opinion in the Government. It became the cue of the pro-Turkish party to lay as large a portion as possible of the blame upon the shoulders of an infuriated populace, or of underlings; and to deny

this treatment. . . . The officer of an Austrian steamer which passes up and down the Save twice a week assured Dr. Liddon and myself that they often saw human beings writhing on those cruel stakes. And we saw with our own eyes a ghastly confirmation of this story in the shape of a body thus impaled." The Turkish Ambassador writes (*T. Oct. 3rd*), saying the absurdity of the story is self-evident, but he is authorised to give it a formal denial. Mr. Denton (*T. Oct. 5th*) cites a letter he had just received from the Archimandrite of Herzegovina, in which, incidental mention was made of impalements, "Les vieillards mis sur le pal." Musurus Pasha writes again (*T. Oct. 6th*), and on the same day letters appear from Dr. Liddon and Mr. MacColl. The latter cites further evidence in corroboration of the original statement, namely that of a Roman Catholic priest, and of Bishop Strossmayer, whose guests they were, and whose diocese was the scene of the occurrences. He said it was all quite true, with this addition, that women as well as men were impaled. Canon Liddon sends a letter from Mr. Humphrey Sandwith to the *Times* of Nov. 30th. The latter says:—"During my travels . . . I have inquired from time to time about the practice of impalement as you requested me. From various people I have gathered that the practice is still more or less in force, though not very common." He incloses a translation of the deposition of an eye-witness of one case, taken before the tribunal of first instance of Belgrade. Consul Holmes, who was directed to report as to the truth of the original statement, replied that no one there had ever heard of anything resembling the cruelties mentioned, and it was impossible they could have occurred without becoming publicly known. He suggested that Mr. MacColl might have been hoaxed into accepting a faggot of beans, fixed up to dry, as an impaled body. (*Turkey*, i. 1877, Nos. 687 and 961.) Various other critics made similar ingenious suggestions. (See Mr. MacColl's letter headed "Impaled Vampires," *D. N. March 2nd*, 1878.) With reference to the whole matter compare *Contemp. Rev.* Feb. 1877, "The Morality of Mistake."

that the atrocities could be regarded as anything more than an accident arising from the unfortunate circumstance that the Porte had not been able to send regular troops to put down the insurrection. But the more detailed information that was now coming in brought out two facts which were inconsistent with this lenient view; the facts, namely, that so far from punishing, the Porte had approved and rewarded the perpetrators of the atrocities, and further, that regular troops had been guilty of some of the worst of the massacres.

Moreover the mention by name of the offenders gave English indignation something definite against which to direct itself; something to bite upon, if we may so speak. There was indeed a danger (as we shall see) that the current of popular indignation might be too much diverted upon these individuals, to the losing sight of deeper causes and broader ends.

Shefket Pasha, for instance, who burned the village of Bazardjik, and slaughtered nearly all of its inhabitants under more than usually revolting circumstances has been promoted to a high position in the Palace of the Sultan at Constantinople. Again, there is the case of Achmet Aga, a Tus-hashî, or captain of a company of Bashi-Bazouks, who likewise distinguished himself by his ferocity It was he who slaughtered 8,000 people at Batak, and burned 200 women and children alive in the school. He is a low and ignorant brute, who can neither read nor write, and yet he has been promoted to the rank of Pasha, and with an exquisite mockery of justice, named a member of the Commission appointed to prosecute and punish the Bashi-Bazouks. The reason is clear and simple. These men carried out the wishes and intentions of the Government, if not the positive orders. They did their duty and have been rewarded. [*MacGahan in D. N. Aug. 16th.*]

Wherever there were any regular troops to commit massacres they rivalled the Bashi-Bazouks in atrocity. Here [Otluk-keni] as Mr. Schuyler will show in his report, regular and irregular troops were equally cruel, pitiless and ferocious, and Hafiz Pasha is no less guilty than Achmet Aga.—[*MacGahan in D. N. Aug. 26th.*]

The Porte has, moreover, given a powerful handle to its enemies and detractors, by the way it has treated those who took an active part in the suppression of the insurrection. Those who have committed atrocities have been rewarded; while those who have endeavoured to protect the Christians from the fury of the Bashi-Bazouks and others have been passed over with contempt, e.g. Shefket Pasha holds high office in the Palace; Hafiz Pasha has a command in Servia; Achmet Aga has been decorated; so have Tossoun Bey and Nedjib Effendi, Kaimakam of Plevna. On

the other hand, has any reward been given to Hafiz Effendi, who saved Yamboli to Rustem Effendi, Yuybashi of Tournova, who saved the prisoners from the fury of the mob ?
—*Mr. Baring's Report.*

[Referring to the case of Panagurishta] This scene of rapine, lust, and murder was continued for three days, when the survivors were made to bury the bodies of the dead. The perpetrators of these atrocities were chiefly regular troops commanded by Hafiz Pasha.—*Mr. Schuyler's Report.*

The first telegrams from the seat of the atrocities appeared in the *Daily News* just before the prorogation, but it was not till after the rising of Parliament that the full reports of the various commissions of investigation were received. Of these, the letters in the *Daily News* were by far the most important in their effect on Public Opinion.¹

Mr. MacGahan's communications constituted a tale of horror which the *Daily News* published in serial form. New numbers, so to speak, were coming out at short intervals through August and the beginning of September; but the climax was reached in the terrible letters in which was told the fate of Batak and of Otluk-keui.²

¹ Letters dated from Tatar Bazardjik and Constantinople from a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, giving narratives of the atrocities, appeared in that paper on Aug. 16th and Sept. 12th.

² Mr. MacGahan arrived at Philippopolis about July 23rd. He pursued his journey in company with Mr. Schuyler, and for the most part they followed in the wake of Mr. Baring. His first letter was from Philippopolis, dated July 28th, and appeared in *D. N.* of Aug. 16th. Two telegrams of later date, however, namely one from Philippopolis and the other from Tatar Bazardjik, sent after Batak had been seen, appeared in *D. N.* of Aug. 7th. It was this publication which, as we have seen, was the text for bringing up the subject again in the House of Commons on Aug. 7th (*ante*, p. 325). The second letter (dated Pestera, Aug. 1st) appeared in *D. N.* Aug. 21st. That day Mr. MacGahan saw Batak, and went on the same evening to Tatar Bazardjik. Mr. Baring was at Batak a day earlier. The third letter (Tatar Bazardjik, Aug. 2nd, *D. N.* Aug. 22nd) gives an account of the fate of Batak. The next letters (fourth to seventh) are dated from Philippopolis, from 10th to 20th Aug. There were also telegrams of the 9th, 10th, and 11th from the same place in *D. N.* of Aug. 18th. (Alluded to in *Spec.* Aug. 19th, as "almost too horrible to read.") The fourth letter describes the bombardment of Panagurishta (Otluk-keui) by Hafiz Pasha with Bashi-Bazouks and regular troops, and the massacres and outrages that followed their entry. The fifth letter dealt with Avrat Alan and other places. The sixth letter speaks of the bombardment of a church at Perustitsa, which was crowded with women and children. Mr. MacGahan attributes this to Aziz Pasha, Governor of Philippopolis; but this appears to be an error. Mr. Baring and Mr. Schuyler in their reports, Mr. Pears in his first letter (*D. N.* June 23rd), and Mr. Ashley's correspondent (*H. of C.* Aug. 11th), all attribute it to Raschid Pasha. The seventh letter deals with the case of Klissura. This appeared in *D. N.* Sept. 9th. The eighth letter (Bneharest, Aug. 22nd) appeared in *D. N.* Aug. 30th, overtaking the later letters from Philippopolis. Mr. MacGahan had passed rapidly through the district north of the Balkans, leaving Mr. Schuyler still investigating there. In this letter he alluded to Mr. Disraeli's denials in the *H. of C.* Aug. 11th. He strongly emphasises the assertion that the outrages are still going on. "It is of the living we have

The mere statistics of the slaughter were now overshadowed. Death seemed a small matter compared with the things Mr. MacGahan described. Nor could the English public take refuge in the impersonality of mere numbers. The homes, the surroundings, the individuality of the victims were brought home to their imagination, as well as the things they had endured. It is this graphicness of detail and of description, which is the main characteristic of the closing chapter of the story of the atrocities.

No one now professed doubt or disbelief; and the publication of the official reports of Mr. Baring and of Mr. Schuyler did nothing to mitigate the offence. The latter appeared in the *Daily News* of Aug. 29th. Mr. Baring's report was impatiently awaited. The delay added to the unpopularity of the Government. They were suspected of a desire to keep the public in the dark. At length it was published in the *London Gazette* of Sept. 19th.

The *Times* said that it was not creditable to the Government that it should have been so long delayed.—(Sept. 20.)¹

Mr. Baring's report was a document of great length. He commenced by attributing the troubles to the machinations of a certain "Bulgarian Committee" established about fourteen years previously at Bucharest for the purpose of fomenting insurrection,² and wresting Bulgaria from Turkey to add it to a future South Slavic Empire. His account of the havoc substantially corresponds with the accounts in the *Daily News*, both as to the amount and character of the destruction.³

As regards the importance of the insurrection, it was neither so formidable as the Turks in their first panic thought it was, nor so utterly insignificant as many people wish to make it out to be . . . The insurgents put themselves in the wrong by killing

now to think, and their position is lamentable. There is no security for life or property in Bulgaria." Mr. MacGahan's letters (exclusive of the last from Philipopolis) were published in collected form on Sept. 11th, 1876 (Bradbury, Agnew, and Co.). For long extract from the Batak letter see Clayden's *England under Lord Beaconsfield*, chap. ii.

¹ Compare *T.* Sept. 2nd, 15th, and 18th; also reports of the Guildhall meeting of Sept. 18th.

² See *ante*, p. 330, as to his report on some of the controverted details.

³ Mr. Baring's account of Batak is quoted by Argyll, vol. i. p. 223.

Lord Beaconsfield (*H. of L.* Feb. 20th, 1877) remarked that the world had been in ignorance of the atrocities for a long time after they had happened, "the Government of a past day . . . having cut off all consular agencies in that part of the Turkish Empire." This version of the matter having been somewhat criticised, Lord Beaconsfield (Feb. 22nd), in his reply, strangely spoke of Batak as not having been discovered till Mr. Baring discovered it in his subsequent investigation into the atrocities.

defenceless Turks and committing other acts of insurrection, but the resistance they made when actually attacked was hardly worthy of the name. The Turks gained an easy victory, and abused it most shamefully, the innocent being made to suffer for the guilty in a manner too horrible to think of.—*Mr. Baring's Report.*

Mr. Schuyler's report was comparatively short, but it told substantially the same story.¹

During the last winter and spring agents of the Bulgarian Committee at Bucharest made an agitation against the Turkish Government, and met with considerable encouragement among the younger part of the population. [The insurrection broke out prematurely on the 1st and 2nd of May. There was a panic at Tatar-Bazardjik and Philippopoli. Telegrams were sent to the Porte for regular troops which, after some delay, were refused.]

The Beys of Philippopoli and Adrianople practically seized on the government and armed the Mussulman inhabitants of the towns and of the country, arms being sent for that purpose from Adrianople and Constantinople. These armed Mussulmans, called irregular troops or Bashi-Bazouks, were then, together with the few regular troops at hand, sent into a campaign against the Bulgarian villages for the purpose of putting down the insurrection, and of disarming the Christian population. But few Circassians seem to have been employed at this time. Their settlements are east of Adrianople. It was a *levée en masse* of the Mussulman villages against their Christian neighbours. The insurgent villages made little or no resistance. In many cases they surrendered their arms on the first demand. Nearly all the villages which were attacked by the Bashi-Bazouks were burnt and pillaged, as were also all those which had been abandoned by the terrified inhabitants. The inhabitants of some villages were massacred after exhibitions of the most ferocious cruelty, and the violation not only of women and girls, but even of persons of the other sex. The crimes were committed by the regular troops as well as by the Bashi-Bazouks. The number of villages which were burnt in whole or in part in the districts of Philippopoli and Tatar-Bazardjik, is at least sixty-five.²

Besides the villages four monasteries were burnt. . . .

It is very difficult to estimate the number of Bulgarians who were killed during the few days that the disturbances lasted, but I am inclined to put 15,000 as the lowest for the districts I have named.

¹ On one point Mr. Schuyler is directly contradicted by Mr. Baring. The latter says, "It has been denied that a single Mussulman village was burnt, or a single mosque destroyed, when with my own eyes I have seen the ruins of both."

² Here follows a list of names: Mr. Schuyler says that Turkish and Bulgarian names for the same town may be repeated in one or two instances, but, on the other hand, some villages are probably omitted.

[Particulars follow of what was done at Perushtitsa, and some other places.] While pillage reigned supreme at Kuprishtitsa and lust at Panagurishta, at Batak the Turks seemed to have no stronger passion than the thirst for blood. . . .

These atrocities were clearly unnecessary for the suppression of the insurrection, for it was an insignificant rebellion at the best, and the villagers generally surrendered at the first summons ; nor can they be justified by the state of panic, which was over before the troops set out on the campaign.

An attempt, however, has been made—and not by Turks alone—to defend and to palliate them on the ground of the previous atrocities, which, it is alleged, were committed by the Bulgarians. I have carefully investigated this point, and am unable to find that the Bulgarians committed any outrages or atrocities, or any acts that deserve the name.—*Mr. Schuyler's Report*.¹

The publication of Mr. Schuyler's report to the American Minister at Constantinople on the conduct of the Turkish troops towards the Christian population of Bulgaria has substantially confirmed the history of those horrors which had already been given by the newspaper correspondents. It is now fitting to say that there remains no shadow of doubt as to the substance of that hideous history. The abominable character of the Bulgarian atrocities was never doubted by any sane persons, and the doubts that were really entertained as to their extent and number have been finally disposed of by Mr. Schuyler's report, which in its principal statements will probably be confirmed, according to the *Times* correspondent at Therapia, by that of Mr. Baring. . . There is now ample proof that the exaggerations of the newspaper accounts affected the language rather than the facts. There is no more to be disclosed, and we may ask whether after the publication of Mr. Schuyler's report we have not heard enough. . . To enter into further and more carefully analysed particulars of events, the detestable import of which has been fully grasped by the public mind, is to pander to an unwholesome appetite for "atrocities,"

¹ Official copies of Mr. Baring's and Mr. Schuyler's reports were received by Lord Derby from Sir Henry Elliot on Sept. 14th, and appear as inclosures to *Turkey*, i. 1877, No. 220. The report of Mr. Schuyler is dated Philippopolis, Aug. 10th. Subsequently he reported at greater length. Mr. Gladstone notes at p. 15 of *Lessons in Massacre* : "It may be well to mention that [the report of Mr. Schuyler, to which my references are made, is an enlarged and digested form of the document which appears in [the Blue Book]. I translate from the French version, kindly sent me by the author. It is dated Nov. 20th, 1876." This full report attracted little attention in England.

In September a new Commission (mixed Turkish and Christian) was appointed by the Porte to inquire further, this Commission at the same time being invested with powers to bring to trial and punish persons guilty of the atrocities which had been laid to their charge, and Mr. Baring was directed to accompany it. (*Turkey*, i. 1877, Nos. 489, 295, 312). His despatches to Sir Henry Elliot respecting these investigations appear from time to time in the Blue Books. On his report that the Commission had acquitted Tossoun Bey in spite of conclusive evidence of his guilt, Mr. Baring was directed to withdraw. (*Turkey*, xv. 1877, No. 77.)

or to the luxurious indulgence of uncontrolled emotion.—*P. M. G.* Aug. 30th.

The enterprise of searching out and dwelling upon atrocities has itself become an atrocity of a most disgusting kind.—*Standard*, Aug. 31st.

The publication of Mr. Baring's report is not now of course the important event which it would have been a month ago. The truth about the Bulgarian atrocities has been placed substantially beyond doubt for some time past; and no one expected that the published result of Mr. Baring's inquiries would materially alter the complexion of the terrible story. Nor has it done so. Its importance consists only in the fact that it is a confirmation of that story not only by new evidence, but by evidence of a new kind—the testimony, that is to say, of a calm and unimpassioned inquirer. And all that it has done has been to explode a few extravagant stories and to reduce the estimate of victims by a few thousands. . . It matters little from this point of view whether 12,000, or 15,000, or 20,000 Bulgarians have fallen victims to the savagery of the Turkish soldiery; the crime is great enough on the lowest estimate to justify to the full the indignation which has been aroused in this country. Nor has any one denied its justice even before this Report appeared. All that has been urged is that it should be kept within bounds of reason and directed to proper objects. And one of these is clearly indicated in the Report—the punishment of those primarily responsible for the sanction or the direct encouragement of the outrages. This, it seems to us, ought not only to be demanded by Europe of the Porte, but ought at once to be conceded by Turkey as an elementary proof of her right to remain a member of the community of civilised nations. That such miscreants as Achmet Agha should have been decorated and not hanged is in itself too gross an outrage upon public decency. Demands should at once be made for their condign punishment, and Turkey must listen to and obey them. If this cannot be done, nothing can be done. It is idle to talk of enforcing reforms upon Turkey, of compelling her to do this or that, if she can defy her civilised neighbours in respect of so simple and fundamental a duty of good government as this. We do not argue that Europe should be content with the punishment of these wretches. She may rightly demand more, but she must at least demand this; and the consideration of further demands appears almost premature until at least this poor satisfaction has been insisted on and obtained.—*P. M. G.* Sept. 20th.

The most important aspect of the influence upon Public Opinion was the enormous *volume* of feeling that was produced in England by the news of the atrocities. But a word must be said as to the *quality* of the effect produced by this new factor.

(1) Previously the question had been confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now Bulgaria was added to the problem. Thus the sphere of contention was enlarged locally. A greater "dis-memberment" of Turkey was thus necessary to give effect to the "violet" policy.

(2) An impetus was given to the sentimental as distinguished from the purely diplomatic factors of anti-Turkism. Previously the *Spectator*, for instance, had talked of the government of the Turks as being "*on the whole* as bad as that of King Bomba," and of the insurgents as being "at least as much in the right as ever the Italians were."¹ But after the atrocities people got to look on Turkish rule as something generically distinct from mere bad government. Moreover the news reached England at a time when Turkey was said to be reforming. It is true that the wholesale massacres and outrages which were spoken of pre-eminently as the "Bulgarian atrocities" had been done under the old *régime*, but the new Government by rewarding their authors had adopted them. Not only so, but the reports from Bulgaria showed that the cruelties could not be regarded merely as a flash of vengeance, however savage, which had passed away with the emergency which excited it. The Provincials were in a chronic state of terror. Atrocities, if on a smaller scale, were still going on.

At present the Christians are afraid to go about the country, and the peasants dare not even work in the fields at any distance from the villages.—(*Mr. Baring's Report*).²

Thus the conclusion was driven inexorably home that the disease of Turkish government was something essential, radical and incurable. This is the key-note of anti-Turkism.

(3) A strong feeling of the necessity of *doing something* was engendered by the knowledge that the outrages were still going on though in a less virulent form, and that periods of renewed virulence might recur. Moreover Public Opinion was confirmed in its belief in its own powers by seeing that it had stimulated the Government to take some action, which already appeared to be effecting some good.

I have very great pleasure in saying that the action of the English Press and Parliament has saved very much suffering and probably very many lives. It was a surprise to the Turks here to learn that England was indignant at the cruelties which were desolating Bulgaria. They were really alarmed as well as surprised,

¹ *Ante*, p. 303.

² Compare Mr. MacGahan's letter, *D. N. ante*, p. 333, *note*.

and the Commission which was sent by the Turkish Government last week has already done much to put an end to the judicial atrocities—let me say at once to the Bloody Assize, which was succeeding the cruelties in the villages. Men were released in great numbers from Philippopolis on the very day when Mr. Baring was leaving Constantinople.—*Constantinople Correspondent, D. N. Aug. 2nd.*

(4) At the same time a combative temper had been roused in Public Opinion by the dogged resistance which the Government seemed to be opposing to its desires. Not a little of the vehement feeling exhibited with respect to the atrocities was probably due to this circumstance.

(5) A new light was cast upon the action of Serbia and Montenegro. The wrongs of the Provincials must have excited there a far stronger feeling than even in England. The hypothesis of Russian intrigue, even if allowed to be a real one, became entirely unnecessary to account for the impulse that drove them on to war against Turkey at the beginning of July. Thus not only was the sympathy in England for the subject Christian populations increased, but Englishmen were led to rate far more highly the feeling by which the subject Christians and their free neighbours were animated.

§ 3. *The Servian Campaign (to the Suspension of Hostilities).*

Simultaneously with the story of the Atrocities, another account was being received in England which, though in a lesser degree, had also its effect in guiding the course of Public Opinion. This was the narrative of the course of the Servian war. Its chief importance lay in this, that it showed that the strength of Turkey had been underrated, and that if the great Powers should decide to stand aloof, the result of such a policy would be not only that the tributary principalities would not be able to work out the deliverance of the subject Provincials, but that they might themselves again be brought under the yoke.

Hence while at the beginning of July those who looked at the efforts of Serbia to accomplish the emancipation of the Provincials from the Turkish Power might be satisfied with a policy of strict neutrality, they became more and more anxious for the adoption of an active "violet" policy as the events of the short campaign developed themselves. On the other hand, the number of Russian volunteers that flocked to the Servian ranks, and above all the fact

that a Russian general, Tchernaeff, was at Prince Milan's side and in high command, strongly excited the jealousy of those who could see nothing but Russian intrigue in the movement against Turkey, and thus tended to reinforce the "red" policy.¹ The war actually came considerably after the massacres in point of time ; but just as when we are looking at two stars, we see them not as they are now, but as they were when the light left them, the more distant one in a condition earlier perhaps by years than that of the other, so the English public saw as it were simultaneously the massacres and the course of the war.

War was formally declared by Servia on July 1st and by Montenegro on July 2nd. In Montenegro Prince Nikita maintained a partly successful contest against the Turks under Mukhtar Pasha, on whom he inflicted a severe defeat on July 28th, taking prisoner Osman Pasha, Mukhtar's second in command. Another victory of the Montenegrins was reported on August 14th, and some further success early in September.

But it was on the efforts of the Servians that the result mainly depended. The campaign opened with an offensive movement of the Servian force, which shot out from the south-eastern corner of Servia, and passing the fortress of Nisch seemed to threaten Sofia. Such a movement for a moment gave colour to the prevalent impression that the Provincials and Tributary States could, unaided, work out their own deliverance. But before the end of July it appeared that the fighting power of Turkey had been underrated, and the correspondent at Belgrade writes :—

The Servian war has virtually collapsed. . . . No Servian troops are now outside the frontier on the south-eastern front. . . . Henceforth the aggressive is quite abandoned. Servia's ambition goes no further than self-defence and the warding off of invasion. . . . The deepest despondency reigns in Belgrade among those best acquainted with the situation, and although at headquarters men strive to show a good front, there is much gloom at heart.—
Belgrade Correspondent in D. N. July 26th.

However, the struggle was not over. The Servians fought with renewed determination when on their own soil. Moreover, each manifestation of Servian weakness seemed to stimulate the stream of Russian volunteers, chiefly officers, who now began to pour into Servia.

¹ The *Times* correspondent at Belgrade notes as ominous that, "Up to the present Prince Milan was, nominally at least, Commander-in-Chief of the Servian army. He is so no longer ; of course, by consent of his Highness, Tchernaeff is appointed to the command held by the Prince."—*T. Aug. 9th.*

The Servians were now reduced to the defensive. To the eastward, Horvatovich stood fronting the enemy along the line of the Timok, while at Alexinatz, Prince Milan with General Tchernaiëff blocked the Morava Valley which leads from the south-eastern corner of Serbia straight to Belgrade. But the loss of Saitschar, about Aug. 5th, after several days' hard fighting, broke the eastern line of defence; and it seemed probable that the Turks might soon come pouring down into the Morava Valley from the eastward, and behind Tchernaiëff's back. But for a moment the Turkish generals seemed inert. It now began to be recognised, however, that the Servians, unaided, would hardly be able to defend their own territory.

It is very miserable. One's heart aches at the spectacle of a proud and sanguine people forced to realise the bitter truth of defeat. . . . The cruel force of circumstances is slowly but surely compelling the Servian Ministers to face the necessity of making terms. They are groping in a helpless, dazed, stunned sort of way in search of some device that may procure an arrestment of hostilities. —*Belgrade Correspondent*, Aug. 12th. *D. N.* Aug. 18th.

The invasion of Serbia by the Turkish forces forced a new consideration upon public attention. To understand the feelings with which it was watched in England, account must be taken of something more than the purely military, or the purely political situation. It was not merely, as it might be in the case of two European Powers, the sympathy which attached to a brave military defence, or to the gallant struggle of a small State for political independence. Over and above these considerations there was the thought of women and children, of non-combatants, and of wounded and captive combatants too, whose personal safety would have been assured in any European war, but with whom, in the present case, it was far otherwise.

As early as July 28th the *Daily News* published a letter from its correspondent with Prince Milan which drew attention to this consideration, and various confirmatory communications from the correspondents of the *Times* and *Daily News* followed.

Every tongue is charged and every heart is full of well-authenticated tidings of Turkish atrocities committed on the inoffensive peasant folk of the frontier villages in districts where there can be no pretence for severity for military reasons. The men are gone from the villages of the Greuze; the victims are the miserable women and hapless children. Burning wrecking, butchery and violation, constitute to all appearance the enjoined

functions of the merciless Bashi-Bazouks and ruffianly Redifs, whom the Turkish commanders, keeping in fixed positions their regular troops, let loose with letters of marque to practise the utmost ingenuity of devilry. From the frontier district between Nisch and Alexinatz come now similar tidings to those I telegraphed the other day as having been sent by Alempics from the western frontier about Bollina. No man who is not obstinately determined to be incredulous can question the truth of these statements. Officers and soldiers who come down from the front authenticate them with tales of burnt villages which they have seen, the mangled bodies of children lying in the gutters among the charred *débris*, headless trunks of Servian soldiers in places where there has been fighting, men in the up country hospitals, with noses slit by knives as they lay helpless from their wounds. — *War Correspondent in D. N.* July 28th.

Thus it was seen that wherever the Turkish arms could reach them, the Servian peasants were exposed to outrage and wrong, and men might well fear that a Turkish invasion and conquest would mean a repetition upon Servian soil of the horrors of Otlukkeui and of Batak.

There was in some quarters a tendency to bring recriminatory charges of Montenegrin barbarities, but the general feeling was expressed by a leader in the *Times* of August 9th, and reflected by a despatch which Lord Derby addressed to Sir Henry Elliot on the same day.

The Turkish Ministers must be solemnly warned that they will not be allowed to make a wanton use of their victory. If they think that on the soil of Servia their troops may safely commit one hundredth part of the atrocities which have been perpetrated in Bulgaria, they are the victims of infatuation. . . . Nor will Turkey be allowed to make such a use of her victory as to cancel Servian freedom.—*T.* August 9th.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the capture of Saitchar may probably lead to the occupation of a considerable part of Servia by Turkish forces. I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to urge strongly on the Porte that it is absolutely necessary that its troops should be kept under proper control; that the unarmed population should be spared, and that any repetition of the outrages committed in Bulgaria should be avoided. Your Excellency will point out that any renewal of such outrages would prove more disastrous to the Porte than the loss of a battle. The indignation of Europe would become uncontrollable, and interference in a sense hostile to Turkey would inevitably follow.—*Derby to Elliot*, Aug. 9th.¹

¹ *Turkey*, v. 1876, No. 38.

Mr. Bourke announced this despatch in the House of Commons on the very day it was written, and about the same time, an English officer, Sir Arthur Kemball, was appointed to accompany the Turkish army into Servia.

The *Daily News* was glad to observe the instructions to Sir Henry Elliot.—(Aug. 11th.)

The *Times* spoke of the admirable language of Lord Derby's despatch, and of Sir Arthur Kemball's appointment, as another welcome indication that the Foreign Office had laid aside its lethargy.—(Aug. 12th.)

About August 20th, a Turkish force under Eyoob Pasha advised, as it was said, by a Prussian adlatus, advanced from the direction of the fortress of Nisch; and a direct struggle for the Morava Valley commenced in the neighbourhood of Alexinatz. Fighting continued for several days. The Servians at first claimed some successes, but on Aug. 24th, after many anticipatory rumours had begun to circulate, Servia begged the mediation of the great Powers. The ambassadors at Constantinople immediately opened negotiations, and news of an armistice was daily looked for when, on Sept. 1st, the Servians suffered a great defeat at Alexinatz, which seemed to render their position in the Morava Valley untenable, and well-nigh to open the road to Belgrade.

But at this juncture the course of the victorious Turks was stayed by diplomacy; a suspension of hostilities was effected, and though the negotiations were broken off, and fighting was resumed towards the end of September, the narrative of the latter portion of the campaign belongs to a somewhat different phase of affairs.

§ 4. *The Attitude of Public Opinion when it awoke.*

It was the sudden feeling that there was "War in the Air," which roused Public Opinion in England at the beginning of July from its long political torpor to the notion that it must bestir itself to avert an imminent danger. The Government were understood to be pursuing a "vigorous" policy in the East. As Mr. Gladstone put it, "They caused the clang of preparation to be heard in the arsenals. They progressively increased the squadron to a fleet."¹

Their rejection of the Berlin Memorandum now appeared as an indication that they had ranged themselves on the side of

¹ *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 40.

Turkey, and that Turkey would have the armed support of England if it should be necessary to enable her to resist her foes. The predominating feeling, when people first awoke to a sense of the situation, was the desire that England might not be engaged in war against Russia or the Provincials on behalf of the Turks.

We find in the newspapers at about the time of the "moment of awakening" a number of letters written by persons who were anxious to instruct and guide the people. Among the voices—as if of eager rivals hurriedly speaking in the ear of one who has suddenly to rouse himself and take action on some business of supreme importance—were some which advocated the active "violet" policy. But Public Opinion did not as yet go further than negation. It repudiated the "red" policy; but did not, for the most part, demand an active "violet" policy. That came later.

Our policy clearly ought to be to lend our countenance, whenever it can be done fairly, to the formation of some sort of Slavonic State or Federation which could constitute a new and a legitimate influence against the overweening growth of Russia. This would be the natural solution of the present difficulty. This is what would undoubtedly happen if the Slavonian populations could be left unchecked to mould at the present moment their destinies for themselves. We do not expect or desire that our Government should take any active part in the promotion of this object.—*D. N.* July 14th.

The demand that the Government should give some clear indication of what their policy really was, became more and more urgent until *Punch* (July 15th) draws the Premier as the silent impassive Sphinx, surrounded by an angry and menacing crowd, who shout with uplifted arms "Speak!" "Speak!" On July 3rd it was formally announced in both Houses that war having broken out between the Porte and Servia there was no longer any reason why papers should be withheld.¹ But still the policy of the Government was not made clear, or at all events it was not made clear that their policy was *not* a "red" one, and that was the point about which Public Opinion desired to be assured. The subject dropped in the House of Lords, but in the Commons a hot little debate ensued, and a significant incident happened.

Mr. E. Jenkins pressed for further information. *Sir H. D. Wolff* said he believed the majority of the people of this country fully ratified the course taken by Her Majesty's Government;

¹ The Berlin Memorandum was thereupon at once published.

whereupon several members shouted "What course?"—*H. of C.* July 3rd.

[Mr. Bright] said that if the policy of the Government was to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire at the sacrifice of British treasure and British blood, he believed after the experience of twenty years ago, that no considerable portion of the British people would support the Government in such a policy. Further, if the policy of the Government was to give its countenance even in moral support to the Turk in opposition to the efforts that were being made by some of the subjects of the Porte to free themselves from its dominions, the people of the country would not support the Government. This opinion of Mr. Bright is couched in confident and absolute terms; but we believe that it is substantially in accordance with the fact.—*T.* July 4th.

The *Daily News* thought it would have been better if Mr. Disraeli had taken the House of Commons a little more into his confidence yesterday. All that the country would wish to know at the present is that the Government are determined if possible to observe a strict neutrality between Turkey and the populations which are making war upon her, and which now are not merely rebellious provinces; and that no inclination exists among our Ministers to find a constructive title for intervening to sustain the decrepitude of the Turkish anachronism.—(July 4th.)

On the other hand, a protest was raised against the tendencies which Public Opinion was beginning so distinctly to exhibit.

We cannot but fear that they are doing much injury to the hope of localising this turmoil who persistently incite Parliament to begin an Eastern debate, and talk of the Servian forces as if they were an advanced army of Christian chivalry marching down to fight a holy Armageddon with the Paynims. . . . [The Ministry] seem to be on the side of the written law of Europe and of amelioration effected by reforms and not by violence None among us should at this moment endeavour to help the evil game with fancy schemes of autonomy or Slavonic kingdoms, when the right word to speak is that treaties must be observed if civilisation is to continue, and the right attitude is one of union between "all sorts and conditions of men," for the sake of the interests of England. At such a time the duty of patriotism is to support the Government of the country without asking to what political party it belongs. The nervous curiosity which has persistently besieged Her Majesty's Ministers to say "what they have done and what they intend to do, and what have they no intention of doing," appeared to us as illogical as it was mischievous.—*D. T.* July 4th.

A few days later there appears something which looks like an anticipation of Lord Derby's announcement of July 14th, promulgated with an air of authority.

We shall not interfere in the unfortunate struggle between the Servians and their suzerain, unless other Powers violate the clear prohibition of the existing treaty law as regards foreign intervention.—*D. T.* July 8th.

As no satisfactory declaration was forthcoming from Ministers in Parliament, people here and there began to cast about for extra-parliamentary means of making their opinion felt, and accordingly a few faint premonitory symptoms of agitation begin to appear.

Mr. Lewis Farley asks for signatures to a memorial to Lord Derby,¹ and writes:—

In the present crisis when our country is drifting into an unholy war, it is of the utmost importance that the public voice should be distinctly heard.—(*Letter in D. N.* July 3rd.)

The policy of the Ministry is obvious. It is to refuse all information, to evade all discussion, till the ordinary time for prorogation comes. Then they can get rid of the control of Parliament, and can commit the nation to what they think good, perhaps even to war on behalf of the foul and tottering tyranny to which they are lending the support of the English name One word more. Is there nothing that can be done outside the walls of Parliament? Cannot a meeting be held? —*Mr. E. A. Freeman in D. N.* July 13th.

Mr. Stuart Poole lectured at the College for Men and Women, Queen's Square, on "The Seat of the War in the East" (July 8th). He attributed the war to the sufferings of the Slavonic population. He deprecated support of Turkey. A discussion followed, and various speakers expressed in the strongest terms their feelings of horror at the atrocities.—(*D. N.* July 10th.)

Public meetings in favour of neutrality, and to protest against upholding Turkey by armed force, were held at Bridport (July 12th), Wrexham (July 13th), Liverpool (July 14th), and Gloucester (July 17th). At Bridport an amendment "That in case other nations engaged in war it might be the duty of England to do the same," and at Liverpool, an amendment affirming that England should not go to war except in defence of her Indian Empire, were put and lost.—(*D. N.* July 14th, 15th and 18th.)

The Reading Working Men's Liberal Association adopted a resolution to the following effect:—Believing that no consideration could justify a Christian nation like England upholding a degrading Mahometan despotism, like that of Turkey, the leaders of the Opposition in Parliament were earnestly requested to obtain a full and distinct statement of the views and proposals of the Government in reference to the Eastern Question; and to take all necessary measures in their power to prevent the possibility of this country being committed to an unnecessary and unjust war.—(*D. N.* July 15th.)

¹ See next section.

§ 5. *Feeling of "War in the Air" dispelled by Lord Derby's Reply to Deputations—(July 14th).*

The phase marked by the feeling of "War in the Air" was brought to an abrupt close on July 14th by a reassuring speech delivered by Lord Derby at the Foreign Office. On that day Lord Derby received two deputations. The first was introduced by Mr. John Bright, and presented a memorial signed by upwards of forty members of Parliament, and 570 other gentlemen from all parts of Great Britain. The second deputation, introduced by Mr. Lewis Farley, presented a memorial from the "League in Aid of the Christians in Turkey," signed in the name of the League by Earl Russell.

So far as the language of their memorials went, there was no very obvious difference between the two deputations, but practically the first represented the negation of the "red" policy, and the second, the affirmation of the "violet." Still, Mr. Farley's deputation did not at that time go further than to ask for "moral support" for the insurgents, and it contained several members of the "Peace Party." On the other hand, Mr. Bright's deputation included several members who were disposed to ask for a policy more favourable to the Provincials than mere neutrality. These last gentlemen, had the deputations been divided on more accurate lines, would have found themselves among Mr. Farley's supporters.

Lord Derby's reply to Mr. Farley's deputation is chiefly remarkable for his clear enunciation of what he understood by the "Integrity of the Ottoman Empire,"¹ and for the chilling and contemptuous way in which he met the suggestion for the adoption of a policy of emancipation. He brushed it aside as something that was not practical—hardly, as it seemed, being at the pains to disentangle the policy intended from the phraseology in which it was presented. The only matter, about which he could conceive that there could be any practical question, was the possibility of England affording active support to Turkey against the Provincials, and as to this he said he thought there was no difference of opinion between himself and those he was addressing.

But it was Lord Derby's reply to Mr. John Bright's deputation which attracted most attention, and which for the time put an end to the feeling of "War in the Air."

¹ *Ante*, p. 101.

The conclusion to which you come—namely, your desire that the Government should observe a policy of strict neutrality except where it may be able to interpose its friendly offices to hasten the close of the complication—I say as regards that expression of opinion, your feeling is absolutely and entirely mine. . . . So far from thinking such an expression of opinion on your part premature, I am very glad, and I think that any Minister who stands in my position would be glad to know in time what your opinion and that of the country is. I have often thought that it is one of the most difficult parts of the duty of a Minister in a Parliamentary country that, being as he is in practice the servant of Parliament and of the public, as well as of the Queen, he does not always receive his instructions from his employers beforehand, but is left to guess what it is that they would desire him to do, and he only ascertains their real feeling when he finds that he has gone against it. (A laugh.) I hope that there is no risk of anything like that in our present case.

[The despatch of the fleet was] an act upon which a construction has been put very different from that which would have been put if those who criticise it had been following out step by step the course of events which led to it. . . . It was a step taken by us simply as one of, and acting in concert with, the other Great Powers. It does happen that when you talk of fleets, ours is considerably the biggest (a laugh); and, therefore, more attention was called to its being brought up than in the case of the others. . . . So far as it is possible for any one to forecast the future of events, I think it is the most improbable thing in the world that, in consequence of anything that is now passing within the limits of the Turkish Empire, a general European war should ensue. (Loud and general applause.) That seems to me one of those hypotheses which are so remote that it is scarcely worth while to speculate upon them. (Cheers.) I do not see the quarter from which the war is to come.

[The understanding recently arrived at between the Czar and the Emperor of Austria] proceeds entirely upon the bases which you laid down, and which I assent to (cheers)—namely, that of rigid and absolute non-intervention while this struggle continues, such non-intervention not, of course, excluding any efforts of mediation which may seem calculated to lead to good results.

[The doctrine of absolute indifference had never been professed by this country and would not be popular with the nation at large.] No one is more strongly for non-intervention within all reasonable and practical limits than I have been and am (loud cheers); but we must push no doctrine to an extreme, and an absolute declaration of non-intervention under all circumstances is a declaration of international anarchy, and I need not tell you that international anarchy does not mean either international peace or progress. . . . We have done what was in our power to prevent this war from breaking out. In that we failed. We shall now do what

is in our power to keep it within certain limits. (Cheers.) As regards intervention between Turkey and the subjects of the Porte, or between Turkey and the semi-independent States which form part of the Turkish Empire, that is a question which has never been so much as entertained. (Hear, hear.) We will endeavour to impress that view upon others, and I have every reason to hope that we shall succeed. If, as it has been said, the Turkish Empire is in a state of decay from internal causes—that is a question upon which I pronounce no opinion,—but if that is so, it is clear that merely external assistance would be no remedy. (Cheers.) The utmost that can be asked of us is to see fair play. We undertook undoubtedly twenty years ago to guarantee the sick man against murder, but we never undertook to guarantee him against suicide or sudden death. (Cheers.) Now that, gentlemen, is in a few words our policy as regards this war now going on. We shall not intervene; we shall do our utmost, if necessary, to discourage others from intervening (cheers); but I don't believe that under the present circumstances it will be necessary. If an opportunity of mediation should offer itself—and that does not seem to be an unlikely event—we shall gladly avail ourselves of it.—*Lord Derby at F. O. July 14th.*

The policy which Lord Derby expounded, it will have been observed, was primarily one of "Order." He carefully guarded himself from giving any pledge of non-intervention in the popular sense. Indeed, his words carefully considered would seem to indicate an intention to interpose should interposition become necessary to resist Russian intermeddling. But these considerations were perhaps hardly immediately appreciated, and the general impression produced was that the English Government was for a policy of neutrality generally, on the part of this country, throughout the complications. Besides, the Servian effort had not yet failed. Moreover, Lord Derby's strong expression of incredulity as to any danger that any great Power would be involved in the war was of itself calculated to produce the widespread feeling of relief which immediately followed his speech.

Be this as it may, it is certain that for the moment his statement had a most sedative effect. In thanking Lord Derby for his speech,

Mr. Bright said: My own impression is that it will have a very salutary effect in all parts of the country. At this moment there is . . . a great gloom over almost all the industrial and commercial interests of the country. It is impossible to say how much is due to one cause and how much to another, but no doubt the whole is greatly aggravated by the threatened war. I think that the speech we have heard will have some influence in removing some of that gloom and in dispersing some of the clouds which are now hanging

over us, and I think I may say that the speech Lord Derby has delivered to us is one calculated to give satisfaction to the country as it gives satisfaction to us.—*Mr. J. Bright*, July 14th.

But critics were not wanting who marvelled that the acts of the Ministry in the past should be susceptible of such different glosses, and who saw how many, and how large were the questions that were still left unanswered for the future.

Lord Derby's reply to the deputation which waited upon him yesterday will give an immense relief to the country, and with good reason. It was not merely that he expressed so strong an opinion as he did in favour of the ultimate preservation of the peace of Europe; it was the ground on which that opinion had been formed.—*P. M. G.* July 15th.

The *Times* remarks that as the public is likely to be as much pleased as Mr. Bright and his friends, the Government will probably see the wisdom of keeping strictly to Lord Derby's lines. But it is worthy of notice that the Foreign Secretary thinks fit to repudiate an interpretation of the despatch of the fleet to Besika Bay which has prevailed without contradiction for so many weeks, not only at home, but abroad, and in Constantinople itself, and has been credited with great political consequences.—(July 15th.)

The *Standard* hopes Lord Derby's reply to the deputation will put an end once for all to the absurd misrepresentations of the policy of her Majesty's Government which a certain section of the Opposition has been industriously spreading. At any rate, there will be no excuse for pretending to believe that Ministers are aiding the Turks in oppressing the Christians.—(July 15th.)

It is no exaggeration to say that Lord Derby's speech has made an absolute change in the common appreciation of our policy in the East. A very simple consideration will illustrate the effect it has produced. . . . Just forty members of the House of Commons were found ready to sign this memorial. It was thought a bold and even a dangerous thing to press the duties of neutrality upon the Foreign Office, and members of the Opposition were as shy of hinting at it as supporters of the Ministry. . . . The Foreign Secretary having thus replied to the memorial almost by accepting as his own its cardinal expressions, there would be no difficulty this afternoon in obtaining in the House of Commons 200 or 300 signatures to the Address for which forty were hardly collected on Friday.—*T.* July 17th.

This is the third time this year that the Foreign Secretary has been engaged in making out that some act which his colleagues would gladly have seen described as brilliant and daring statesmanship is really but a piece of prudent and necessary business ¹

¹ The two other occasions referred to were the purchase of the Suez Canal shares and the Royal Titles Bill.

. . . . In the same spirit the Foreign Secretary toned down public opinion yesterday as to the presence of our fleet in Besika Bay. There was no political intention whatever in the event, as the Foreign Secretary views it. . . . We fear that there are not a few of Lord Derby's political followers who will hardly thank him for thus reducing to a mere act of necessary precaution the measure which in some quarters had been regarded as the first illustration in action of the spirited foreign policy which England had so long been bidden to expect. . . . The assurances which the deputation received from Lord Derby had to do only with the neutrality of the Government during the war as it at present shows itself.—*D. N.* July 15th.

Abroad, as well as at home, the reply of Lord Derby to the deputation of Friday last has created a remarkable impression. The Exchanges have taken heart again, and securities of various kinds have revived as flowers do when the rain falls after a long drought. . . . While we all bask, however, in this prediction of peace—which it would be unfair to forget can only be an opinion—and while a section among us rejoice that, if Turkey must not be exactly murdered, she can at all events perish, unpitied and unassisted, by *felo-de-se* or internal disease, we would once more invoke a recollection of British interests, of historical logic and of international fair play before the Eastern Blue Book appears. . . . Lord Derby's words about the limits of non-intervention must be remembered. . . . England is still held by the Treaty of 1856 not to see Turkey murdered, and we would warn some among us to study the problem better before they so passionately desire her end by suicide or decay. At present she is tolerably active for a moribund Power, and some of those who have "sold the lion's skin" may yet die in hunting the lion. It is possible that the Turks may close the war in Belgrade, and nothing can be more immoral than the statement that Serbia ought not to suffer whether she win or lose in this wilful strife. The "autonomisers," among their other plans, would do well to be ready for the vigorous counter-blows which the Porte is likely soon to strike at its rebellious vassals, and for such an issue as the reconquest of Serbia, and her sentence to pay the expenses of the war. The Sultan, at any rate, asks nothing better than the non-intervention which the deputation seemed so happy to hear about.—*D. T.* July 17th.

It is somewhat singular, but very characteristic, that a declaration of this importance should, even before the prorogation, be made by a Secretary of State to a deputation, instead of in his place in Parliament.¹

The *Times* gravely affected to condole with Lord Derby on the

¹ To Lord Granville's inquiry on this point, Lord Derby simply replied that it was not usual for a Minister who was not questioned, and confronted by no motion, to volunteer a general statement.—*H. of L.* July 31st.

disadvantage he had been subjected to in not being earlier able to unbosom himself.

Lord Derby was glad to see Mr. Bright and his friends because he wished to learn what they had to say ; he must have been more glad to see them because it gave him an opportunity of letting the world know what he had to say. For weeks past he and his policy have been perverted and misrepresented by those who affected to be his most devoted friends and admirers. He has had the mortification, than which nothing can be more galling to a man of honour, of receiving credit for conduct which he repudiates, as being praised for motives of policy totally alien from his mind and his purpose. This misconstruction of his aims has not been confined to the "poor creatures" whose lucubrations men of sense like Mr. Disraeli "never read;" it has extended throughout Europe, and worst of all, has been accepted in Turkey as indisputable. . . . We can understand how Lord Derby must have fretted when he found that he was believed in every Continental Court to have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia by sending the fleet to Besika Bay. —*T. July 17th.*

At the same time Lord Derby's reference to "his employers" could not but tend to confirm Public Opinion in its impression of its own right to be obeyed by Ministers, even though its behests should be conveyed otherwise than through the constitutional channel.¹

Not long since, Lord Derby, speaking to a deputation, had informed them, and through them the country, that one of the greatest difficulties of a Government was that they were unable to know what were the intentions of their employers until it was too late. I do not know whether Lord Derby did not rather under-rate the responsibility under which the Government acts. I should have thought it might sometimes have been the duty of the servants of the Queen to conduct the foreign policy of the country in a manner not altogether according to the instructions of those whom Lord Derby called their employers. But at the same time, there can be no doubt that it is of vast importance to the Government to feel that the policy they pursue is supported by the general feeling and sense of the country.—*Marquis of Hartington, H. of C. July 31st.*

¹ The *Quarterly Review* (Art. "The Crown and the Constitution," April, 1878, p. 325) says he always thought Lord Derby's reference to his employers was meant as a joke.

CHAPTER XI.

ATROCITY PERIOD. SUB-PERIOD—PUBLIC OPINION WAITING FOR GUIDANCE.

§ 1. *The Blue Books of July 1876.*

THE calm which followed Lord Derby's declaration was but momentary. The fear of immediately impending war was sensibly alleviated, but there was a growing wish that England should help on the emancipation of the Provincials, rather than hinder it, and a perception that hitherto notwithstanding all disclaimers of hostility to the subject populations, practically, the action of the English Government had been to hinder, and not to help, their efforts.

The long-expected Blue Book was published on July 21st.¹ It now appeared that Lord Derby regarded the attainment by the unaided efforts of the revolted Provinces of a position for themselves similar to that of Servia or Roumania on the one hand, or a grant of insufficient and unreal liberties like those of Crete on the other, as the limits of the settlement to be come to, when either success had declared itself for the insurgents, or the Porte had succeeded in reestablishing its authority, as the case might be. At the same time these papers showed that the English Government, as represented by Lord Derby, had been extremely hostile to any attempt on the part of the subject populations themselves or on the part of their friends, to achieve their emancipation. He alleged the sympathy generally felt in Russia for the insurgent population of Turkey as accounting for the general distrust felt in England as to the designs of the Czar, a distrust of which the Russian ambassador spoke with regret.²

¹ *Turkey*, iii. 1876. See *T.* July 22nd. Compare Argyll, chap. iv. and *Spec.* July 29th, for criticisms of the policy developed.

² *Ibid.* No. 427.

It is true the same unfriendly bearing towards the insurgents had marked the papers issued earlier in the session, but it had passed almost unnoticed, put out of sight, perhaps, by the concurrence of the English Government in the Andrassy Note. Now, however, this hostile attitude attracted attention, and elicited unfavourable comment.

It will startle some readers of the papers presented to Parliament to see the sort of surprise and indignation with which Lord Derby, the British ambassador at Constantinople, and most of the British consuls (though most notably Mr. Holmes) for months treat the omission to starve the insurrection as an offence combining the worst features of political and even moral guilt.—*Fort. Rev.* Sept. 1876.¹

Lord Derby holds towards the Christians in European Turkey the position which his father held towards the Italians and ocean steamers,—an attitude of disbelief, prompted by inner distaste for the innovation. Let us hope that his judgment will prove equally erroneous.—*Spec.* July 29th, 1876.

The relations between the Porte and the insurgents were treated by Lord Derby as a matter with respect to which the Powers might possibly mediate when success should have declared itself on one side or the other, but which primarily must depend on the question whether the insurgents unaided should prove themselves able to extort from the Porte something beyond the mere administrative reform which the Porte might propose to grant.

Such were the explanations which Lord Derby had given to the Russian ambassador when (June 12th) Count Schouvaloff asked to be informed of the drift and object of the English policy.²

A few days afterwards (June 21st) the Russian ambassador urged that the Powers should not refrain from using their efforts to arrive at a practical solution till hostilities had resulted in some definite issue, and proposed the plan of "vassal and tributary autonomous States." Lord Derby spoke of this as a vague term,³ liable to be misunderstood, and informed Count Schouvaloff of the objection which he understood the Austrian Government entertained to any such proposal. For his own part, he saw no objection to a change which would give to Bosnia and Herzegovina "a large measure of real freedom," but he doubted whether any concession of the kind would satisfy the insurgents then in arms.⁴

¹ "Turkey in Europe," Albert Rutson. ² *Ibid.* No. 427. ³ *Ibid.* No. 476.

⁴ It will be observed this despatch was written on June 29th, subsequently to the receipt of the first accounts of the atrocities in England.

Again, he wrote that he could not regard the insurrection as exclusively or principally directed against local oppression. The Roman Catholics had taken no part in the movement. The Christians who had not joined the insurgent bands had been unmolested.¹ Numbers of inhabitants who had quitted their villages were deterred from returning by the action of the insurgents, not by fear of their Mahometan neighbours. In Lord Derby's opinion the insurrectionary movement must be suppressed and order restored, before schemes for better administration could be advantageously treated. He objected at that moment, and without close inquiry, to press projects of reform on the Porte going beyond those already promised. However, the English Government would willingly join other Powers in considering and advising such amelioration in the existing administration of the two provinces as they might believe practicable. If Serbia were warned, in a tone which did not admit of misconstruction, that she must not expect protection from the consequences of defeat, and if the Turkish insurgent provinces were freed from the instigations to revolution due to foreign Slav committees and agitators, the work of pacification would be an easy task.²

It is a question whether Lord Derby in his devotion to Order, and his anxiety that the insurrectionary movement should never attain proportions capable of disturbing the repose of Europe, did not overshoot the limits of that technical non-intervention on which he insisted, when the question which he deemed most pressing was that of preventing other Powers from assisting the Provincials and thus enlarging the area of disturbance. It may fairly be surmised that the efforts of his diplomacy were directed to inspire Turkey with energy in dealing with the insurrection,³ and at all events, he did not scruple to press Austria and Russia to restrain both Serbia and Montenegro.

When his object was to prevent Serbia from coming to the aid of the wholly subject provinces, Lord Derby insisted that she ought not to be allowed to commit a breach of the public peace; but when subsequently it was to prevent Russia from coming to the aid of Serbia, we find him glad to remember the vassalage of Serbia, and to minimise the Servian war as an internal quarrel

¹ *Ibid.* No. 502.

² *Ibid.* No. 506.

³ See *Turkey*, ii. 1876, No. 13; *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 427; and compare Argyll, chap. iv.

in which the maxim of non-intervention forbade other Powers to concern themselves.

It may appear at first sight that at this crisis Lord Derby was making the maintenance of the technical maxim of non-intervention the chief aim of his policy. But in truth his mind seems to have been singularly free from technical scruples of this kind. He kept Legalism in his storehouse of arguments against breaking the peace for use in case of need, and for the benefit of persons who would attach weight to it. But Lord Derby himself must be regarded as the representative of Order, not of Legalism.

In the upshot the papers now made public went to show that while the English Government would not themselves forcibly interfere to *prevent* the Provincials from extorting their freedom from Turkey, they would strongly disapprove, if not resent, any attempt at forcible interference on the part of Russia in the contrary direction. Would such resentment carry the English Government to the length of interposition? Would they engage in war to assist Turkey to withstand any such interference? This was the point on which those who were fast coming to see that there was a problem which must be solved, and to believe that emancipation alone would solve it, were getting anxious to be reassured; and in the published papers they could find little that was reassuring.

§ 2. *The Despatches of May 25th and Sept. 5th.*

It will be convenient here to speak of two other despatches which were subsequently much quoted on one side or the other, as throwing light on the position and intentions of the Government during this period. On May 24th Lord Derby told the Turkish Ambassador that the Porte would be unwise to count on more than the moral support of England. He explains to Sir Henry Elliot, however, that he merely suggested this in conversation, and carefully avoided pledging Her Majesty's Government to any line of policy.

It is a singular circumstance that although the conversation with the Turkish Ambassador was reported¹ in the Blue Book laid before Parliament in July, no allusion to this "warning" was allowed to appear.

¹ *Turkey*, iii. 1876, No. 295.

However, it appeared by the Blue Books presented to Parliament at the opening of the Session of 1877 that on January 2nd, 1877¹ Lord Derby told the French Ambassador that as long ago as the summer before he had warned Musurus Pasha that the Porte must not expect material assistance from England in the event of a Russian war.

On Feb. 13th, Mr. W. E. Forster asked how it was that no such despatch appeared in the Blue Books of the year before, and Mr. Bourke replied there was good reason for the omission at the time. Thereupon, the suppressed despatch in which Lord Derby informed Sir Henry Elliot of this part of the conversation, was published as a separate Parliamentary paper.²

What was the "good reason" for the omission? Was it that Lord Derby was desirous that Turkey should not count upon English assistance in order that Turkey might not assume a defiant attitude, and at the same time desirous that Russia should suppose the assistance would be given in order that Russia might be deterred from interfering?

But on the assumption that it had been throughout this period the determination of the English Government not to interpose in the event of Russian interference, it was hard to understand a despatch which Lord Derby addressed to Sir Henry Elliot on Sept. 5th.

It is right that you should be accurately acquainted with the state of public opinion in England on the subject of Turkey. . . . Any sympathy which was previously felt here towards that country has been completely destroyed by the recent lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria. [The accounts have] roused an universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society, and to such a pitch has this risen that in the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire. Such an event, by which the sympathies of the nation would be brought into direct opposition to its treaty engagements, would place England in a most unsatisfactory and even humiliating position, yet it is impossible to say that if the present conflict continues, the contingency may not arise.—*Turkey*, i. 1877, No. 159.

A few days earlier (Aug. 29th) Lord Derby had sent a telegraphic despatch to the same effect. The despatch of Sept. 5th

¹ *Turkey*, ii. 1877, No. 126.

² Derby to Elliot, May 25th, 1876; *Turkey*, iii. 1877. However, the description which was given to Sir Henry Elliot of the "warning," does not represent it as quite so explicit as it appears in Lord Derby's description of it to the French Ambassador.

duly appears in its place in the bulky Blue Book presented at the beginning of the session of 1877, but for some reason or other, the despatch of Aug. 29th was not included among those papers. It was published a little later in the session as a separate paper.¹

Possibly the concluding passage of Sir Henry Elliot's despatch of Sept. 4th was written by way of protest against the tendency manifested in this message from Lord Derby. It is a passage which may be regarded as the classical exposition of the "red" policy, and it identified Sir Henry Elliot with that policy in an unmistakable way.²

§ 3. *Opinion Begins to Crystallise.*—(*Willis's Rooms Meeting.*)

But after all, the Blue Books seem not to have been studied very critically nor to have aroused much attention. In fact the new ideas were making such rapid progress that men seem to have regarded the papers as referring to a past phase of the matter, since which much had changed. Still, the light thrown upon the past attitude of the Government was not such as to commend it.

Thus with renewed misgivings as to the intentions of the Government, and a growing conviction of the inadequacy of mere negation to the exigencies of the time, men were casting about them for guidance, and guidance was coming here and there. A great mass of new opinion was now being brought to bear for the first time upon the Eastern Question. The sentiments of the vast number of persons who had hitherto had no special knowledge and had given no particular thought to the matter had now become "Public Opinion." Everybody was now an ardent politician, and nearly everybody was agreed that something or other must be done for the Provincials if they were exposed to the chance of suffering such things as had been described.

The formation of a committee of members of both Houses to watch the course of events,³ and the holding of a meeting at Willis's Rooms, as well as the increasing number of letters and leaders in newspapers and articles in the magazines, all helped on the crystallisation of Public Opinion lately so amorphous. In the process which was going on the "violet" notions, as distinguished from the mere negation of the "red," were rapidly taking shape. And the signs also point to the nascent conviction of Public Opinion that it must make some extraordinary effort to organise itself if it

¹ *Turkey*, vi. 1877.

² *Ante* p. 313.

³ *D. N.* July 27th.

wished to make itself felt in determining the policy of the country.

Lord Russell addressed a letter to Lord Granville, in which he urged that the time had come when Canning's policy of 1827 ought to be revived and made applicable to Servia. [*Communicated to T. July 4th.*]

[After Lord Derby's reply, those who sympathise with the Christians] have no longer to urge Government to be neutral . . . It appears to me that at the present stage nothing more can be asked of Government except the use of its influence to stop inhumanity. . . . No doubt the time might come, as I trust speedily it may, when the insurrection grows so wide and general as to afford evidence on which as a nation we may act.—*Mr. Boyd Kinnear*, in *D.N.* July 20th.

What objection can we have to the autonomy of Bosnia and the Herzegovina? Why do the Sclavs in North-western Turkey always finds us their bitter foes? Why do we do our utmost to drive them into the arms of Russia, when they would greatly prefer our friendship to that of their powerful and absorbing neighbour. . . . The policy of England is clear. It is indicated by common sense and common humanity, and it is set forth in the letter of Lord Russell to Lord Granville. We should invite the great Powers of Europe to join in a treaty by which the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be placed under a European guarantee. In accordance with the wishes of their respective inhabitants, Bosnia should be joined to Servia and the Herzegovina to Montenegro.—*Mr. H. Labouchere*, in *D. N.* July 24th.

It seems that there is a chance—and only a chance—that the affairs of South-Eastern Europe may be debated in the House of Commons next Monday. If that chance breaks down, what is to be done? Will honourable members endure to be kept a little longer from their grouse for the sake of their country and of mankind? Or will it be left wholly to the people at large to speak the mind of England at a crisis than which there have been few more momentous in her later history? The plain question is this, If Russia should make war upon the Turks, will England again make war on Russia on behalf of the Turks? That is the question for the Parliament and people of this country. On that question we are left wholly in the dark by all the Ministerial utterances. Lord Derby expressly reserved the case of the war spreading beyond its present range. . . . Then comes the question, If this very probable thing does happen what will England do? Are we again to fight on behalf of the barbarian oppressors of South-Eastern Europe? That is the plain question. Nobody supposes that Lord Derby wishes for war. To go to war would be to do something, and to do something might forfeit that reputation for wisdom which Lord Derby has gained by a vigorous course of doing

and saying nothing. But how about Mr. Disraeli? What Mr. Disraeli may think fit to do under any given circumstances, no one would be so rash as to guess beforehand. But so far as there has been any rule in Mr. Disraeli's policy, it has been to take up something which Liberals have started, and sometimes to carry it to a length which few Liberals had thought of. Liberal Governments had their Reform Bills; so Mr. Disraeli had his Reform Bill also. A Liberal Government once unhappily had a Russian war; so Mr. Disraeli may think it the right thing to have a Russian war also. Anyhow, if there is the faintest chance of another war with Russia on behalf of the Turk, we cannot be wrong in letting the mind of England be unmistakably known on the point. . . . I have no wish to see any advance on the part of Russia. I wish the people of South-Eastern Europe to carve out their destiny for themselves. If the New Rome, free from either Turks or Russians, can be kept as the common centre of South-Eastern Europe, that is doubtless the best thing that could happen. But it is a very far-reaching policy which can take in schemes so elaborate as that. The immediate question is, if Russia comes to the help of the revolted Slaves and their Servian and Montenegrin allies, is England to hinder her? To that question England ought with all the speed that may be, to make her answer.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman* in *D. N.* July 19th.

The rising desire to see the influence of England thrown actively in aid of the Provincials, in other words, the coming to the front of the policy we have called "Emancipation" as a factor of Public Opinion, is marked by the meeting held at Willis's Rooms, on July 27th, a meeting promoted by Mr. Lewis Farley and the League in aid of Christians in Turkey. The chair was taken by the Earl of Shaftesbury. A letter of sympathy was read from Earl Russell. The key-note was struck by the third resolution, moved by Mr. E. A. Freeman, which, reciting the notorious abuses of Turkish rule, and repeated failures to fulfil obligations, alleged the hopelessness of any permanent settlement of the Eastern Question which did not confer on the inhabitants of the Insurgent Provinces the full rights of self-government. Other resolutions were moved by Mr. Arthur Arnold and by Mr. George Dawson of Birmingham.

Not the least striking and vigorous of the contributions afforded by this gathering was the opening speech of the chairman.

Lord Shaftesbury said:—Surely it is high time for the kingdoms of Europe to interfere and declare that Turkey is a spectacle disgusting to humanity and wholly unfit to exercise rule and authority. (Cheers.) Gentlemen, it has been asserted, and, perhaps, it will be so still, that the existence of Turkey is essential to what is called the balance of power. I doubt it; and were it so, I should hesitate to

maintain even so good a thing by the sacrifice of so many millions of the human race. The balance of power would be far better maintained by clusters of flourishing, vigorous, and civilised communities, in the place of ignorance, spoliation, and ferocity. Thus far I believe that I speak the sentiments of many. Now I venture to speak only for myself when I say that, looking at the present state of things, believing that the future will be much more terrible than the present, being deeply convinced that the rule of the Ottoman Porte is utterly beyond remedy (applause)—utterly incorrigible (applause)—I, for one, would rather in view of the interests of the whole commonwealth of mankind see the Russians on the Bosphorus than the Turks in Europe.¹ (Cheers and cries of "No.")—*Willis's Rooms*, July 27th.

The strong leaning shown towards an active "violet" policy provoked a protest from the standpoint of Isolation.

Mr. Howell wished to say a few words on the position of the working man in relation to this question . . . He was afraid some of the speeches they had heard had gone far beyond the resolution. The position he adopted with regard to this meeting was this: neutrality and non-intervention on the one side and on the other . . . They would have enough to do to prevent the Government from drifting into a war in support of Turkey. . . . We did not interfere to put down slavery in America, and he did not see why we should interfere to put down slavery in Turkey . . . It behoved every one to stand up for neutrality, and avoid provoking interference even in favour of the Danubian Principalities. Lord Derby deserved a certain amount of the praise that was given to him. He was slow to move in any direction. But we had to deal not merely with Lord Derby, but with a man of mystery, whose sentiments would, as a rule, from the very course of his life, go with Islamism, instead of with the Christians.—*Willis's Rooms*, July 27th.

The progress which the "violet" notions were making appears by the newspaper comments.

¹ This was sometimes garbled into a wish to see the Russians at Constantinople. See Lord Elcho at Winchester, *post*, chap. xii. § 1. Similarly, after the St. James's Hall Conference in December, the exclamation "Perish India!" was fathered on Mr. Freeman. Mr. Freeman writes:—"The story about 'Perish India!' is a remarkable instance of the way in which falsehood will take root and live, and seemingly get believed in the teeth of all contradiction." He goes on to name a great many occasions on which the contradiction had been published (*D. N.* April 30th, 1879.) So again Mr. Gladstone, after the publication of his pamphlet in September, was credited with a proposal to turn the Turks, "bag and baggage," out of Europe, and on various occasions protested against the misrepresentation. In the columns of the *Daily Telegraph*, the Earl of Shaftesbury's expression became metamorphosed into, "Better the Russians in Constantinople than another year of Tory rule." The *Telegraph* does not indeed attribute this phrase to the Earl of Shaftesbury, or to any particular person, but quotes it as the watchword of a party, and connects it with "perish India" and "bag and baggage." (See *D. T.* Jan. 11th and Feb. 13th, 1877, *post*, chaps. xiv. and xv.) These persistent misrepresentations were probably not without effect, and suggest the reflection that epigrammatic phrases are sometimes double-edged weapons.

[Lord Shaftesbury] declared the Turks to be incorrigible, and ended with a sentiment so bold with regard to the presence of the Russians on the Bosphorus that it provoked a remonstrance. We have no doubt that the feelings expressed by Lord Shaftesbury will find an echo in the hearts of a great majority of the British public. [The independent administration of the Northern Provinces under the suzerainty of the Sultan is the smallest change which can be proposed in the internal disposition of the Turkish Empire, and some such arrangement will probably be adopted, but we must remember the jealousies the proposal arouses—especially in Austria.] As to our own country it would be hypocrisy to pretend that the jealousy of a Russian advance towards Constantinople does not affect the judgment both of statesmen and the public.—*T. July 28th.*

The *Saturday Review* thinks the popular feeling represented by the meeting may possibly determine the future policy of the country; but the irrational violence and exaggeration of the majority of the speeches is not calculated to influence a sober judgment. The change of popular feeling in England since the Crimean War is oddly illustrated by the meeting.—(July 29th.)

The great thing needed is that our statesmen should perceive clearly now what Lord Derby saw very distinctly in 1864.¹ . . . A year ago we should have thought the business as safe in Lord Derby's hands as in those of any statesman who could fill the office which he now holds. No one had spoken more frankly and distinctly than he had done. He stood committed, by the language of a speech which we have on previous occasions quoted, to a very clear and decided view of the duty and interest of England in the affairs of Turkey.—*D. N. July 24th.*

Two or three principles of policy in dealing with the disturbances in the East have gradually become defined in recent months. . . . In the first place, we have all come to agree that it is neither our duty nor our desire to protect Turkey from the operation of internal disintegrating forces. . . . The second position, which has been made clear by the Blue-Book presented to Parliament, is that the insurrectionary movement now developed into war derived no countenance or support from any foreign Power. . . . It becomes a question whether we should not make it a principle of action to try to make [the inhabitants of the Trans-Balkan Provinces] friendly to us and to assist them in standing on their feet, instead of throwing them into the arms of others. This we take to be the third principle which has gradually become clear.—*T. July 31st.*

The question to be decided, therefore, is whether the country will accept the policy of compromise through the creation of vassal States decidedly enough to compel the Government to allow of such a solution. That Mr. Disraeli will accept it willingly, we do not

¹ See *ante*, p. 204.

believe . . . That Lord Derby will accept it heartily we do not believe . . . But neither Mr. Disraeli nor Lord Derby hold their ideas in a way which would induce them to enter on a war with English opinion, to risk the safety of their Government, or even to endanger the quiet majority now possessed by their party. They will not perhaps act rightly, and help to enfranchise the Christians, under any provocation, but they may be induced, if the public voice is unmistakable, to remain quiescent. It rests, therefore, with the country and its representatives to decide whether the Christians of European Turkey shall be peacefully freed, or whether this country shall assist, probably at the cost of a long and most costly war, in once more whipping them back to bondage. In the representatives we have very little confidence. They were elected to support Mr. Disraeli, and they will do it whatever the consequences may be. . . . But we have more confidence in the country, when once it sees that the decision is in its own hands. Average Englishmen, when once aware what Turkish rule is, are not the men to go to war to support it, and some faint idea of what it is, is gradually filtering down among them. It is necessary, however, to speak out.—*Spec.* July 29th.

It is all very well for the English Cabinet to say that it is not supporting Turkey. Its attitude has led to a contrary belief in Europe and especially at Constantinople. . . . The best, nay, the only means of anticipating the triumph of Pan Slavism is to emancipate the southern Slavs.—*Fort. Rev.* Aug. 1876.¹

§ 4. *Parliament fails to afford Guidance.*

There were many causes that contributed to delay to so late a day in the session as July 31st the debate on the Eastern policy of the Government. Among the official leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition, there was the conviction that a victory was impossible if they challenged a regular party division, such as would decide the fate of the Cabinet. Among many independent members there was a desire to pledge the Government against a "red" and in favour of a "violet," policy; and there was the wish to avoid exposing the "violet" policy to a direct negative on the part of the Government from which it might be difficult for them afterwards to withdraw. These considerations may partly account not only for the long delay, but also for the reluctance to come to close quarters exhibited in the Parliamentary debates when they did occur, and for the fact that the debates were far less effective than they might have been in forming Public Opinion.

¹ "Home and Foreign Affairs."

Thus during the critical period of "waiting for guidance," Parliament to a certain extent abdicated its great secondary function of instructing Public Opinion. The effective guidance came chiefly from extra-parliamentary sources.

As we have seen, although the subject of the atrocities had been mentioned several times in Parliament, the regular debate, invited by Mr. Bruce's notice of motion, had been postponed from time to time.

Mr. Disraeli on July 10th, while refusing to give up a night for a private member, significantly added that perhaps the leader of the Opposition might wish to challenge the Government policy, but Lord Hartington did not respond.

It seemed doubtful whether, after all, an opportunity for discussing the papers which had been presented would be afforded to the House of Commons before the Prorogation, but at last after some preliminary fencing July 31st was fixed. Various notices of motions and of amendments were given, but all by private members, from both sides of the House. Mr. Bruce's motion, as originally drawn, expressed approval of the Government policy, as disclosed in the recently published correspondence. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice gave notice of an amendment censuring the past action of the Government. But Mr. Bruce modified his resolution by confining it to the expression of a hope as to the future action; and Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice met him by omitting the censuring clause of his amendment. As finally settled Mr. Bruce's motion expressed the hope that Government would use their influence to secure the common welfare and equal treatment of the various races and religions subject to the Porte. It was understood that the Liberal leaders could acquiesce in this aspiration, and thus any party issue was eliminated.

Mr. Forsyth gave notice of an amendment which affirmed the duty of England, as one of the parties to the settlement of 1856 to obtain adequate guarantees for the good government of the disturbed provinces. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice's amendment unequivocally affirmed the expediency of adopting the "violet" policy of making proposals to the Powers who had treaty engagements with Turkey with a view to securing the advantages of self-government to the insurgent provinces.

In effect, Mr. Bruce pointed to the "red" policy of strengthening and vivifying Turkey by general measures of reform applicable to the whole of the empire. Mr. Forsyth recognised

the difficulties of Turkish rule over Christian provinces, and spoke of exacting guarantees for good government. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, going a step further in the "violet" path, affirmed that the only effectual guarantee for good government would be to render them practically independent of the Porte. But these distinctions were perhaps hardly fully comprehended out-of-doors at the time.

Every one must hope that the debate which begins to-night will be useful in indicating to the Government the determination of the national judgment on the aims to be pursued by the Foreign Office in dealing with the present phase of the Eastern Question; but this hope is dashed with many fears that the result of the discussion will be little more than an effusion of purposeless and desultory talk. . . . The terms of the Motions are such that the effect of any one of them must depend greatly on the temper in which the Government receive it, or the significance which is imported into it by the speakers on either side. . . . The temper of the House and the country may be discerned in the character of Mr. Bruce's Motion and its Amendments. They all practically tend one way—that is, towards a recognition of our duties as a humane and civilised people. If the Government will satisfy the public feeling in this respect, it will strengthen itself even more than by its happy stroke with regard to the Berlin Memorandum.—*T. July 31st.*

The apparent unanimity conveyed by a common assent to Mr. Bruce's resolution covers wide and deep divergencies of opinion.—*D. N. July 31st.*

It was understood in advance, as we have already explained, that there was no inclination to censure the action of the Ministry, even if there had been the amount of strength in any party opposed to the Government which would have rendered it possible to pass a condemnatory resolution. . . . Let us understand; do not go any farther without seeing that we comprehend each other; do not leave our intelligence and our cooperation out of your plans—such is the meaning of the appeal, and such certainly was the general object of yesterday's debate in both Houses, regarded as an invitation to the Government.—*D. N. Aug. 1st.*

At last, on July 31st, the long looked-for debate took place, and it so happened that on the same night the subject was discussed in the Lords.

In the Upper House, Lord Stratheden and Campbell, the persistent and unwearied advocate of an active "red" policy founded on treaty legalism, moved a resolution which promised the Government support for measures for upholding the treaties of 1856. Lord Granville hinted that the Russian proposal of securing

administrative autonomy for Bosnia and the Herzegovina might have been more favourably entertained. Lord Derby opposed the motion on the ground that there was no imminent danger that those treaties would be infringed, and took the opportunity to disclaim any hostility to autonomy in the abstract.

In the House of Commons Mr. Bruce's motion was seconded by Mr. Hanbury. In moving his amendment, which was seconded by Sir H. D. Wolff,

Mr. Forsyth said :—He had been much disappointed by the tone of the speeches that had been delivered. His object in putting an amendment on the paper, was what he took to be the policy shadowed forth in the resolution of the hon. member for Portsmouth,—namely, that the time had come for England no longer to put faith in the professions of the Ottoman Porte, but to insist upon substantial guarantees of good faith. Judge his surprise, then, when he heard his hon. friends making speeches which were nothing more nor less than apologies for the Turkish Government, speeches which might have been delivered by Turkish ministers who were interested in throwing discredit upon the poor Christians who happened to reside within the Turkish Empire.—H. of C. July 31st.

As both original motion and amendment were withdrawn without a division, the other amendments could not be formally proposed ; but Lord E. Fitzmaurice spoke in favour of the "violet" policy to which the amendment of which he had given notice pointed.

It was this debate which Mr. Gladstone afterwards assigned as marking the date when he first assumed anything approaching a hostile attitude to the Government.¹

He said he preferred the amendment to the resolution because he would deal with the disturbed provinces and not with the whole of the Ottoman Empire, thus lightly touching on the ever-recurring antithesis between Emancipation and Reform. He deduced from the Crimean War England's title to insist on something more than mere promises, and declared himself in favour of

¹ "I certainly had no disposition to signalise myself in leading an Opposition to the present Government, and for the first three sessions of the existence of the present Government, or at least until one of the very last days of the third session named, the 31st July, 1876, although I had occasionally objected to their measures, yet the occasions had been very few, and I had been glad to remain in the shade. It was the peculiar nature of the Eastern Question which first made me feel it an imperative duty to modify the resolution I had arrived at . . . and when I first shared in the Eastern Question it was not to oppose, it was to support Her Majesty's Government ; it was to encourage them, if I may say so without presumption, in the course which I fondly hoped they were about to take. . . . That was my first step in the Eastern Question. (Hear, hear.) Nor was it till six months after, at the end of July, 1876, that my second step was taken."—Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden, on his seventieth birthday, *D. N.* Dec. 30th, 1879.

effectual guarantees for good government. Turkish promises were unfulfilled more by reason of impotence than iniquity. He contended that there was no authority for saying that Austria objected to autonomy.

It is in the direction of free local government and in that direction alone that we can seek a remedy for the present disorder. . . . I am not ashamed to say that I desire the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire. (Hear.) I do not see how, if that is broken up, we can avoid very serious difficulties and dangers.—*Mr. Gladstone*, H. of C. July 31st.

Mr. Gladstone concluded his speech with the hope that the Government would yet find a happy solution, which while maintaining the territorial integrity should enforce adequate guarantees for good government. Thus the fact that there was any serious divergence between Mr. Gladstone and the Government hardly became apparent till Mr. Disraeli, who immediately followed him, emphatically repudiated the policy of interfering or countenancing interference with the sovereignty of the Porte, and said that Mr. Gladstone's speech was equivalent to a vote of censure on the Government.

We have said from the first that we were in favour of non-interference; we have said from the first that we should observe a strict neutrality if that strict neutrality were observed by others. There has been a difference of opinion between us and the other Powers; there has been some controversy; in what has it all ended? It has all ended by the other Powers adopting our policy. They have all, in a manner most unmistakable, admitted that non-interference is the policy that ought to be pursued, and that neutrality is the process they ought to follow. . . . We did not conceal from the House on a previous occasion that Her Majesty's Government hesitated much before they adopted the [Andrassy] Note. The reason why they hesitated was this: They were of opinion that the *status quo* in Turkey should be, if possible, maintained, and I understand from the right hon. gentleman he is still of that opinion. [*Mr. Gladstone*.—The territorial integrity.] You will find it difficult to maintain the territorial integrity of Turkey without acknowledging the principle of the *status quo*. . . . Servia required no redress. What Servia wanted was provinces—a very different thing. . . . The Mediterranean Fleet is the symbol and the guarantee of our power. We never concealed that we had in that part of the world great interests which we must protect and never relinquish, and it was no threat to any particular Power that we said at such a moment that the Mediterranean Fleet, which is the guarantee and the symbol of our authority, should be there, that the world should know whatever might happen, there should be no great change

in the distribution of territories in that part of the world without the knowledge and consent of England. (Prolonged cheers.)—*Mr. Disraeli*, H. of C. July 31st.

Thus while in the one House the Foreign Secretary was treating any contingencies that might arise out of the treaties of 1856 as outside the range of practical politics, in the other the Premier was representing England as no longer indeed isolated, since the other Powers had deferred to her views; but as lately the one Power in Europe which had stood forth as the champion of the Sultan's right to do with his subjects as he chose. He raised again that conception of the significance of the mission of the Fleet to Besika Bay which his colleague had been at such pains to lay a fortnight before, and, as we have seen, he insisted that the subject of the atrocities, as bearing on the character of the Turkish rule, must be thrown out of the account altogether, in determining the policy of this country.¹

Lord Hartington, who concluded the debate, regretted that it had been necessary to discuss the question in so brief and unsatisfactory a manner, and spoke of the value of discussion in Parliament as a mode of forming opinion; but he himself was very reserved. A plain straightforward declaration by the Government of their real intention in despatching the fleet would have done more to dissipate false ideas than the two versions of the affair which had been made public. The objects of the Government he said were in the main good, but their measures were open to great question. They should have remonstrated with more energy with those Powers who broke their neutrality by allowing their subjects to help the insurgents. And they should have remonstrated with more energy on the subject of the atrocities. He thought there was no advantage in pronouncing at that moment on the particular remedy called for by the evils under which Turkey was suffering. It might be otherwise, if a time should come when, in contact with other Powers, we might usefully interpose with our advice.

The official leaders of the Opposition it was clear were rather waiting for guidance themselves than prepared to give any; even Mr. Gladstone's speech hardly came up to the point which out-of-door Public Opinion had already reached; and in particular, his reference to "integrity," which perhaps he first made understood of the people² in his pamphlet and by his Blackheath speech, gave

¹ *Ante*, p. 321. Compare this with Sir Henry Elliot's despatch of Sept. 5th, p. 313, and compare p. 358.

² *Post*, Chap. XII. § 3.

rise to the impression that even he was not altogether weaned from the "red" policy.¹

The attitude of Mr. Bruce, who may be taken as the private echo of the official language of the Ministry, and of Mr. Hanbury was promptly repudiated, and, as we are happy to remember, on the Ministerial side of the House. [By Mr. Forsyth, Sir H. D. Wolff, and in the other House by Lord Bath]. . . Compared with these expressions of Conservative members the very careful and elaborate speeches of Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone may not improperly be held of less importance. . . . It appeared that the actors in the Crimean War were best pleased with it because it gave them a ground of moral and, it may almost be said of legal right to remonstrate with Turkey and to compel attention to their remonstrances, and we may start from this position without going back to the reasons that underlie it. Mr. Gladstone himself was feeble in the conclusion of his speech . . . when he began to use all the old phrases about maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire, his energy evaporated, and he seemed to forget that these were mere phrases if the first part of his speech had any meaning.—*T. Aug. 1st.*

Nobody made a very brilliant or very memorable speech. . . . Lord Elmond Fitzmaurice had not the power to utilise his magnificent opportunity. . . . He left no impression that the right was also the statesmanlike course. Nevertheless the debate was most valuable, for it compelled the two chiefs of parties to make not only their opinions, but their policy visible to mankind. Mr. Gladstone was, in part of his speech, purely historical, and in part fettered by the restraints of conventional diplomacy; but no one who reads it carefully, or even steadily, as we trust every politician in England will do, can doubt of the policy which, were he again ruling England, he would advise Her Majesty to adopt. He would restore the accord of the Powers, with the object of securing autonomy to the Christian provinces of European Turkey. His whole speech from first to last, cautious and even timid as it occasionally seemed, was directed with wonderful art towards this single end. His long and able defence of the Crimean War—a defence unexpectedly hearty, and quite unanswerable except by men who despise history—was designed to show that Russia is not now so formidable as in 1854; that it is no longer our necessity to restrain the vast ambition of the first military Power in the world; that indeed, in appearing as the enemies of her *protégés*, the Christian Provincials of Turkey, we are simply playing into her hands. . . . The very first quotation made by the Premier from Mr. Gladstone's speech revealed the depth of the chasm which divides their opinions. . . . He was of course,

¹ Mr. E. Jenkins (*H. of C. Aug. 11th*) regretted Mr. Gladstone had spoken of the territorial integrity as a thing necessary or important to support. Compare letter from the Bishop of Manchester, *post*, chap. xii. § 1.

corrected, but in that carefully designed and adroit blunder he had expressed his inner thoughts. . . . The victory of the Turks, the emancipation of the Christians, those, in broad outline, are the rival policies of the two great parties in the State. It is for the country to choose between them and to choose soon.—*Spec.* Aug. 5th.

On the whole, the debate was calculated to give the impression that the Government was as yet very far from being in sympathy with the "violet" notions. Still these had evidently made such way with the independent members of both parties, that Ministers, it might plausibly be anticipated, would soon go with the stream. Until some sign of this should be given, however, the efforts to press the "violet" policy upon them were not likely to be relaxed.

In this debate the Premier, while declining to admit the truth of the accounts of the atrocities, demurred to their relevancy in a discussion about the right policy for this country to adopt. But Public Opinion refused to allow the two matters to be separated thus. As the narrative of atrocities had been the starting-point of their interest, so to prevent atrocities was the goal of their policy. From this point of view the question whether in fact the Christian subjects of the Porte were subject to such things was pre-eminently relevant. The question of general policy had become indissolubly united with the subject of the atrocities, and the increasing strength of the impulse which was making for an active "violet" policy is shown by the tone of many members, on August 7th, when, as we have seen¹ the arrival of the first accounts from the men who had been sent to Bulgaria especially to investigate caused the subject to be again mentioned in the House of Commons; and again on August 11th, when on the eve of the prorogation the growing sense of uneasiness at separating without having obtained some more definite assurance caused the subject to be once more brought forward.

Mr. Mundella said where there was such a mass of indisputable evidence as existed in the present case it was shocking that an English Minister should speak of such things as "inevitable." That was an expression which produced a great deal of pain in his mind. . . . He was not an advocate of war, but it was unworthy of England that she had not said to these Turks, one of whom had died of the scissors and another of whom was dying of something worse, "Bring this to an end, or we will point

¹ *Ante*, p. 325.

our guns at your palaces." We were once governed by a man named Cromwell, who in a similar case uttered a word which brought the massacres to an end. He trusted the Prime Minister would shake off some of his present lethargy. It was high time that England awoke to her responsibility as a great Christian Power.

Mr. P. A. Taylor said they had been saddened by the language of the Prime Minister, who did all he could to cast a slur upon the accuracy of the newspaper correspondents, and who had represented those atrocities as an inevitable accompaniment of civil war. . . . If that gallant old gentleman Earl Russell were in power, we knew what he would do; the name of England would not long be disgraced or mixed up with these infamies.

Mr. Jacob Bright did not know what our fleet in Besika Bay was doing; but it would gladden the heart of every Englishman if we could feel that its influence was being used in favour of humanity. It was a scandal to Europe that such crimes should occur within its borders.—*H. of C.* Aug. 7th.

Mr. Evelyn Ashley said this was an important moment, when the Recess was coming on and the House would not meet again for six months. He was in favour of a spirited foreign policy, but the spirit he wished to pervade our policy was a spirit of freedom on behalf of oppressed nationalities. He could not think that the Government were really opposed to the emancipation of these subject races, but he would remind hon. gentlemen opposite that the Conservative Party were kept out of office for many years by their ill-disguised hostility to Italian emancipation. (Murmurs.) Well, he would not say their hostility, but their lukewarmness. He ventured to say that if the country thought that Her Majesty's Government or the party which followed them were really indifferent to the aspiration of these subject races, the same feeling would be excited, and they would suffer from the same cause. (Cheers.)

Mr. Forster could assure the Premier he would have the support of hundreds of thousands of his fellow-subjects in this policy: "We shall take care of our own interests, and with respect to Constantinople we shall have our fleet to take care of those interests; but we cannot consent to this one thing. We cannot suffer ourselves to be implicated in the support of a Government which carries on war in this way, or attempts to put down rebel subjects or foreign enemies by a recourse to inhuman atrocities." (Cheers.)

Sir William Harcourt said in his opinion, the cries of these unhappy men, these slaughtered women and children, would not go up to Heaven in vain. Providence, which governs the fate of nations, is a Power which out of evil still educes good; but we had learnt the lesson taught by these transactions. We had not learned it soon enough, but he hoped we had learned it thoroughly. Speaking for himself, he had no hesitation in saying the moral of

these transactions, characterised as they had been by ferocity, perfidy, and mendacity from first to last, was this—he hoped to God that at last we had done with the Turks! (Cheers.) If we could not control their proceedings—and we had shown in these transactions that we could not—then we had no right to prop up their power. (Cheers.) In the name of humanity and civilisation we should allow them to sink beneath the crushing weight of their own wickedness. (Cheers.). . . They had a right to ask the Government in the last days of an expiring Session, Was not the time at last come to “do justice and to work mercy”? (Cheers.). . . He had hoped, and he still hoped, that England would take a proud and worthy place in the vindication of this great cause. In common with other members of that House he had read with pleasure the despatch of Lord Derby of the 9th of August.¹—*H. of C. Aug. 11th.*

There are never many members of the House of Commons in London on the evening of the 11th of August, and the attendance at Westminster last night was not large, but the gathering was fairly representative of all shades of opinion, and the discussion was, perhaps, the most important that had been raised this Session. A most marvellous agreement in reference to Turkey and our relations with Turkey was revealed; opinions which a few weeks ago were hesitating and uncertain had become sharply defined and firmly held; and the predominant judgment of the Legislature, no longer embarrassed by doubt, was clear and strong. It is evident that the atrocities committed in Bulgaria have—to use Lord Derby's expression—proved more disastrous to the Turks than the loss of a battle. They have deprived the Porte of the good opinion of England. They have forced the reflection on many minds unwilling to receive it that we cannot assume the responsibility of upholding a system of which such deeds are the natural fruits. If the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire means a grant of licensed impunity to Bashi-Bazouks in the Provinces of the Empire, our efforts cannot be directed to uphold it. With the exception of the official speakers,—the Prime Minister and Mr. Bourke,—this was what was said by every member who took part in last night's debate, and Mr. Bourke was silent on the subject of policy. Mr. Forsyth, speaking from the Ministerial side, outdid Mr. Evelyn Ashley in the plainness with which he insisted upon the necessity of giving the Northern Provinces of Turkey the practical security of self-government. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was no less emphatic; and the weighty declarations of Mr. Forster, spoken with a deliberation which made them still more weighty, were received with manifestations of hearty approval in all quarters of the House. Later in the evening Sir William Harcourt was ardent in his renunciation of the Turk and all his works. What may be regarded as the last sitting of the Session has thus been

¹ *Ante*, p. 342

devoted to a warning to the Porte of unusual significance; and the Ambassador who has so long and so ably represented the Sultan among us will have to report to the Council of Ministers at Constantinople that any approach to a repetition in Servia of what was perpetrated in Bulgaria will be fatal to the Ottoman Empire. It will involve an armed intervention which we shall approve and support.—*T. Aug. 12th.*

This debate, raised by Mr. Evelyn Ashley on the eve of the Prorogation, is remarkable as being the last occasion on which Mr. Disraeli spoke in the House of Commons. His last words there were an assertion of the duty of the Government before all things to maintain the Empire of England.

After taunting Sir William Harcourt with his Rhodian¹ eloquence, the Premier went on:—

[That Sir William Harcourt] should counsel as the solution of all these difficulties that Her Majesty's Government should enter into an immediate combination to expel the Turkish nation from Eastern Europe does indeed surprise me. (Cheers.) And because we are not prepared to enter into a scheme so Quixotic as that would be, we are held up by the hon. and learned gentleman and the right hon. gentleman the member for Bradford as having given our moral, not to say our material assistance to the Turkish people and the Turkish Government. We are always treated as if we had some peculiar alliance with the Turkish Government, as if we were their peculiar friends, and even as if we were expected to uphold them in any enormity they might commit. I want to know what evidence there is of this. We are the allies of the Sultan of Turkey; so is Russia, so is Austria, so is France, and so are others. We are also partners in a tripartite treaty in which we not only generally, but singly, guarantee with France and Austria the territorial integrity of Turkey. These are our engagements, and they are the engagements that we endeavour to fulfil. And if these engagements, renovated and repeated only four years ago by the wisdom of Europe, are to be treated by the hon. and learned gentleman as idle wind and chaff, and if we are to be told that our political duty is by force to expel the Turks to the other side of the Bosphorus, then politics cease to be an art, statesmanship becomes a mere mockery. . . . We refused to join in the Berlin Note because we were convinced that if we made that step we should very soon see an Imperial interference in that country, and we were not of opinion that by a system of material guarantees the great question which the hon. and learned gentleman has adverted to would be solved either for the general welfare of the world or for the interests of England, which, after

¹ Reported in *Times*, "After the Herodian eloquence to which we have just listened (a laugh) it is rather difficult for the House to see clearly the point which is before it."

all, must be our sovereign care. . . . I am sure that as long as England is ruled by English Parties who understand the principles on which our Empire is founded, and who are resolved to maintain that Empire, our influence in that part of the world can never be looked upon with indifference. If it happen that the influences which control the greater portion of those fair lands are found to be incompetent for their purpose, neither England nor any of the Great Powers will shrink from fulfilling the high political and moral duty which will then devolve upon them. (Cheers.) But, Sir, we must not jump at conclusions so quickly as is now the fashion. There is nothing to justify us in talking in such a vein of Turkey at this moment. It is a state of affairs which requires the most vigilant examination and the most careful management. But those who suppose that England ever would uphold, or at this moment particularly is upholding, Turkey from blind superstition and from a want of sympathy with the highest aspirations of humanity, are deceived. (Cheers.) What our duty at this critical moment is, is to maintain the Empire of England; nor will we ever consent to any step—although it may obtain comparative quiet and a false prosperity—which could hazard the existence of that Empire. (Loud cheers.)—*Mr. Disraeli, H. of C. Aug. 11th.*

§ 5. *Mr. Disraeli becomes Unpopular.*

Public Opinion was becoming very critical of the tone in which public men alluded to the atrocities; and the manner in which the Premier had treated the subject, his scepticism, and what was regarded as the levity exhibited in his replies, especially in that of July 10th, fixed on him a reputation of cynically disregarding the sufferings of the Provincials. And from this reputation he could never shake himself free.

It must have been hard to stick to the conventional forms of Parliamentary courtesy, to speak of "the right honourable gentleman," and the like, after such a speech as that of Mr. Disraeli. That any man in the Parliament of England could have found matter for brutal mockery in the past and present deeds of his barbarian friends might make one blush for one's country if one did not remember that he who uttered those words, though Prime Minister of England, is not an Englishman, and has never yet learned to understand the feelings of Englishmen. That Englishmen were found to laugh at his words was perhaps simply because the reference to the "historical people" was a little over the heads of his party. To have looked on at the flaying of Bragadino, to have gazed on the martyrs writhing on their stakes before the walls of Mesolongi, would seemingly have been matter of choice merriment for Mr. Disraeli. I do not think so ill

of the great mass of those whom a strange fate binds to cheer and laugh at his sayings as to think that they would have cheered and laughed at his saying if they had only known its meaning.—*Mr. Freeman* in *D. N.* July 13th.

Moreover, Mr. Disraeli had come to be regarded as the apologist of Turkey, and the advocate of an ultra "red" policy, in a more special manner than other members of the Cabinet, and it began to be noted that a great change was coming over the general appreciation in which he was held.

Mr. Disraeli has done himself more harm in the House of Commons by his jaunty replies in reference to the questions put to him as to the atrocities in Bulgaria, than by any escapade of his Premiership.—*Spec.* July 15th.

The bitterness with which Mr. Freeman writes of him, the roughness, almost brutality with which Mr. Chamberlain recently attacked him, the disposition shown by the press to doubt him, all these recent incidents mark a change in the general attitude towards Mr. Disraeli which is worth a moment's examination. He is losing rapidly a popularity with his enemies, which both in its degree and kind was quite exceptional in English politics. . . . There is a tone of suspicion and even of active dislike in all comments on Mr. Disraeli which is novel, and which exercises an ever-increasing effect on his position. The old toleration has become slightly contemptuous, the old distrust has deepened to hostility, the old smile at his vagaries has broadened into a sneer. The country papers, always first to indicate a change, have begun to doubt if Englishmen ought not to be ashamed of such a ruler, to speak of the Premier, "whom it pleases Providence to set over us"; and to warn their readers very carefully that on foreign politics more especially it behoves them to be very watchful of Mr. Disraeli's personal idiosyncrasies and desires. . . . Mr. Disraeli's indifference to facts has in the novelist and the orator had a charm, but the public now, when people are being tortured for insurrection, do not like to hear, as an extenuation of such deeds, that Turks have usually taken a shorter method with insurgents. If an actor were suddenly understood to be not acting but behaving, many an amused cheer would be changed into an angry hiss, and that is precisely the change which is passing over Mr. Disraeli's position. His words have become facts, and the tendency to admire their skill without reference to their importance has consequently passed.—*Spec.* July 22nd.

We wish we could bring home to our readers the serious, even the disastrous consequences which will arise to the British Government from the attitude which Mr. Disraeli, and Mr. Disraeli alone, even in his own Government, has assumed about the Turkish atrocities.—*Spec.* Aug. 5th.

Perhaps after reading [the Batak letter in the *Daily News*] Lord Beaconsfield may lose his levity, and Lord Derby his passion for *status quo*.—*Mr. Auberon Herbert* in *D. N. Aug.* 28th.

The excessive imprudence of the tone and language of the Prime Minister during the last weeks of the recent Session has seriously aggravated the difficulties of his Administration. When he should have declared his abhorrence of Turkish cruelties, and his profound grief and anxiety that English Statesmen should ever have to weigh their existence against the still more terrible calamity of a general war, he made a mock of Bulgarian sufferings, and sought to raise a laugh at the more primitive and speedy methods of despatch used by an historical people to get rid of its enemies. That misplaced frivolity has cost the Government dear. The indignation of the people against the indulgence of Turkish sensuality and cruelty has been made more intense because the leader and spokesman of the nation led Europe to suppose that we cared nothing about such excesses. All that Lord Derby did and Mr. Bourke can do cannot dispel this feeling. The Ministry have a double odium to overcome, and their tardy efforts to put themselves right before the country must be pushed more energetically and more openly if they would recover the position they have too evidently lost.—*T. Sept.* 6th.

The next day the following letter from the Premier himself appeared :

There are some occasions on which a misstatement, frequently repeated, ought to be noticed. There is such a case, I think, in your leading article of yesterday.

I never used such an expression as "an historical people," to which it is difficult to annex a precise idea, or ever sought to raise a laugh at the more primitive and speedy methods used by such peoples to get rid of their enemies.

My statement was in answer to one that ten thousand Bulgarians had been submitted to torture. I was perfectly grave when I replied that I was sceptical as to such occurrences, as massacre, not torture, was the custom of an Oriental (not historical) people. Unhappily, it has turned out that I was correct.

Certainly, on the occasion in question there was, to my surprise, a laugh, but it came, as I was subsequently told, only from one member. I hope the misplaced laughter of another is no proof of the levity of your obedient servant.—*Beaconsfield* in *T. Sept.* 7th.

We catch a faint suggestion of an analogy between the conduct of the Turkish Government and the attitude of Mr. Disraeli, considered merely as matters of prudence, or of tactics.

The *Saturday Review* says that the outrages which the Turkish Government has permitted in Bulgaria may perhaps turn out to be the gravest mistake it has ever made. It is in many ways unfortunate that the official reserve which may have been incumbent

on Mr. Disraeli induced him to use a language and tone which was thought to imply a deficiency of righteous indignation. One result of his error, or of popular misapprehension, is the opportunity which has been afforded for employing excited feelings for party purposes. The dispassionate part of the community is naturally slow to abandon the policy which has been steadily pursued since Russia first began to threaten Turkey; but in England public opinion is greatly modified by moral feeling, and if the maintenance of Turkish dominion is associated in general belief with plunder and persecution, Governments and political parties will be compelled to conform to the general sentiment.—(Aug. 12th.)

§ 6. *The Cabinet Janus-faced.*

Lord Derby, too, had given some offence by his coldness and scepticism, but no one suspected him of any design to go out of his way to engage the country in the active support of Turkey. He was looked upon not so much as the advocate for an active "red" as the opponent of the "violet" policy.

Among much to make us sad and anxious there is one small gleam of comfort. The Derby windbag has burst. It is now lawful to speak freely of one of the dullest and most incapable of so-called statesmen. I have allowed myself that liberty for ten years past. At last others also are doing the same. Ten years ago I denounced in your columns that hideous crime, and I have ever since taken every opportunity of denouncing it by voice and pen. The man whom we have been taught to look on as wise almost beyond human wisdom has for ten years been to me simply the man who forbade our consuls and naval officers to do anything to save the women and children of Crete from the jaws of their Turkish destroyers.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman* in *D. N.* Aug. 23rd.

The discrepancy between the light in which Lord Derby presented the course of the Government and the impression left by the Premier now assumed a much greater importance.¹

We find from this time a slowly growing belief in the "Janus-like" character of the Cabinet. And we may notice that where the personality of the Premier became matter of discussion, the topic "divisions in the Cabinet" was always near at hand. It was the

¹ Lord Hartington alluded to it in the debate of July 31st. Again, Mr. Grant Duff wrote:—"Sir H. Drummond Wolff objected to the discrepancies which existed between the statements made by a leading personage of his own party out of doors and the papers presented to Parliament. . . . The same point of the Janus-like character of the foreign policy of the Government—Lord Derby giving one version of its conduct and the Premier another—was pressed from the Liberal benches by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice."—*Contemp. Rev.* Sept. 1876, "Eastern Affairs at the close of the Session."

incipient recognition of this, no doubt, which gave rise to the following incident.

Mr. E. Jenkins asked whether Lord Derby's statement might be accepted as an official declaration, and if so, that authentic reports of those statements might be included in the Blue Books; or, in the alternative, that the Premier should give an authoritative exposition of the policy and intentions of Government particularly with respect to the fleet.

Mr. Disraeli. When a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office, in answer to a numerous deputation, not unattended by skilled reporters, makes a declaration of the policy of the Government of which he is a member, it is unquestionably an official declaration, and ought to be so esteemed. [For the rest, he referred his interlocutor to the papers.] If anything is obscure, I shall be ready in my place in Parliament on any legitimate and proper occasion to give ample explanations, and I trust the House will always maintain that it is in discussion in both Houses of Parliament that such information can best be given. (Loud cheering).—*H. of C.* July 18th and 24th, 1876.

We are at a loss to understand what motive could have prompted so injudicious a question. . . . The *solidarité* of an English Ministry should always be assumed. Each speaks the sense of all, and the burden is upon any one who dissents from the statements of a colleague to let it be known, if not to retire altogether. . . . Everything that Lord Derby said may and should be imputed to Mr. Disraeli, and the less he may like to adopt it as his own, the more imperturbably should it be taken for granted that it was his own. Mr. Jenkins was guilty of an elementary error as a politician in suggesting the possibility that the Foreign Secretary's language might not be unhesitatingly adopted by his colleagues.—*T.* July 26th.

§ 7. *The Cabinet Tripartite.*

As other members of the Government spoke from time to time, beginning perhaps with Lord Salisbury at the Mansion House on August 2nd, the impression of a *threefold* division in the Cabinet sprang up, and Lord Salisbury began to stand out in the public estimation as the representative of a third tendency in the Cabinet, differing alike from Disraeli and from Derby.

From several quarters accounts have reached us of brutalities with respect to which, if they are true, the judgment, the unanimous judgment of the people of this country cannot be doubtful. . . . We may be certain that the Turkish Government will

make every effort to put a stop to these horrors ; and if they did not do so from their own feelings, the voice that is rising from every part of Europe must warn them of allowing such proceedings to go on. (Cheers.)—*Lord Salisbury at the Mansion House, Aug. 2nd.*

Looking at the substance of what Lord Salisbury said, it is perhaps not very easy to see why it should have been thought that he was more favourably disposed to a "violet" policy, but the more sympathetic tone of his references to the sufferings of the Provincials was one circumstance which led to this conclusion.

The allusions made by Ministers at the Mansion House last evening to the Bulgarian atrocities may, we hope, be taken to show that the Cabinet as a body are more sensible than some of their members have shown themselves of the responsibility which lies on them as the friends and patrons of the Turkish Government.—*D. N. Aug. 3.*

No one can wonder at any action of Lord Beaconsfield's, and Lord Derby's dealings with Bulgaria are exactly what I should have looked for after his dealings with Crete ten years ago. I can make a wide distinction between these two chief criminals and other members of the present Ministry. The tone of Lord Salisbury was quite different from that of Lord Derby or Lord Beaconsfield ; and Mr. Bourke writes like a man who finds it hard to reconcile his own honest feelings with the necessity of making out a case for a chief who does not share them.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman in P. M. G. Sept. 7th.*

§ 8. *Mr. Disraeli becomes Lord Beaconsfield.*

The day after the debate on the Appropriation Bill came the news that Mr. Disraeli had become the Earl of Beaconsfield. For the moment all his unpopularity was forgotten.

If the peerage was a translation to a less influential, though a more dignified position—and so it was regarded by most¹—then it might be taken as a further indication that the Ministry were breaking away from the "red" policy, and preparing to follow in the direction in which Public Opinion was now so strongly setting. If this was so, if Mr. Disraeli had frankly recognised that his idiosyncrasy must not stand in the way of so desirable a consummation, then every one was delighted to admit that the

¹ But we see the shrewd suggestion of the contrary in *P. M. G.* of Aug. 15th, *post*, p. 381.

peerage was the fitting and well-earned reward of a striking career.

“ And so the Session with a Title ends
That with a Title ope'd ; but how unlike
This Title unto that ! *This* Title given
Ungrudged and uncontested, unto one
Whom, howsoever differing men and minds
May differ in their judgment of the man,
All own a fighter who has fairly won
The meed of honour which now crowns his age :
Like some great argosy, that after years
Of buffeting with winds and waves and wars,
Crowned with the memories of conflicts past,
Passes from high seas' strife to harbour's calm.”

—*Punch*, Aug. 26th.

These lines accompany a sketch modelled on Turner's picture of the *Old Téméraire*. A majestic hulk, whose bows are somehow twisted into the lines of Disraeli's well-known features, is towed by a smoking tug, which assumes the likeness of an earl's coronet, to its last resting place. The face is tinged with regret at quitting the scene of past triumph,—or it may be chagrin at an unacknowledged defeat ; but the bows are wreathed with laurel, the water is smooth, and around is the splendour of the setting sun.

The public will be almost as much pleased as Mr. Disraeli can be that the success of a life has been recognised in the highest possible sphere and the stamp placed upon it by Royalty. Mr. Disraeli has fought his way, if ever a man did, to the highest place. . . . It remains to be seen what influences the Conservative Party and the State will receive from so great a displacement as the removal of Mr. Disraeli from the House of Commons. It is no depreciation of his talents to say that he can never retain in the House of Lords the power he possessed in the House of Commons. —*T.* Aug. 12th.

Nothing beats an Earl. The best form of English nobility is the old Earldom, Saxon and Danish as well as Norman. This stage reached, the rest is superfluity. This is the proud title which, incredible as it would have been thirty years ago, the Premier takes so appropriately that a lower rank would hardly have fitted him. It will be replied with no little warmth that a coronet is a trifle, the House of Lords a banishment, a title an eclipse of honour, and the whole apotheosis a funereal pageant.—*T.* Aug. 14th.

The *Saturday Review* says there is but one feeling of pleasure at the fortune which has enabled Mr. Disraeli to close his long career in the House of Commons while he is still in the height of prosperity.—(Aug. 9th.)

Allowing always for Mr. Disraeli's one possession, "the zigzag lightning in his brain" which has so often shown him a way out of an impossible position, we conceive him to have made alike for his party and himself, a very great mistake. [The secret of his power was admiration for the intellectual gymnast.] Disappearance kills that kind of confidence, and Mr. Disraeli as intellectual gymnast has retired. The Earl of Beaconsfield cannot disport himself in that way in the upper chamber. . . . Unless the Earl of Beaconsfield can not only make himself, but show himself necessary to some course of policy on which the nation has set its heart, he will find that, no longer leading the Commons, no longer exciting daily admiration, he will . . . be forgotten. . . . And what chance is there of his propounding such a policy? We should say simply none. . . . When eager to lead in foreign affairs, he has only to offer a people, who pray every week for deliverance from Turks, the Turkish *status quo*. You cannot make a great policy out of a mere refusal to believe disagreeable evidence. No man in England grudges Mr. Disraeli ease, if he desire it, "honours," if he cares about them, social rank, if he thinks that Britain has it to give, but among all Englishmen, those who grudge them least are those who most desire that his authority should end.—*Spec. Aug.* 19th.

It is commonly believed that Mr. Disraeli is anxious to devote himself to foreign politics. There is another general belief (it may be equally unfounded) that foreign politics are not particularly safe with him. It is thought by men of all political creeds that they are safer with Lord Derby. Now if the first-named of these beliefs turns out to be a true one; if the leisure of a peerage is employed by the Tory chief as here suggested; and if Lord Beaconsfield shows any aptitude for stepping out before Lord Derby in the field of "foreign affairs," then those other beliefs will operate not to the advantage of the Government; and so far the elevation of Mr. Disraeli will fail in usefulness to his party. However, we have no right to assume anything of the kind at present.—*P. M. G. Aug.* 15th.

Such was the situation when Parliament separated and Mr. Disraeli went up to the Lords. Out of doors, excitement was rising day by day, and day by day the conviction was hardening that Emancipation was the only solution. One or two things¹ had happened which sanguine men might take as signs that the Government was beginning to see the necessity of adopting a policy which would satisfy the rising demand of Public Opinion, but they were only enough to stimulate the demand—not to content it. The public had not received the assurance for which they craved. And they were beginning to see that it would cost them a great effort to get it.

¹ The despatch of Aug. 9th (see p. 342) and the changed tone of the Ministry supposed to be discernible in Lord Salisbury's speech (see p. 379).

CHAPTER XII.

ATROCITY PERIOD. SUB-PERIOD—THE GREAT AGITATION.

§ 1. *Public Opinion finds Voice.*

WE now come to the time when the effect of the atrocities upon Public Opinion reached its climax. At first there had been doubt—then astonishment—then a great emotion of pity and indignation, a desire that the *persons* who had suffered should be helped, and the *persons* who had done the wrong should be punished for the past and restrained for the future; then came the perception that things of this kind were not strange and unheard of exceptions, but only a capital example of the incidents of Turkish rule; and finally the conviction indelibly branded into the public mind that Turks were not fit to be trusted with sovereignty over Christian populations.

The barbarities in Bulgaria constitute a turning-point of European policy, because they show the meaning of Turkish rule. No doubt many of us knew beforehand what possibilities of violence lay in the Mahometan people when heated by fanaticism and the fear of losing their dominion. The massacres in Scio and in Syria are familiar chapters of history. Even the atrocities in Bulgaria merely show that the dominant race in Turkey is what it always was, and what it always will be so long as its hands are loose. But at one time many things combined to spread a belief that the Turkish Government would be so purified, civilised, and strengthened as to be able to keep order among its discordant races, and do inflexible justice to Christian as to Mahometan. That delusion had been vanishing long before the outbreak in Bulgaria; but a change of public conviction seldom brings a sudden change of action, unless it be precipitated by some striking event. That is what the crimes in Bulgaria did. They summed up in one tremendous total those vague and scattered conclusions to which the country had almost unconsciously been feeling its way. They did not surprise us so much as bring to light what all

had been ready to believe. They did not change opinion so much as condense it and set it on fire. It is one thing for a man to know vaguely that he is travelling near a precipice on a dark night, and another thing for him to see the depths of the abyss laid bare by a flash of lightning. That is what the atrocities in Bulgaria did for England, and they have raised more indignation here than in any other country because no other has done so much to save the Porte from the consequences of its own vices.—*T.* Sept. 29th.

As the Prorogation approached, Public Opinion saw with something like dismay that it was about to be deprived of its constitutional organ, and to consider what assurance there was that at this critical juncture the Executive might not commit the country to a policy directly contrary to its judgment.

It would be vain to dissemble the fact that in the dispersion of Parliament the public is about to lose the best guarantee it has hitherto possessed for a satisfactory treatment of this very grave business. From first to last official persons of all ranks and degrees have fought with the facts as they were struggling to light. The establishment of those facts will be due to the Press, not to the Government; but their partial, tardy, and reluctant acknowledgment by Ministers is due to the fact that Parliament was sitting when they were published, and that questions could be asked to which a reply of some kind must be made.—*D. N.* Aug. 11th.

[A meeting in Battersea Fields resolved that Ministers being left to follow their own behests, it is incumbent on the part of the nation to bring to bear upon them the healthy glow of public opinion.]—*D. N.* Aug. 21st.

For several months to come Earl Beaconsfield and Lord Derby will have it practically their own way; and what that way is we know only too well. . . . To what they may commit us now that they are released from the check of Parliament [who can tell?] *Mr. E. A. Freeman* in *D. N.* Aug. 23rd.¹

The people of this country are just now in a most helpless situation. Parliament is not sitting, and no questions can be asked of the Government. The Prime Minister is working in darkness, and the country knows not how far its influence is being employed to bolster up the vilest tyranny that ever oppressed a European people.—*D. N.* Sept. 5th.

No sooner had Parliament separated than the demand for an Autumn session arose, and people redoubled their efforts to find extra-parliamentary channels through which they might make their opinions felt by the Government. Thus the Prorogation

¹ Letter headed "England Without a Parliament."

marks the commencement of the period which is characterised pre-eminently as a period of agitation. Symptoms had appeared before, but it was after the Prorogation that they became general. A great accession of energy occurred immediately after August 22nd, the date of the publication of Mr. MacGahan's Batak letter in the *Daily News*. Of course to organise meetings requires an appreciable interval, but, before the end of August, Public Opinion had got its improvised organ into working order, and it was speaking with a unanimity, and a vehemence, and moreover with a definiteness of purpose, which astonished the world. The newspapers were filled with references to the subject. Scarcely a day but it furnished each with the theme of one, and sometimes of two leading articles. Numerous paragraphs and letters appeared referring to the state of opinion, or to the action which was beginning to be taken all over the country.

The *Daily News* in particular opened its columns to a correspondence which is noteworthy rather as being typical of the prevailing sentiments, than for the importance of the individual letters which constituted it. It was not unnatural, as the *Daily News* had been the foremost in telling the tale of the atrocities, that it should become the recipient of these communications.¹

We are overwhelmed with the number of letters that reach us from all parts of the kingdom respecting the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria. These letters are written by persons in every class of the community, and of every shade of political opinion. They express a feeling perfectly natural in the circumstances; they declare that the country is wronged in the misrepresentation of its convictions and sentiments by a Government which makes England the defender of the Turks, whose crimes in Bulgaria are but too consistent with the historical character of their race. From the only sources of information open to the public—from the speeches of Ministers and the official correspondence laid before Parliament—it is seen that our Government will think the insurrection and war well ended if only the authority of the Turks is re-established over the Christian populations whom they cannot govern, but whom they are able and willing to rob, outrage, and murder. These things are making people impatient, and compel them to declare that the position in which England is placed is so false to her character as to be intolerable.—*D. N.* Aug. 24th.

¹ The writers express their gratitude to the *Daily News*, their horror at the misdeeds of the Turks, their dissatisfaction with the Government, (some especially stating they are Conservatives), and their desire to make their feelings known. "Do give us a chance of crying where we shall be heard," says one (Aug. 19th). Many urge the various "violet" notions and the arguments for the "violet" policy.

Other letters appeared, principally in the *Times* but also in the *Daily News*, which were entitled to weight from the positions of the writers or the importance of the contribution which they brought to the discussion. Early among them we find indications that the agitation now rising was regarded as an organ by means of which Public Opinion might be able to exert the influence to which it was legitimately entitled in shaping the policy of the country.

Lord Derby desired instructions from his employers. It is to be hoped that he may now get them with rather more emphasis than he suggested.—*Mr. Auberon Herbert*, in *D. N.* Aug. 25th.

A Minister who has thus frankly confessed the difficulty he finds in reading the signs of the times when the *vox populi* is silent, ought not to be left without opportunity of knowing the public verdict upon the affairs of the East, and it is very satisfactory to observe in your columns that meetings are to be held in many places for the expression of public opinion upon the events of the war. It is much to be desired that the resolutions of these meetings should be stated, not in the vague, indefinite language which is now so common, as a consequence of the thrill of horror which your narration of the Bulgarian devilries has caused to pass through the heart of England, but in terms such as the Foreign Office cannot fail to understand.—*Mr. Arthur Arnold*, in *D. N.* Aug. 28th.

In the last week of August and through September meeting crowded on meeting thick and fast. The newspapers teemed with the reports of them daily.¹ The proceedings were marked by the greatest enthusiasm. If now and then, as at Oxford, we catch a discordant note amid the overwhelming chorus, this seemed to do little more than emphasize the prevailing unanimity. Scarcely a Mayor but presided at a public meeting in his borough. But as

¹ On Sept. 5th, for instance, the reports—most of them very brief paragraphs—filled four and a-half columns of the *Daily News*. The points comprised in the resolutions may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) An expression of horror and abhorrence.
 - (2) A demand that the Government should take effective measures to prevent a repetition of such outrages, and to secure practical independence for the disturbed provinces.
 - (3) Punishment of the guilty Turkish officials.
 - (4) Relief to the sufferers.
 - (5) Thanks to the *Daily News* and *Times* (the *Daily News* generally had the precedence) for their efforts to make the truth known.
 - (6) That petitions should be signed, or copies of the resolutions be sent, to the Premier and Foreign Secretary.
- The following were often included:—
- (7) A protest against the inaction of the Government, or against the past support afforded by them to the Turks.
 - (8) A demand for an autumn session of Parliament.
 - (9) A demand for the recall of Sir Henry Elliot.

those who were now earnest in pressing a "violet" policy upon the Government thought they should be heard for their much speaking, they did not for the most part rest quiet when their first shot had been delivered and their first town meeting held. Thus the town meetings were followed by meetings called together for the same purpose, but under other names; meetings of working men, meetings of Liberals, meetings of Nonconformists and so forth, and in some instances it seems that repeated town meetings were held.¹

People who assembled for quite other purposes, as in town Councils, or to transact the business of religious bodies, or even for entertainment, did not deem the occasion inappropriate to a few words or a resolution on the subject of which every mind was full.²

It is an excitement and an agitation which has not been confined to public meetings in the country; it has found its echo in the public press and in the pulpit, whilst there is scarcely any place where men meet together in which this subject does not rise to their lips, and almost every one is discussing events which have recently happened in certain parts of the Turkish dominion.—*Lord Hartington*, Sept. 7th.³

The extent to which the engrossing subject occupied men's thoughts and energies is also described by Mr. Gladstone⁴ in a striking passage—

On Monday morning last, gentlemen, between four and five o'clock, I was rattling through the calm and silent streets of London, without a footfall to disturb them, and every house looked so still that it might have been a receptacle of the dead. But as I came through them I felt it to be an inspiring and ennobling thought that in every one of those houses there were intelligent human beings—my fellow-countrymen—then asleep, who when they woke would give many of their earliest thoughts—aye, and some of their most energetic action—to the horrors in Bulgaria.—*Mr. Gladstone*, Sept. 9th.⁴

The energetic action of which Mr. Gladstone spoke was mainly a struggle to gain the ear of the Government. If the sound of

¹ e.g. Nottingham, where a public meeting was held on Aug. 31st, and a second public meeting after a very short interval. See T. Sept. 11th.

² e.g. resolutions passed by the quarterly meeting of the Wesleyan Circuit, Ely, and by the General Assembly of the Wilts and East Somerset Congregational Union, reported *D. N.* Sept. 29th.

The *D. N.* (Sept. 5th) speaks of a crowded meeting in Mr. Charrington's great tent, at Mile End, to hear the Rev. Josiah Henson, the "Uncle Tom" of Mrs. Beecher Stowe's well-known tale. At the close the chairman referred to the atrocities which have been perpetrated by the Turks in Bulgaria, and a resolution was carried with enthusiasm.

³ At the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield, *post*, p. 398.

⁴ In his Blackheath speech, *post*, § 3.

the meetings did not reach it, people would send memorials to the Premier and the Foreign Secretary, and if there was still no response, they would raise a louder shout, or invite the Ministers to meet them so that they might speak with them face to face.¹

Women took the matter up, and went with their petitions straight to the Queen.² Subscriptions were opened for the sufferers. Ladies made garments to send them. The dome of St. Paul's and the roof of the dissenting chapel alike rang with appeals to the conscience of the nation. It is this great outburst of energy, primarily with a definite political object but also secondarily benevolent and to some extent perhaps merely emotional, which constitutes the most striking phenomenon of the whole epoch.

We may recall by way of illustration, from among the many reported at the time, a few of the incidents which went to make up this great agitation.³

Manchester, Aug. 9th. A town's meeting was convened by the Mayor, in compliance with a numerous signed requisition, to "express indignation at the atrocities now being perpetrated by Turkish troops in Bulgaria, and make known the opinion of the people of Manchester as to the duty of England with regard to these barbarities." At the commencement of the proceedings the following telegram from the committee of Bulgarian ladies resident in Vienna was read:—"Hearty thanks in advance to the ladies of meeting for its sympathy with the unfortunate Bulgarian women and children who are groaning in cruel slavery." A letter was read from the *Bishop of Manchester* (interrupted by loud and frequent cheering.) "The action that the country is expecting from its Government is not a policy of non-interference, which, however, looks very much like interference on the wrong side—(hear, hear)—but a policy of intervention in concert with the other great Christian Powers on the side of order, justice, and

¹ See the invitation to Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, and the deputation to Lord Derby, which was the outcome of the great City meeting at the Guildhall, *post.* § 5.

² The language of some of these memorials with regard to the personal action expected from the Queen is very remarkable, *e.g.* :—

MADAM,—We, the undersigned women of Great Britain and Ireland, your Majesty's humble and dutiful subjects, having heard with horror and indignation of the atrocities committed and still continuing to be perpetrated in Bulgaria and other provinces subject or tributary to Turkey, earnestly beg your Majesty to use your Royal Prerogative in directing your Majesty's Government to adopt measures in concert with the other Powers of Europe to provide effectually against the continuance and recurrence of such atrocities."—*D. N.* Sept. 16th.

Somewhat similar language occurs in the address to the Queen, published in the *Guardian* of Sept. 6th, at the request of Canon Liddon and others.

³ It is not suggested that all the meetings spoken of in the following pages had any particular importance in themselves beyond many others. They are intended rather as samples.

humanity. . . . I confess that it was not without regret that I read Mr. Gladstone's expression of opinion, which seemed to be accepted on both sides of the House of Commons, that 'the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire in Europe must be maintained.' . . . Never was there greater need for the people of England, if they would stand before the bar of European opinion acquitted of complicity with some of the most dreadful crimes which history records, to speak their minds loud and clear." The *Dean of Manchester* was quite certain that if the people of England would rise as one man and say, "We will that our Government should interfere and stop these wickednesses going on in Bulgaria," the Government would very speedily do it, for in this country the will of the people was finally supreme.

Canon Liddon preached at St. Paul's, Sunday Aug. 13th. Admitting that it is better as a rule for the ministers of Christ to avoid references to political questions, and to refrain from language which may tend to increase the difficulties of those who are charged with the responsibilities of government, there are times when silence is incompatible with the law of Christ, when issues are raised which are above any considerations of expediency, when the question is not what is politically expedient, but what is moral, Christian, humane. Such a time had now come in reference to recent events in Eastern Europe. He did not desire to appeal to sentiment, but to elementary morality, for it was a question whether the Sixth and Seventh Commandments should be violated on a gigantic scale. Some countries might be forced to act against the will of the people, but it was not so with England; and they could not put the responsibility on the Government, which represented them as much as it ruled them, nor upon that abstraction called the nation. To all who heard him the Canon appealed to make their wishes known on the matter.

The *Rev. Ll. D. Bevan* preached at Tottenham Court Road Chapel Sunday Aug. 20th. "People said, 'Why interfere in the struggle?' Why, humanity demanded it."

The *Archbishop of York*, preaching at York, Sept. 5th, called on the people to speak out that, "Not one great from our coffers, not one drop of blood from the meanest man in our ranks should be given hereafter to keep this black spot in the midst of Europe."

Sunday, Sept. 10th.—In nearly all the pulpits of Plymouth yesterday the atrocities of the Turks were freely commented upon, with the special object of obtaining support for a fund in aid of the Bulgarians. In several churches and chapels collections were made, but in others it was resolved to await the issue of a town's meeting. The King-street Wesleyan Chapel, the largest in the town, was crowded to hear the Rev. J. T. Wells on the subject. [The matter formed the subject of sermons at many other places, including St. Paul's by Canon Lightfoot, and Christ Church, Westminster Road, by the Rev. Newman Hall.]—*D. N.* Sept. 11th.

Nottingham, Aug. 31st. At this meeting a letter was read from the Under Secretary of the Foreign Department. Mr. Bourke wrote: "You may be quite sure that the Prime Minister and Lord Derby feel as indignant at these events as any other two men in the country, and mean to act in accordance with those feelings; but heartrending as the Bulgarian massacres have been, we must all recollect that English statesmen are not the rulers of Turkey, and cannot use physical force in the internal provinces of the Empire upon a few days' notice of the danger. The first duty of English statesmen is a regard for the interests of this country; but Turkey knows as well as you do that the Government of England will never support tyranny, oppression, or cruelty, wherever it may be found, and that, as the Queen of England treats her Mahometan subjects with justice and mercy, we have a right to demand from the head of the Mahometan faith similar treatment for the various Christian races who live in the territories of the Sultan. Mr. Isaac (Conservative M.P. for the borough) contended that Mr. Bourke would not have written that letter unless the Prime Minister were ready to carry out those ideas. ("Why didn't he do it before?") He would take care to let the Government know that this was no party meeting, but represented all shades of opinion. A resolution urging the Government to use every effort to secure "practical independence" was moved by Mr. F. Wright, who was introduced as a member of one of the oldest Conservative families in the country.

Darlington, Aug. 25th. A rider asking for the recall of Sir H. Elliot proposed from the body of the meeting was added to one of the resolutions.

Bristol, Sept. 4th. A letter was read from the Bishop, and a resolution was moved by Mr. Wait (Conservative M.P. for Gloucester). The Roman Catholic Bishop, Dr. Clifford, said "we must demand the autonomy of the Christian Provinces that have been so devastated."

Rochdale, Sept. 4th. Letters were read from the Bishop of Manchester and Mr. John Bright.

Hackney, Sept. 4th. A letter from Mr. Fawcett was read in which he said: "It is now being perpetually repeated that we must demand peace. But deeply as we may deplore the horrors of war, it should be remembered that a peace may be so concluded as to make it far more disastrous than war."

Plymouth, Sept. 5th. Letters were read from the Earl of Mount Edgcumbe, Mr. E. Bates (Conservative M.P. for the borough) and others. Lord Mount Edgcumbe said he shared fully "the universal horror excited by the Turkish outrages in Bulgaria," but he thought independent meetings "are both unnecessary, because the horrible facts speak for themselves, and undesirable, as being calculated to hamper rather than to strengthen diplomatic action, full of immense difficulties and intimately connected with

the most vital interests of our country." *Mr. E. Bates* wrote :— "No doubt the Turkish atrocities are something too frightful to contemplate, but what can we do? It is no use barking if we are not to bite; and if we are to bite, what will the country say, especially the 'peace at any price' party? I myself doubt the wisdom of these meetings."

Christchurch, Sept. 7th. *Sir H. Wolff* (Conservative M.P. for the borough) was present. He was thanked for having sacrificed party to patriotism. He said we could not maintain the treaties better than by establishing such a system of government in the provinces as would remove the causes of the insurrection—after the Syrian model. A resolution was proposed, calling on the Government to prevent a repetition of the atrocities. An amendment was moved calling on them to obtain Independence for Bulgaria and the other provinces. Efforts were made to secure unanimity. *Sir H. Wolff* suggested the substitution of the words "administrative autonomy" for "independence" in the amendment. This was not acceded to, and the amendment was carried by a large majority.

Cardiff, Sept. 7th, the first resolution was moved by the *Rev. Canon Perowne*. He was not there to join in any denunciation of the conduct of the Government. He did not think in the first instance they could have acted otherwise than they did. He did not regard this as a political question or a question of parties; he looked on it as a national question. England was bound to do two things: first, to protest against any repetition; secondly, to determine that no considerations of political expediency, or terror of a Russian advance, should bind us to the Turk. *Alderman David* (Conservative) trusted that the Government would act in concert with other Powers in repressing these gross wrongs. *Mr. E. A. Freeman* said: Twenty years ago we went to war in our madness, in our folly, against an Eastern nation that had never wronged us, on behalf of the foulest tyranny on earth. Such meetings as this are enough to show that whatever occurs we shall never go to war again to press the yoke upon the necks of our Christian brethren. "I do not think that if I had stood up twenty years ago, and spoken as I am speaking now, I should have been received as I have been received among you. Yes, the eyes of Englishmen have been opened." [He alluded to Lord Derby "that man without a heart";—to Lord Beaconsfield "with his merry laugh"] "Our voice must go up, a voice that cannot be mistaken, a voice that even Lord Derby can understand. . . . Many of us have spoken, and at last the great man of all, the chief of us, whom we must some day have back, whether he will or no. (Great cheering). See how Mr. Gladstone speaks. I trembled for a moment when I read his speech in the House of Commons. He spoke there of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. I did not like this. In the pamphlet, however, he puts a meaning

on his words which is perfectly harmless. . . . Let it be made plain not only that we will not again go forth to fight for Sodom and Gomorrah, but that we will not allow the yoke of Sodom and Gomorrah to be again pressed upon our Christian brethren, and that we will not endure the Turk as our ally, nor the friends of the Turk as our rulers." A resolution was proposed¹ calling on the Government to take such steps as in their opinion would prevent a repetition of the atrocities, but it was objected to as not sufficiently practical. Ultimately it was withdrawn in favour of an amendment, insisted on by the meeting and carried with enthusiasm, which, accusing the Government of apathy and indifference, asserted that nothing less than severance from Turkish rule would satisfy the just demands of the oppressed.

Newcastle, Sept. 7th, the promoters encountered an organised opposition from the local "Foreign affairs Committee,"² who proposed an amendment, for which, however, only six hands were held up.

Bridgwater,³ Sept. 9th. A resolution was passed in favour of "practical independence," and urging on the Government the duty of combining with the other Governments of Europe to secure it.

The *Times* Dublin Correspondent notes that it has been a subject of surprise that Ireland has been apparently unmoved; but now Belfast has spoken out.—*T.* Sept. 9th.⁴

Several meetings, at which the usual resolutions respecting the Turkish atrocities were adopted, were held yesterday. At a meeting held at Oxford the proceedings are described as "boisterous" and "stormy." The Bishop of Oxford proposed the first resolution, expressing horror and indignation at the atrocities, which was carried unanimously. Mr. E. A. Freeman then proposed a resolution which advocated the practical independence of the revolted provinces, to which Mr. Hall, M.P., moved an amendment, the effect of which was to leave the course to be pursued in the hands of the Government. All the speakers were much interrupted, but in the end the mayor declared the resolution

¹ Intrusted to the present writer.

² See *ante*, p. 138.

³ The following circumstance, with which the present writer happens to be acquainted, may perhaps be worth referring to by way of illustrating the feeling of the time as to persistence in agitation, and the results expected from it. *Mr. E. Seymer Thompson* wrote to the *Bridgwater Mercury*, Oct. 11th, referring to the meeting, and asking whether the greater number of those who passed the resolutions with such apparent unanimity and enthusiasm had been satisfied with the turn affairs had taken since that meeting. Some were very much the reverse. "Feeling it impossible to remain under the reproach of doing nothing, we took counsel as to the best line of action, and the upshot of it was that I communicated with Dr. Freeman, and asked him if he would be willing to give a lecture in Bridgwater on the Eastern Question. I received a note of cordial acquiescence." He went on to say that an insuperable obstacle was presented by the action of the Town Hall Committee, who refused the use of the hall.

⁴ Five weeks later the *Times* (Oct. 18th) reports a crowded meeting held at Belfast in support of the Government in its policy on the Eastern Question.

carried. A resolution in favour of Parliament being assembled at an early date was also declared carried.—*P. M. G.* Sept. 13th.

Maidstone, Sept. 15th. A meeting of the Conservative Party was held, and a resolution proposed deprecating agitation, as calculated to weaken the influence of England abroad. The seconder was frequently interrupted and cheers were given for Mr. Gladstone.

London, Sept. 18th. Two meetings were held. The *Times* notes that Exeter Hall was crowded by an audience of working men even more enthusiastic, if possible, than the assembly in the Guildhall;¹ and the bitterest foe either of Turkey or of the Government might have been satisfied by the fervour of Mr. Fawcett's denunciations.—(Sept. 19th.)

The *Daily Telegraph* reports many meetings; among them one at Liverpool, where a "prominent Conservative" said that "if the Government did not recognise the feeling of the country, they must follow the example of other Governments and cease to exist."—(Sept. 27th.)

A great meeting at Glasgow (Sept. 19th) stands out conspicuously in the reports from over the Border; and it is noteworthy not only as a great popular demonstration, but on account of the speech delivered by the Duke of Argyll.

I begin with this proposition, that the Turkish Government is so bad, so execrably bad, that any and every rebellion against it on the part of its Christian subjects is presumably just and righteous. When this night has passed away, and to-morrow's dawn arises, it will be the dawn of the 22nd anniversary of the battle of the Alma. I am one of five survivors of the Cabinet which waged the Crimean War. I was the youngest member of it, but there was no difference in that tremendous responsibility. There was no member of that Cabinet, be he the youngest or be he the oldest, who had not to search his own heart whether the course we were then taking was wise and just; and this I will tell you, that if I could imagine that this policy of Lord Derby had been the legitimate result of that Crimean War, I would sit in sackcloth and ashes for the part which I then took, as one of the greatest sins of my youth. I rejoice to tell you, gentlemen, that I labour under no such conviction. On the contrary, it was the Crimean War which specially lifted us above the level of such a cold and heartless and selfish policy as this. This uprising of the people of this country rejoices one's heart to see. I feel that this policy is ended for ever. No British Government will dare in the future to exhort the Turkish Government to put down the Christian Insurgents. No Government will dare to do it in the name of the sovereign and in the

¹ See *post*, § 5, as to the City meeting.

name of the people of this country; and I read that determination in your faces, and I hear it in your ringing cheers. (Loud applause.)—*Duke of Argyll at Glasgow, Sept. 19th.*

It is much easier to say when the agitation commenced than when it ended. The acute agitation which sprang up with the prorogation passed into a somewhat different phase about the middle of September, but there was no diminution in the amount of attention engrossed by the question at issue. Political meetings of various kinds continued to be held in great numbers all through the autumn. The public addresses of Members of Parliament ("Parliament out of Session," to use the significant name now often adopted in the newspaper reports) assumed an unwonted prominence, and were almost exclusively devoted to the all absorbing question. Thus many of the later meetings were significant rather as defining the position of particular statesmen, than as irrepressible expressions of Public Opinion bursting spontaneously into voice. But the distinction is by no means a sharp one, and the characteristics of both types of meeting were often exhibited by the same specimen.

Meanwhile the utterances of the platform were supplemented from time to time by letters of weight in the correspondence columns of the newspapers. Thus expression was given to a great number of individual opinions of importance. Many of these utterances, of course, bear on the special aspect of the moment. Amongst them, in connection with the first outburst of agitation we may note the following.

In my judgment an English politician should neither be philo-Turk nor pro-Christian. He should be anti-anti-Turk and anti-anti-Christian. The moment he abandons that position, he is running into danger—the danger either of playing into the hands of unscrupulous intriguers, who use the Christians of the East as mere pawns in a political game, or the danger of setting himself in opposition to manifest destiny, and to the sentiment of Liberal Europe.—*Grant Duff, Contemp. Rev.*¹ July, 1876.

Sir Charles Dilke feared to disappoint his hearers when he said that he did not take, so strongly as did many, either side in the present struggle between Turkey and her revolted provinces. He should have been more likely to carry them with him and to rouse their feelings, were he either to attempt to awaken their hostility against the intrigues of Russia or to enlist their sympathy for the oppressed Christians. He could do neither without hesitation,

¹ The "Pulse of Europe." Compare same writer's "Eastern Affairs at the Close of the Session," *Contemp. Rev.* Sept. 1876.

or, to speak properly, he thought he could do both. He could but look at this war sadly, as the outcome of a long conflict of races, carried on with much cruelty on both sides. He believed that the faults on both sides had been such as to lead those who knew the circumstances best to look towards the future without much hope. Of a permanent peaceable arrangement he confessed that he saw no prospect.—*Sir Charles Dilke at Notting Hill, Aug. 15th.*

It appears to me that, although Parliament has been recently prorogued, and according to the usual flow it will not meet again till February, there is an urgent necessity for an autumn session. The barbarities, the outrages, the cruelties which prevail in the provinces of Turkey, not in one, but in several, in Bulgaria, Servia, &c., seem to me to demand an alliance of several Powers of Europe—viz. of Germany, Austria, Russia, Prussia, England, France, to combine in one firm and resolute treaty against Turkish tyranny in Europe. I care not whether Russians, Austrians, Germans, or Italians succeed them. England will only require to have the passage into the Black Sea free to all ships of war and of commerce—the passage to Odessa and Varna open.—*Earl Russell, T. Aug. 24th.*¹

It is necessary to stop the atrocities of Turkey by a strong hand, and if the Minister of Foreign Affairs does not do this Parliament must interfere. It is for this reason that I consider an autumnal session of Parliament to be necessary.—*Earl Russell, in T. Sept. 4th.*

Earl Russell declines an invitation to be present at a workmen's meeting arranged for Oct. 9th, feeling quite unequal to the noise and tumult. He adds: "It is well known that the Emperor of Russia opposes civil and religious liberty. I cannot wish to see Russia at the head of the government of Turkey, nor will I do anything to promote that object. If there is to be a change in Turkey I wish to see the people of Turkey intrusted with the government of their own country."—*T. Oct. 6th.*²

[Bosnia and Bulgaria should be constituted tributary states, like Servia.]—*Mr. Forsyth, in T. Sept. 6th.*

The chief merit of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet is neither its eloquence nor its reasoning, admirable as they are, but the directness with which attention is fixed upon the only measure which furnishes a solution of the question—the grant of self-government to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, subject to a tribute to Constantinople. . . . As a preferable alternative to the stupid, ferocious Turkey tyranny, these provinces would throw themselves into the arms of Russia; but give them the management of their own affairs, and they will defend their independence against all the

¹ Letter addressed to Earl Granville, a copy being sent to *Times* for publication.

² The letter of Oct. 6th, which is addressed to Mr. J. A. Giles, seems to be tinged with the "erubescence" of the "Reconciliation Period" (see *post*, chap. xiii. § 7). These communications, if not absolutely the last, were among Earl Russell's latest public political utterances. His death took place on May 28th, 1878, at the age of eighty-five.

world. Roumania has been an obstacle thrown across the path of Russia, and self-governing Bulgaria would be an additional barrier on the way to Constantinople.—*Mr. C. E. Trevelyan*, in *T. Sept.* 11th.

The country has spoken out, the Government has spoken out.¹ It remains to be seen whether we should submit to have our affairs conducted in a sense directly contrary to that which our own consciences and feelings of justice require, or whether we shall be strong enough to enforce by some means or other the necessary change which we require . . . There has been a tradition in Europe which has been the pest of Europe, and that is the thing called the balance of power.—*Mr. Lowe at Croydon*, *Sept.* 13th.²

Lord Elcho observed that if he said anything upon this question that in any way seemed to strike a discordant note in the chorus of righteous sympathy, indignation, and humanity, which was at the present time issuing from press, platform, and pulpit throughout this country, he hoped they would do him the justice to think that he was not less shocked by these atrocities than the gentlemen who wrote and spoke so strongly upon that subject. Still, while he was proud to see the grand spectacle of humanity aroused, he humbly ventured the opinion that it would be an evil day for any nation to allow its foreign policy to be dictated by the pulsations of the heart, unregulated and uncontrolled by judgment and guidance of the head. There was a want of reason in the agitation when men like Lord Shaftesbury, a near relative of the late Lord Palmerston, had said that he should be glad to see the Russians at Constantinople.—*Agricultural Dinner, Winchester*, *Sept.* 15th.

If I were free from still higher obligations, I should esteem it a privilege to address a meeting of my fellow-countrymen as to our duty towards the victims and the authors of these abominable cruelties, which have filled England with wrath and horror. But I am not free. I am bound to abstain, except in my place in Parliament, from political discussion, and if I were to speak on this subject I could not so abstain. I concur, indeed, absolutely with those who have no desire for any change of Government. I concur absolutely with those who say that it would be most unjust to blame the Government, as if they had anything to do with atrocities of which they did not know, and which they could not prevent. But I absolutely differ from those who think it unjust to blame the Government for the present attitude of England towards the authors of these atrocities. The Government for all practical purposes represents England to foreign States. Those who are satisfied with the attitude of England are quite right not to blame the Government. But I am profoundly dissatisfied, nay, more, I am ashamed of it; and the two recent speeches of Lord Derby give me no reason to believe that the Government is either

¹ This refers to Lord Derby's speech of *Sept.* 11th. See *post*, § 5. For subsequent letters from Mr. Lowe on this point, see *post*, chap. xiii.

² See *ante*, "Anti-Turkism," § D, p. 88, for part of the same speech.

the one or the other, nor any ground for thinking that they are at all inclined to change the attitude of the country. . . . I could not speak without giving the reason for my shame and dissatisfaction, nor without pointing out, with such energy as I can command, who I think are responsible for them. I should feel that I was merely wasting time at a meeting where I could not do this; and a public meeting is not the place for a Judge to do it. There are cases in which it may be my duty, at any risk of personal misconstruction, to try, however feebly, to arouse my countrymen to a sense of right. But they are aroused already. Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe have said already, with immeasurably greater power and authority, all that I wish to say; and I therefore feel bound to decline an invitation, for the kindness and courtesy of which I beg of you to convey my grateful acknowledgments to the managing committee.—*Lord Coleridge, T. Sept. 22nd.*¹

Mr Sergeant Simon, M.P., said they were often asked what was the use of these meetings. (*A Voice*: "Party purposes." Loud cheers and hisses.) He denied the imputation. Mr. Gladstone had distinctly set forth the duty both of the nation and the Opposition. It was also said that these meetings embarrassed the action of the Government. They would not do so if the views of the Government were in accord with the national feeling. (Cheers.) The *Rev. Dr. Allon* moved a resolution calling for the autonomy of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. He pointed out how injuriously the theocratic aspect of the Turkish Government affected the nation. *Mr. W. McCullagh Torrens, M.P.*, in supporting the motion, spoke of the process by which independence was won for Switzerland and the Netherlands. Lord Derby and Count Andrassy might bring about something of the same sort in the present instance. (Applause.) Every great Government in Europe, with one exception, was constitutional, and what he said was that England should co-operate with these free Governments—with France, Austria, Prussia, with Italy, with Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, and every other self-governed country. (*A Voice*: Why not Russia?) No; for Russia has no representative Government. He said what Byron, who breathed his last as a volunteer in the service of Greece, said when the Greeks were advised to put themselves under the protection of the Czar, and trust to his mercy. "How should the autocrat of bondage be The king of slaves and set the nations free?" (Loud applause.) If Russia co-operated with England let England take such aid: but it should never be said that free England was afraid or unable to do what Servia and Bulgaria might be obliged to ask Russia to do for them. (Hear, hear.) Now for the remedy. The Christian States of Turkey asked for equal laws and pure tribunals, for the fair assessment and gathering of the taxes, for the discontinuance of their treatment as an inferior race, and for the right to bear arms. (Applause.) In conclusion, he asked the meeting to pronounce

¹ Letter to the Committee of the Exeter meeting.

clearly what they desired should be done by their representatives in Westminster—that was, if they desired Parliament to be called together, and upon that they should speak distinctly. (Applause.) The proposition was agreed to, with the following addendum, which was accepted on the motion of *Mr. Stonelake*: “This meeting is of opinion that Parliament should be called together for an autumnal session.”—*Meeting at Finsbury, reported D. T. Sept. 27th.*

Lord Justice James submits “suggestions of a detailed practicable scheme for effecting the object we all have in view.” He proposes the institution of a Governor General with a mixed council, with powers like those of the Governor General in Council in India, and of supreme Courts of Justice, composed in equal numbers of Mussulmans and Christians, highly paid, and irremovable, who should go circuit, for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. The first nominations to be made after communication with (that is, really, *by*) the six Powers. Moreover, the great Powers should appoint consular agents, who should be entitled to make official representations of any official wrongs to the Provincials.—*Letter in T. Oct 3rd.*

We may perhaps include among the utterances of this time, a letter from *Mr. Carlyle*¹ which appeared at the end of November.

To undertake a war against Russia on behalf of the Turk, it is evident to me would be nothing short of insanity; and has become, we may fondly hope, impossible for any Minister, or Prime Minister, that exists among us. . . . It seems to me that something very different from war on his behalf is what the Turk now pressingly needs from England and from all the world—namely, to be peremptorily informed that we can stand no more of his attempts to govern in Europe, and that he must *quàm primùm* turn his face to the eastward, for ever quit this side of the Hellespont, and give up his arrogant ideas of governing anybody but himself. Such immediate and summary expulsion of the Turk from Europe may appear to many a too drastic remedy; but to my mind it is the only one of any real validity under the circumstances. . . . The only clear advice I have to give is, as I have stated, that the unspeakable Turk should be immediately struck out of the question, and the country left to honest European guidance; delaying which can be profitable or agreeable only to gamblers on the Stock Exchange, but distressing and unprofitable to all other men.—*Carlyle's letter in D. N. Nov. 28th.*

A “counter-blast” shortly appeared in *Mr. Swinburne's* “Note of an English Republican on the Muscovite Crusade.”

It contains a great deal of noble thought, nobly expressed in English which has living movement in its march, and the tone of a trumpet in its ring. It errs in nothing except in its aim and application.—*D. N. Dec. 15th.*

¹ Part of which has been already quoted, *ante*, p. 164.

Of especial importance among the utterances of this time were a speech from Lord Hartington, at the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield, and a letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which appeared within a day or two of each other. The one was important as being the first public utterance from the official leader of the Opposition, since Parliament had separated; the other as containing the suggestion of a solution which, as we shall see, was endorsed by Mr. Gladstone, as containing the essential elements of the Emancipation Policy.

Lord George Hamilton in responding to the toast of "Her Majesty's Ministers," said there was no doubt that the most fearful atrocities had taken place; but he protested against such resolutions as one which condemned the Government "for the support it had given to the unholy attempt to exterminate the Christians." He was expressing the deliberate opinion of every member of the Government when he indignantly repudiated these charges. *Lord Hartington* did not intend to discuss the responsibility or otherwise of the Government for the terrible events which had occurred. His noble friend spoke as if the Government were charged with *wilful complicity*. He thought no member of any party had done that. Negligence and want of policy they had been accused of, but that was all. He regretted that Parliament had broken up before this question of ministerial responsibility could be settled. An agitation remarkably intense, spontaneous, and unconnected with party politics had meanwhile sprung up. There had been imputations on both sides. "I think it will be a serious question of consideration for the Government, if the matter has not been under their consideration already, whether this state of things shall not be put an end to by an early session of Parliament." The great issues depending in the East, would not be decided by the war going on in Servia. They would have to be decided by the great Powers of Europe. The time was past for a system of mere objections to foreign proposals, unless we had something better to suggest. The state of things in the East had lately become intolerable from its perpetual menace of war, and through recent events intolerable to us, and our own honour. They had heard lately a good deal about the contrast between sentiment and policy, and about the interests of England. Within limits, he agreed to such a distinction; but sentiments of some kind no statesman might ignore when they were those of the nation, "whose power he governs, and without whom he is nothing." Our interests had doubtless been best consulted for a long period by maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire; in striking out a new policy, there was doubtless danger and difficulty, "but the task of a statesman is to overcome difficulties, and the task of patriotism is to confront danger." . . . "What I cannot believe is that the safety, the interests, and the honour of England are indissolubly bound up with the maintenance and integrity of a

system of Government so weak or so wicked as that which exists in Turkey has been by recent events proved to be." *Mr. Roebuck* spoke of the clamour which had been raised about the conduct of the Government with reference to the Turkish atrocities as disgraceful. He admired the feeling of the people of England about the atrocities, but the agitation now going on might lead to a general war.—*Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield, Sept. 7th.*

The mediation solicited by Serbia should be undertaken with views of conclusive meaning, and every appliance required to secure an adequate result. [The Andrassy Note failed because it gave no security that the misgovernment in the provinces would be corrected. It is valuable, however, as showing that the guaranteeing Powers are agreed in tracing the evils to misgovernment. There is need of a] pressure from without superior to the resistance from within. [It is true the attack upon Turkey by Serbia and Montenegro] was a measure unauthorised by the practice of civilised nations [but there are several mitigating considerations.] There is much reason to think that a chain of autonomous States, though still perhaps tributary to the Sultan, might be extended from the Black Sea to the Adriatic with advantage to that potentate himself. But at all events, the very idea of reinstating any amount of Turkish misgovernment in places once cleared of it is simply revolting. [Whatever terms may be the result of mediation, they must be enforced by something more than mere Turkish authority.] A mixed commission of members appointed by the several parties, might be intrusted with the duty of superintending the execution of reforms and reporting to their respective Governments. [The convention might be made subject to extinction, or renewal after twelve or fifteen years. The sum of the suggested proposals is to close the war by a peace which would leave the Turks at Constantinople under terms with the great Powers of Christendom, terms confirming the autonomy of the tributary principalities, extending reforms to the empire at large, and establishing securities for the faithful execution of the settlement.] I must conclude with a word of regret that the confidence which to all appearances we are now placing in the other parties to our mediation was not employed from the beginning to put England in her right position at their side.—*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in T. Sept. 9th.*¹

The earlier meetings were convened hastily and spontaneously. It was the time of year when most prominent politicians were

¹ Lord Stratford de Redcliffe returns to the subject (*T.* Oct. 3rd) communicating a memorandum of his suggestions for the pacification of the insurgent provinces and the realisation of reforms. He specifies thirteen heads of general reform. Six may be classed as new. These comprise political equality of all classes, gradual abolition of slavery, abolition of tax-farming (with proposals of other financial measures), and a mixed police. The others, he says, are more or less adopted already, though not effectively. These comprise abolition of punishment except by sentence of law, total abolition of torture, evidence of witnesses to be taken on oath irrespectively of creed, and perfect freedom as to religious profession and worship. Otherwise the letter is substantially to the same effect as that of Sept. 9th.

taking their holiday. Thus the reading of letters from public men was a general feature in the earlier meetings. It was not the great party chiefs, it was the leaders of local opinion who first moved. At every centre of English political life, at a thousand points scattered up and down the counties, the determination which had at last become clear for the "violet" policy unconcertedly found voice at the same moment.

We hear indeed of one or two organisations like the "Bulgarian Committee" for collecting petitions.¹ There was also in existence a committee into which some Members of Parliament had formed themselves at the end of the session for watching the progress of the Eastern Question. But apparently this had fallen into abeyance, like Parliament itself, by the scattering of its members at the prorogation. We do not hear much about it till November, when we find it developing into a more general representative and quasi-permanent organisation of Public Opinion.² But there appears to have been nothing of the kind in August and September. The public press was the only means of co-ordinating the expression of the general feeling.

Thus the correspondence columns, especially those of the *Daily News*, served the function of affording counsel to those who were spontaneously organising the agitation. Suggestions substantially the same, appeared simultaneously from independent sources.

The danger now is, lest the excited feeling of the country should die away without producing any effect upon events. What is wanted is not merely a sustained tempest of righteous passion, but a clearly defined policy to be enforced by every means at our command upon the English Government. If all public meetings that are held on the subject of the Bulgarian atrocities could pass resolutions substantially identical, the result would represent a body of opinion too powerful to be ignored by any Minister. May I then suggest—subject, of course, to correction from those who know better—some points which should be especially insisted on? viz. :—(1.) Autonomy for the Provinces—especially Bulgaria. (2.) Revision of the Treaties in the interests of the Christian populations. (3.) Compensation to the sufferers, and punishment of the culprits. (4.) If necessary to enforce these terms, the replacing of Sir Henry Elliot by a less pronounced Turkish sympathiser, and the sending of the fleet to Constantinople.—*Canon Liddon* in *D. N.* Sept. 2nd.³

¹ See *D. N.* Sept. 20th and 22nd.

² The Eastern Question Association. See *post*, chap. xiv.

³ Letter headed "What to Insist On."

I had written down to this paragraph when your paper of to-day came, and in it the letter of Dr. Liddon, setting forth views which are much the same as those which I have been trying to set forth.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman*, in *D. N.* Sept. 5th.¹

That the resolutions passed at public meetings were often based on suggestions such as these, only shows that the suggestions gave adequate expression to the general sense.

Public Opinion was no longer in a docile mood. It had felt its way to a conclusion, and required that the means for giving effect to it should be formulated in strong and unmistakable words. In many cases where the resolutions prepared by the conveners of the meetings did not express the "violet" policy in sufficiently clear terms, or did not sufficiently express the dissatisfaction which the attitude of the Government had aroused, amendments or additions were proposed and insisted on.

The recall of Sir Henry Elliot has again and again been demanded as an addition to the pre-arranged resolutions submitted at these gatherings.—*T.* Sept. 7th.

It is clear that the impulse of this great movement originated in the ardent desire now felt by vast numbers of people to see the international authority of England exercised in one direction rather than in another, and that it was not communicated from any authoritative quarter. We may say in short that the impulse came from below, not from above.

§ 2. *Emancipation Policy comes to the Front.*

As the agitation goes on, we trace an increasing tendency to recognise that there is a problem to be solved beyond the mere restoration of order, and that England might fittingly take a leading part in bringing about a happy solution. Moreover Public Opinion seems to have come to something like a general consensus as to the lines on which the solution should proceed. It is significant to watch how the *Times* turning with the stream slowly and almost reluctantly comes to the conclusion that Bulgaria is part of the problem, and that the risks must be run of dealing

¹ Letter headed "Points for Public Meetings." See *post*, § 2. A postscript to this letter is significant as showing the way in which people had been roused to undertake something like a propaganda, and to seize on some of Mr. Freeman's communications as valuable for their purpose. The postscript begins:—"Some good friends of the cause have reprinted some of my former letters. As I do not know who they are, I can speak to them only through your means."

with it according to the same considerations which applied to Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Why should we hesitate to declare that all our influence must be used to promote a restoration of peace? Agree, and agree quickly, with Serbia and Montenegro is the advice that must be given with authority to the Porte by the Power that has above all others the right to influence its decisions. A pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina is part of the work of peace. The only firm settlement of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has been suggested is that of their conversion into tributary Provinces. The suggestion that Bosnia and Herzegovina might be administered by an Austrian Prince has been received with a degree of unanimity which at least attests its practical character.—*T. Aug. 29th.*

It seems a strange thing to talk about peace as impending—to apply to that great blessing the language one uses of some great danger. But let us consider the meaning of that peace with which we are threatened and we shall surely see that it is no peace at all, or a horrible peace, “full of wrongs and shames,” and worse than any war. Serbia is to make peace with Turkey on the footing, we are told, that the state of things previous to the war be maintained Surely, it is not too late for England still to take part in that deliverance of the oppressed which will infallibly be effected without her, and, if without her, to her detriment and disgrace. Perhaps our politicians care little for the latter; but the risk to us of an exclusive Russian influence, deservedly earned by an exclusively Russian intervention, can be appreciated by the coldest-hearted of statesmen; while cordial joint action with our old ally would secure us a friendship which we may one day want, besides commanding, as a minor consideration, the restored approval of all brave and good men.—*Prof. E. C. Clark, in T. Sept. 2nd.*

Let me give a warning against any meeting committing itself to the phantom of “neutrality.” The days for neutrality are passed.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman, in D. N. Sept. 5th.*¹

Those who assert most strongly this necessity of upholding the authority of the Porte speak of it as “the” policy of England, and refer to it as a tradition of the highest wisdom of the last generation. No statement can be historically more untrue. Wise men do not cripple their minds with phrases, and Lord Palmerston’s intellect was too free and active to allow him to suppose that the settlement of the Ottoman Empire following the close of the Crimean War was to be perpetual. All that is permanent in the English policy in the East may be summed up in the sentence that we desire to reduce to a *minimum* the disturbance involved in each inevitable change. There is no such thing as “the” English policy in the East, written out in

¹ “Points for Public Meetings,” see *ante*, p. 401.

detail like the book of the Law, and sealed up in some Ark of the Covenant, open to none but high priests of politics. Happily for us, this notion of maintaining all things unchanged in South-Eastern Europe in the interest of England has been disproved by events. It is, indeed, clear enough that Englishmen would run the risk of a change rather than be responsible for keeping everything as it is; but they may be re-assured. What have been deprecated as necessary evils have proved blessings. Many Englishmen looked askance when Wallachia and Moldavia were erected into the semi-independent Principality of Roumania. They thought it was the first step to the absorption of these provinces into the Russian Empire; but Roumania has shown in this contest all the jealousies of an independent State, and has proved a formidable wedge between Russia and Bulgaria. . . . Calling intermediate States into existence along the Danube has preserved the equilibrium of the European system far better than any forced maintenance of the *status quo*; it has been the safeguard against Russian preponderance as well as the safety-valve of forces that could not be forever repressed. We can have no shadow of interest in restraining the development of this process. . . . If these truths had been recognised last year, we might have prevented that terrible chapter of horrors which must now remain for ever a part of Turkish history. The trouble then extended no further than Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . But now it is in the highest degree doubtful whether any settlement is possible that shall not extend to Bulgaria also. The trouble has grown. The letters of Lord Russell and the Bishop of Manchester bear witness to the feeling of the nation. We have thus had fastened upon us a tremendous problem—the extension of self-government to Bulgaria—because there was too much sluggishness of mind in high quarters to do the right thing at the right moment. . . . [If *Lord Derby*] would know shortly what Englishmen want, it is to cease from vain repetition of the language of tradition, and to come to an agreement with the Emperor of Russia on terms of peace which the two Powers can press with irresistible authority on the Sultan and his Ministers.—*T.* Sept. 5th.

It is hard to maintain any position in English politics which cannot be defended on the hustings. . . . The policy which was pursued by the present Government in the East—it has, we believe, been much modified of late, not to say abandoned—cannot be defended on the hustings. A man here and there sitting in his library may evolve many ingenious arguments in its favour, to the possible satisfaction of himself, but there is not a town in England where he could address a public meeting in the same sense without being received with a chilling silence rapidly passing into loud expressions of dissatisfaction and dissent. We do not adduce this fact as a conclusive proof that the policy of sacrificing the subject races of Turkey to the maintenance of the unrestrained authority of the Porte is bad and mischievous. Popular feeling has often erred in judgment, and may err again. But it is a fact

that no Government can neglect, and least of all the present Ministry.—*T. Sept. 6th.*

What, then, are we to do who believe that remonstrances can here be of no avail without intervention? At present our Government is clearly looking to the country for a policy. In a short time—at the very earliest date by which Parliament could be assembled—all will be over. If we are to have any effective action, those who hold definite views must express them strongly now. They must say whether they will support Ministers in proceeding, not by way of feeble remonstrance with Turkey, but by way of strong action with Russia; if so, whether they are ready to face the contingency, which, though not likely, is, of course, possible, of a European war; whether they have counted the cost of such a war, and are willing to pay their individual share of the reckoning. Tried by such a test, much inflated eloquence will collapse and much fiery zeal will grow cold. But, unless I am much mistaken, a large remnant will stand the trial, and will bear the extra income tax, and the losses of trade, and even the sacrifice of lives worth more than any money, rather than desert the “good old cause” of freedom and humanity. Definite expressions, then, of popular feeling are what is now wanted. With such support any Ministry will find it expedient to act; without it, any Ministry may well shrink from the awful responsibilities involved. It is not a question of replacing Lord Beaconsfield by Mr. Gladstone, but of enabling the one or the other to join in vindicating the honour of England and avenging the wrongs of Christendom.—*Prof. E. C. Clark, in T. Sept. 8th.*

It has undoubtedly come to be true that Englishmen are now of one mind in resenting the barbarities of the Turks in Bulgaria; and it seems to be also true that they are agreed in the conclusion that Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria must, in some fashion or other, be withdrawn from the administrative control of Turkey. The voices that were heard in opposition to this policy have ceased to argue against it, and the question which now remains open and undecided refers to the means for bringing about the end we unite in desiring.—*T. Sept. 11.*

Mr. Gladstone maintains that if the Turk were allowed to retain the titular sovereignty of Bulgaria and the other Christian provinces, and receive an annual tribute, but be excluded for ever from their administration, he might congratulate himself upon having made a very good arrangement. We advocated this plan of settlement a year ago, and still believe that this is the only practical and permanent solution of the question now troubling Europe.—*D. N. Sept. 11th.*

Our leaders are improving, the Marquis of Hartington's speech at the Sheffield Feast was a very great step in advance, and shows that he can learn from Mr. Gladstone to sympathise with the feelings, and carry out the resolve of the nation, even though in great crises he has not the same power to guide and to anticipate

them. . . . [Quoting his peroration¹].—After that the Liberal party at least may “breathe freely,” for they have a pledge that their leader will lead them where they know that they ought to go; nor is it easy to conceive that Lord Hartington can have so gravely pronounced himself on the weightiest subject of the day without previous consultation with Lord Granville. Let us hope that in the Conservative camp, too, there will be principle enough and foresight enough to see that without cutting through the strands of the policy which keeps the Conservative Government close-tied to the dead-weight of Turkish crime, there will be no rescuing the Administration from that speedy fate which overtakes swimmers who try to swim in deep waters with stones about their necks.—*Spec.* Sept. 9th.

The election to fill the seat for the county of Buckingham, vacated by the Premier's peerage, took place on Sept. 21st. The result was expected with considerable interest. The Liberal candidate, Mr. Carington, pronounced for the “violet” policy, while the sympathies of Mr. Fremantle, the Conservative, inclined to the “red.”²

The Conservatives have, as was fully expected, succeeded in retaining the seat for Buckinghamshire so long held by Mr. Disraeli; but they have done so after a contest which has proved unexpectedly close, and it is very doubtful how far their success can deserve to be called a victory. [This] cannot but indicate the spread in the constituency of some distrust of the Government. The result, thus regarded, is probably a very fair illustration of the prevalent feeling in the country. That feeling is not one of decisive condemnation of the Government, for among moderate men great allowance is everywhere made for their difficulties. But it is one of uneasiness and anxiety, which might easily be aggravated into decided distrust. . . . Mr. Disraeli has always exhibited a respectful appreciation of the constitutionally expressed opinion of the constituencies, and he is not likely to ignore this intimation of incipient defection. He is not, of course, the man to make a sudden change in his course merely to regain the popular vote. But it is simply, so to speak, a matter of business for a statesman that he should recognise the popular forces with which he has to deal. . . . Public opinion is in England the instrument and the only trustworthy instrument, which a Prime Minister and a Secretary for Foreign Affairs have at their disposal; and if that opinion has decidedly expressed itself in favour of one course or against another, it is a matter of simple necessity that the foreign policy of the country should be modified accordingly.

¹ *Ante*, p. 398.

² The following were the results of the polling:—Hon. T. F. Freemantle, 2,725; Hon. Rupert Carington, 2,539—majority, 186. The *Times* (Sept. 23rd) computed that, as compared with the general election, 177 voters had deserted the Conservative side, while about 600 others, who did not then come forward, supported Mr. Carington.

Now the Buckinghamshire election is the last among many evidences that upon one most important point a change of opinion of this kind has passed over the country.—*T.* Sept. 23rd.

The *Daily Telegraph* characteristically attributed the Liberal defeat to just the circumstance which was generally regarded as accounting for the narrowness of the Conservative victory.

It is possible, indeed, that the remarkable result of a triumph for the Liberal cause might even have been attained, if greater reliance had been reposed upon the principles of reform in legislation, and the signal personal advantages of the candidate had not been compromised by what seemed to many electors in Bucks an unpatriotic programme.—*D. T.* Sept. 23rd.

Two articles purporting to be representative of the attitude of English working men belong to this epoch.¹ We have already quoted from one of them an illustration of one of the factors of anti-Turkism.² This shows a great advance in the "violet" direction since the Willis's Rooms meeting in July, when Mr. Howell stood up as the spokesman of Isolation, demanding neutrality and non-intervention on the one side and the other.³ The writer, Mr. Howell, says the working men are for making Turkey do right to the Christians, though they know full well that in the event of war they would be the first and greatest sufferers. They would still cry out "Let us do right though the heavens may fall." Not that they want war. They detest it. But they believe that if the English Government were to "put its foot down," the other Powers would act in concert with it.

The writer of the other article, Mr. Potter, says on the other hand:

The working men, even the most liberal among them, will refuse to make these Bulgarian atrocities a question between the Ministerial *Ins* and the Opposition *Outs*. If the Liberal party is to be reconstituted, and brought into effective discipline, other and very different questions will have to be chosen as a programme for a Liberal party. And the leaders of that party, as well as numbers of their following, will have to stand before the country for the purpose of carrying questions which the working men thoroughly understand and which have a direct bearing on their lives, and the interests of their lives.⁴—*Contemp. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

¹ *Contemp. Rev.* Oct. 1876.

² *Ante*, p. 85.

³ *Ante*, p. 361.

⁴ But this article of Mr. Potter's does not accord with the sentiments of the Address from the Trades Unions to Lord Derby, which Mr. Potter read on Sept. 11th (*post*, § 5). Mr. Howell, in his article, attributes that Address to "The Working-class Leaders," and says it was finally agreed to before Mr. Gladstone had spoken at Blackheath. He does not say whether it was so before the pamphlet had appeared.

If we compare the tone of the agitation in September with the tone of the Willis's Rooms meeting in July, we may note that the public mind had gone through something like a process of "making up" in the interim. It is clear that in September any possibility that the Government should actively support Turkey was thought to be out of the question. There is no longer any expression of satisfaction in mere neutrality. The demand that England should take an active part in bringing about a happy issue has grown strong, and crystallised into a call for a perfectly definite policy. The demand was that the provinces in question should be emancipated from the Turkish yoke. Exactly how this was to be effected, whether by autonomy, or by reducing the rule of the Turks to a mere name by controlling their administration of these provinces by means of an international commission, was a question of detail and of degree. There might indeed be a preference for the larger and more ungrudging measure, but, about this, compromise might be admitted, if the substantial end could thus more easily be obtained. To give Bosnia, Bulgaria and Herzegovina the position of Servia or Roumania was the solution to which most seemed to incline; but it was generally recognised as sufficient that the Turkish Power should be excluded from interference with the life and personal safety and property of the inhabitants.

Thus the desideratum was often expressed by the phrase "practical independence," leaving the question how it was to be worked out an open one.

We must make our diplomatists understand that any peace will be a sham peace which does not provide for the practical independence of Turkish Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Servia, and Bulgaria. . . . I say the practical independence of those lands, because if it merely comes to a question of tribute or some other purely outward acknowledgment of Turkish supremacy, I should not be disposed to stand out on that point only. . . . But it must be made plain that, if the tributary relation is to go on, it must be in a shape which will not allow any agent of the Turk, military or civil, to exercise authority of any kind within the delivered lands.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman, in D. N. Sept. 5th.*¹

We may for the present accept, as the very least that we can accept, if nothing better is to be had, the erection of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria into tributary states like Servia and Roumania. This is my *minimum*. I cannot take less; I should like to get more.—*Mr. E. A. Freeman, in D. N. Sept. 15th.*

¹ "Points for Public Meetings," *ante*, p. 401.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe leans—as I gather from his letter—to the appointment of a foreign commission, representing the Powers of Europe, and appointed to exercise a conclusive control over all Turkish operations and proceedings in those provinces. (“No, no,”) Well, my respect for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe’s authority is such that I am ready to say that, if such a measure could be adopted as we did adopt in Syria when Lord Dufferin was sent there, I should be very glad to see that. . . . I know that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has always looked to that measure without repudiating others, and that it is a very great question whether the simplest course is not that which I have presumed—for it is presumption on my part—to recommend, that all Turkish authorities should walk out of the place. . . . If it can be done by a foreign commission taking the government of these provinces virtually into their own hands, let it be so done. I myself lean to the simpler method of saying to the Turk—which I believe to be very good terms for him—“You shall receive a reasonable tribute, you shall retain your titular sovereignty, your Empire shall not be invaded; but never again, while the years roll their course, so far as it is in our power to determine, never again shall the hand of violence be raised by you, never again shall the floodgates of lust be opened by you, never again shall the dire refinements of cruelty be devised by you for the sake of making mankind miserable in Bulgaria.”—*Mr. Gladstone at Blackheath, Sept. 9th.*

§ 3. *Mr. Gladstone comes to the Front.*

(*First Pamphlet and Blackheath Speech.*)

The climax of the Agitation is marked by the appearance of Mr. Gladstone’s first pamphlet,¹ and by the speech which he delivered at a great open-air meeting, at Blackheath.² These, together, may be regarded as constituting one event; but it must be noticed that it was in the short interval between them that Lord Hartington spoke at Sheffield and that the letter of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe appeared in the *Times*. The pamphlet was published on Sept. 6th. The sale was enormous.

The speech was delivered on Saturday afternoon, Sept. 9th. The pamphlet is the more rhetorical utterance of the two, and the

¹ “Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East,” *ante*, p. 81.

² Mr. Gladstone’s first utterance on the subject after the recess appears to be contained in a letter read at a meeting at Hackney (*T.* Aug. 30th). In this letter he says the Premier treated the subject in so inadequate and unsatisfactory a manner that it is well the people should assist the Government to judge whether it is right to give opportunities for the repetition of the recent outrages by the re-establishment of the *status quo*.

delivery of the speech was made an occasion for softening down or explaining some of the stronger and more epigrammatic utterances of the pamphlet. The supposed change, which at most amounted to a slight difference in tone, was remarked on by the "red" newspapers, with expressions of satisfaction.

The *Pall Mall Gazette* says the speech must have been read with relief by every moderate-minded man.—(Sept. 11th.)

One important new point, it is true, the speech contained. Mr. Gladstone who, in the pamphlet, had formulated the particular solution he advocated, namely, total withdrawal of all Turkish administration from the provinces, in his speech, as we have just seen,¹ expressed himself willing, in deference to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's great authority, to adopt the plan of vesting the control over all Turkish officials who came into contact with the Christian populations, in a European commission, so that they might actually be amenable to it, instead of to the Porte, although the titular sovereignty of the Sultan might remain.

Perhaps there could not be found a more striking example of the function of the orator, defined as "the giving back in flood what he receives in vapour," than is afforded by the Blackheath meeting. It was one which pre-eminently combined in itself the characteristics of the earlier and strictly *agitation* meetings, and of those later ones which rather assumed the character of "Parliament out of Session." It was at once the expression of an enormous body of Public Opinion, and it made plain the position of Mr. Gladstone.

This was a matter on which people up to this time had not been clear. The independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire was the Shibboleth of traditional official philo-Turkism; and this Shibboleth Mr. Gladstone had seemed to pronounce.² To be sure, he had not framed to pronounce it aright; but the public ear had not been fine enough to catch the distinction.³

The *Spectator*, already convinced of the Premier's invincible philo-Turkism, had written somewhat dubiously of Mr. Gladstone.

There is hope, we believe, that Mr. Gladstone will perform his clear duty at this crisis, and lend his powerful aid to solidify the decision of Englishmen that Lord Beaconsfield shall go, and that

¹ *Ante*, p. 408.

² *Ante*, p. 367.

³ In the pamphlet, p. 55, he alludes to the incident in the debate of July 31st, and makes the distinction clear between the "*status quo*" and the "territorial integrity."—*Ante*, p. 103.

Turkey shall suffer the only retribution possible for her conduct in Bulgaria by losing the direct government of the province.—*Spec. Sept. 2nd.*

A week later Mr. Gladstone was unhesitatingly accepted as the one statesman who could be trusted to point out what was, and what was not, a practicable policy for giving effect to the “violet” notions.

The first and larger portion of the pamphlet is mainly occupied by a historical retrospect of the recent action of the English Government in the Eastern Question. As to this, Mr. Gladstone draws the conclusion that:—

The House of Commons has in the main been ousted from that legitimate share of influence which I may call its jurisdiction in the case.¹

But the chief interest of the work centred in the expositions of the policy Mr. Gladstone advocated, and in his anticipations of the means by which the adoption of it, as the policy of the English Government, was to be brought about.

The nation will have to speak through its Government; but we now see clearly that it must first teach its Government, almost as it would teach a lisping child, what to say.² . . .

In my hope and my opinion, when once the old illusions as to British sentiment are dispelled, and Lord Derby is set free, with his clear, impartial mind and unostentatious character, to shape the course of the Administration, he will both faithfully and firmly give effect to the wishes of the country.³ . . .

[The latest present indication of British policy is the re-establishment of the *status quo*:—that is, of the same forms and opportunities, which again mean, on the first occasion the same abuses and crimes.] This purpose of the Government, I feel convinced, is not irrevocable. But it will only be revoked if we may take experience for our guide under the distinct and intelligible actions of public opinion. No man will so well understand as the Prime Minister what is the force and weight of that opinion, and at what stage in the development of a national movement its expression should no longer be resisted.⁴ . . .

It would not be practicable, even if it were honourable, to disguise the real character of what we want from the Government. It is a change of attitude and policy, nothing less.⁵ . . .

But this change is dependent on an emphatic expression of the national sentiment which is but beginning to be heard. It has grown from a whisper to a sound; it will grow from a sound to a peal.⁶ . . .

¹ *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 56.

² *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 57.

³ *Ibid.* p. 48.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 58.

I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and to insist that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria.¹

A tremendous denunciation of the Turks chimed well with the climax of anti-Turkish feeling.²

The remedy for which Mr. Gladstone called, both in the pamphlet and the speech, was the exclusion of the "administrative action" of the Ottoman Government from Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and above all Bulgaria.

This was expanded in a celebrated rhetorical passage:—

Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves: their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.³

The expressions of this passage, as well as his denunciation of the whole Turkish race, were much criticised. They carried to some minds suggestions of violence and spoliation as attaching to the Emancipation policy.

The *Times* asks:—Whither are the Turks to carry themselves? As for Mr. Gladstone's tremendous anathemas, and his indictment of the whole of Turkish rule, from the beginning to the end, in Asia no less than in Europe, was it prudent to frame such stupendous premisses for the justification of a course which can be defended on simpler grounds? It may be of service to open our eyes to the full nature of the Eastern Question. That question is not only whether the Turks shall cease to govern, but who shall govern, or maintain any sort of order, in the East in their stead. As a matter of justice, it must be acknowledged that the Turks, bad as they may be, have governed in the East for four centuries, because no other race had the cohesion, the unity, and the force requisite for national organisation.—(Sept. 8th.)

¹ *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 61.

² See illustrations of "anti-Turkism," *ante*, p. 81. This passage contrasts somewhat with the contention of Mr. Gladstone in the debate of July 31st, that Turkish promises were unfulfilled more by reason of impotence than iniquity (*ante*, p. 367). See also pamphlet (p. 61), "Nearly the whole mischief has lain in the wretched laws, and the agents at once violent and corrupt of a distant central Power, which (having none others) lets these agents loose upon its territory."

³ *Bulgarian Horrors*, pp. 61, 62.

Mr. Gladstone immediately wrote to repudiate the misconception to which his rhetorical description of the Emancipation policy laid itself open.

With reference to the second article in the *Times* of to-day which criticises in so wise a spirit a pamphlet which I have published, I hope it was understood by you, and will be understood by the public, that my desire that the "Turks" should "carry off themselves" from Bulgaria is strictly limited to military and official Turks; as I have shown in the lines following immediately by enumerating . . . titles indicating employment by the Government. The civil rights and the religious freedom of Mahometans have in my eyes precisely the same title to respect as those of Christians.—*Mr. Gladstone*, in *T.* Sept. 9th.

While Mr. Gladstone did not insist on any particular solution, so that the essence of emancipation was preserved, that is, so that Turkish sovereignty over the Provincials should be effectually curtailed, that which he did insist on was, that the recurrence of such atrocities as had taken place should be prevented.

If I found that that which was mild would not be effectual, and that which was effectual could not be mild, my choice would not be long in making. I must take the effectual, and I must put aside the mild. Nevertheless, I do not despair of measures which I call mild, and which may, I trust, be effectual.¹

[He alludes to the danger of a "wholesale scramble" if the principle of the territorial integrity should be prematurely abandoned.] But even that crisis, I for one would not agree to avert, or to postpone, at the cost of leaving room for the recurrence of the Bulgarian horrors.²

The pamphlet and the Blackheath speech were inspired by the spirit of the agitation, and in them its every aspect found complete expression. "We want a leader," cried a voice in the crowd at Blackheath.³ The great body of opinion which had been feeling its way to the "violet" conclusions, now heard them enunciated and enforced with the authority of a statesman of the first rank. It recognised that it had at last got a leader, and rallied to him at once. From that day his name was a name to conjure with. The mention of it set audiences cheering vehemently. "Lord Beaconsfield is in place, but Mr. Gladstone is once more in power,"⁴ it was exultingly said, while it was still assumed that the Government could not choose but give effect to the general resolve.

¹ Blackheath speech. ² *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 33. ³ *D. T.* Sept. 11th.

⁴ London correspondent's letter, *South Wales Daily News*, Sept. 9th.

§ 4. *Traits of Public Opinion characteristic of the Period.*

a. *Self-confidence at the zenith.*—The Agitation marks the time when the self-confidence of Public Opinion touched its zenith. In the first place Public Opinion was now confident in its own capacity to discern the right policy.

Now, I think I may say this as to the general attitude which the people in this country hold with regard to foreign policy—as a rule they do not understand it. (Cheers, hisses, and laughter, and a Voice, “A thousand times better than the Government.”) I can assure you I say that not by way of reproach to the people of this country—I say it merely as a matter of fact, and because it is almost impossible that it could be otherwise. (Cheers and hisses.)—*Sir Stafford Northcote at Edinburgh, Sept. 16th.*¹

The Chancellor of the Exchequer seems to think that there is a much easier explanation of the excitement.—“As a rule,” he says, “the country does not understand questions of foreign policy.” But, if there be such a rule, it has conspicuous exceptions, and the present case is one.—*T. Sept. 18th.*

Again, Public Opinion was confident in its capacity to enforce the policy it desired on the Government even *without* the agency of Parliament. The *Times* protested, day by day, that in face of such unmistakable indications as the agitation was affording, the Government would, must, could not choose but bring itself into accord with the nation. At the same time Public Opinion believed that it was placed at a disadvantage by being deprived of its constitutional organ. Hence an autumn session was among the demands of the agitation meetings.

b. *Doctrine of British Interests and Anti-Russism at the nadir.*—The Bishop of Exeter, referring to the Foreign Secretary's reply to one of the deputations which waited on him on Sept. 11th,² asks—

Does Lord Derby seriously mean to say that if such horrors were proved to be necessary in order to keep Russia out of Constantinople, such horrors must, therefore, be allowed? Are we to give up humanity in order to preserve the “balance of power,”

“Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas?”

—*Bishop of Exeter, in T. Sept. 16th.*

The *Times* commenting on the City deputation,³ notes how Lord Derby sarcastically said that for any English Minister to speak of “English interests in the East” was to use an unpopular phrase.—(Sept. 28th.)

¹ Report in *D. N.* Sept. 18th, *post*, § 5 a.
³ *Post*, § 5 a.

² *Post*, § 5 c.

The standing hobgoblin of Russia . . . is at present out of repair and unavailable.—Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 44.

The *Marquis of Bath at Frome* Sept. 27th said, of this he was certain—if the alternative lay between leaving the provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria at the mercy of Turkey or letting Russia take them, let Russia have them, and God be with her. (Loud applause.) But the autonomy of these States would be no help to Russian aggression.¹

Although "British Interests" had ceased to be a valid plea in the estimation of Public Opinion for adopting the "red" policy, it is another question whether the enthusiasm for the "violet" policy would have stood the strain of a demand for great efforts and sacrifices. But there was no expectation that the adoption of the "violet" policy would entail any such consequences. England's diplomatic resources would, it was believed, easily suffice to bring about the desired results. Thus we find the course of acting in conjunction with other Powers often urged by the professed peace party. The belief in the practicability of the policy was, of course, one great argument in its favour. Some money might perhaps have to be spent upon the navy, and some sacrifices of cherished antipathies might indeed be involved in coming to a cordial understanding with Russia, but this would be all. Turkey, it was taken for granted, unless encouraged by England, would not be able to withstand Russia alone; far less the pressure which England in conjunction with Russia, and with the approval of Europe, might easily bring to bear upon her.

The time has come for us to emulate Russia by sharing in her good deeds, and to reserve our opposition until she shall visibly endeavour to turn them to evil account.—Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 58.

It was not interference, but non-interference, that was really required. The English Government had but to withdraw its countenance and its support from the Turks, and Russia would deal with the question, and free its kindred races from Turkish despotism.—*Marquis of Bath at Frome*.¹

A good settlement of this question depends, not upon a mere hollow truce between England and Russia, but upon their concord and their hearty and cordial co-operation. Their power is immense. The power of Russia by land of acting upon these countries as against Turkey is perfectly resistless. The power of England by sea is scarcely less important at this moment; for I ask what would be the conduct of the Turkish army if the British Admiral

¹ Report in *D. N.* Sept. 30th.

now in Besika Bay were to inform the Government in Constantinople that from that hour, until atonement had been made, until punishment had descended, until justice had been vindicated, not a man nor a ship nor a boat should cross the waters of the Bosphorus, or the cloudy Euxine or the bright Ægean, to carry aid to the Turkish troops (loud cheers)—those armies of Asiatic hordes that are now desolating Servia and are endeavouring to reproduce the horrible portraiture they have left behind in Bulgaria? To stop the passage of these waters at once cuts off the vital source of what is called Turkish power. Such is the power of those two States. I rejoice to think that the people of this country have lifted themselves up to a level far higher than that of ancient recollection of blood and strife.—*Gladstone at Blackheath*, Sept. 9th.

c. Great energy and apparent unanimity.—There can be no doubt of the extraordinary quantity of the Opinion which found its expression in the Agitation, as compared with the amount of Opinion generally evoked by political questions; or that in its intensity, not less than in its volume, it was quite exceptional.

I have lived long in public life. I have witnessed many vivid movements of the popular mind, but never one to compare with that which, during the last fortnight, has taken its commencement, and has swollen with such immense rapidity, and such legitimate rapidity, to the dimensions of a national movement. . . . It is idle to deny or to disparage the character of this movement. It is absurd to connect it with the mere action of any political party however powerful.—*Gladstone at Blackheath*, Sept. 9th.

There is no mistaking the voice of the people, and it is the voice of the people that speaks now, in every variety of expression and tone, from the energetic remonstrances of the provincial meeting to the elaborate argument of the ex-Premier.—*T. Sept. 8.*

That the conscience of the nation is awakened there can be no doubt. The spirit of slumber or indifference, whichever it was, has passed away. The people are thoroughly aroused. Meetings to express the popular feeling are being held everywhere, and everywhere the expression of feeling, with barely a dissentient voice—at Manchester the dissentients were three—is the same. "In this district," writes to me the Editor of a Northern paper under yesterday's date, "the public conscience is aroused as I have never seen it before. We are holding indignation meetings every day; and," with a wild rebound, "so intense is the popular feeling on the subject that a declaration of immediate war on the Turks would be hailed in many quarters with a burst of enthusiastic delight."—*Bishop of Manchester*, in *T. Sept. 4th.*

Within the last few days, however, we have witnessed a most astonishing phenomenon, an outburst of public feeling the like of

which no man, perhaps, ever beheld in this country. Like all things of the kind, it can be explained in a way highly honourable to the persons concerned, if it cannot be wholly justified at the bar of reason. Still there it is, and it is a tremendous force.—*Mr. Grant Duff*, in *T.* Sept. 11th.

On hearing of the terrible atrocities in Bulgaria, the mind and spirit of Englishmen were moved more than has ever happened within my recollection, which is rather a long one, or as far as I can go back into history; I know nothing like the extraordinary feeling that pervaded the country.—*Mr. Lowe at the Colston Dinner, Bristol*, *T.* Nov. 14th.

I don't know that I ever recollect any public question so absorbing the public mind as does the state of affairs in Turkey.—*Mr. Forster at Aberdeen*, *T.* Nov. 28th.

Moreover the diffusion of the "violet" opinion was so wide that the nation appeared to have arrived at something approaching practical unanimity.

The policy of inaction and non-intervention which for some time seemed popular in England has been shrivelled up.—*D.T.* Sept. 9th.

The necessity of imposing restraints of some kind or other on Turkish sovereignty over the Provincials could not, it seemed, but be admitted even among the few who were holding aloof in disapproval of the methods and objects of the Agitation.

d. Question of persistence.—A matter much questioned subsequently, was the *persistence* of the opinions of which the Agitation was the expression. When the fury of the first agitation subsided, it was assumed in some quarters that the strength of conviction with which the "violet" policy was advocated had subsided too. Some began to sneer at the Agitation as a passing folly, of which all who had taken part in it had become heartily ashamed.¹ On the other hand, there were those who remained persuaded that the "violet" notions had become a firmly-rooted belief, from which the great mass of Public Opinion never really swerved, whatever appearances of temporary fluctuation there might be. Thus, at these later times, it became a controverted matter between the opposing sections, on which side the weight of the true opinion of the nation would be found to lie, if it could be ascertained.² There were moments when the "violet" section seem to have been shaken in their belief that they had the real opinion

¹ *Ante*, p. 38.

² Compare, *inter alia*, chap. xvi. § 6.

of the country with them, by the clamour of the opposing opinions and the cessation in the manifestations of their own. But again they were reassured by the manner in which those manifestations were renewed from time to time when the occasions for them seemed to arise. Although a time came when, as we shall see, the voice of Public Opinion speaking in this sense could hardly make itself heard, yet the whole course of subsequent events seems to point to the conclusion that the sentiments of the autumn of 1876 had become the permanently preponderating opinion of the country generally.

But at all events, whether the conclusion just stated be well founded or not, one thing is quite clear and beyond controversy. The sentiments of the autumn of 1876 were no mere passing whim, but, on the contrary, they endured as a solid body of permanent opinion, henceforth to be comprised, whatever its weight may be, as a factor in English Public Opinion on the Eastern Question, so long as that Question shall remain.

§ 5. *Ministerial Utterances.*

a. Sir Stafford Northcote at Edinburgh.—With public feeling at such a high state of tension, it was natural that every word which fell from Ministers should be eagerly scanned. The Ministerial utterances of the time, as we shall see, had an important bearing on the course of Public Opinion. A speech delivered by the Premier which was unique among them must be considered by itself. Meanwhile there were some others which may be noticed.

On Sept. 16th Sir Stafford Northcote addressed a meeting of Conservative working men at Edinburgh. We have already had occasion to remark his repudiation of the notion of subordinating our policy with regard to Turkey to the supposed necessity of conciliating the Indian Mahometans,¹ and his assertion that Foreign Policy was a thing not understood of the people.² The most noteworthy passages in his speech were those in which he acknowledged the duty of England towards the Provincials, and announced that the Government was at that moment taking steps to fulfil it.³ For the rest, he laboured hard to reinstate the Government in the good opinion of his auditors. The Ministers had been acting, he said, with the most sincere desire of promoting the very ends which his hearers themselves were desirous

¹ *Ante*, p. 157.

² *Ante*, p. 413.

³ *Post*, chap. xiii. § 2.

of attaining. They had been misreported, involuntarily misrepresented.

I have heard it said by some people that the Government and some of its principal members were indifferent to the sufferings of the unfortunate Bulgarians. (Cries of "True," cheers and hisses.) Indifferent! I pass by that—I disdain to reply to such an imputation. (Loud cheers.)—*Sir Stafford Northcote*, Sept. 16th.

He disclaimed unworthy jealousy of Russia, and said though he was trying to expound a "policy of the head" he was not trying to put it above the "policy of the heart." He besought his hearers to remember what the attempt to drive the Turks out of Europe, "however agreeable to our feelings," must lead to. The meetings, he added, if they were properly turned to account, would strengthen the hands of England in the councils of Europe.

In a somewhat similar strain, Sir Stafford Northcote spoke a few days later at a great open-air Conservative demonstration of the "pic-nic" type, held in the grounds of Nostell Priory, at which a resolution was carried expressing confidence in the Government.¹

b. Lord Carnarvon at Derby.—Lord Carnarvon took the opportunity afforded by the annual speech day of the Derby School, on Oct. 2nd, to allude to the subject. He concluded his remarks after the prizes had been distributed by observing that—

Though he knew all political allusions were divorced from such a meeting, and it was not the occasion to seek to defend the Government from the somewhat pitiless storm which had fallen during the last few weeks upon their devoted heads, it *was* the occasion for any member of the Government, when he found himself face to face with a meeting of his countrymen, at such a moment as this to express, if only in half a dozen words, his utter horror and detestation of the abominations of which they had heard so much. So far from weakening the hands of the Government, he believed that if rightly understood at home and abroad, nothing could more strengthen the hands of the Foreign Secretary than the burst of indignation, which had gone through the length and breadth of the land. It was not only necessary to express horror, to seek for reparation and security, but they should beware that no word or act should put in jeopardy the general peace of Eastern Europe. The situation was aggravated by the difficulty that they had Turkey half dead, and the Christian States half alive. It was in such a condition indeed that one called to mind the words "*Ut nec mala nec remedia ferre possent.*"

¹ September 27th. Arranged by the South-west Riding Union of Conservative Associations.

In these critical, these almost supreme moments, a member of the Government might ask that patience should be accorded, and a fair and liberal construction given, not only to their words, but still more to their intentions.—*Lord Carnarvon at Derby, Oct. 2nd.*

c. Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, Sept. 11th.—A marked feature of the time is the desire to get face to face with Ministers; as if it were believed that the strength of the out-of-door feeling must surely prevail, if it could only get speech of a Minister so that perforce he must listen to it and make some reply.

On Sept. 11th, Lord Derby received two large deputations at the Foreign Office. The first, from the London Trades' Unionists conjointly with some of the gentlemen associated with the agitation movement in the City of London, presented an address which was read by Mr. George Potter. The second was from the Working Men's Peace Associations, and their address was read by Mr. Cremer.

Mr. Potter's address disclaimed the intention of questioning the past policy of the Government.

We have not come, in any wrong sense of the word, as party politicians. We are here simply as men connected by position and sympathy with that large section of the British public called working men. We profess to know something of the thoughts and feelings of this class of our countrymen, as our intercourse with them has continued over many years, and with most of us extends nearly all over the kingdom; and we may add that it has always been intimate, we might even say confidential. On all great public questions we think we may say that our thoughts and feelings fairly represent theirs, and it is therefore we have asked this interview, that their sentiments expressed by us may, on this Eastern Question, meet with some consideration from Her Majesty's Government. We hope, my Lord, you will believe us when we say that we are not here in the slightest way to suggest to you how the duties of your important office should be performed; nor would we attempt to instruct the Government as to the precise manner in which it should act on a great question of foreign policy like that which is agitating the public mind at present. You stand in closer relation to the facts than we do, and, we presume, understand them better. [The memorialists hold it to be the duty of the Government to act in this matter so as to render such hideous barbarities impossible for the future, and to make plain to Turkey the indignation of the English people.] We should have been here to urge these views had Liberals been in office, because we feel that the British nation is [compromised by even apparent toleration of a nation capable of permitting such crimes without reprobation and punishment]. We believe that your Lordship is an earnest friend of peace, and

we, as working men, believing that peace means a more active and more profitable industry, urge on your Lordship the duty of promoting peace in the East. At the same time no consideration of policy or of class interest can ever obtain from us sanction or approval, or anything but the most determined opposition to any Government or policy that equivocates with such awful wickedness as the Turks have enacted in Bulgaria and Servia. We make no offers of support to the present Government, nor do we threaten opposition in regard to anything that may be done; but on this subject our feelings are fixed. Our final word is, no complicity with crime, no official inaction, when outrage against liberty or humanity calls for suppression. Several plans have been mooted for the limitation of the power of the Turk in Europe. We do not pretend to say here which is the best or fittest for the Government to adopt. We simply urge immediate action, that shall be effectual, and that may in its effects be permanent.—*Trades' Unionists' Address.*

The Address read by Mr. Cremer commenced by recalling the fact that—

A few months ago, many of our countrymen feared there was a danger of our once more interfering in the Eastern struggle, on behalf of Turkey. Subsequent events, however, have so completely changed the current of public opinion, that the tendency becomes every day greater of our being called upon to actively oppose her. Against, however, any armed intervention on either side, we, with the experience of the past to guide us, have again and again protested. [Satisfaction is expressed, that this country had refrained from taking any active part in the struggle, together with deep regret that the Christian races of Turkey had appealed to arms instead of to the Great Powers of Europe, and a lament that the English Government had not placed on record an emphatic protest against the atrocities. The immediate object of the Address is to urge the withdrawal of the fleet from Besika Bay]; and further that in the interests of peace, the Government will use its influence in conjunction with the other Powers to secure the absolute independence of Herzegovina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Servia. . . . [In the event of Turkey refusing to concede complete independence and restitution, our Ambassador should be withdrawn from Constantinople, and Turkey informed that no further protection will be accorded her.] And we trust that no special regard for the interests of bondholders, undue jealousy of Russian influence, fear of disturbing the balance of power, or of alienating the Mahometans of India will prevent our Government from doing its duty by expressing its righteous indignation at the monstrous cruelties of the Turks, and using its best endeavours to settle the Eastern difficulty on the basis of the complete independence of the Christian races of Turkey.—*Working Men's Peace Association Address.*

Lord Derby prefaced his reply ¹ by a reference to the imputations of responsibility for, or indifference to, the atrocities, which had been, as he said, thrown out against himself and his colleagues by many writers and speakers in the excitement of the time.

I ought to apologise to you for having dwelt so long upon this subject, but if you can fancy the daily correspondence which I receive—to say nothing of the language used in public meetings—you would begin to think as I do, that there are a great many people in England under the impression that Lord Beaconsfield is the Sultan, and that I am the Grand Vizier. We have exactly the same right, and the same power of interference with regard to acts of this kind, connected with the internal administration of Turkey, that is possessed by every other great Power. I do not know whether in France, Germany, Italy, and other countries people are crying out as they do here, and denouncing their Government as being accomplices in these atrocities.

He then proceeded to deal with the question of policy a little more closely, and distinguished between two things a good deal confused, he said, in the public mind; namely, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the relations between the Porte and the various races of which that Empire is composed.

Undoubtedly many have advised us to abandon our policy of the last fifty or sixty years, to wash our hands of the whole affair, and to let the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire take care of itself. I am bound to tell you that I think that it would be as great a mistake now as at any former time. The reasons which induced us to set a value on the territorial integrity of Turkey are constant and permanent. The last word on the Eastern Question is, "Who is to rule in Constantinople?" (Hear, hear.) No great Power would be willing to see it in the hands of any other great Power, and joint occupations, which sometimes receive countenance, are, at the best, very dangerous expedients. [Any attempt to partition Turkey would probably bring about a European war.] I hold therefore, that it is as sound policy now as it was twenty years ago, to adhere to that which diplomatists call the territorial *status quo*. . . . But as to the relations of the various races within the Turkish Empire to the Government, that is an entirely different question. These relations have been repeatedly modified within the last few years, and they may be modified again. [He referred to Egypt, the Lebanon districts, Crete, Servia, and Montenegro.] Every one of these arrangements has been settled with the concurrence, more or less, of the guaranteeing Powers. . . . You will not find a word uttered

¹ The deputations were received and replied to separately, apparently at the desire of the first, and contrary to Lord Derby's suggestion. In his second speech Lord Derby added little to what he had already observed.

by me, or by any of my colleagues—nor, I believe, by those who have preceded me in office—which tended to show hostility in principle upon our part to any further extension of such constitutional changes there that circumstances admit of . . . For my own part, I never will be guilty of the quackery of putting my name to a scheme which I believe in my conscience will not work, merely because it has a plausible appearance.—*Lord Derby*, Sept. 11th.

With respect to the part England was taking, and her aims in the pending negotiations, Lord Derby used expressions which, as we shall see,¹ gave countenance to the belief that the Government had determined to embark upon a “violet” policy. But these expressions were balanced by others which were not so satisfactory.

d. The Guildhall Meeting.—A great meeting of the City of London, to which Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury were invited, was held in the Guildhall on the afternoon of September 18th. This meeting is intimately connected with the utterances of Ministers. A letter from Lord Salisbury was read at it, and the deputation to Lord Derby on September 27th grew out of it.

The proceedings point strongly to the desire to get face to face with Ministers. Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury declined the invitation to the meeting, the latter writing:—

I do not doubt that a result on which England is so earnestly bent will be attained.—*Letter read*, Sept. 27th.

The common course at meetings had been to send copies of the resolutions passed to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary; but at the Guildhall meeting it was resolved to seek another interview with Lord Derby, and to endeavour for once to get face to face with Lord Beaconsfield.

Mr. Gladstone’s name was received with loud cheers and waving of hats.

In declining the invitation

Lord Granville wrote that his presence might injure the effect of the meeting, which depended on the spontaneous character of the movement. He also wished to avoid any pretence for saying it was a party, and not a national one.

Mr. Goschen wrote:—On this occasion I do not for one moment believe that there is any antagonism between the claims of humanity and British interests, and I am truly glad that Mr. Gladstone has given a definite shape to the demands on which the country appears determined to insist.—*Letters read*, Sept. 27th.

¹ *Post*, chap. xiii. § 2.

The members of the City of London Conservative Association had been asked by circular to attend the meeting, and an amendment, presumably emanating from this source, was proposed expressing entire confidence in Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Derby.

The Lord Mayor put the amendment, and declared it lost, whereupon the great majority of the meeting, including a number of ladies, rose and gave vent to their enthusiasm in the most demonstrative manner. The building rang with cheers, hats and handkerchiefs were waved, every one vying with his neighbour apparently for who should most emphatically endorse the objects of the meeting.—*Report in D. T. Sept. 19th.*

One of the resolutions was moved by Mr. Hubbard (Conservative member for the City). He expressed his belief in the readiness of Russia to co-operate with this country, and added—

If this was to be the last act of my natural life, or of my political existence, I would not hesitate to give my voice, if necessary, in favour of intervention such as would interpose the strong arm of England between the suffering populations of the south-eastern provinces and those who subject them to the most grievous form of misrule. (Loud cheers.)—*Mr. Hubbard at Guildhall Meeting.*

[Few more enthusiastic meetings have been held in the City of London than that of which the Guildhall was the scene yesterday afternoon. The resolutions drawn up beforehand were sufficiently bold, yet they seemed too mild for the temper of the audience; while the call for a general election, which was embodied in a resolution passed at the meeting outside the Hall, marks, perhaps, the highest pitch of practical hostility to Turkey that the public indignation has yet reached. In the Guildhall the Conservative party had no lack of bold representatives or the Government of staunch friends; but the very courage of those gentlemen only served to bring to light the hostility of the audience to the Ministry as well as to the Turks. It is in the highest degree desirable that Liberals should join Conservatives in giving moral support to the Ministry, if Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Derby will heartily and frankly recognise the national character of the demand. The Government must show that it has in view the same objects as the country. The most important decision to which the City meeting came yesterday was that the Lord Mayor and an influential deputation should present the resolutions to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Lord Beaconsfield knows his countrymen too well to imagine that the meetings denote nothing more serious than a passing gust of anger; and we refuse to believe that he will find it beyond his skill both to maintain the honour and to do the will of England. At least, it will be time enough to consider the demands for an autumn session when we hear his reply to the deputation from the City.]—*T. Sept. 19th.*

The City meetings of yesterday were Indignation Meetings in very truth. The reports thereof yield nothing but cries of anger and impatience, together with some political doctrine which in calmer times would itself arouse indignation. The meeting would listen to denunciation only, and its most favoured speakers had nothing else to deliver themselves of. The only utterances which pointed in any degree to practical conclusions were in favour of an alliance of England and Russia to settle the Eastern Question by a rearrangement of the Turkish Empire—a purpose which, if carried out, would, according to every probability, mean war from one end of Europe to the other. Six months ago such a suggestion would have been thought mad. It is no less mad because the Turks have committed crimes in Roumelia, however cruel, dastardly, and vile.—*P. M. G. Sept. 19th.*

e. Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, Sept. 27th.—The deputation to present the resolutions passed at the meeting was received on September 27th by Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, Lord Beaconsfield having declined to be present. It was introduced by the Lord Mayor.

The Lord Mayor said :—

The feeling of that meeting was very strong indeed, and the spirit of the meeting was really this, that the old foreign policy of England with regard to Turkey and the East was no longer tenable—(cheers)—and they resolved that they would ask the Government of the day, backed by the strong and powerful expression of public opinion, to attend to the voice of the people as far as possible.

Mr. J. G. Hubbard said :—

The Committee felt great confidence that the Government would persevere in the course of justice, which, they gather from the public prints day by day, they had inaugurated for the settlement of this great crisis. But the Committee felt that it must be an assistance to her Majesty's Government to be acquainted with the strong feeling which pervaded the whole country upon this important crisis in European policy. (Hear, hear.) If he might venture briefly to describe the points to which that feeling led, they were these: That this country required a policy which would bring immediate relief and permanent security to the suffering Christians of the East—(hear, hear)—and it was in that view that public feeling, as it had been evinced throughout the country, showed a remarkable concurrence upon one or two points. The first was that that portion of Turkey which might roughly be described as lying north of the Balkan should be absolutely emancipated from the Turkish rule—(loud cheers)—that it should be provisionally occupied by the combined Powers of the mediating countries, and be made subject to Turkey only by virtue of a sovereignty expressed by an annual tribute.

Mr. J. J. Merriman said :—

This movement, if it might be so called, was perfectly unique in one respect. It proceeded from no party and no organisation. One man of no special influence put out a circular addressed to a few friends, and opened his office to receive signatures to a requisition. That requisition at once divested the movement of everything like a party aspect. Within five or six days 800 signatures of men of more than average respectability, and very many of them of men of commanding position in the City of London, were attached to that requisition. When it was presented to Sir Robert Carden he (Mr. Merriman) explained that if it had been held over a few days longer the 800 would have been swollen to 8,000; and Sir Robert Carden, estimating the feeling of the City of London accurately, said, "Yes, and if the working men of London were asked to sign, he had no doubt the number would be increased to 80,000." (Hear, hear.) . . . He should be wanting in candour if he did not frankly state to his lordship that there was an attempt made to fasten upon the Guildhall meeting a party character. The day before the meeting a circular was sent out calling upon the Conservative party to "come and show their accustomed discipline." (Laughter.) The worst electioneering devices were resorted to, but, he was happy to say, with total and significant failure. There was an amendment proposed at the meeting, but it received only about 80 votes in an assembly of 4,000 people. There was no desire on the part of any section of the committee, let alone the committee as a whole, to seek the removal or even the embarrassment of the Government. They desired certainly to have from his lordship a clear, frank exposition of the policy of the Government. (Hear, hear.) They asked that his lordship would place himself at the head of the opinion and earnest feeling of the country—(hear, hear)—and the men who convened the City meeting, the committee, and that great body of requisitionists to a man, would give him the most earnest and loyal support—(cheers)—if they found that policy in accordance with the wishes of the people of England. (Cheers.) Speaking representatively, he hoped and trusted, he implored his lordship to tell them as nearly as he possibly could, what his policy was. (Hear, hear.) Let them have, broadly if he pleased, but definitely, a statement of that policy, and let them hope that at the last moment they would not be disappointed in finding that that was not the policy which pervaded the public mind at the present time, and which had wrought the deep sympathy of the English people up to a point of fervour and enthusiasm such as certainly had not been witnessed for the last thirty, forty, or he might say fifty years. (Hear, hear.)—*Deputation to Lord Derby, Sept. 27th.*

Lord Derby in his reply, dealt chiefly in minimising criticism. As to calling Parliament together, Parliamentary approval, or the

reverse, of concluded negotiations would be as well pronounced in February as in November.

If, on the other hand, the object of summoning Parliament is to give an influence and a direction to negotiations in progress, (hear, hear,) then you will excuse me for saying that, taking the very earliest date which would now be possible, you would still very likely be too late.

[A state of things so grave, that the public might rightly desire that Parliament should be summoned for its discussion, and the Government be willing to take that course as tending to strengthen their hands, might conceivably arise, but was not probable.] I do not think you will see either the general peace of Europe disturbed, or the whole fabric of the Turkish Empire broken up. (Cries of "Oh!") . . . The American war, and the war between France and Germany were considerably more important, if I may venture to say so, than what is passing now. (Cries of "No!") But the real question is, What do you want us to do? ("Hear, hear," and cheers.)

He proceeded to pass in review, various plans which had been put before the public. He need mention only to put aside the "plan of simply washing our hands of the whole affair."¹

I say nothing of what might happen at Constantinople, because I know that, at this moment, for an English Minister to talk of "English interests," in connection with the Eastern Question is to use a very unpopular phrase. [It was enough to say the policy was not practicable. The proposal to turn the Turks as a governing power altogether out of Europe, leaving them a nominal suzerainty and fixed tribute but nothing more, is a plan which had "undoubtedly found wide and general acceptance in this country, and has been eagerly, and even vehemently supported by many eminent persons." But why is an arbitrary geographical line to be drawn, and the claims of the Christians in the Asiatic provinces ignored? Moreover] you cannot, as reasonable men, suppose that the Government of the Porte will commit political suicide. You cannot suppose that it would willingly and without resistance allow itself to be turned out of Europe. (Hear, hear.) Very well, then, you are in that case driven to use force. (Hear, hear, and a Voice: "We do not object.") You do not object? (Cries of "No, no.") So I thought, you do not object; but who is to do it? (A voice: "Russia.") Who will be with you? I can tell you who will be against you. There is at least one European Power which I have no doubt would resist, even at the cost of war, the substitution of a Slavonic for a Turkish State. (Cries of "Name.") France, Germany, and Italy would look on. A voice just now, when I said, Who will help you? answered "Russia." The Russian Government has never proposed any

¹ Lord Derby connected this with Mr. Lowe's name. See *post*, chap. xiii. § 3, for Mr. Lowe's disclaimer.

change so sweeping. . . . I confess that I look upon that plan of complete autonomy—a plan, that is, of the creation of a fresh group of tributary States, as one outside the range of practical politics. (Cries of “No, no.”) There is not a single Government—whatever its sympathies and whatever its ideas—there is not a single Government in Europe which has at any time proposed or entertained that scheme, and if I were now to propose it, I am convinced that I should stand alone. (Cries of “No, no,” and a voice, “Try it.”) . . . But allow me to point out that there is a very wide difference between rejecting, as I do reject, that particular proposition as impracticable, and saying that things are to remain as they were and as they are. (Hear, hear, and loud cheers). It is quite possible, while rejecting the idea of political autonomy, to accept the idea of local or administrative autonomy. (No.) I do not particularly like the phrase. It is not an English phrase; it is very vague and elastic in meaning, and for my own part I much prefer the plain English phrase of local self-government. (Hear, hear.) But I take the word as I find it, and I think in that direction we may look for a possible and practical solution. (No, no.)

Towards the end of his speech, Lord Derby let fall a sentence which the *Times*¹ regarded as the most important in the whole speech, and one which the Turkish Ministers could not too attentively study.

I do not at all wish to disguise the fact that what has happened in Bulgaria has, to a certain extent, changed the position, not only of our own Government, but of every European Government in regard to Turkey and the East of Europe.—*Lord Derby*, Sept. 27th.

The deputation retired, and proceeded to consider Lord Derby's reply:—

Mr. M'George then moved the following resolution: “That the reply of Lord Derby this day to the deputation, in presenting the resolutions passed at the meeting held in Guildhall, is unsatisfactory, and that the policy enunciated by the Foreign Minister does not represent the convictions of the British people.”

Mr. Hubbard, M.P., could not agree with the terms of the resolution, and for that reason begged to withdraw from the meeting. He heartily sympathised with the object of the movement, but thought it was far better they should endeavour to work with the Government rather than be antagonistic. Lord Derby had produced four or five separate propositions which he conceived to have been presented to the Government, but had never told them what his own policy was. (Oh, oh.)

Mr. E. Kimber seconded the resolution, which was unanimously carried, *Mr. Hubbard*, the only dissentient, having in the meanwhile left the room.

¹ Sept. 29th.

Dr. Abbott moved, and *Mr. Lawrence* seconded, the following :
 "That this meeting is of opinion that the present agitation must be continued and enlarged, in order that the country may not be allowed to be committed by Her Majesty's Ministers to a policy which cannot issue in a permanent peace."

This resolution was carried, as also was one with respect to the early assembling of Parliament.—*Report in D. T.* Sept. 28th.

Lord Derby's words were everywhere eagerly canvassed, and compared with the speech which Lord Beaconsfield had delivered at Aylesbury a few days previously:—a speech which will be alluded to in connection with the new development which Opinion was beginning to undergo.¹ Grave discrepancies were noted, which shook men's confidence in the Cabinet as a body agreed upon a policy capable of coherent explanation.

"One of the Deputation" wrote to the *Times* to explain why he and many others felt it to be impossible immediately to suspend the present agitation.

[He refers to the discrepancy between Lord Beaconsfield's statement, that the English Government reverted to the position occupied before the Servian war, and Lord Derby's admission that its position towards Turkey had been changed by what had happened.]

Again, Lord Derby, in his reply to us, used these words:—
 "No decisive success having been obtained on either side, both parties may fairly and honourably treat the matter as a drawn game." He proceeded to illustrate the importance of this point by remarking that, otherwise, concessions could have hardly been asked from Turkey. But he was interrupted. A voice near me said, in a low whisper which penetrated the whole room, "Crushed." Not a word more was said; not a sound of applause was uttered, but everybody felt that everybody else understood perfectly what was intended. We were all thinking of the after-dinner speech at Aylesbury and of the wonderful utterance of Lord Beaconsfield:—"Turkey was triumphant; she had crushed these ungrateful subjects of the Suzerain."

If we cannot trust the Government for its own sake, can we trust its policy? I fear not at present. . . . The question of course turns, as you have repeatedly pointed out, entirely on the meaning of the word "autonomy." But here a little significant remark dropped parenthetically by Lord Derby, and not, I think, contained in your report, made a great impression on many of the deputation. After expressing his preference for the "plain English phrase of local self-government," he added, "You all know what that means." Yes, we felt we did all know what that meant; but it did not mean what we wanted.

¹ See *post*, chap. xiii. § 3.

Your report states that when Lord Derby put the question to the deputation, who would be with England in her policy of giving genuine political autonomy, a voice answered "Russia." It is my impression that more than one voice made that answer. I believe that many others feel that the right policy for England is to seize this opportunity of laying aside her antagonism to Russia and of coming forward in the new attitude of joint protector with Russia of the interests of the Christian populations in Turkey. Lord Derby threatens us with a war from Austria. Some may venture to doubt whether the Magyar interests would be powerful enough to drive Austria into a war, discreditable certainly to her, and possibly dangerous; but, be that as it may, a transient and delusive peace may be dearly bought at the cost of a terribly increased war a few years hence. Amateur politicians must not venture to dispute with great statesmen on matters of political detail. But common sense might teach us that there is such a thing as borrowing peace at compound interest.

In conclusion, we would beg the Government to be more explicit if it has anything really satisfactory to say. We all alike, Liberals and Conservatives, misunderstood the intentions of Her Majesty's Ministers when they sent the British fleet to Besika Bay; how do we know that we are not misunderstanding them again?—*One of the Deputation in T. Sept. 30th.*

I scarcely think it possible to exaggerate the profound dissatisfaction with which Lord Derby's last speech will be received by all who care for the future of Bulgaria. We now know that, whatever reforms and guarantees his lordship will recommend, he will not recommend that administrative autonomy which is the only real reform and the only effectual guarantee. We now know that the erection of Bulgaria into a fresh tributary State is "outside the range of practical politics" to the present Government as at present advised.

It is something, at least, to have the issue between the public and the Government brought to a clear, intelligible point; for, if I am not mistaken, the one thing which Lord Derby will not do is the one thing which the great majority of that public wish to have done, and will have done. What tribute may be imposed, what suzerainty may be retained, are matters of indifference; but Turkish rule must cease where these Turkish atrocities have been committed. [With reference to the objection that autonomy could not be confined to certain districts] Lord Derby has answered himself. Unless he means his local reforms to extend through the Turkish Empire, he must have some definite area in view for them. Let him propose tributary independence within the same area, and the present agitation will die away in praise and gratitude. Few of those who most unwillingly put themselves forward in this matter have any wish for a change of Government; and any meeting of Parliament would most likely, as Lord Derby points out, be too late to do any good.—*Prof. E. C. Clark, in T. Sept. 30th.*

If Lord Derby was reticent, it was certainly from no want of invitation to speak out ; for seldom has less measured language been addressed to an English Minister. The Lord Mayor gave a clear and impartial account of the temper displayed in the City Meeting, as well as of the Resolutions which it passed. Some other speakers became unpleasantly dictatorial even at the moment when they said that nothing could be further from their minds than a wish to dictate. One was so indiscreet as to menace the Government with an outburst of something more violent than verbal indignation if it should not change its course ; and another so far forgot that the courtesies of life should govern even a Deputation as to denounce to the Foreign Secretary some words recently spoken by the Prime Minister. . . . There are real objections to Mr. Gladstone's plan—objections which would be insuperable unless it were accompanied by other provisions for the maintenance of order ; and, if Lord Derby correctly interprets the determination of all the Great Powers, there are also political causes, which, for the present at least, make it perfectly impracticable. The Porte, he said, would not withdraw its officials from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, save at the bidding of compulsion. It would have been more correct to say that the Porte would not do so save at the united dictation of the Great Powers. The Porte would withdraw its officials even from Bulgaria if all the Great Powers were to say to it, in Mr. Gladstone's phrase, "You must." But Lord Derby assures us that such a joint command is out of the question. [He became much more vague on the subject of his own proposals. Until we have the precise character of the "local self-government" which he would apply, we practically know nothing of his schemes. Taking his own statement of the essential aims, certain securities are essential too. If both Mahometan and Christian could appeal from local injustice to a body composed of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers, the pressure of European civilisation would gradually be brought to bear on every detail of Turkish administration. The desideratum is to systematise the present method of putting pressure on the Porte by vesting the power in a regularly constituted and permanent body. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's experience has taught him that a bridge might so be built between the present and the future.] At all events local "self-government" will be the idlest of mockeries if applied merely by Turkish officials in Turkish ways, and the time has passed when mockeries of justice in Turkey could be safely tolerated even by Europe itself.—*T.* Sept. 28th.

The country has the diplomatic situation unrolled like a map before it, and those who continue an unpatriotic agitation henceforward must meet facts with facts, and plans with counter-plans. Vague declamation and loose political chatter have come to an end, with the simple exposition of events and views which was yesterday imparted ; for the limits of what is practical now stand marked with a sure hand by Lord Derby, and it is inside these that sensible men will think and act. . . . In answer to those

who propose to coerce the Porte. Lord Derby quietly explained that, so far from finding allies in this new crusade, one Power at least besides Turkey would stake its last florin and soldier against such an effort, while Russia has never countenanced so violent a solution, which would by no means suit her policy. These solid facts, which come from well-informed lips, will furnish eminently useful meditations to those who have been saying that we had only to "agree with the Powers" in order to make an immediate end of the Ottoman rule. If so desperate and iniquitous a policy could be even contemplated as the violent extrusion of the Sultan from his dominions, guaranteed to him by treaties as solemn as any extant, we should have to wage war on Islam with no allies, and with at least one certain opponent among the Powers. . . . The intelligence just received of Prince Milan's timid and helpless surrender of his Government to the dictation of Tchernayeff, and the infamous infraction of the truce, seems to present a new situation: but Servia must obey if the Powers command. In that case the programme holds. The *status quo ante* therefore as regards the actual conflict, and "local self-government," as a means of reform, in the European provinces—such are the bases of the policy of conciliation and amelioration which the English Foreign Minister explained to the deputation as that which he had successfully supported. . . . If Europe secures what is indicated by the programme still, as we must trust, approaching a happy acceptance, it gains a remarkable development in the Eastern Question, and the victims of the recent horrors have not suffered in vain; nor will the generous voice of the English people have been idly raised. If more is demanded than international justice admits or rival interests allow, we part with the great principle of gradual solution in the Eastern Question, and the price of our impatience must be war, costly, dubious, and dreadful. The British nation now know as much almost as the profoundest statesman, and we believe their response to this official explanation will be that of a reasonable and patriotic community.—*D. T.* Sept. 28th.

[Can the deputation be for an instant regarded as representing the City of London commercially, industrially, or in point of personal repute and influence?] The pretension is of course absurd in the eyes of Londoners, but use is being made none the less of such fictions by Pansclavic schemers. . . . For us at home it is enough to see the divergence between Mr. Merriman's language and that of Mr. George Potter and the Trades Unions, to be assured that the kind hearts of the English working people have not really affected their brains. . . . [To those who differ from them the writers say] Your policy may be the right one; but—make no mistake about it—it is a war policy, and its inevitable upshot would be a conflict, beside which the Servian and Turkish struggle is dwarfed into utter insignificance.—*D. T.* Sept. 29th.

§ 6. *The Pro-Turkish Press.*

Although the weight of Public Opinion thrown for the "violet" policy was overwhelming, the "red" notions were by no means extinct. Though it is true a discordant note was occasionally struck, speaking broadly, the opposing voices were hardly heard upon the platform, but it was far otherwise in the press.

The *Economist*, almost the sole advocate of abstention, deprecated alike the enthusiasm which might lead this country improvidently to subject itself to new and onerous responsibilities, and the anti-Russism which would engage England's responsibility for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

[The moral effect produced by the history of the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria has been rarely paralleled in this country. While foreign critics, who generally miss the point of popular movements in England, are declaiming against the English Government as the protector and patron of the Turk, the real danger is not that England may plunge into war or involve herself in diplomatic meshes in defence of the Ottoman Government, but that she may be forced into a military or political intervention, abounding in risks and responsibilities, for the humiliation or subjection of the Turks as a penal measure to satisfy the boiling anger and indignation of our countrymen. We trust so injurious and ill-considered an impulse will be resisted as well by the leaders of the Liberal party as by the Conservative Ministry.]—*Economist*, Aug. 18th.

[We had better run the risk of letting Russia or any other competitor obtain Constantinople than give a complex series of binding promises to prevent it. We can estimate the risk of harm from Russia, or from any one else possessing Constantinople, but we cannot in the least foresee or estimate the loss which the wars necessary to keep the promises might cause us. Nor is it likely now that Russia would ever be allowed to obtain Constantinople. A saying of Mr. Cobden has come true, which no one believed when he said it, and which, right as he has proved, scarcely any one would have been then warranted in believing. It is to that "great educated nation—Germany—that we must look to defend Europe against Russia." We cannot, therefore, think Lord Derby to be wise in wishing to use English power and give English guarantees to uphold the present form of things in European Turkey, any more than we think Mr. Gladstone to be right in wishing to use English power and give English guarantees to create a new form there.]—*Economist*, Sept. 6th.

The pro-Turkish journals, bowing to the blast in their expression of feeling about the atrocities, were far indeed from

abandoning their advocacy of the "red" policy; but, meeting the exigencies of the time, presented it in a somewhat modified form.

The question of actively defending Turkey fell a little into the background, and the legalistic notion was urged that she must be allowed to reap the full fruits of her victory over Servia.

The accusations against the agitation which were afterwards so vehemently reiterated¹ began to be brought. The agitation was disparaged (even in the act of flattering it) as mere "sentiment." The antithesis between this and our "policy" was insisted on, and our "policy" was represented as something too sacred to be changed in obedience to a mere "sentimental" impulse.²

Again, the cry was raised that the agitation was an attempt to fasten the responsibility of the massacres on the Government in order to embarrass them for party purposes.

The *Standard* cannot too strongly protest, in the name of humanity itself, against attempts to engage the sympathies of the British public on the side of one of the combatants.—(Aug. 8th.)

The *Post* deprecates mediation, at all events until the war has arrived at some decisive issue; and says Servia must be regarded first as a rebel, next as a wanton aggressor, and thirdly as ungrateful for benefits bestowed spontaneously upon her by Turkey. This quarrel ought not to be patched up only to break out afresh when it suited the convenience of the aggressors; it should be fought out now once for all. There is absolutely nothing to warrant any interference unsolicited or objected to by Turkey.—(Aug. 10th.)

The extreme section of the Liberal party has shown itself disposed to make vigorous partisan use of the atrocities perpetrated by the irregular soldiery of the Turks in suppressing the Bulgarian insurrection. . . . The sentimentalists without responsibility who sit below the gangway say we ought at once to break off all connection with the accursed thing. . . . Against so sudden and causeless a perversion of English policy we feel assured this country would, if necessary, protest with emphasis. The interests we watch and guide in the East are too momentous to be shifted about as if they were pawns on the political chess-board. We may change our policy on a deliberate calculation; but it would be discreditable to do so in the spasms of even a just and natural indignation at acts of savage cruelty for which we have no shadow of responsibility.—*P. M. G.* Aug. 10th.³

There has been for some time a real danger that popular feeling, stimulated by the hideous details of slaughter and outrage

¹ *Post*, chap. xiii. § 7.

² For a protest against this view of our "policy" see *Times*, Sept. 5th, quoted *ante*, p. 402.

³ Art. "Atrocities and Policy."

. . . may precipitate some act of national rashness that no Ministry could resist or guide. . . . We have to make a choice between the extravagant indulgence of sympathy and the maintenance of a policy any departure from which the country, in its after mood of sobriety, would be sure to disapprove. We do not say, and Mr. Disraeli does not say, that our sympathies are misdirected, but that they should not be allowed wholly to overmaster the judgment and carry our actions away helplessly captive.—*P. M. G.* Aug. 12th.

The Hackney politicians, under the guidance of some old practical agitators, have the credit of being the first to burst through the sham of these atrocity protests, if not of showing us the true character of this movement. They protest, not idly against the Turks, but, with a shrewd eye to business, against Her Majesty's Government.—*St. Aug.* 31st.

By and by it will be found that this [general loathing of the Turks] may have serious consequences for ourselves (who happen to be more indignant than any other people), and may even place the fortunes of the empire in jeopardy. It is for that reason, and not from any hardness of heart, that we view with distress the signs and tokens of the hour. Therein we seem to differ from some other public writers. They like the idea of a grand moral European war to avenge the sufferings of Bulgaria: frankly, we do not. . . . The anxiety of good men to outdo each other in the madness of indignation continues.—*P. M. G.* Sept. 2nd.

The *Post* says there can be no doubt that the excitement in England regarding the "atrocities" in Bulgaria is spreading fast and wide. On every side there are signs of anti-Turkish feeling. It is positively astounding, however, to find the people of England nursing their wrath until it threatens to overleap all bounds, and to swallow up impartial justice, sound judgment, the discrimination of national danger, and the policy handed down by truly English statesmen, for which England has toiled and fought with all her might.—(Sept. 6th.)

[There are three particular charges brought against the friends of the Christians in Turkey by the Mahometan newspapers of London, which influence some Liberals and a good many waverers. These charges are, that it is unfair to protect Serbia when she has been beaten in war; that to punish Turkey for outrages on civilisation, though possibly justifiable in itself, is a "sentimental policy"; and finally—that Turkey is a Power entitled to suppress her own insurrections in her own way.]—*Spec.* Aug. 26th.¹

[There are two fallacies exercising a certain authority upon the minds of men so as to prevent that unanimity which would otherwise characterise English opinion on the Eastern Question. They are accepted by a minority of our countrymen, and would be powerless to check the resolution of the mass of the nation; but it is not the less desirable that they should be removed, so that we

¹ Art. "The Catch-words of the Mahometan Press."

may all be of one mind. The first is that Turkey is an independent member of the European system, just as Russia, Austria, or Germany is. The second fallacy is perhaps more insidious. It is thought that to maintain unabridged the authority of the Porte throughout the Ottoman Empire is, in the interests of England, an essential condition of every peace to which we could be a party.]—*T. Sept. 5th.*

Nothing in the present controversy is more remarkable than the all but insane vehemence with which the English advocates of Turkey are writing, now that the support of England is slipping away from their client for ever. One journal of undoubted ability has calmly laid down the moral proposition, that in imparting to the British Government a share of responsibility for the infamies in Bulgaria, some opponents of Turkey have been guilty of as great wickedness as the Turkish Government, "in permitting those atrocities to go unpunished."¹ When the *Pall Mall Gazette* could print such a piece of stupendous silliness, it is clear that even the cooler and more intellectual of the English Mahometans have momentarily lost the command of their wits. It is less surprising to find in a very unintellectual quarter indeed the theory—so far as we can fish any theory out of muddy and mendacious "gush"—that the Bulgarians have been massacred and outraged through the operation of a vast Muscovite conspiracy, chiefly planned by General Ignatieff, to mislead England.—*Spec. Sept. 9th.*²

§ 7. *The Daily Telegraph.*

The newspaper to which the *Spectator* alluded, in its article entitled "English Mahometans," is evidently the *Daily Telegraph*;³ and the course pursued by that journal presents us with a political phenomenon so peculiar as to be well worthy of separate consideration. The possibility of the existence of influence such as that exerted by the *Daily Telegraph* would form a section in a discussion on what, to adapt J. S. Mill's phrase, might be called "Infirmities and Dangers of Government by Newspapers." No one would desire that newspapers should have the functions of pioneering and formulating the Public Opinion by which the country is to be governed, without an assurance that these functions would be performed under the deepest sense of public responsibility.

It would be dangerous to admit that even a responsible statesman could ever be allowed to set himself to sophisticate the opinion he cannot fairly combat, or safely disregard. To do so, would be to admit the supposition that there are times when the sovereignty of Public Opinion must fall into abeyance, and when a nation, like

¹ Compare this with Lord Beaconsfield at Aylesbury. *Post*, chap. xiii. § 3.

² Art. entitled "English Mahometans." See *ante*, p. 164.

³ Compare "Betsy Frig's Soliloquy," *Punch*, Dec. 23rd, 1876.

a man raging in a delirium or paralysed by terror, must, for its own good, be delivered over to the personal authority of one wise enough and strong enough to perceive the path of safety and lead it along that way.

But a newspaper has no personal authority, save either such as it derives from confidence in the soundness of the judgment of those who conduct it, and their ability to obtain the data on which opinion is to be built, or else the authority due to the faithful expression of the conclusions of a large body of floating opinion. The general understanding about a newspaper is that it has a certain platform and a certain constituency; it stands or falls (so far as it depends on its political side) in accordance with the popularity of the opinions it holds and the ability with which they are expressed. The influence of its leading articles depends largely, like that of a sermon, on a tacit belief in the sincerity of the person who utters them. The public confidence is based on a supposition that there are no hidden bye motives;¹ that the facts and materials on which a newspaper professes to base its opinion are the real ones—and that it presents the case it builds upon them fairly.

The position of the *Telegraph* was peculiar. It ranked as a Liberal organ, but the *Pall Mall Gazette* quite early spoke of it as

a newspaper which now seems to be the official organ of the present Government, as it was of the last, and doubtless will be of the next.—(June 28th.)

And, again, the *Spectator* alluded to it as a paper

which has often a very accurate knowledge of the wishes of dominant persons in the Tory Cabinet.—(July 1st.)

Its circulation was immense; it was doubtless accepted as political Mentor by vast numbers of people, and it was understood, in a somewhat vague way, to aim at making itself the organ of the opinion of its constituency, in the sense of giving expression to it.

Such was the journal which, at this juncture, employing all the arts of insinuation and innuendo, did its best, as Antony before the Roman mob, to sophisticate and beguile opinion, until the time should come when the mask could be thrown aside, and a policy of war for Turkey openly advocated. No doubt they were honestly convinced in their own minds that the adoption of Mr. Gladstone's policy would be ruinous to the country; but, as afterwards appeared, the proprietors of the paper claimed the right to treat it as a purely

¹ Compare the case of the money articles in newspapers. It is manifest that confidence in them would be destroyed by any suggestion that the proprietors were interested in raising or depressing certain stocks.

commercial enterprise, and to take whatever course they considered most advantageous to themselves, personally or pecuniarily, without incurring blame.¹

The *Telegraph* affected a peculiar style, rich in sounding phrases, useful occasionally to give a new and unexpected turn to some thought that had already won popular acceptance.

He seemed
For dignity composed, and high exploit :
But all was false and hollow ; though his tongue
Dropt manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels :
. Yet he pleased the ear,
And with persuasive accent thus began.

The *Telegraph* ranked itself as a Liberal paper ; what reason, other than pure patriotism, should it have in deprecating an attack on a Government to which, in party politics, it was opposed ? why should not any advice it might tender to the supporters of the Agitation have all the weight allowed to friendly counsel ? such were its representations.

Its writers acknowledged the horrors of the Atrocities—"proved far too completely for the credit of mankind, though not so copiously

¹ See the criminal prosecution of Messrs. Labouchere and Wyman for an alleged libel, published in *Truth* of Oct. 9th, 1879, on Mr. Lawson, of the *Daily Telegraph*. Mr. Labouchere wrote in the incriminated article :—"So long as you publish articles in which you speak of yourself as 'the nation,' so long shall I continue to inform the public who the person is that arrogates to himself the right to speak with grandiose impersonality as the representative of the entire country." The defence substantially amounted to this :—That it was to the public advantage that it should be made manifest what were the motives and what the real weight to be attached to the articles in the *Daily Telegraph*. Mr. Labouchere charged the editors with currying favour with the members of successive Administrations for the purpose of getting information, and in his speech at the trial went on, "I said that the proprietors were large owners of Turkish bonds." Mr. Lawson did not deny that. "I did not make that a direct charge, but I submit that it is a very undesirable thing that a newspaper which has been so anxious in the interests of Turkey should have as its proprietors the persons who would most have profited if their views about English aid to Turkey had been carried out."

The Lord Chief Justice (Coleridge), in the course of his summing up, said :—"Whereas Mr. Labouchere had contended for the right of unveiling the personality of newspapers, Mr. Lawson said, 'You have no right to do anything of the kind ; this paper is a trade speculation carried on by the proprietors for their own benefit and written for those who like to read it.' Now I confess that I have great sympathy with Mr. Lawson's view, that journalists have a right to exercise their brains honestly in a way that is likely to attract readers. But I must say that in the passage set out from it in the plea there is an air of authority, an air of speaking for a great number of persons besides themselves, and, if the fact be that in such cases, we have two or three people writing what they think best for the purpose of selling the paper, it would be a very good thing were the view taken by Mr. Labouchere generally accepted." The jury were unable to agree upon a verdict and were discharged.—*Reported in the London papers*, March 19th-26th, 1881.

perhaps as some have been hoping.”¹ Their own correspondents as they were careful to point out,² had contributed to the body of the sad testimony. But then would come some reference to “atrocities mongers”³ or “the crafty trap set for England” by making her own Government responsible for these enormities into which “only blunderers or schemers will fall,”⁴ to “headstrong Circassians”⁵ or to the “unintended crime” and the “scoundrels” whom the necessities of the “hunted empire”⁶ employed. They commence the “comparison of atrocities,” and express surprise that not a word is said against the Montenegrins.⁷

They pose as demanding equal justice for Turkey and for her subject populations at her hands:—

Islam must be taught, even in its hour of agony, that the Koran must Europeanise its fierce pages but Constantinople has the right to warn ignorant and sensational moralists here, that the ruin of Turkey, and not her repentance and atonement, is what her enemies hope for as the result of these accidental atrocities.—(Sept. 4th.)

They seek, to use a familiar phrase, “to draw a red herring across the scent,” by calling for the punishment of individuals,⁸ and by urging the purely charitable side of the Agitation.

We go beyond the demands of Mr. Gladstone in calling for punishment upon the miscreants concerned in Bulgaria.—(Sept. 11th.)

They draw a distinction between the “moral” and the “political” question. It is the nation’s business to speak upon the one, that of the Government upon the other.⁹

If the accounts could be disproved to-morrow, they might be glad for the sake of humanity, but “we should lose a demonstration, which decisively clears the policy of Britain from the accusation of selfishness.”¹⁰

They speak as if Turkey had to perform an expiation of the crime, after which she might be restored to favour.¹¹ “It must drink to the dregs the cup of penitence.”¹² As for England, the Agitation

¹ Sept. 4th.

² Sept. 11th. Letters from Tatar Bazardjik and Constantinople, with narratives of atrocities, appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on Aug. 16th and Sept. 12th.

³ Sept. 4th.

⁴ Sept. 4th.

⁵ Aug. 12th.

⁶ Sept. 4th.

⁷ July 27th and Aug. 8th.

⁸ Mr. Gladstone, in his pamphlet, warns against being led away on a false scent:—“Do not let us ask for, do not let us accept, Jonahs or scapegoats, either English or Turkish. It is not a change of men that we want, but a change of measures.”—*Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 48.

¹⁰ Sept. 11th.

¹¹ Aug. 31st.

⁹ Sept. 6th.

¹² Sept. 4th.

is alluded to as if it were a sort of lustral rite, by which Englishmen had liberated their consciences, and were now free to renew their support of Turkey.¹

The "splendid and impassioned" address of Mr. Gladstone—"the chief of living Liberals"—had, they say, but one fault; he passed too lightly over "the deep gulf between sentiment and practice." They proceed to prophesy woe to the country if it forces on the Government a policy inspired by a weak humanitarianism, instead of a resolute but rational and just humanity.²

The ambiguity of the word "reform" affords an opportunity to obscure the distinction between the "red" and the "violet" policies.³ They are anxious for "good government"⁴ and "radical reforms";⁵ but they represent the Agitation as a movement for expelling the Turks from Europe or extirpating them like vermin,⁶ and they sneer at "the magic panacea of autonomy."⁷

During the height of the Agitation, not only did they pay compliments to it, but they bowed to the blast, and wrote in terms which amounted to the advocacy of a truly "violet" policy, if indeed, the "Commissioners" and "guarantees" of which they spoke,⁸ were intended to carry with them a real limitation of the Turkish power, and not merely to act as a screen for it. They talk of "reforms" which "must be placed under the guarantee of united Europe."⁹ And again—

If we obtain pacification and local self-government for these miserable people, we shall then be able to think with less sadness of the events which have produced so much and such honourable emotion.—(Sept. 20th.)

They "wholly applaud and heartily share" the honest outburst of English feeling.¹⁰ They protest that even if it hindered the efforts of diplomacy that would be no argument against its necessary utterance. But they go on to allude to those who day by day are advertising to the enemies of England that they trust soon to separate the nation from its Government.¹¹ They speak of their own

independent course, [in which] although obviously inspired by nothing except national considerations, it has been our ungrateful task to appear to stem a current of popular emotion which in all its honest manifestations was a true credit to the country, and

¹ Sept. 12th.² Sept. 11th.³ See especially Sept. 9th.⁴ Aug. 1st.⁵ Aug. 2nd.⁶ Aug. 31st.⁷ Sept. 8th.⁸ Sept. 9th.⁹ Sept. 9th.¹⁰ Sept. 12th.¹¹ Sept. 15th.

may be productive of happy results. The tide is changing now, however, without any abatement in the generous sympathies of the people, and we are rewarded at last by many signs that our arguments are understood and appreciated.—*D. T.* Sept. 16th.¹

Subsequently, as we shall see, the *Daily Telegraph* became clamorous in presenting a certain diagnosis of Public Opinion, and in claiming for the opinions which it declared to preponderate the right to predominance with regard to the course of the State.²

We have no means of ascertaining whether in this course the *Telegraph* was endeavouring faithfully to present to its readers a genuine conclusion arrived at from the information to which it had access, or whether, on the other hand, it was endeavouring to manufacture the Public Opinion which it loudly asserted already existed, and to claim for a fictitious Public Opinion the right to govern the course of the State.

But however this may be, one important consideration, at least, suggests itself. An organ which, as long as it acts spontaneously, performs a useful function, may lose all its virtue when the element of self-consciousness comes in. We have touched on the exalted functions which some writers have ascribed to the newspaper press,³ and we shall see how the great stream of Opinion, which manifested itself in the Great Agitation, and in leading which the *Daily News* was conspicuous, was, for a time, believed to have diverted the course of the Executive Government.⁴

If it should be the practice of the Constitution that the course of the State is to be guided in accordance with the preponderating Public Opinion as declared by the newspapers, it will never do for those who conduct newspapers to know the power intrusted to them, unless they recognise a standard of professional duty and honour no lower than that of an English judge, and unless they are fenced in by surroundings at least as efficacious to guard against any dereliction from it.

¹ See also *D. T.* Sept. 27th, *post*, chap. xiii. § 2.

² See *post*, chap. xvi. § 6, and chap. xvii.

³ *Ante*, p. 18.

⁴ Chap. xiii.

